Political Developments
in Arab Countries Since 2011

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Papers from a workshop organized by the *Arab Network for the Study of Democracy* and the *Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs*

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AUTHORS

Tarek Mitri • Ziad Majed • Samir Franjieh • Fouad Fouad Adel Shargabi • Ahmed al-Fituri • Mohamed al-Mekhlafi Ahmad Karoud • Fouad al-Said • Mohammad al-Haj Salem Abdelaziz Karraky • Hazem al-Amin • Hassan Krayem

Translated by Jeffrey D. Reger.

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THIS BOOK

This book is comprised of research papers and case studies that were presented and discussed at a working that was organized by the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy and the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut on March 17–18, 2016. The workshop addressed the situation in the region since the outbreak of what was known as the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" in 2011. The workshop was divided into three sessions dealing respectively with the effects of societal divisions on the region; the role of the armed forces and security services; and the role of the forces of "political Islam" and the repercussions for "civil" forces.

FOREWORD

Tarek Mitri[*]

In the past two decades, in light of the wave of democratization that took place in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe, the Arab world appeared unique in its reluctance to embrace the politics prevailing in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union. Talk began to spread in the West and among Arabs themselves about an Arab or Islamic exception. Some proponents of our authenticity and originality, those clinging to our distinctiveness and exaggerating its greatness, saw this not as a form of distinction or differentiation, but as resistance to the torrent of globalization, which they considered to be an expression of Western domination over the resources of the world. Others saw Arab exceptionalism as a major difference between our countries and the rest of the world, hiding the lag in catching up to the process

[*] Tarek Mitri is an author and academic, a former Lebanese minister, and the former head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. He currently works as director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.

of transitioning toward democracy, which has caused fundamental problems in society as well as in culture. This is connected in part to the resistance of traditional structures to modernity and the force of collective identities constricting the independence of the individual and constraining individual freedoms. Others attributed the Arab exception to the deep contradiction between the prevailing political culture and the history of Islam, where the unity of the ummah (the Islamic community) and its protection from fitna (sedition leading to civil strife) are paramount for the freedom of the community and its right to participate in decision-making—wherein disobedience toward the ruler is stigmatized under suspicion of weakening the ummah and sowing discord. While in this model the space between subjugation and disobedience was narrowed, by contrast, democracy seeks to widen this space.

However, the explosion of the Arab revolution, five years prior, put an end (on the surface at least) to this exception. The many failures in the transition toward democracy have brought back the idea of exceptionalism to the minds of some, as if they have seen what we have arrived at after a short period and judged it to be the ultimate end of the story. In reality, we are still at the beginning. The initiation of revolutions and the beginning of unprecedented, radical transformations changed expectations, far exceeding what scholars and activists had previously came to expect from their observations.

Today, we confront setbacks and severe disappointments. Acknowledging this fact does not mean that failure is predetermined, and it does not mean that its causes are inherent to the Arab world—as if there is some imagined essence to our Arab societies that precludes democracy. Rather than resort to essentialism, analyzing the failures requires looking with both eyes open at a number of historical problems. These historical problems can be grouped into three

categories: the fragility of social cohesion and national unity, the difficulty of extricating a country from the legacy of authoritarian regimes, and the weaknesses in managing the transitional period.

These problems illustrate the rockiness of the road to democracy. They raise serious questions about the priorities of transformation in our societies and how to do it. There are various causes for the difficulty of democratic transformation, both internal and external. Some of these problems reveal the dilemma of extirpating practices witnessed for ages under authoritarianism. Others highlight the dearth of political experience in the modern era, connected to the decline of the influence and capacity of the middle class, and the disintegration of state institutions after the fall of the ruling elite that had exploited them, while remaining preoccupied with preserving their tyranny over all openings via its security services.

