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| Date: Jul 8, 2010 | |||
| Author: Hassan Krayem | |||
| Social Structural Limitations for Democratization in the Arab World | |||
Social Structural Limitations for Democratization in the Arab World
BY
HassanH.Krayem
________________________________________________________________________
SocialStructuralLimitations
for Democratization in the Arab World ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This article discusses the nature of the process of political liberalization that has been taking place in several Arab countries in the last two decades. It argues that this limited, controlled, slow, and divisive process is but a reflection of the crisis of authoritarian structures and regimes. To analyze the current attempts at liberalization and their prospects, this paper employs a socio-historical approach that traces the modern historical evolution of the social structure. It investigates the reasons as to why there has been a lack of accumulation of democratic experiences in the Arab World, with many periodic interruptions and setbacks. In seeking to answer this question, the paper probes the importance of several factors including the state, social structure, civil society and social class and forces. It argues that the important long-term structural effect of these factors supersedes any temporary arrangements and policies.
Academic and policy interests in liberalization and democratization processes in the Arab world have recently increased. In the aftermath of the second Gulf war, the scholarly studies focused on the potentiality of such processes with some optimistic speculations. Since the mid 1980s, nine of the twenty Arab states have experienced some type of political liberalization of one kind or another. In the first decade of the 21st century, however, one can describe the record as commingled with some countries continuing to experiment albeit reluctantly with their political liberalization, while others have put the process on hold, and even reversed it. While scholars have been looking at the socio-structural limitations of democratization in the short term, a more in-depth analysis of the long-term structural changes and transformations that have affected these societies in the last few decades is required.
This article seeks to apply such an approach with a focus on the nature and evolution of social structure, civil society, state, and social class as four major factors. It argues that the changes that are taking place in many Arab countries are not necessarily indicators of democratization. Rather they indicate that authoritarian regimes are suffering from an accretion of their hegemony crises, which may be a necessary cause for democratic transformation but it is not, in itself, a sufficient cause. However, it is precisely because of these crises and the socio-structural changes that many scholars, both Arab and Western, have raised their hopes for democratization in the Arab World. Hopes are insufficient for democratic transformation without the social and political forces that can carry out such a task. Thus, democracy without democrats in the Arab world has led to polarized societies between two undemocratic choices. The popular Islamic alternatives and the authoritarian states are violently facing each other as the clear cases of Algeria and Egypt and the tacit cases of many other Arab countries are demonstrating including the controversial case of Iraq, a country experimenting with democracy under occupation and a divided society.
Liberalization and Democratization:
Democracy is a historical process for a full-fledged system that has evolved gradually over two centuries. Political liberalization is the extension of some freedom rights and the introduction of some institutions to enable people to practice these rights. Democracy is about empowering people to participate and affect the decision-making processes while liberalization provides the voice.
Robert Dahl, in his book Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), gives eight minimum requirements for a country to be classified as a polyarchy, which is the term for the approximation of a system of liberal democracy. These are:
From the above, it is clear that the focus is on a specific conceptual definition of democracy, a widely used term and a practical one, which has developed over a very long time to emerge as “political democracy” or, better yet, “liberal democracy”. Thus, our discussion of the state of democracy in the Arab world will centre on the components of such a definition. These are:
In order for democracy to work, citizens must not only participate and exercise their rights, but they must also observe certain principles and rules of democratic conduct.
There has been a gradual trend toward accepting a more expansive conceptualization of political democracy. The debate over how to go beyond narrow, procedural conceptualizations has led scholars to pay more attention to a broader set of institutions and factors than those simply associated with free elections. These include a coherent state, effective and democratic accountability and rule of law, the role of the civil society and NGOs, and civilian control over the military.
At another level, democracy is also defined as a form of decision-making or a mode of government in which the people participate in formulating public policy, and the state acts responsibly and is held accountable for its decisions and actions. In the recent literature (especially from UNDP and the World Bank), this is referred to as good governance or accountable governance. It is strongly linked to development, whether sustainable human development or comprehensive development.
Approaches to liberalization and democratization in the Arab world
In the study of democracy and democratization as a process generally, and the limited democratic experiences in the Arab world particularly, scholars have differed in their adoption of contending approaches. To start with, many have resorted to the political culture approach. Their explanations for the lack of democratization in the Arab world ranged from a reductionist stereotyping about the effect of the Arab authoritarian mind , to a more in-depth analysis of patrimonialism and patriarchy , to a general reductionist approach focusing on Islam as an impediment to democracy. The argument that cultural norms substantially condition state-society relations has been prominent in political science since the early 1960s. The contention that political culture is an inherent obstacle to democratization has focused on Islam and primordialism as key factors.
