By Basem Shabb 

As the battle of Qusair rages on, one wonders why Hezbollah, with its 100,000 rockets, appears to be bogged down, a mere shadow of its effective self during the war with Israel in summer 2006. The 2006 war ended with passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Israel, despite its tactical setbacks, imposed a quiet northern border. Hezbollah, battered but emboldened, emerged from the conflict strengthened. Moreover it was able to replenish its arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles in South Lebanon, which it installed in static positions in remote sanctuaries. Longer-range missiles targeting Israel’s heartland were deployed further north, out of reach of Israeli artillery and ground fire. This pattern of deployment provided excellent deterrence in peacetime and poses a formidable military challenge in the event hostilities resume.

 

The Syrian civil war caught Hezbollah in an awkward situation, as its order of battle was tailored toward Israel. To make matters worse, the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in the vicinity of Hezbollah positions made it almost impossible for the party to tap its military assets, even if the presence did offer it some protection from Israeli firepower. A brilliant plan of concealment turned into a logistical nightmare: Hezbollah’s massive firepower was forcibly quarantined by UNIFIL.

 

This lack of firepower has been evident in Qusair. Artillery fire alone has been inadequate to suppress the Free Syrian Army. According to some sources, poorly coordinated airstrikes by Syria’s air force have claimed several Hezbollah casualties. To compensate for the lack of saturation fire and eager to secure a quick victory, Hezbollah has had to dispatch large numbers of reinforcements to engage in close combat with the Syrian rebels. Not unexpectedly, the party has sustained heavy losses on the battlefield while facing indignation at home.

 

The party’s long-range missiles in North Lebanon are more suited for high-value targets, therefore are of little use in either urban or guerilla warfare. Like the V2 rockets used by Germany during World War II, President Bashar Assad’s Scuds have been mainly employed to terrify and demoralize, but without much success.

 

UNIFIL’s presence has had little impact on the internal balance of power in Lebanon in the aftermath of the 2006 war, when Hezbollah enjoyed popular support. However, as Sunni-Shiite sectarian tensions have risen, Resolution 1701 has become more consequential. In addition to inhibiting Hezbollah’s access to certain types of military stockpiles, UNIFIL’s presence has complicated logistical operations.

 

In a reversal of fortune, Hezbollah can no longer rely on a steady supply of weapons and ammunition from Syria. Instead the flow of materiel has been reversed, with the Beirut-Damascus highway a lifeline for the Syrian regime in terms of food and fuel. The Beirut-Damascus and Lebanese coastal highways traverse predominantly Sunni and Druze areas that may become insecure. Iran has built an alternate highway connecting the south to Syria via the southern Bekaa Valley. UNIFIL surveillance hampers the use of this highway as a main supply route. Replenishing supplies in a war of attrition may prove challenging, even if the recapture of Qusair, by securing the road between Damascus and Syria’s coast, will greatly help the regime.

 

Additionally, should a sectarian confrontation break out in Lebanon and come to involve Palestinians, Hezbollah may find it difficult to deal with armed and trained Palestinian factions in Lebanon’s southern refugee camps, because it may not have ready access to those weapons that provide the party with its overwhelming advantage in firepower.

 

As Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah threatens to expand resistance to the Golan Heights, Resolution 1701 assumes greater importance. Such threats are best carried out from the Lebanese side, since the Druze population on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border is reluctant to engage in such an endeavor. At the same time, UNIFIL’s presence on the Lebanese side precludes a sustained and meaningful effort to extend the confrontation to the Golan Heights.

 

Resolution 1701 should be re-examined in light of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria and the potential for a sectarian spillover in Lebanon. By sequestering large and valuable assets in southern Lebanon as well as limiting the possibility of expanding the conflict against Israel to the Golan Heights, Resolution 1701 may have achieved indirectly what it initially failed to do.

 

UNIFIL’s presence has affected the balance of power in Syria, by affecting whether Hezbollah can fully mobilize its resources and freely project its firepower in support of the Syrian regime. Whereas Resolution 1701 failed to contain Hezbollah after 2006, it now assumes an important role in moderating Hezbollah’s outreach. As events unfold UNIFIL’s presence may be more important than ever in maintaining stability and peace in Lebanon