Thus, we need to more precisely define the social forces that have been responsible for revolutions. Do they see the establishment of democracy as a primary objective and understand the conditions for democratic life? Are they convinced of the fundamental need for democracy as a means to escape the disintegration of our societies? We have seen that not every uprising against an authoritarian ruler is proof of a commitment to democracy. There is no doubt that the orientations of the new elite, on the level of their values, political culture, and behavior, have a profound effect on the chances of the democratic transition, especially in terms of their ability to present alternatives to the fallen regimes and be truly liberated from their legacy.

This does not mean the blind adoption of ready prescriptions promoted by various international organizations, inspired by the experiences of other countries in regions that have known historical circumstances and cultural influences different from those in our countries. These

prescriptions call for hastily organizing free and fair elections, implementing a new constitution, empowering civil society organizations, and administrative reform—rather than striving first to build a national consensus about the requirements of state building and urging the collective national will to rise above score settling with the deposed regime. These priorities may necessitate not quickly convening elections, because such a rush may exacerbate divisions in an unconsolidated society and increase the chance of fragmenting its most critical components after the fall of the repressive regime.

Naturally, democratic transition necessitates an awareness of the importance of distinguishing between stages. The first transitional stage is, as a matter of fact, a stage of laying the foundation necessary for managing the process of the transition. This means giving priority to dialogue, consensus seeking, and inclusive participation in public discussions about the constitution—as a type of new social contract—and not rushing to formulate it among a limited coterie, whether appointed or elected. We have learned from the experiences of other countries that the people most capable of completing the task of leading the transitional stage are those without aspirations of assuming power after the conclusion of the transitional stage. We have also learned that the military, if forced by the circumstances of the country to play a prominent role in the transitional stage, should not be invited to assume control over state institutions. Instead, their task should remain keeping the peace and protecting the political process, without intervening in it.

The Arab world, with a few exceptions, remains at the start of the path to true democracy. This necessitates consciousness of the need for gradual progression, step by step, and not being content with elections, which risks falling into a needless struggle. Adoption of quick elections, in light of the

familiar mix among us between authority and state, makes democracy a means of obtaining power for a faction, whether a great majority or an isolated minority, over another faction. In light of the vertical divisions—sectarian, doctrinal, and cultural—elections become divisive, sorting groups formed on the basis of clannishness, without reference to shared nationality.

The Arab experiences of the past five years, both the bitter and the gratifying, have taught us that inclusion is better than exclusion, joining together is better than segregation, and acceptance of diversity is a necessity. This ensures that the subsequent competition, which is part of the nature of democracy, remains a quarrel and does not escalate into bloody conflict.

INTRODUCTION

A NEW FOUNDATIONAL MOMENT AMONG CONFLICTS AND CHANGING PARAMETERS

*Ziad Majed**

Since 2011, the Arab world has witnessed transformations, revolutions, and counterrevolutions—ending decades of political stagnation and calcification under regimes that had taken or usurped power via coups for several decades. The *mashriq* (the eastern part of the Arab world) has experienced violent rumblings that could best be considered as the dawning of a new age, or a foundational moment for the fifth stage in its modern history, which followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This latest moment follows four other moments, each of which has had a profound effect in determining the features of the years following them.

∗   Ziad Majed is a Professor of Middle East Studies at the American University of Paris and Coordinator of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy.

The first foundational moment was from 1915–1920, marked by the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Pikot Treaty, the Balfour Declaration, and the conferences following World War I at Paris and San Remo, which resulted in the treaties of Versailles and Sèvres. The events and agreements of this period resulted in borders for emergent national entities that remained vulnerable to irredentist claims and objections. These entities began building new narratives and formulating renewed identities based on reclaimed pasts and the land demarcated for them by the victorious colonial powers.

The second moment took shape from 1948–1949 with the establishment of the state of Israel and its expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, which was followed by a series of Arab-Israeli wars in the shadow of the Cold War and a bipolar world. Newly independent Arab states sought shelter in the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle against their own social upheavals, which resulted in coups in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, and something akin to a coup in Algeria (though under different circumstances owing to the peculiar form of French colonialism, which had occupied Algeria for over a century and sought to officially incorporate it as départements of France).