Although one agrees with Hudson that “[S]ome comparative understanding of political
culture is necessary to save us from egregious ethnocentrism,” it is still necessary to
emphasize that political culture analysis as currently done is “unusually susceptible to distortion
and bias. If we are not careful to specify its contexts and limits, we not only risk analytical
confusion, we set the stage for sloppy, self-indulgent, or even damaging prescription.” The
political culture approach is strongly associated with orientalism, and is essentially ahistorical
with its focus on the different static inner qualities of the West and the East. Iliya Harik
presents a more sophisticated critical analysis of political culture as he emphasizes the dual role
of Islam. For Harik, in Islam “one finds the idea of individual integrity juxtaposed with that of
integral membership in the community (al-Jamaa’a), a dualism that has served those who preferred a
strong civil society as well as those who wanted a strong and authoritarian form of
government.”
Other major work that questioned the presumed exceptionalism of the Arab and Islamic world is Ghassan Salame’s edited book, Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. One of the major objectives of this work was to show that: “Beneath the surface of continuity, societies have changed greatly during the past two or three decades and while leaders may remain in power, the nature of their power has been altered by incessant adjustments both to domestic, regional and international constraints.”
Another approach that for different reasons reaches a similar conclusion about the limited prospects for democracy in the Arab world, or other peripheral countries, is the radical historical dependency perspective. The different historical conditions of central and peripheral capitalism and the nature of the independent central and the dependent peripheral bourgeoisie explain the advancement of bourgeois democracy in Europe and its failure in the peripheral areas. However, the examination of the historical evolution of the social structure goes back to pre-capitalist social formations, as far as early Islamic empires. This should not mean that this approach is concerned with the past only. Indeed, the focus on the evolution of class structure, state formation, colonialism and imperialism, ideological currents and political forces is comprehensive and up to date. Nevertheless, one can still observe the overemphasis on external factors as well as the tendency to generalize at the expense of neglecting the complicated different class, state, and other socio-cultural forces.
Although they do not constitute a developed approach, there are certain apologetic justifications for the lack of democracy in the Arab world that are worth mentioning here. These Islamist, Arab nationalist, Statist and Traditionalist ideological views have affected the current Arab political forces and Arab political discourse. Essentially, these different arguments share one common objective, and that is to reject democratic transformation on the ground that change should be introduced by the region at its own pace and according to its own systems of values, priorities, culture and ideology.
Another explanation of the failure to transition to democracy in the Arab world focuses on structural aspects of economic development and their impact on state-society relations in the region.
The socio-structural limitations such as deformed social classes, a weak and
dependent bourgeoisie, and the persistence of traditional affiliations like the family, tribe, sect,
clan, and other forms or bonds of Asabiyya, all contribute to a conception of authority and state
that is distinct from the above-mentioned western concept. In addition, the rentier economies with
the weak taxation policies also distort not only the concept of the state but also state relations
with civil society, with important implications for democracy. The class structure and deep
involvement of the state in economic affairs have inhibited the evolution of participatory political
institutions in the Arab world. Outside of the Arab World, however, this state of affairs did not
last. Beginning with the debt crisis that hit the developing world in the early 1980s, economic
stagnation eroded the ability of Third World statist regimes to maintain the continued support of
elite coalitions and/or key sectors of the population at large. It forced them to liberalize their
economies as a means of attracting foreign investment and debt relief loans from the international
community. This also led to a wave of democratization since the mid 1980s in countries in Latin
America, Asia, and some African countries. However, this wave stopped at the door of the Arab World,
raising the question of Arab exceptionalism. Therefore, in the coming section I will survey the structural limitations to democratization in the Arab World through five broad variables:
I. The State Formation:
The state is a modern concept that evolved in Europe. It entails respect for rule of law, as well as a separation of powers and an independent judiciary. Organizationally, the state is associated with unity, centralization and decentralization, and more importantly functional differentiation, identified in Weberian discourse as legal-rational type authority with emphasis on modern bureaucracy and public administration. Economically, the modern state has generally accompanied the development of capitalism. The strength of the state is highly associated with political legitimacy, political responsibility, stability and democracy. In other words, the stronger the consent of the people, the stronger the legitimacy of the state and the more stable and democratic it is. In the Arab world, as well as in many other peripheral regions and ex-colonies, the state may lack these elements of strength, although they may resemble characteristics of a hard and fierce state. As Ayubi puts it, these are states that “heavily rely on administrative means and instruments as well as coercion and raw force.” Moreover, the lack of continuity, weak institutions, the lack of agreement on the political rules of the game, the lack of respect for essential human rights and the lack of democracy, all contribute to a lack of political legitimacy and responsibility and thus a lack of stability and a weaker state, despite the predominance of authoritarian, coercive and violent institutions. In discussing the role of the state in the Arab world, I will use three predominant models of the state in relation to the social structure in order to explain the different characteristics. The objective is to reduce the level of generalization of the concept, nature and role of the Arab state. These three models are the rentier state model, the national statist model, and the liberal model.
