Michael Young

Iran and Russia may be dealing with a difficult situation in Syria as they defend the regime of Bashar Assad, but they can take solace in the fact that the Syrian president’s enemies are facing hard times as well. The Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia at their head, as well as Turkey are embroiled in conflicts, while an Arab stalwart, Egypt, is said to have sent arms to the Syrian regime.

The anti-Assad coalition was never the most solid of partnerships. For years, before cooperation was imposed, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar were working at cross purposes in Syria, each side backing certain opposition groups against others. This gave Assad crucial room to gain from his opponents’ divisions. It’s only when these rivalries were overcome that military progress was visible, for instance the takeover of Idlib this year by an alliance of forces calling itself Jaysh al-Fatah.

While unity continues to exist over Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been occupied with new priorities in recent months. The Houthi takeover in Yemen was viewed by the Gulf states as an Iranian-backed gambit in their backyard, leading to a Saudi-led Gulf military operation to push the Houthis back.

In Turkey, American support for Syria’s Kurds in their battle against ISIS led to an expansion of Kurdish-controlled territory. This heightened Turkish fears that an embryonic Kurdish entity in Syria would rekindle Kurdish separatist impulses in Turkey. The conflict between the Turkish army and the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which has influence over Syria’s Kurds, has gradually escalated. This week it culminated with a Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq, the first since 2011.

While all this has taken place, there have been reports that Egypt may have armed the Syrian regime. The sources for the information are not especially reliable, however there have been several signs that Cairo and Damascus are moving closer. Syrian rebels have published photographs of Egyptian-made rockets used in the attack by regime forces against Zabadani, while Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, while on a visit to Moscow in August, endorsed a Russian proposal for the formation of an anti-terrorism coalition that would include Syria.

These situations are further complicated by internal political dynamics in each country. In Turkey, the conflict with the Kurds may have been prompted by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s desire to reverse the consequences of the parliamentary elections last June. The ruling AK Party lost its majority in part thanks to a surge by the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP).

The outcome of the war in Yemen will have significance for the future of Saudi Arabia. The deputy crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, has, as defense minister, been closely associated with the Saudi-led campaign there, which is regarded as an effort to contain Iran’s influence. As several observers have remarked, a successful conclusion of the conflict could shake up power relationships in the kingdom to Prince Mohammad’s advantage.

As for Egypt, Sisi has been facing a growing domestic insurgency by militant groups, which has further damaged the already vulnerable Egyptian economy. Cairo’s support for Assad, if confirmed, could well represent an effort to undermine any prospect for a victory by extremist groups in Syria, which would have dire consequences for Egyptian security.

None of these conflict situations fundamentally threatens the efforts to bolster Assad’s enemies. But what they do is make the Syrian uprising much more complex to manage, as resources are diverted elsewhere and as relationships that had been thought solid are adapted to new circumstances. In contrast, both Russia and Iran, whatever their differences over Syria, share a common purpose in wanting to maintain Bashar Assad in place.

Meanwhile, the one country with the ability to impose some order on the anti-Assad coalition, the United States, has concerns of its own, even as its willingness to be rid of Assad is characterized by great ambiguity. Officially, the Obama administration has said it wants the Syrian president to leave office; but at the same time it does not want his exit to be so sudden, or so soon, that it might create a void that the extremists could exploit.

As CIA director John Brennan observed last March at the Council on Foreign Relations: “The last thing we want to do is to allow [ISIS and Al-Qaeda-linked groups] to march into Damascus.”

While the Obama administration will strenuously deny it, such anxieties have turned the Americans into de facto allies of the Assad regime under certain circumstances. That is why Russia and Iran have doubled down on Assad’s behalf. Both Moscow and Tehran see an opening to initiate a political process that, ultimately, could consolidate Assad rule. The Russians have been pushing again for the Geneva plan, but their view of the transitional government it calls for is aimed not at ousting Assad. Rather they want to divide the opposition and generate the critical mass required for an international consensus around a solution that imposes a cease-fire while leaving Assad’s fate vague.

With Europe and the United States focused on migrant issues and ISIS, the Russians and Iranians may feel, now is the time to make a move. And with Assad’s main regional foes entangled in wars of their own, their ability to block international momentum toward a settlement that favors the Syrian regime may be limited.

That may be the thinking at least. We will have to watch in the coming months whether Assad’s friends can turn the political tide in Syria to their advantage. To avoid that Assad’s enemies will have to triumph quickly in their own conflicts. The regime in Syria has always been good at profiting from the multiple fires that have been ignited all around the country.