Tony Badran

A curious news item has been circulating over the last week claiming that Russian warships have been sent to Syrian territorial waters. The Kremlin has so far refrained from either confirming or denying the story, leaving the door open for speculation. While the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad eagerly wishes to project the perception that it is under a Russian military umbrella, Moscow’s calculation is perhaps best understood in the broader context of its dispute with the US and NATO over what it views as an encroachment on its traditional zones of influence, well beyond Syria.

The report of the Russian flotilla supposedly entering Syrian waters was intended to give the impression that Russia was flexing its military muscle on Syria’s behalf. As one Syrian official boasted on Tuesday, “Russia is our political shield.”

The story first appeared last Friday in an obscure Lebanese rag belonging to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The report delivered the regime’s intended message, spinning the alleged Russian move as a stern message from Moscow that Syria was “a red line,” and that Russia would not “remain a spectator” should that line be crossed.

Interestingly, however, the Russian media were tellingly unable to substantiate the claim, instead relaying the statement by Navy Press Secretary Igor Dygalo that the Defense Ministry “do[es] not comment on these reports.”

There is little reason to suspect that the story originated from anywhere other than the Syrian regime. A Syrian news site eventually reported that “unnamed Syrian sources” had told the German Press Agency that Moscow “leaked the story of dispatching six warships to the Syrian coast as a form of tangible solidarity,” in response to the Arab League’s recent call to send observers to Syria, which the latter found unacceptable. At one level, therefore, the story was intended as a rebuff to the notion that the league’s resolution was the launching pad for an international intervention in Syria.

Delivering this response to the Arab League was the main purpose behind Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem’s press conference on Sunday. When asked about the report, Mouallem did not confirm it, and referred only to the naval maintenance facility in the port of Tartous and the relevant 1980 treaty between Syria and the former Soviet Union governing its use.

The reference to the Tartous facility was not accidental, and was meant to exploit a primary Russian interest in Syria at a time when tensions between Russia and the US and NATO continue to heat up.

Moscow’s sensitivity when it comes to access to warm waters is well known. It is matched only by its chronic defensiveness against perceived encirclement by NATO and Western impingement on the spheres of influence of the former USSR.

All these insecurities came to the fore in the midst of the Syrian crisis in June, when the US sent a Navy cruiser equipped with a ballistic missile defense system to take part in naval exercises with Ukraine in the Black Sea—home of Russia’s only warm-water naval base.

Then, Turkey gradually began moving away from its previous non-aligned position and more in line with US interests vis-à-vis Syria and Iran, agreeing to host NATO’s early-warning radar system over Russian objections. Now that Ankara has effectively adopted Washington’s objective of regime change in Syria, Russia’s concerns have intensified.

Turkey already controls the Bosphorus Strait—Russia’s passageway to the Mediterranean. If there was to be regime change in Syria, Russia calculates that Turkey’s sway there is likely to be significant, potentially making its access to the Tartous facility subject to the influence of a NATO member state. Naturally, the Syrian regime’s interest lies in amplifying these fears.

Of course, Moscow will not go to war for Assad, and NATO is not shying away from intervention in Syria out of fear of Russian warships. However, for the Kremlin, Syria is another arena where it can voice its displeasure with the perception that the US and NATO can simply ignore Russia. In a sense, the process is comparable to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s threats yesterday to deploy “advanced offensive weapon systems” on the borders with Europe if missile defense talks with Washington result in failure.

In similar fashion, Moscow is looking to negotiate over Syria’s future and wants to ensure that its interests are acknowledged and secured. Russia’s attempts to position itself as a sponsor of a dialogue between Assad and his opponents, and its meetings with the Syrian opposition groups, could be read as part of this negotiation effort.

However, aside from its veto power at the Security Council, Russia’s hand is relatively weak. Even if the warships report were real, it’s unclear how much of an impact it would have on the dynamics on the ground. With a population determined to rid itself of the Assad family, such a move risks being meaningless, if not potentially counterproductive. Perhaps that is why Moscow declined to confirm the Syrians’ story.

For Assad, however, desperate times call for desperate measures. Assad is eager to exaggerate his significance to Russia and to try and leverage its disputes with NATO in his war against the Syrian uprising. The information operation involving the Russian warships is part of this war, which Assad is losing.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.