Marten Youssef

If the perpetrators of the Feb. 14, 2005, assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri knew the consequences of their action, or how it would affect Lebanon, would they have committed their crime?

If they knew that millions of dollars would be spent on a judicial process that would expand beyond 10 years to expose them, would they still have carried out that Valentine’s Day attack? We may never know. However, deterrence is a core belief guiding international justice. In demonstrating a judicial process that exposes the truth and dispenses accountability, there is hope it could deter future attacks.

The next logical question is: If a judicial process is created to deter future attacks, then why is it that political assassinations have continued in Lebanon for the past decade?

That, in my opinion, is due to the fact that international justice has not yet developed to its fullest potential. There are serious barriers in the way. Ironically, these barriers have been placed by the same hands that have shaped international justice.

If international courts want to become more efficient and effective, they must distance themselves from the politics. But in reality fulfilling that statement is nearly impossible. Courts rely on the cooperation of governments for investigations, funding and protection. It is virtually impossible to expect international courts to progress without such cooperation. Despite this fact, there are high expectations in the capacity of these courts. 

Courts alone, national or international, cannot end impunity. They are a part of a broader political system. In fact, it is the political system that should bear the greater responsibility to implement changes and bring about accountability. So while it’s convenient to review the accomplishments of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon a decade after the attack, we ought to examine what the Lebanese government has done to be the catalyst for change. 

In the past few days international media have focused again on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. One of the most repeated criticisms is the absence of the accused in the court. Selling this lengthy in absentia trial to a culture where in absentia proceedings last a few days, was arguably the toughest part of my job as the court’s spokesperson. I remain convinced that the entire ordeal is for the benefit of the victims, but the fact that there are no accused participating in the process remains the court’s greatest weakness. 

Yes, it is a process to discover the truth. Yes, it will give the victims some sort of closure. Yes, it is a precedent-setting court. But no, it will not deter future attacks. It has not so far. This is not the fault of the STL, however. It boils down to Lebanon’s complex political system that has prevented the authorities from apprehending the accused.

More than a year ago, I sat with a prominent figure in Lebanon who bluntly said, “Even if the accused tell me personally that they killed Hariri, I would still not support the tribunal?” When I asked why, he replied, “Of all the assassinations, why would they go after the ones that target Hezbollah– the only resistance to Israel.”

That reasoning, or lack thereof, has come to characterize opposition to the STL. For many of its critics, the tribunal is an American-Zionist project created to weaken Hezbollah – despite the fact that it was created during a time when Syria was the only accused.

During my time as spokesperson for the STL, I must have sounded like a broken record trying to emphasize that very point. The indictment is not an accusation against Hezbollah; it covers a crime in which certain individuals stand accused because of their role in the attack, not their membership in a party. Unfortunately my statements fell on deaf ears. 

Because the strength of the STL draws from the strength of the Lebanese political system, there have been unreasonable expectations placed on it. That’s why it is time for the government to renew its efforts to apprehend the accused. Not for the sake of the tribunal or the sake of international justice, but for the sake of Lebanon’s future. Lebanon’s efforts to apprehend the accused are mired in political calculations. It can do more, but chooses not to – out of fear. 

I realize that the consequences of the government even attempting to arrest the accused could potentially start a civil war. But the consequences of not arresting them are far greater than anything imaginable. Lebanon’s choice to not arrest the accused is in fact the largest obstacle standing in the way of deterring future attacks.

That same fear of civil war, however realistic, is the reason why the international community has not pushed for the arrest. Such inaction sends a deafening message that political assassinations are permitted because this has become the norm and is culturally acceptable. 

So let me rephrase the question I started with. If the perpetrators knew with certainty that the Lebanese state would relentlessly seek to arrest them and transfer them over to an international court, would they have still carried out their attack? Most likely not. 

You tell me what’s standing in the way of accountability?