Alvaro Vasconcelos

Tunisia has proved wrong the theories that Islam is incompatible with democracy. The recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the National Dialogue Quartet that mediated the Tunisian democratic transition did more than acknowledge the exemplary nature of the process. It also encouraged Tunisians to continue seeking out necessary compromise for the consolidation of democracy. This message is particularly relevant in the current context of disintegration and war in Libya and throughout the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq.

The decision would have been more exemplary still had it also included Rashed Ghannouchi, the leader of Ennahda, the democratic Islamist party that negotiated with the Quartet the commitments required for a successful transition.

In Tunisia with Ennahda, as in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamist parties were long regarded as the true alternatives to authoritarian regimes. It is for this reason that they won the first free elections that were held after the downfall of authoritarian regimes in 2011.

However, in both cases, a part of the political elite, along with sectors linked to the old regimes, refused to accept the election results. This created malignant polarization in society, fueled in Tunisia’s case by radically secular intellectuals and French politicians.

In France’s Le Nouvel Observateur, the influential Algerian-born French journalist Jean Daniel described Ennahda’s electoral victory as that “of the counterrevolution.”

In the case of Egypt, polarization set the stage for the military coup of July 2013, which interrupted the democratic process. In Tunisia, polarization was overcome by the Quartet, composed of various civil society groups – civic associations, entrepreneurs, lawyers and human rights activists – lead by the Tunisian General Labor Union, which had already played a key role in the revolution that overthrew Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s dictatorship.

The Quartet’s actions were significant when, following the brutal repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, sectors with ties to the old regime felt the time had come to eliminate Ennahda. They were backed by a part of the liberal secular elite, which feared Islamists more than they did Ben Ali’s supporters.

The situation was made worse when secular radicals held all Islamists responsible for attacks on left-wing secular personalities, confusing different Islamist factions. Concurrently, the work of the Constituent Assembly took longer than anticipated due to the difficulty of reaching an agreement between Islamists and non-Islamists.

The Quartet took on the search for a consensus between the secular liberals they represented and democratic Islamists. Specifically in this context, the role of Ghannouchi was – and remains – crucial. In the many conversations I held with him throughout the Tunisian transition, he always upheld his ambition to reconcile political Islam with democracy, defending the legitimacy of multiple interpretations of the Quran. Exiled in London during Ben Ali’s dictatorship, Ghannouchi reflected on the tragic experience of Algeria after the Islamic Salvation Front won the elections of 1992, which ultimately led to civil war.

Ghannouchi was critical of the inability demonstrated by the Egyptian Brotherhood to commit to alliances with secular sectors, which is why he guided Ennahda to forge alliances with two secular Tunisian parties. One went on to assume the presidency, the other fronted the Constituent Assembly. This option led Ennahda to accept leaving government after the proclamation of the constitution, favoring a government of technocrats who prepared the elections.

In Ghannouchi the Quartet found the necessary partner, ensuring an advanced democratic constitution and the acquiescence of more radical elements in Ennahda. Days after the constitution vote, Ghannouchi told me he had preached at a Tunis mosque that the universality of human rights, such as the freedom of religious conscience, is inscribed in the Quran.

Some have said it should have been the Quartet plus two, or three, receiving the Nobel Prize, a reference to the role played in the transition by the current Tunisian president, Beji Caid Essebsi. Essebsi was popular among anti-Islamist sectors, particularly former President Habib Bourguiba’s successors. Ghannouchi met with him during the worst moment of the crisis, negotiating the transition against the backdrop of national dialogue promoted by the Quartet.

Another candidate for the prize could have been Mustapha ben Jaafar, the president of the Constituent Assembly. Many others, too, made the transition possible.

Regarding the success of Tunisia’s transition, the Quartet’s mediating action was supported by most external actors, such as the European Union and its member states. At the Portuguese embassy in Tunis I met an anti-Islamist deputy who had called for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly after the Egyptian coup. He pointedly told me that it was at a lunch at the embassy that he understood he had no support from Europe, which led him to conclude his stance was undemocratic.

Tunisia has also demonstrated the need to distinguish between different Islamists factions. Understanding these notions is essential to preventing Europeans from falling into the trap of those who, like Syrian President Bashar Assad, call for an alliance against all opposition forces in the name of fighting ISIS extremism. It is equally essential to tackle the Islamophobia rife in Europe, which threatens European democracy.

The consolidation of democracy in Tunisia still faces obstacles, be they from neighboring Libya, with two governments and a thousand militias; or internally because of the deteriorating social crisis, fueled by a sharp decline in tourism and tendencies within the current power structure to push security measures to the extreme, demonstrated by the recent anti-terrorism law.

The European Union has an important role to play in the military consolidation of the Libyan-Tunisian border and through economic support for Tunisia. These actions are crucial in enabling the Tunisian example to survive in this time of war and despair throughout the Middle East. It would also maintain the hope of the democratic revolution of 2011 alive.