II. The Social Structure
The oil producing countries are rentier states par excellance. Not only are citizens not obliged to make a substantial financial contribution to the state through taxation, but also most are dependent, either directly or indirectly, on government expenditure. The wealth of citizens is primarily derived not from their own productive activity, but from the state. Although only in the above-mentioned "petrocracies" is the preponderance of government revenue derived from oil, petroleum exports are a significant source of foreign exchange earnings in Egypt, Algeria and Syria. Oil rents are "recycled" to poorer Arab countries, such as Egypt and
Jordan, through remittances from workers living in the Gulf, generating a similar political dynamic.
Unlike oil revenue, however, worker remittances do not accrue directly to the state, but flow into
the private sector. Like any other private sector financial flow, the state can tax this money, but
this would be expected to generate the same demands for accountability as any other form of direct
taxation. According to the logic of rentier state theory, oil remittances should not inhibit
democratization. On the contrary, remittances should empower citizens vis-a-vis the state.
Oil-rentier countries share the following commonalities:
It is very inaccurate to use the term “development” to describe the economic growth pattern that these countries have followed. Their economies are not only unproductive and rentier but exclusively dependent on one basic commodity, namely crude oil. Their social structures are still undeveloped despite the large fortunes, which make the average income in them relatively higher than in other developing countries. The pattern of consumption in these countries is characterized by the inflation of the volume of military spending, which makes them one of the most important weaponry markets in the world.
Rentier states are characterized by consummatory luxury spending, especially in real estate projects. Industrial and agricultural projects, on the other hand, are subject to various distortions because of the surplus in oil revenues, which allows for state intervention and subsidized support.
In addition, to the above, in recent years, especially
after the Gulf War, the continuous drop in oil prices below the level of 1973, produced a new
reality in these oil-rich countries. The international economic order has adjusted to the higher
prices of oil and gradually drained the region from its surplus through the channeling of
petro-dollars to serve the economies of the center. Oil has therefore deepened dependency instead of
serving as a means to liberate these economies and develop them. For political reasons as well as
strategic positions, the region became a primary market for the purchase of weapons, thus
transforming these countries into indebted nations. As a result, one can conclude that the countries
following the oil rentier pattern did not experience real development in the meaning we referred to
at the beginning. The Nationalist Statist Model
This model contains a group of countries that vary in their levels of development, but share independent developmental approaches, national liberation, and socio-economic state intervention theories. This model is the only one among the three models that can be described as a developmental state model, especially in reference to the policies in the period of 1950s-1970s and in accordance with the general developmental model followed by many third world countries in the same period. The model can be described in the following manner:
These countries suffered from an inflatory role of the state transforming the latter into a dominant static authority and system of governance that rules these countries according to inflexible and authoritarian mechanisms. The crisis of democracy was among the major reasons for the failure of developmental efforts especially as the state turned into its rentier function, inflating the number of military and civilian employees and linking employment to the authoritarian networks.
The Liberal Model:
This model can be described as follows:
These three state models, however, share relatively
common social structural characteristics: • They all suffer
from weak institutions in spite of the varying degrees of strength of the repressive apparatus,
which in turn, qualify many of them as weak states. • They all share
a crisis of political legitimacy, or at least weak and skeptical approval, and lack of political
accountability. • They all have relatively a narrow social base of
support, and they resort to changing social pacts and alliances, which may lead to instability.