The third moment began in 1973, the year of the last war between Arab states and Israel, and the year of Egypt's withdrawal from the conflict and its transition away from the legacy of Nasserism and toward what was called *infitah*, or economic openness to private investment. This moment had numerous implications, among them the ascendance of Palestinian nationalism in the form of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which took the lead in the conflict against Israel and was emblematic of the fracturing of the Arab side into cleavage-ridden organizations and non-state actors.

However, this moment also witnessed the beginning of the oil boom that gave the states of the Arab Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, expansive influence in the region. Oil money accelerated the changing of the guard in favor of Islamist movements and gave rise to a new socio-cultural climate in multiple countries, which began identifying as Islamic as well as Arab.

The fourth moment emerged immediately after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the emergence of Khomeinism as an attractive ideology of rule capable of exportation and duplication. The revolution was followed by a vicious war between Iraq and Iran that propagated additional wars in the future, such as the invasion of Kuwait and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, foreign military bases were established in much of the Gulf, the focus of Osama bin Laden's ire and the pretext for al-Qaeda's attacks on the United States, which in turn led to the most recent American war in 2003 that toppled Saddam Hussein and occupied Iraq. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was also accompanied by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion initiated a call to jihad that attracted thousands of jihadists and established support networks that would continue their operations publicly and privately until the Soviet defeat. These same networks gave the support needed to establish and grow al-Qaeda, which in turn established branches in multiple countries, relying on fighters returning home from the war in Afghanistan. Some were jailed or co-opted by the *mukhabarat* (secret police or intelligence agencies) in their respective countries, with each nation's returning jihadists taking divergent paths, until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 became a rallying point, attracting some veterans of the Afghan jihad as well as a new generation inspired by jihadist ideology.

The fifth foundational moment, which we have been living in since 2011 and is being addressed by this volume, is no less

dangerous than those preceding it, and its implications are no less transformative for the existing political, economic, and cultural structures (though none of these changes are completely new or divorced from the past). What perhaps distinguishes the situation today is the capacity to uncover transformations occurring in tense political situations or in violent warzones, and our ability to understand or reinterpret dynamics or phenomena that were ignored or marginalized, or whose effects were unrecognized or imprecisely studied using outdated methodologies. Such issues include sectarianism, regionalism, tribalism, and nationalism, as well as class and other types of formations, the roles of the military and security apparatus, and the differences from one country to another.

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have occupied the most attention for the twists and turns of their respective paths. All three kicked off revolutions and the processes of toppling their regimes in divergent circumstances. The first, Tunisia, witnessed a political transformation with relative flexibility. The second, Egypt, saw a brief experiment in Islamist rule after snap elections and then a military coup with a veneer of popular support. The third, Libya, resulted in a civil war pitting regions against each other and a half-hearted Western-led military invention. In the meantime, the *mashriq*—along with Yemen—has transformed into a space of open conflict for domestic, regional, and international actors to settle scores and pursue their interests, often at the expense of the existing balance of power and alliances.

A case in point is the Syrian situation, which evolved from a popular, peaceful revolution against authoritarian rule into an armed conflict for the country. The war has not negated the legitimacy of the revolution and it has not completely suffocated its dynamics, but it has flooded the country with militias and external allies of the Syrian parties in the internecine war, transformed much of the

country into rubble, and caused the worst humanitarian
disaster since World War II. Likewise, the Iraqi situation has
collapsed in the wake of the authoritarianism of the new
ruling elite and their marginalization—for sectarian and
political motives—of wide swaths of the Iraqi public, which
Da'ish (the Arabic acronym for the organization declaring
itself the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham") exploited in
its rise and extension throughout Iraq and Syria. The rise
of Da'ish in Syria in turn has also threatened Jordan and
Lebanon with demographic change, at least temporarily,
through the massive Syrian displacement.

