Tony Badran

The attack by Syrian regime thugs on Turkish missions in Syria last Saturday has spurred a strong rebuke and warnings from Ankara. However, while this may have been the most open Syrian attack against Turkey, it certainly was not the first, or the most dangerous. For months now, the Turks have known that Damascus, in league with Tehran, is working with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against them. In Bashar al-Assad’s calculation, the PKK offers an instrument both to deter Turkey and to splinter the opposition to his rule.

Turkish media analysis and intelligence reports began focusing on this renewed relationship back in the summer, as the conflict between Ankara and the Kurdish group began heating up with increased PKK attacks. A consensus quickly emerged that the Iranians, who may have released the militant group’s acting leader after seizing him in the Kandil Mountains in August, were likely trying to pressure Turkey over its critical stance toward their Syrian ally.

After a deadly PKK attack against Turkish soldiers in late October, it was Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who pointed the finger at Damascus and Tehran, without naming them. The PKK, Erdogan said, “are subcontractors used by other forces and other powers, trying to provoke Turkish society.” Everyone knew who these powers were. “Without naming names, Tayyip Erdogan has pointed to Syria and Iran,” one Turkish columnist wrote.

A few days later, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was explicit. Syria “should think about the past and not even think about playing such a card,” he said, bluntly reminding Damascus of the 1998 precedent, when Turkey almost invaded Syria over its sponsorship of the PKK.

Assad’s game was recently detailed in a report in Le Figaro. Aside from threatening Turkey and “punishing” Erdogan, Assad also saw in the renewed relationship with the PKK an opportunity to exploit the mistrust of Syria’s Kurds toward both the Turks and the Syrian Arab opposition, especially the major groupings that had come together in conferences hosted by Turkey, such as the Syrian National Council.

According to the report, early in the uprising, Assad made an overture to the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK affiliate in Syria. Initially, Assad may have sought to enlist the Kurds in a coalition of minorities to bolster his regime. But Kurdish leaders, including the PYD, all refused to meet with him or to publicly come out in support of him.

The next best thing for Assad was to try and keep the Kurdish areas disengaged from the uprising, thereby avoiding having to open yet another front for his overstretched forces. He also sent a deadly message to any Kurdish leader willing to work with the opposition groups meeting in Turkey. That message was delivered with the murder of Kurdish activist Meshaal Tammo last month.

It also appears that the PKK in Lebanon has been going after Kurdish activists who partook in anti-Assad demonstrations in front of the Syrian Embassy in Beirut alongside their Arab compatriots. In addition, to make Assad’s point clear, pictures of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan were brandished at pro-Assad rallies in front of the Syrian Embassy.

In Beirut, the Iranian factor also comes back into play through Hezbollah. According to the spokesperson of the Lebanese Institution for Democracy and Human Rights, the PKK and Hezbollah had been gathering the names of anti-regime Kurdish activists and handing them over to the Syrian Embassy. Also partaking in this campaign of harassment is the Armenian Tashnag Party, an ally of Tehran and Damascus that shares the PKK’s loathing of the Turks.

Aside from being a highly dangerous gambit for Assad, as his father’s 1998 episode with Turkey attests, the so-called Kurdish card is highly volatile. Witness, for instance, the role the Iraqi Kurdish leadership played in the Arab League’s decision to suspend Syria’s membership. According to Arabic news reports, it was Iraqi Kurdish influence that pushed the Iraqi government not to vote against Syria’s suspension. Iraq’s Kurdish leaders are not banking on Assad’s survival either. Already in May, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari was publicly stating that Assad “will find it difficult to remain in power.”

Also, as noted by veteran French diplomat Ignace Leverrier, Syria’s Kurdish groups may wish to take advantage of Assad’s predicament in order to secure as many gains as possible, but it doesn’t mean that they are on his side or interested in his survival.

What about Turkey? Despite the strong rhetoric, the Turks have yet to adopt powerful punitive measures against the Assad regime. As long as that attitude persists in Ankara, Assad will remain convinced his PKK strategy is working and will grow more emboldened to keep going after Turkish interests.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.