Monday, April 04, 2011

Revolutions in the modern age are never only domestic developments, and Arab revolutions are no exception. The state is one of several building blocks in an international system. A revolution in one country is a sign of change, for better or worse, in one of these building blocks. It is likely to cause changes in the entire structure that other states cannot ignore.

Beyond this general rule, revolutions and interventions should be evaluated case by case. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt completed their initial phase of regime removal with minimal foreign intervention. Local political intervention was sufficient in both cases. But things are different in Bahrain and Libya.

Turmoil in Bahrain had a strong regional dimension from day one. Long-standing Iranian demands have rendered its fate a matter of regional and international concern for decades. Bahrain’s position on the frontier between the Arab-Sunni and Persian-Shiite worlds grants the conflict there additional regional significance.

Bahrain is a Sunni-ruled Shiite enclave in the heart of the Sunni Arab Middle East. Turmoil there jeopardizes the regional balance among states, nations and sects. Regional actors had no choice but to intervene in Bahrain. The uniqueness of the situation derives from the fact that regional allies of the government took the lead in the intervention.

The Gulf Cooperation Council proved to be the most effective and cohesive regional Middle Eastern bloc. Bahrain’s GCC allies demonstrated great resolve. The GCC intervention in Bahrain followed a comprehensive plan with political, economic, media and military dimensions. Contrary to the typical Western intervention, the GCC move aimed at defending the status quo and thwarting the challenge of the Shiite opposition. The GCC governments experienced no confusion regarding their goals – no conflict between ideological and pragmatic considerations – thereby saving them the hesitation and reluctance typically apparent in Western policy.

First, the GCC countries under Saudi leadership made a show of political support for the monarchy in Bahrain. They then committed generous financial resources to the troubled country. During all phases they employed media and propaganda resources to serve their purposes without being restrained by professional and ethical considerations. They directed Gulf-controlled media to play down the revolt in Bahrain. Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera, which proved to be very effective in promoting the cause of revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, were used to achieve the opposite outcome in Bahrain.

Pan-Arab media have been very effective in manipulating revolution around the region in past years. The role of media and propaganda wars in inter-Arab politics is as important as direct military intervention. This was proven by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, and is being proved again today.

When all media, financial and other passive instruments failed to restore stability in Bahrain, the GCC countries deployed military forces there. Even though Qatar did not take part in the military phase of the joint plan, it avoided disrupting GCC policy. The GCC countries operated as a coherent concert of autocrats determined to avert revolutionary change at any cost. This realist approach enhanced the countries’ chances of success. Their determination contrasted with Western confusion regarding the crisis.

Thus, the distinct nature of the conflict in Bahrain and the well-defined priorities of its neighbors facilitated effective intervention. At least in the short term, this has contained the conflict and allowed an opportunity for reconciliation. This is the exact opposite of the situation in Libya, where the conflict may yet drag and which may have more serious consequences for Libya’s neighbors. The absence of any credible regional institutions in North Africa similar to the GCC in the Gulf is conducive to further instability.

A lot of conflicting narratives have emerged from Libya. None is sufficient to shed light on the political dynamic underlying the conflict. The “National Council” in the forefront of the anti-Gadhafi forces has had little credibility in commanding opposition forces on the ground, which look like a broad and loose coalition of tribal and political groups, including a wide spectrum of Islamists. The obscure political structure in Libya may not allow for a clear outcome of the conflict, explaining initial Western and regional reluctance to intervene.

Western intervention in Libya is a product of both media and reaction to the atrocities committed by pro-Gadhafi forces. The unprecedented Arab League resolution demanding the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya neutralized any Western pretext not to intervene. The Arab League decision was made possible through the support of the GCC countries that apparently chose to sacrifice Moammar Gadhafi’s regime in order to protect theirs. Furthermore, rescue of civilians in Libya is a popular demand in almost all Arab countries, where governments chose to respond as a means of improving their position at home, with little consideration of the wider regional implications of foreign intervention in Libya.

The vague Western intervention strategy in Libya has reflected both great uncertainty regarding the political reality on the ground there and an effort to avoid military entrapment. While Western powers will strongly resist further involvement beyond the level of air assaults, Arab and perhaps African neighbors don’t have that luxury. Egypt, in particular, cannot avoid a role in the Libyan conflict. Even though it has adopted a low profile, Egypt’s involvement is likely to increase.

The hundreds of thousands of Egyptian laborers in Libya, kinship relations between the tribes of Egypt’s western desert and Libya’s east, and pressure from conflicting Libyan parties all beckon Egypt to get involved. Fairly credible reports of Egyptian and other militants pouring into Libya across the two countries’ border already exist. Prolongation of the Libyan conflict is conducive to consolidating the influence of militants in the eastern part of the country, a scenario that Egypt cannot long ignore. Egypt has to make serious choices in Libya even before fully recovering from the impact of the revolutionary upheaval it has just experienced.

Gamal A. G. Soltan is director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.