Tony Badran

This week, the Obama administration edged closer to advocating regime change in Syria. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who last month stated that Bashar al-Assad’s legitimacy had “nearly run out,” declared on Monday after the US Embassy in Damascus had been attacked by pro-regime protesters that the Syrian president has “lost his legitimacy.” The rhetoric of the administration has shifted, and so have some of its actions. Washington is right at the doorstep, but not yet fully through that door.
 
The turning point came with Ambassador Robert Ford’s trip to Hama last Friday. Doubtless this overdue display of solidarity with the protesters is highly laudable, even if it raises a question as to why the administration didn’t instruct Ford to go to Deraa, Idlib or Homs, or any other city besieged and assaulted by the regime in the last four months.

But more important is the policy context in which Ford’s actions are to be read. In other words, did Ford’s trip truly signal a change in policy on the part of the Obama administration? Up to this point, the administration’s public position was defined on the one hand by the president’s call on Assad to “lead the transition or get out of the way,” and on the other by the administration’s call for a “real dialogue” between the regime and the protesters. Even after Ford’s Hama visit, a US official speaking to the Los Angeles Times last Sunday reasserted the “dialogue” mantra: “A dialogue has to be attempted. It has to be tried,” the official said.

Following the attack on the embassy, however, the tone in Washington did change. Secretary of State Clinton led the way on Monday commenting that, “From our perspective, [Assad] has lost legitimacy, he has failed to deliver on the promises he’s made.” In addition, Clinton repeated a line she had used in her op-ed in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat last month that Assad was “not indispensable,” adding to it that the US has “absolutely nothing invested” in him remaining in power.

Yet Clinton’s seemingly strong statement was tempered by the fact that it did not include any action words to go with the sharpening rhetoric. President Obama followed in the same vein and even managed to dull the edge further, saying in an interview with CBS News that “increasingly you’re seeing President Assad lose legitimacy in the eyes of his people. And that’s why we've been working at an international level, to make sure that we keep the pressure up—to see if we can bring some real change in Syria.” (Emphasis added.)

It is evident, however, that Washington has given up hope in Assad “leading the transition.” As one senior official put it to the New York Times yesterday, Assad “has shown definitively he has no interest in reform. The rationale for holding on to him has evaporated.” But yet neither Clinton nor Obama have taken the next logical step of explicitly calling on Assad to step down. Obama’s statement conspicuously left out the “get out of the way” part of his May 19 ultimatum to the Syrian dictator.

What is the end-goal of the pressure Obama described? What is the nature of the “real change” he has in mind? Is the pressure still intended to push Assad to change his behavior, or is Washington’s desired objective to see Assad out of the picture, regardless of how long that might take?

The reason why this continues to be an issue is because up until now, the administration had ceded leadership on Syria to the Turks, who have signaled that they are holding out hope for Assad to undertake convincing reformist measures. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is said to be planning a visit to Syria in coming days, following a trip to Tehran, where he reportedly tried, and failed, to get the Iranians to stop their logistical support for Assad in repressing protesters. Whether he will reiterate Turkey’s hopeful posture with Assad—thereby undercutting the US position—remains to be seen. As Mrs. Clinton heads to Turkey tomorrow, it might be the right time for Washington to inform the Turks that the US no longer sees a role for Assad other than his leaving.

On the tactical level, several observers have noted a number of avenues to step up pressure on the regime, especially through targeting the regime’s financial lifeblood, Syria’s energy sector. While administration officials had told journalists that they were looking at that option, a month later officials are saying that they’re still “weighing” such sanctions.

The administration needs to quickly move on this option, but it also should have a number of responses lined up in the event the regime escalates further. Ford’s precedent in Hama needs to be followed through lest it backfires, even if the regime, which allowed the visit to its great embarrassment, is unlikely to accommodate another.

This week’s developments have shown that America’s words and actions, not to mention leadership, matter. Moving forward, for Washington’s tactical instruments to be effective, they need to be integrated in a coherent strategic framework and a clear-cut policy objective. That objective, as per President Obama’s ultimatum, is to make Assad get out of the way.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.