Antoine Haddad

When the war in Syria began in 2011, and Syrians fled to Lebanon seeking refuge, many Lebanese held two contradictory illusions. Some expected a quick victory of the regime of President Bashar Assad, while others expected the regime to rapidly collapse. 

Regarding the growing numbers of Syrians in Lebanon, both groups reached the same conclusion, namely that within a few months the refugees would return home. Reflecting this belief in the temporary nature of the Syrian presence, and probably the common wish of most Lebanese, the newcomers were referred to as “displaced,” or “nazihoun” in Arabic, instead of “refugees,” or “lajioun.”

In four years, the number of Syrians in Lebanon has neared 1.5 million, tripling the number of Syrians who had been in Lebanon before the conflict. With already more than 500,000 Palestinians, Iraqis and other nationals living inside Lebanon, the country now hosts the highest number of refugees per capita in the world. 

A great deal has been said about this unprecedented displacement, its challenges and its impact on nearly every aspect of society, from security, the labor market, health, education, infrastructure and the vulnerable Lebanese sectarian balance. Many fears and concerns have been raised, but very little has been done to resolve them.

The so-called “distancing” policy declared by the previous Najib Mikati government dominated by Hezbollah failed to prevent the party from getting involved in Syria’s war. Yet it provided the government with the formal cover needed to entirely resign from its policy role. As a result, Lebanon was left with open borders allowing Syrians free access, no shelter policy of any kind and a firm rejection of setting up organized camps, fearing a repeat of the experience of Palestinian refugees.

This “laissez-faire, laissez-passer” approach resulted in the burgeoning of hundreds of substandard, unorganized settlements (informal camps, destroyed or unfinished buildings) across most of Lebanon, housing more than half a million refugees. These settlements do not meet the minimum standards of living and constitute a social and security time bomb for the host community. 

For basic services and food assistance, registered refugees are taken care of, mostly but insufficiently, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, along with other international agencies and a number of non-governmental organizations and charities. However, funding for these organizations is decreasing, while tension in many villages because of the Syrian presence in general and that of refugees in particular is rising, reflected in acts of discrimination that are sometimes carried out by municipal authorities or the local police.

Under the current government of Prime Minister Tammam Salam, not much has changed, despite the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan that the government launched in early 2015. The main development has been the imposition of entry restrictions on Syrians in or entering Lebanon, which has stabilized the number of registered refugees at around 1.2 million. 

This restriction has probably succeeded in curbing economic migration. Yet the problem remains, is likely to worsen, and may spin out of control if intensive clashes spread to the area of Greater Damascus, where the largest population in Syria resides. Under such a scenario, official restrictions at the border will be of no real value and Lebanon will face an unprecedented political, security and humanitarian crisis. Even if this is avoided, the Lebanese should plan to live with the refugee crisis for a long period of time.

Although this crisis was not necessarily predictable, it could have been managed and contained despite the Lebanese political divide. To prevent the spillover of war to Lebanon, the Lebanese protagonists agreed over the last 18 months to freeze – or at least soften – their dispute over several contentious issues, including the full military engagement of Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict. 

In my opinion, the management of the Syrian refugee issue could and ought to have been included in this arrangement. 

The reasons why this was not carried out is not due to a lack of awareness of the crisis and its implications and challenges or indeed of the tools and strategies of dealing with it. In fact, several workshops and seminars held recently established the eight main components of a possible consensual policy in this field.

First, control the flow of Syrians to and from Lebanon. There are already tight restrictions on newcomers from Syria. This needs to be complemented by contingency plans in the event of intensified clashes in the Greater Damascus area, such as establishing “safety zones,” “no-fly zones” and “humanitarian corridors” inside Syria with the assistance of the United Nations, as well as efforts to relocate Syrian refugees in other host countries.

Second, establish a clear legal distinction between the various statuses of Syrian nationals present in Lebanon. The great bulk of them are registered refugees, but many are migrant residents with (or without) work permits, and a lesser number of others are temporary visitors. This needs to be clarified to avoid double status for Syrians. The Lebanese authorities will also have to create their own register for Syrian refugees or agree with the UNHCR on criteria for registration, as well as maintain a database of all Syrian nationals living in Lebanon. These are basic tools and essential for any rational policy for the management of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Third, adopt a proactive sheltering policy for registered Syrian refugees, especially those living in substandard, anarchic settlements. After the failure of the current no-policy policy, the only available options vary between establishing organized collective shelters (allocated and supervised by the Lebanese authorities) and regulated individual sheltering (in private properties that the authorities would help locate for families who can pay rent), depending on the geographic area, needs, resources and the dynamics of displacement. 

Fourth, formulate a plan for the provision of basic services and other needs for refugees, mainly food, health and education. This plan should detail the quality of services provided and how to secure funding, especially from foreign sources. Education in particular has a unique strategic importance with relevance for security.

Fifth, organize the relationship between the Syrian workforce and the Lebanese labor market, assuming that officially registered refugees should not be entitled to work in Lebanon or benefit from both statuses. Moreover, priority should be given to Lebanese, then Syrians, with the focus on those sectors where the Syrian workforce can fill a gap, such as construction and agriculture.

Sixth, enhance programs that support host communities to mitigate the increased pressure on infrastructure and employment opportunities, with a focus on income-generating projects. Vulnerable villages and communities with limited resources should be prioritized.

Seventh, establish a fund-raising plan for the previous six points, and appeal to Arab and international donors by presenting them with transparent, detailed and professional proposals.

Eighth, empower a new ministry, public administration or ad hoc agency with executive powers to coordinate these intertwined policies and monitor their implementation under the supervision of the government.

Until now, the government has not seemed willing or interested in adopting such a comprehensive approach. The efforts that are being deployed by various ministries and agencies have had a limited impact so far, due to limited resources and prerogatives. The prevailing overall attitude is still a mix of complaint, accusation and denial. For instance, many officials frequently ask, “Why are we getting so little foreign support?” The answer is actually known by many. Unlike Jordan or Turkey, which suffer similar refugee issues, there is no serious policy in Lebanon to deal with the crisis. Moreover, there is no fully authorized body that is considered an interlocutor by the international community on refugee matters.

Lebanese officials can continue to pursue the present course if they wish and continue to attribute their failure to the lack of consensus within the government, which would be true. They could also continue to blame the international community for its lack of support, which is also true. The government can, moreover, consider that the official restrictions on the borders are sufficient to contain the crisis. But all this will neither stop the problem from increasing, nor prevent the refugee flow that might occur with any intensification of the violence in the area of Greater Damascus.

The other option is neither easy nor foolproof but it is necessary and urgent. That is to work seriously and swiftly on a comprehensive and inclusive national policy that would cater to common Lebanese interests, priorities and needs, regardless of the position of different Lebanese parties toward the war in Syria. Moreover, it is necessary to meet the needs of host communities and improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees, while preserving their dignity. The solutions and compromises that seem possible today might not be available in the future.