Michael Young

Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, was true to form last week, when he delivered a speech on the occasion of the “victory” against Israel nine years ago. The core of his address, however, was not Israel but his support for Michel Aoun, who stood by the party in the July 2006 war.

Nasrallah declared that he would not allow Aoun to be isolated, adding that the general represented the “necessary” path to the Lebanese presidency and government. This ringing endorsement notwithstanding, Nasrallah was doing two things: encouraging Aoun to pursue his obstruction of the presidential election and laying the groundwork for a more long-term partnership between the Shiite community and the Maronites.

Ironically, while Nasrallah suggested that Aoun’s political rivals were seeking to “break” him, the reality is that the harshest words directed against the general in recent weeks were uttered by Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament. And no one seriously believes that Berri would have said what he did without the approval of Hezbollah, which did not want Aoun to destabilize the government, whose continued functioning the party seeks.

The Aoun-Hezbollah relationship is one of the more interesting developments in the past decade in Lebanon. While for a long time many saw it as an alliance of convenience, which it was, the Syrian conflict has added a new dimension to it. As Hezbollah faces the very real possibility of defeat in Syria, or at best a long period of debilitating stalemate, it will have to consolidate itself against a likely Sunni counter-reaction resulting from these. That means the Shiite community has no choice but to strengthen its relations with the Christians, the Maronites in particular.

Some affirm that Aoun represents only part of the Christian community. That’s doubtless true, but two things qualify this. First, his main rival, the Lebanese Forces, decided recently to reconcile themselves with Aoun, in part to avoid internal Christian rifts that would only make the community more vulnerable at a moment when the Christian presence in the Middle East is threatened. That means that Aoun’s ability to portray himself as the Christian representative, if only because nobody openly opposes him, has been enhanced.

Second, when it comes to Christian fears of a Sunni triumph in Syria, Aoun probably speaks for a majority. The sectarian performance of his supporters last week, who for no apparent reason sought to depict moderate Sunni politicians as a kinder, gentler version of ISIS, was an embarrassment. But there is a deeper strain of Christian anxiety (and not only Christian) with regard to the Sunni majority in the region that, Christians feel, may treat sectarian or religious minorities as secondary citizens. The region has never dealt with its religious and ethnic minorities with any great degree of tolerance, and so has pushed minorities into protecting themselves through all means available, often leading them to make bad choices.

Hezbollah has been very conscious of Christian fears, and has played up the threat from Syria in such a way as to present the party as the strongest barrier in the face of Sunni extremism. Unfortunately, this message has largely succeeded, which may make many Christians far more willing to consider political changes in Lebanon that reinforce a Christian-Shiite partnership against an increasingly empowered Sunni community. That such an alliance would only do further damage to the sectarian power-sharing formula that preserves Lebanese coexistence is lost on a majority of Christians.

An “alliance of minorities,” even if its destructive impact has been visible in Iraq and Syria during the past decade, leading to perhaps the permanent end of the Christian presence in both countries, retains credibility among many Christians. This reaction may be natural, but it is also the result of fear, and few decisions taken out of fear remain sound in the long term.

However, the question Christian leaders should ask themselves these days is why Hezbollah has contributed to the deadlock over the presidency. The Aounists believe the party truly wants the general to take office, but that is highly unlikely. At a time when Hezbollah is keen to avoid a vacuum in the state because of its involvement in Syria, it has not decided to hold up everything in the country for an 80-year-old man whom it allows another ally, Nabih Berri, to criticize and keep in line.

Aoun’s vanity aside, the general must be on to Hezbollah’s intentions. That means either he still believes the party can make him president; or he actually buys into the logic of a strategic alliance with the Shiites, which one day could lead to a common effort to transform the post-Taif constitution.

What the Christians have not properly understood is that their only real long-term guarantee in Lebanon is the current sectarian power-sharing system based on compromise. If Aoun doesn’t believe that – and his partisans’ foolish reaction last week indicates that he does not – then he’s doing precisely what Hezbollah wants him to do, for Christian paranoia with regard to Sunnis will only enhance Hezbollah’s power.

Someone entirely absent from this discussion has been the Maronite patriarch, Beshara Rai. The patriarch has often said too much about topics he had no business addressing, but today is saying absolutely nothing about the vital issue that is confessional coexistence. If any Christian representative has influence in speaking against the dangers of an alliance of minorities it is Rai, yet the patriarch refuses to step up.

Hezbollah must feel confident. The day Aoun expires there will be plenty of other Christians willing to pick up the general’s thread in advocating for a Shiite-Christian partnership against the Sunnis. This will be a disaster, but the Christians are skilled in facing disasters, as their slow disappearance from the region attests.