Therefore, the *mashriq* and the region as a whole has
entered a new phase, the features of which are not yet
entirely clear. The end of the current phase will also result
in new variables and the end of certain features and poli-
cies. The future will likely be determined by the balance of
power among the allies in the current conflict, which itself
does not appear to be ending anytime soon.

This volume is a call to consider some of the integral
issues that explain what is going on and to analyze their
variables, and thereby help in better understanding both
our present and where it may lead.

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIETAL DIVISIONS IN THE REGION

THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL SOCIAL DIVISIONS ON THE PATH OF TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Samir Franjieh[*]

A quick panoramic view of events in most of the countries impacted by the "Arab Spring" since 2011 reveals that divisions of society have had an enormous effect on subsequent events. These divisions have not only governed the shapes and motivations of internal conflicts, but have also been the pivotal points for the interventions of major regional and international powers that have sought to manage the conflicts in accordance with their divergent agendas. The result of this "Spring" is that the reins have been taken out of the hands of its people. From a sociological standpoint,

[*] Samir Franjieh is a writer, researcher, and former member of Lebanese Parliament. He is also a founding member of the Permanent Conference for Lebanese Dialogue.

to establish a conceptual framework, I believe that the roots of these divisions may be found in the reality of the diversity and pluralism of particularly complex societies. Herein lies the essential problem: should we condemn difference, diversity, and pluralism and therefore work to erase differences—typically though violence — or should we acknowledge and respect it, and therefore work to manage it wisely? My intervention here will address this problem in our contemporary world and our Arab region, with a focus on the Lebanese experience and its successes and failures, in order to provide a conceptual framework.

First, the challenge facing us today in Lebanon, as well as in the Arab world, can be summarized by the following question: How can we live together as equals in our rights and responsibilities, diverse in our religious, racial, and cultural affiliations, while also being in solidarity with our common effort for a better future for all of us?

In essence, when today we witness the proliferation of violence in our region and beyond in the West, we fail to realize the significance of this diversity that marks our societies. The lack of recognition for this diversity comes as a result of the policies of authoritarian regimes that saw diversity as a danger and a threat to their power. As a result, the authoritarian regimes systematically worked, occasionally using the pretext of "modernization," to break the different forms of solidarity in our societies. Afterward, nothing remained except a pile of individuals, named—for the purpose of aggrandizement—"a people represented by a single party, which in turn was embodied in a single leader." All in Lebanon remember during the Syrian occupation, not unpleasantly, that one referred to Syria colloquially as "al-Assad's Syria." Likewise, the enormous banner raised at the most congested intersection in the capital Beirut: "Our leader forever, Hafez al-Assad!" Most of the Arab world can be summed up in a few names and slogans of this type.

All regimes that construct their legitimacy on ideology—whether nationalistic, religious, or social—participate in this phenomenon of abbreviation whereby the party or the leader stands in for the people. For example, the Soviet Union and populist China are perhaps the best examples of the extent to which this extreme abbreviation can be deployed under the guise of societal representation and identification with the single party or party leader.

Second, although these regimes refused to acknowledge the diversity of their societies, they worked to exploit diversity in other societies and countries to serve their own interests illegitimately.

Syria exploited the sectarian diversity of Lebanon to provoke conflicts, thereby giving it the opportunity to impose its "guardianship" over Lebanon.

Israel—which demanded that all acknowledge the "Jewishness" of its Hebrew state, without any consideration of its own preexisting diversity—was determined for a long time to strike at the Lebanese model of coexistence, considering it a repudiation of the model it sought to impose. It did so through repeated wars and incursions, as well as intervening in internal Lebanese affairs, working under the guise of an alliance of minorities.

Iran, which sought to impose itself as the representative of the Islamic world in the new world order that came to light with the end of the Cold War, worked to establish a "Shiite crescent" in its orbit. This policy, from 2003 until now, has been embodied in four wars through which Iran sought to collude with the Syrian regime: the Lebanese-Israeli War in July 2006, the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007, the Hezbollah seizure of Beirut in 2008, and the Gaza War between Israel and Hamas in 2009. To these, we can add the intervention in Yemen in support of the Houthi-Saleh coup against the constitutionally legitimate government.

