Michael Young

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, commemorating the 39th anniversary of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war recently, has reportedly taken personal command of his country’s military. (AFP Photo)
 

It’s odd that at a moment when Syria’s allies in Beirut have been quietly saying that the Syrian army has widened its margin to act independently of President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian conflict, we hear that Assad has taken personal command of the troops.
 
Odder still is that one of those pro-Syrian Lebanese made this statement to Reuters: “He is no longer a president who depends on his team and directs through his aides. This is a fundamental change in Assad's thinking. Now he is involved in directing the battle.”
 
So, which is it? Is Assad in charge or not in charge? Is the news of the president’s hands-on approach an effort to dispel the widespread feeling that Assad is thoroughly disengaged when it comes to combating what his regime calls “armed terrorist groups”?
 
It’s not clear, but the story opens the door to several possibilities. For a start, that the Syrian regime feels a need to mention Assad’s purportedly new role represents an implicit admission that things have been amiss militarily. Yes, it is the regime’s way of saying that the gloves are off, therefore no one should expect a political solution to the crisis. But it also tells us that the military campaign is in need of new momentum. We knew that, but Assad’s supporters were reluctant to admit it. Now they have indirect confirmation of their worst fears.
 
Bashar’s entering the military fray may also be an indication that the president feels he has lost control over his armed forces, just as he appears to be facing strains in the inner core of his regime. The most recent example of this was the departure of his sister Bushra for Dubai, amid suspicions that the bomb attack that eliminated her husband, Assef Shawkat, was an inside job, organized by the regime itself. Too little attention was paid to Bushra’s exit, as this was likely the first instance of discord within the Assad household.
 
By reasserting his authority, at least publicly, Assad could be seeking to glue the increasingly disparate pieces of Assad rule back together again. But here too there is an implicit admission. When you say that you’re taking command, what you are really saying is that previously you were not in command. And not being in command 19 months into a vast uprising is confirmation of gross negligence.
 
It’s vaguely conceivable that Bashar’s formal implication in the battle may be a sign that senior officers want the president to be less distant from the fighting on the ground. If they are butchering in his name, then he might as well bear full responsibility for what is going on. But then again no one doubts the president’s command responsibility for the carnage. If one day the International Criminal Court happens to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria, Assad will be high in the dock–an Arab Slobodan Milosevic.
 
That the president feels a need to officially announce his direct authority could also be related to internal Alawite politics. Given recent information about inter-Alawite fighting, allegedly sparked by criticism of Assad’s handling of the revolt, it would make sense for the president to remind everyone who is boss, if only to stiffen the back of his own community at a moment of existential anxiety.  
 
Whatever the correct explanation, there is a simple rule in politics: When things are going wrong, never suggest that they aren’t going right. The recent takeover by the Free Syrian Army of Maarat al-Naaman means that Assad’s capability of reinforcing his troops in Aleppo may soon diminish dramatically. The president needs to reverse that setback. This compels him to place himself at the vanguard of the confrontation to give heart to his exhausted units, who are caught on a conveyor belt of killing, without an end in sight. 
 
The rebel advances only underline how damaging have been the efforts by the United States in particular to limit the distribution of qualitatively better weapons to the Free Syrian Army. One is reminded of Bill Clinton’s upholding of a United Nations arms embargo on Bosnia in 1994, after the American president had initially supported lifting the embargo during his campaign. Ultimately, this left the military advantage to the Bosnian Serbs, with terrible consequences. The massacre of over 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica forced Clinton’s hand and precipitated a much higher level of intervention by NATO, under Washington’s guidance.
 
Whatever we can say about the announcement that Bashar al-Assad has taken command, the president, in practical terms, has almost certainly not taken command of anything operationally. In the end he remains a civilian–and an amateur leading Syria’s military is really the last thing it needs after a year and a half of slow, steady retreat. 

Michael Young is opinion editor of The Daily Star newspaper in Lebanon. He tweets @BeirutCalling.