Rami G. Khouri

When Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi announced in late March after an Arab summit at Sharm al-Sheikh that leaders had agreed to create a “joint Arab military force” to respond to security threats in the region, the idea was greeted with skepticism across much of the Arab world. Now, after the chiefs of staff of the Arab armed forces met in Egypt to discuss the matter further without announcing the results of their deliberations, the idea still elicits great doubts.

The idea of a joint Arab military force indeed makes much sense, and could be a positive step for dealing with a wide range of security threats across the region. Yet doubt reverberates all around it because there is little confidence that the high-level decision-making mechanisms of the current Arab leaderships would allow this sound concept to be translated into reality in a manner that elicits widespread popular support and actually serves the security and well-being of Arab citizens.

For one thing, the manner in which such important issues are addressed is typical of the top-heavy, I-command-my-people-to-love-and-obey-me style of leadership and decision-making that defines the Arab world today, and has done for decades.

A serious issue such as his joint military force that could see Arab troops from different countries waging war inside other Arab countries, against a variety of potential foes, should be debated and decided upon in a wide consultative process that allows ordinary citizens as well as our most learned scholars and analysts to weigh in on the pluses and minuses of the idea.

Arab leaders can decide behind closed doors if they wish to agree to a unified technical standard for evaluating imported tuna fish packaging, or reciprocal protocols for postal service deliveries. But when it comes to a joint force that will fight and kill across the region, it would seem vitally important that the idea to be widely discussed and debated, so that a final decision benefits from a genuine consensus.

Two main operational problems seem obvious in such an idea. First, being a voluntary endeavor, this new Arab military force runs the risk of simply perpetuating the ideological, sectarian and other divisions that already plague the Arab world. So if those who join are the same countries that are now operating together under Saudi Arabian leadership in the war in Yemen, it is likely that their decisions to deploy to keep the peace or even to go to war would reflect these same countries’ ideological fears of Iran’s influence across parts of the Arab world. This is likely to heighten regional tensions rather than lower them.

Second, it will be difficult for the Arab states involved to collectively and sufficiently coordinate their military logistics, supplies, mechanics, equipment, training, communications and other technical aspects of their work to be able to engage in useful military action. That could mean that the main point of such a unified force is not necessarily to engage in active conflict, but rather more to function as a peacekeeping force whose presence on the ground in a conflict situation could reduce tensions and prevent an outbreak of active warfare.

Existing situations such as the expansion of ISIS clearly call for a joint Arab military response, because the group threatens many Arab countries simultaneously. The turmoil in Libya and Yemen, as in Lebanon in the 1970s, also cries out for a coherent response from Arab countries, but not mainly in the military sphere. Political and economic issues that threaten various Arab countries need as much attention as military and security issues, and in these realms Arab leaders have zero credibility.

So there is little to be hopeful about right now in the current talk of a joint Arab military force, because it brings together among the most destructive legacies of the modern Arab world: military men in power, making decisions by themselves, relying on military force to get things done, or just keep things quiet. The traditional Arab governments’ reliance on security responses to growing threats and tensions that are created by social, political, demographic, environmental and economic forces is likely to generate more stress and conflict, not less.

I understand the panic that strikes in the hearts of Arab leaders who fear the expanding influence of Iran in the region or the turmoil that could spread from Libya, Syria and Iraq. Perhaps this is the moment to ponder whether excessive reliance on militarism as a response to political and ideological disagreements and socioeconomic disparities is in fact the appropriate solution, or a cause of the problems we face.