Hussain Abdul-Hussain

The policy makers leading America's failure in Syria have managed to peg their incompetence to two drastic events that appeal to the American psyche: the miserable Iraq War and the unforgettable Great Recession. Say Syria and officials will immediately counter ‘US boots on the ground.’ Talk about spreading American values and they will talk about the need for nation-building ‘here at home.’

 

But America has various tools to project its power other than sending its 82nd Airborne to occupy Damascus. These tools include shaping the narrative on Syria, applying serious diplomacy – one that is backed by the threat of the use of force – and twisting some friendly arms to make sure that the sponsors of the Syrian opposition, and therefore the opposition itself, speak with one voice.

 

America has needlessly failed on all three counts.

 

From day one, when the peaceful Syrian protesters took to the streets to demand an end to the Assad autocracy in March 2011, America refused to look at the rallies as an uprising for democracy, but rather described them as a sectarian shakeup, which confirmed Assad's rhetoric and gave him cover to kill more. If the conflict is sectarian, then Assad and his sect are not killing to keep his dictatorship, but to survive.

 

By the same token, Assad's opponents, the Sunnis (not necessarily only Syrian), have found it compelling to rally for self-defense, from which the name the Front for the Rescue of the People of Syria (in Arabic, Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham) was drawn.

 

When America helped Assad turn a revolution into a sectarian conflict, it indirectly invited the rally call for the formation of the terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra.

 

Perhaps shaped by his experience in Iraq, US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, unwittingly imported Iraq's failing solution to Syria, which was originally borrowed from faulty Lebanon. Syria's only way forward was an all-encompassing government that included representatives from all Syrian sects, or so Ford argued. Ford had apparently not learned the lessons from Iraq, and before that from Lebanon, that treating ethno-religious groups as monolithic blocs – on which states should be founded – was a recipe for disaster.

 

Then came John Kerry to Foggy Bottom. Under Clinton, the US State Department had some weight and at times argued against the White House, or even changed its mind, like on Libya.

 

But Kerry owes his job to President Barack Obama, and like Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Obama's National Security Council (NSC), Kerry is one of the yes men who does not challenge the reigning orthodoxy in a team not known for its foreign policy gurus.

 

Bolstered by a national mood sour on foreign policy because of Iraq, the White House found it easy to ignore Syria and still win kudos with the American public.

 

Meanwhile, America's foreign policy became like a ship in a storm without a captain.

 

To further undermine its diplomacy, Washington did not leave any space for imagination. In the past, administrations would stay ambiguous about America's use of military power. This would give diplomats the ‘stick’ they need in their toolboxes that also has ‘carrots.’

 

On Syria, Obama made it clear from day one, that the super-power was not interested in deploying any of its military assets, no matter in how small of a supporting role.

 

In the absence of America's leadership, the world started looking like a jungle. Might became right, while the only nations who were advised to refrain from flexing their muscles were America's allies. Obama's failure to stick to the ‘red line’ he drew on Assad's usage of chemical weapons further proved that the free world was now under the leadership of amateurs.

 

Moscow was the first to notice Obama's shortcomings on foreign policy. Russian interests in Syria are mostly nominal, but its president, Vladimir Putin, saw in the Syrian crisis a chance to expand his anti-American populism, and started behaving as if Russia calls the shots in a country whose leader, Assad, owes his continued existence to Iran.

 

Yet to justify their colossal failure on Syria, Obama officials not only invoked the memory of Iraq, but also cited America's economic hardships as another reason for US inaction.

 

Short of sending troops into Syria, or even sending US fighter jets into Syrian airspace, there are dozens of risk-free assaults that would cost America little and Assad a lot. US missiles from the 6th Fleet can target Assad's command-and-control centers, his air defenses, his MiGs and runways, and even his fortified bunkers in North and East Damascus.

 

An American strike must be coupled with smart diplomacy. Hitting Assad should not be for Israel's interest, or to secure chemical weapons, or to undermine Iran or the Shiites. If the United States ever strikes Assad and help rebels defeat him, it should be because America believes in freedom, opposes tyranny, and spares no effort in such pursuit.

 

After that, Moscow and other world capitals can figure out which conference on Syria they want to attend, or not, while Americans can think that – when it comes to Syria's massacres – at least they did their part to help stop them.