By Michael Meyer-Resende 

It feels like Groundhog Day in Cairo. Again, as in early 2011, masses of people demonstrated against the president at Tahrir Square and elsewhere. Again the military stepped in and seized power, and again a transitional road map was formulated, laying out how Egypt should return to civilian politics under a reformed constitution, legitimized by a series of electoral events within a year. It did not go well the first time, however, and is unlikely to do so now. The imposition of a cookie-cutter transition with a rapid succession of elections will do nothing to build a consensus over the ground rules of politics, which is the only way for deep democratization and stabilization of Egypt.

 

The army and the interim government may have been well-intentioned when issuing the road map. Indeed many Egyptians and international actors demanded clarification about the way ahead with reassurances that the soldiers had no intention of governing in the long run. Yet the road map was immediately met with a chorus of criticism, even from potentially sympathetic circles of the Tamarod protest movement and the liberal National Salvation Front.

 

What went wrong? The army had not learned one of the lessons of 2011: the need to consult widely before making decisions, even if these decisions are “only” about the process.

 

There are deeper problems with the road map, however, for those who believe that Egypt can only be stabilized and democratized if the Muslim Brotherhood is brought back into the political fold. It should be no surprise that the Brotherhood is currently in no mood to negotiate with the new government. It sees itself as the victim of stolen elections: The Muslim Brotherhood won elections to the lower house of parliament, but the Constitutional Court dissolved the body; Mohammad Morsi was elected president, but the military deposed him. And the upper house of parliament, also dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, was dissolved by the new president, Adly Mansour. While this is not the whole story and the Muslim Brotherhood must ask itself hard questions about its record while in office, its humiliation is real.

 

Inviting the Brotherhood in this context to take part in a quick transition feels like inviting a train driver, who has just been thrown overboard, to board the train once more as it is about to leave the station. It cannot work. What is required instead are good faith signals to the Brotherhood to reopen the space for re-engagement. There will be some in the Brotherhood who may never be convinced again of political participation, but there will be others in its leadership and electorate who would respond to moderation.

 

On the other hand, a quick transition in Egypt would close the space for re-engagement of the Brotherhood. Elections, boycotted by the Brotherhood, would be seen as a legitimization of the new situation rather than a genuinely competitive contest. There is also a question if Egyptian voters have a real appetite for electoral events in the context of an economic and social emergency.

 

What then could be done instead? The beginning of a formal transition could be postponed by at least half a year to provide a cooling-off period that would allow the interim government to address the socioeconomic crisis. The time should be used by the civilian parties and mediators to begin a dialogue without preconditions with the Muslim Brotherhood, behind the scenes or in some official forum. Talks should generate ideas for the next steps, none of which should be predetermined in the short term. This is no guarantee that the Brotherhood would re-engage, but it would make fundamental opposition more difficult.

 

It seems imprudent to focus on the constitution now, as proposed in the road map. For a constitution to bring stability, it should be the expression of agreed ground rules that hedge the political struggle in a legal framework agreed by all major parties. The Muslim Brotherhood damaged its reputation by bulldozing the current constitution through the Constituent Assembly last November without real negotiation and public consultations. The new government should not repeat the same mistake.

 

Until now the two sides in Egypt have conducted politics as though it were a football match: 1:0 because I won elections, 1:1 because I dissolved the parliament; 2:1 because I imposed a constitution; 2:2 because I deposed your president, and so forth. It has been a game without rules, limits or a referee. This game cannot be repeated forever. Something new has to happen. Rather than asking the electorate to confirm the country’s deep divisions in another series of elections, it is time to negotiate new ground rules.