• They also share a various degrees of hegemony of the state over
representative institutions, decision-making processes, and civil society organizations that are
weak or dependent on the state. • This severe centralization of the
state and its institutions is associated with the weak institutionalization of the administration,
and the wide spread of corruption. As a result, the ruling elite continued to use the state as a
basic means in political mobilization and the reproduction of power. Such practices increase the
rentier functions of the state both politically and economically, so that the State is no longer
perceived as a public good. This characteristic makes corruption in the administration, which is a
global phenomenon, a very peculiar case in the Arab world because it is linked to the dominant
political relations distinguishing Arab state and society. The absence of an efficient public
administration capable of implementing public policies and managing development not only hinders
development, but also leads to the loss of efforts and a heavy waste and corruption. The issue of
failure to separate between the ruling institutions and capital accumulation and distribution
institutions is also common and is considered a formidable obstacle forbidding the development of
both the private sector and the emergence of an independent middle class. That is especially
relevant when the nation’s wealth is directed mainly to protect and consolidate the ruling class’s
grip over political power. • The social fabric is strongly
patriarchal. Social interactions are organized in terms of vertical patron–client relations rather
than a horizontal, class-based organization of societal interests. They are shaped by informal and
personalized relations rather than by formal rules, and are determined by traditional loyalties.
• Finally, it is also observed that authoritarianism appears to be both a consequence of failure and a response favored by rulers faced with slow economic growth, the degradation of the political and social climate, the decline of educational systems, and moral and ideological ruin.
III. Civil Society Organizations:
Research interest has increased recently in Arab civil society organizations . Civil Society is the place where groups, associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties, and cultural groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen. The following groups meet these criteria:
4) Trade unions and syndicates whose importance is in their sizable membership and relatively good financial resources.
The number of CSOs, no doubt, has increased during the
last two decades. CSOs tripled in number in Lebanon reaching more than seven thousand in 2009, and
increased in places where they did not exist openly such as Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia.
IV. Social Classes
The process of state domination over political parties, civil society, media, and the economy was highly authoritarian and oppressive. In the 1970s and 1980s, these states began experiencing their economic crises (Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Algeria, and Iraq) because of the failure of the import-substitution strategy. As the debt crisis hit them in the early 1980s, economic stagnation eroded their ability to maintain the continued support of their social base of support and the population at large. It forced them to liberalize their economies as a means of attracting foreign investment and securing debt relief loans from the international community. Nonetheless, their economic liberalization remained a survival strategy and was not associated with profound political liberalization and democratization.
The authoritarian state weakened the working class and other deprived groups in society to a point of total containment. These social forces were preoccupied with meeting basic needs (, so that their political socialization did not give a priority to democracy and democratization. This may explain why political Islam emerged in the 1970s to fill up the vacuum created by the crisis of the authoritarian state and the weak role of socio-political forces with democratic alternative.
However, the search and buildup of the social forces that will act as the agent for democratic transformation will continue in the Arab World with the failure of the middle class model (National Statist model), compounded by the failure of the intermediary commercial bourgeoisie (that looks for its legitimacy through external links and alliances and not internal politics.)
The objective social transformation is producing new forces (well-educated youth, women, and new economic forces) who are trying to find their role in society and in politics despite the formidable resistance, they are facing. These new social movements, political groups and other civil society groups are but an indication and a reflection of these changes in the different Arab societies.
V. The role of the external factors
The underlying conditions in Arab society suggest that the lack of democracy in the region may be also be attributable to the absence or weakness of external forces that have driven democratization elsewhere. At the same time, the question remains as to whether democracy can be imposed from the outside, in the absence of national ownership. The weakness of the local social basis and forces for democratization presents the fundamental problem in the transition to democracy. On the other hand, the dubious history of US engagement, with autocratic regimes as primary allies has undermined Western credibility to bring about democratization in the Arab world, shedding light on the double standards with which the West deals with the region. The US can espouse democracy, while concomitantly supporting Arab regimes that are renowned for repressing their own people. Historically and up until today, the West is notorious for having supported autocratic regimes in the past that have flagrantly opposed democracy. Western support for these regimes had been extraordinary and very effective. Recently, the US engagement in the Arab world has witnessed a radical shift from funding authoritative regimes that have justified crushing opposition movements in the name of "security" in the region, to enforcing regime change and democratization instead. In an interview with the Guardian, British Prime Minister Tony Blair explained this transition as a realization on the part of the US that “security measures aren't enough.” American foreign policy has consequently evolved, culminating in a new notion of security, more in line with Europe’s, conceding, “security measures in themselves will not provide enough security.” As such, the best guarantee of security is a re-developed Middle East, one in which there is a just resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and where democracy, human rights and freedom prevail.
In addition to distrust of the West due to double standards, unjustified bias toward
Israel, and Western anti-democratic engagement in the region historically, there is a genuine
concern as to whether the West can simply export democracy to the Arab world. As Lisa Anderson puts
it:
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