By Cherine Chams El-Dine 

Student union elections in Egyptian universities have concluded in all governorates. This has created a 50-member national student union – a president and vice president from each of 22 public universities, two representatives from Al-Azhar University, and four representatives from private colleges and higher institutes – but one that still lacks a union president, vice president and executive bureau. Although the current student body is destined to be short-lived (the next elections come in October 2013), the results reflect the changing face of Egyptian politics, and have highlighted the sharp decline in the Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity – at least on campus. The elections – which began in March – are the first fair student elections in over a quarter century, ending the influence of state security. The only violations observed were relatively minor and included campaigning too close to voting stations. Although no official statistics were released, voter turnout was high, with students eager for “real” elections, and the process was peaceful. There were five rounds, starting at the level of each faculty, and building up to selection of a university-wide student union president and vice president, who then become members of the national student union.

 

In several universities, groups seeking to mobilize an anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition formed broad-based alliances – and in some cases included politically independent students. Creating a broad coalition appeared critical to competing with the coordination of Brotherhood groups. Most prominently, the “Students’ Voice” coalition at Helwan University brought together independents with students from the liberal Constitution Party and the Revolutionary Socialists. Another coalition, the “Fourth Part,” gathering students from Strong Egypt, the Constitution Party and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party – as well as independents – was formed at Cairo University against the Muslim Brotherhood.

 

Despite media attention, liberal forces are still nascent and new to campaigning; they lack the resources to match the Brotherhood’s electoral machine. They also tend to be preoccupied with national political issues and the course of the revolution – thus distracting them from the more mundane (yet crucial) concerns of students, such as textbook prices and improvement of dorm conditions.

 

Interestingly, Salafist groups did not throw their full weight into the elections – perhaps saving their energy for the elections in October, or simply because their discourse and style don’t really appeal to university students. Salafist candidates backed forces sympathetic to political Islam, such as Strong Egypt at Beni Suef University or similarly inclined independents at South Valley University. The only exception was Minya University, where they allied themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood along with Strong Egypt students.

 

These independent candidates were far from homogenous; they included those truly autonomous of any political movement as well as those participating in elections for the first time, but also students previously affiliated with Mubarak’s National Democratic Party– often referred to derisively by others as “security thugs” and “regime remnants.” Students from the Brotherhood in some places chose to enter the elections on shared slates with independents. At Minya University, where the Brotherhood did not carry on its own in the first rounds, Brotherhood-backed candidates entered into pacts in the last two rounds to be able to win the presidency.

 

In the face of strong competition and aware of the need to make further changes, students from the Muslim Brotherhood opted to revamp their electoral rhetoric, ditching names with religious overtones in favor of more inclusive ones: “Colors” (Ain Shams University), “Tomorrow will be Better” (Helwan University), “Dream with Me,” and “Girls and Boys Who Love Egypt” (Beni Sweif University). Some Brotherhood candidates were also pointedly self-effacing, hanging up election posters labeling themselves “The Oil and Sugar Distribution Center” – referencing the food handouts that Brotherhood parliamentary hopefuls used to win votes in the 2011 legislative elections.

 

Such tactics were met with derision from liberal and independent students, who likewise chose names for their own election slates as “For a Sheep-Free Union” (a reference to the Brotherhood’s alleged herd mentality) or “The Renaissance is Ours and May God Give Us Strength” – alluding to the ruling Justice and Development Party’s much-heralded (but as of yet unimplemented) “renaissance” project. Open antagonism toward the Brotherhood has been an integral part of campaigning among opposition groups and has sometimes proven sufficient to win.

 

The independents claimed the lion’s share in the students’ union with 24 seats out of 50. The Brotherhood took only 16, the revolutionary forces (Strong Egypt, the Constitution Party and the Life Makers) won 7, while a single seat went to Salafists. The two seats attributed to private colleges were left unfilled following students’ protests over the exclusion by ministerial decision of candidates from a number of foreign universities.

 

The independents’ headway reflects, partly, the Brotherhood’s poor performance nationally and their declining popularity. Also, a wider disenchantment with political parties endures, leading many students to renounce political affiliation – preferring instead the “stability” represented by independents. Whoever is able to control the national student union will be able to change the Students’ Chart (setting the rules for the different rounds of student union elections, emphasizing the union’s duties and the organization of students’ activities) approved by the prime minister in January 2013 (not the president, as stipulated in the University Regulation Law). The chart had been drafted and pushed through by Brotherhood-affiliated students without consultation with other groups or a student body referendum (the Brotherhood had taken control of the national student union in 2012, but with widespread election boycotts at the time).

 

The Brotherhood-backed regulations are flawed – some articles directly contravene the University Regulation Law, while others restrict rights and freedoms on campus. For example, Article 331 states that the union must be informed in advance of any student activity, and a two-thirds majority of members can veto any activity deemed contrary to “the union’s objectives” – open-ended wording allowing whichever political movement in control to censor students.

 

While the student union elections are supposed to take place within the first six weeks of the academic year, according to the Students’ Chart, the previous student union (dominated by Brotherhood members) insisted on scheduling these elections this late; their choice was backed by the Higher Education Ministry (also dominated by the Brotherhood). Some view this as an effort to add legitimacy to the flawed Students’ Chart. Others consider the rushed election as the result of a Brotherhood miscalculation. They might have bet on the repetition of 2012 scenario (low students’ participation and a boycott by liberal forces) to ensure victory.

 

Either way, the student union elections are viewed as a means of gauging support for the Brotherhood in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Moreover the decision on March 17 of the Universities’ Supreme Council to ban party activities on campus is considered by many a first step toward political neutralization of universities – a return to Mubarak’s-era practices that students will never accept.