Basem Shabb

As the fighting in Iraq is characterized by the slow but definite retreat of ISIS, the situation in Syria remains fluid. Whereas the boots on the ground in Iraq are on the offensive, those in Syria, namely the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, appear overstretched and exhausted. The resiliency of the Syrian regime is questionable and the limitations of Hezbollah are evident in the party’s inability to pacify the Lebanon-Syria border region.

After the ISIS defeat in Ain al-Arab, widely known by its Kurdish name Kobani, a possible retreat from Mosul would likely lead to retrenchment to southeastern Syria. Turkish influence through the Nusra Front as well as the military presence of Syrian Kurds would further pressure ISIS to redeploy southward. It is not inconceivable that within several months southern Syria could harbor the last vestiges of ISIS. Airstrikes without boots on the ground can contain and degrade ISIS, but are unlikely to eliminate the group.

The recent offensive in southern Syria by a joint force of the Syrian Army, Iraqi Shiite militias and Hezbollah has been partially motivated by extending Iranian influence along the Syrian-Israeli border, but also by denying ISIS continuous access westward to the Syrian-Lebanese border. Should the offensive in southern Syria falter because of logistics or weather, Lebanon’s border with Syria will assume greater importance. Retreating ISIS militants from Iraq could potentially extend their influence to the southwest, connecting with other radical elements along the Israeli and Lebanese borders. Nusra, positioned near the Golan Heights, would not challenge an overwhelming advance by ISIS, nor would the FSA. 

A case in point is the Qalamoun area straddling the Lebanese-Syrian border where ISIS has reportedly grown to some 2,500 combatants by incorporating Free Syrian Army and Nusra Front elements. Additionally Israel, by targeting Hezbollah in Qunaitra, has signaled to Iran that it will not tolerate Iranian influence in the Golan Heights region. 

Pro-Iranian forces are also limited by having no demographic presence in southern Syria, which is predominantly Sunni and Druze. The sparse Sunni population is in no position to confront ISIS, whereas the Druze have gradually distanced themselves from the Syrian regime. 

Walid Jumblatt, the Lebanese Druze leader, has openly called for the support of Islamist fighters, knowing that the area in question shelters half the Druze population of the Levant. Jumblatt is aware that a pro-regime stance would compromise the Druze in a poorly defensible region. Swaida, the largest Druze city, may go the way of Kobani. Thus it is conceivable that the current joint offensive could consolidate the defenses of Damascus without being able to curb a westward expansion by ISIS. As the Jordanian and Israeli borders are impermeable, this western movement could eventually reach the southern Lebanese-Syrian border where ISIS has consolidated its presence. 

Defending the long and tortuous eastern borders of Lebanon has necessitated a coordinated effort between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah since neither can secure it alone. Western countries have tacitly approved of such cooperation while supporting a dialogue between the Future Movement and Hezbollah to diffuse Sunni-Shiite tensions. Hence, the insistence of Western diplomats to pursue this dialogue despite March 14 voicing alarm after the last round of Israel-Hezbollah hostilities two weeks ago.

It also seems that during that confrontation, the Western powers, particularly the United States, were not interested in a Hezbollah escalation with Israel that would have detracted from the party’s primary mission of fighting jihadis in Syria. 

Similarly, electing a Lebanese president is now secondary to internal security and counterterrorism. The most relevant individuals in the war on terror are the commander of the Lebanese Army and the head of Military Intelligence, both Maronites, the interior minister, a Sunni, as well as the head of the General Security directorate, a Shiite.

In other words the vacancy in the Maronite presidency, while it may have impeded governance, has had little impact on national security concerns. Close cooperation among all these figures has yielded dramatic results. It allowed the government to bring radical Sunni elements under control in Roumieh Prison and it permitted the army to secure Shiite areas in the Bekaa Valley that had never before under true government control before. 

In this context the rapid infusion of American equipment to the Army, comprising heavy towed and self-propelled artillery, is more suited to the inhospitable plateau of Qalamoun than to urban warfare. However, no matter how much support the army receives, land-based firepower may not be adequate to repel a dramatic and concentrated advance by ISIS. Rather, tactical air support may be required to do so. Kobani was a case in point. 

Serious consideration should be given to such a contingency by enlisting air forces already involved against ISIS. Britain’s Royal Air Force has a credible strike force of Tornado GR4s in close proximity, in Akrotiri, Cyprus, and is well-positioned for such support. The Royal Jordanian Air Force is also within range of Lebanon. A common defense pact under the Arab League would provide a political and legal basis for such intervention. 

Given Jordan’s stance against extremist movements it would be difficult for Hezbollah to oppose such support, especially if the Shiite heartland is in jeopardy. Even U.S. aircraft stationed in Jordan, or offshore, may target ISIS on the Syrian side of the Lebanese border without the need for Lebanese Cabinet approval.

U.S. envoy John Allen has announced that the ground offensive in Iraq will begin in the weeks ahead. The ultimate consequence could be a protracted presence of radical extremists who have redeployed to the Anti-Lebanon mountains.

Having weathered the sectarian storm, Lebanon must prepare for the possibility of a storm on its borders. Confronting terror must take precedence over domestic political disputes. All means must be explored to bolster and supplement the capabilities of Lebanon’s armed forces, including facilitating access to Western and Arab tactical air support should it be needed. 

The head of the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Gen. Qasem Soleimani, had no qualms about taking advantage of U.S. air support to relieve the town of Amerli in Iraq last summer. There is no reason why Iran’s allies in Lebanon should not act with similar pragmatism.