Sajad Jiyad

Earlier this week, Iran announced, through the head of its Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, that it supported the legal process to pick a replacement for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. On the same day, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Iran’s top proxy militia in Iraq, echoed this view. These events in Iraq took place without the usual level of control that Iran has been able to impose over Iraq. The bitter and public split within the mainly Shiite National Alliance and the ensuing struggle over the prime minister’s position was certainly something the Iranians would have tried to avoid.

In the preceding weeks, unconfirmed reports from Iran showed that the official position was turning against Maliki. But this was not Iran’s desire initially. Rather, it was imposed by the reality on the ground. After the fall in mid-June of the city of Mosul to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Qods Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which controls external Iranian operations, was an almost constant presence in Baghdad. A key foreign policy player, Soleimani had as his primary concern the shoring up Iraq’s armed forces in order to prevent an ISIS advance on Baghdad.

The Iranian official was not interested in replacing Maliki or allowing the U.S. to impose his removal as a condition for its military support against ISIS. So Iran brought in military advisers, sent back some Iraqi warplanes that they had held onto from the time of the 1991 Gulf war, and repatriated militias fighting in Syria to Iraq so as to compensate for the delay in U.S. military assistance to Iraq.

The rise of ISIS in Iraq is certainly to Iran’s detriment. Losing access to the overland route to Syria was a big blow and now that U.S. warplanes roam Iraqi skies, it makes access to Syria much more difficult. In addition, Iranian agents in Iraq may be targeted at any time. Having the “Great Satan” on its doorstep is an uncomfortable feeling for Iran, and the Iranians showed in the past that they would destabilize Iraq to force the U.S. out of their backyard. The recent military developments caught Iran off guard and reduced its control over Iraq. Thus, Tehran tried to compensate by maintaining its influence in Iraq intact.

For Iran, there was no reason that necessitated Maliki’s replacement. They knew his weak points, his networks, and his secrets. Moreover, Iran had ensured that Maliki would not oppose any of its policies in Iraq after 2010. This included making sure there was no permanent U.S. military presence in the country and allowing Iran access to Syria to shore up President Bashar Assad’s regime. This came after a troubled relationship with Maliki in 2007-2008, which they worked hard to end, bringing him back under their influence.

A new prime minister might not be so amenable to Iranian requests. Or it might take too much time to work him into such a position, when the clock is ticking and there is a war being fought for Baghdad’s very survival. Changing Maliki, the notional commander-in-chief of the armed forces, also risked triggering a further collapse in the highly politicized Iraqi army, which Iran wanted to avoid at all costs. It is for these reasons that Tehran was averse to Maliki’s removal, and was hoping for a repeat of 2010 when other political parties would eventually agree to his retaining the premiership, under Iranian duress.

But their hand was forced by the United States and the Iraqi political elite, as well as, most notably, by Ayatollah Ali Sistani, in late July and early August. Sistani made it clear, both in public statements and in private correspondence with the Daawa Party, that he would not accept a third term for Maliki. Such a move by Sistani was unexpected, and the strength of his feeling and the agreement of Iraq’s Shiite parties surprised Iran.

In the meantime Maliki’s increasing isolation continued, and even Soleimani found him in an uncompromising mood when he broached the subject of an alternative candidate in late July. Attempts failed to keep the National Alliance, which Iran has worked hard to unify, from breaking apart, despite the work of Iran’s point man among the Iraqi Shiites, an ex-Daawa Party member named Jamal Jaafar al-Ibrahimi, better known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. This posed the biggest danger to Iran’s influence over political affairs in Iraq. That is why the Iranians rushed to endorse Prime Minister designate Haidar al-Abadi’s nomination. They could not afford to find themselves on a different side than the National Alliance and risk being outmaneuvered by the U.S. and others.

For the first time in Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been able to select the prime minister and finds itself reacting to events rather than informing them. For the first time, and as a result of this, Iran has lost some leverage in Iraq.