With the uprising of the Syrian people in 2011, and the involvement of Iran in the fighting alongside the regime there, our region has entered into the furnace of religious war, resembling to a great extent the Thirty-Years War that destroyed European societies from the Baltic to the Mediterranean through bloody conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in the 17th century. What reinforces this impression are the ongoing efforts to form a Middle Eastern "Sunni front" in opposition to a "Shiite front," composed of the sites of Iranian influence or what has been termed the countries of the "Shiite crescent." Such a division of the region, along the lines of religions and nations, will only lead to widespread devastation.

Third, the refusal to acknowledge diversity is not a phenomenon limited to our region. Western modernity, based on the glorification of individualism, necessitates a break from prior loyalties. This breakage is considered liberating from the servitude of connection to another, since the other is no longer considered in these societies a desirable complement, but a competitor and an adversary. One cannot self-realize without confronting the selfish individualism of others.

The reality is that this understanding of individualism has begun to change in the West itself. "Over the past three decades, we have become determined, we the Westerners on the path of individualism," writes the French researcher Jean-Claude Gibeau, "this individual freedom has led to a theory in violation of traditional linkages in our society, whether religious, social, or familial. We have established an anthropological model that no society before ours has known; it is a model in which the individual is the independent master. It is truly a great victory!" He continues: "Despite this, feelings of sadness, exclusion, and loneliness accompany this independence until today. We have begun to realize that our individuality, to which we owe our current independence, has recoiled from the individual to

become a rigid dogma and an organizing principle (…).” The individual, as the independent master of his own invention, suffers today from being orphaned. In other words, we have begun to recognize that social, cultural, and human linkages and relationships among individuals are in fact the basis of existence for any of us. It is incumbent upon us to work to overcome this current conflict inside the modern individual between individualism and a connection with others. We need both of these things together.

Acknowledgment of diversity and what results from it, coexistence, was contained in a paper prepared by a group of European leaders building on an assignment from the Secretary General of the European Parliament, entitled “Europe of Coexistence in the 21st Century.” The term “coexistence” was not used in European policy publications before this report, which noted that Europe contains about 40 million Muslims today, as well as people of other religions and ethnicities coming from the Near and Far East.

But the spread of violence to Europe has driven political currents in most European countries to reject the idea of coexistence and adopt extremist arguments marked by xenophobia, or more specifically, Islamophobia. In France, the National Front is well-known for its extremism. In Sweden, the far-right is distinguished by its severe hostility. In Hungary, there is a neo-Nazi movement. In Bulgaria, the president has called for “turning the bodies of Gypsies into soap.” In Greece, the Golden Dawn party has Nazi sympathies as well.

Fourth, the acknowledgement of diversity begins with the decision by the individual person, before it can be acknowledged by the society.

What is simplified in popular discourse as the “identity” of the individual is in fact a complex array of internal personal identifications and external categorizations by others. Identity contains multiple, overlapping, and nested

affiliations (familial, professional, national, sectarian, cultural, individual, etc.). Some of these affiliations are defined by the history of the existing groupings in society. Others can be traced to the natural features of the country (such as internal geographical divisions between coast, mountain, and plains), in addition to other factors. But "identity" is not a random, arbitrary collection or accumulation of divergent affiliations; rather, it is a sort of précis or short summary of the individual personality or character. The individual will not move from a smaller scale affiliation to a larger scale one without reassurance that there is a place for her or him in the broader context. At the same time, the individual needs reassurance that adding additional layers of identification within a larger grouping will not make her or him lose the preexisting framework, that is, the understanding of who she or he is.

The reduction of "identity" to just one of its component parts leads to the creation of an unnatural division between the different circles of affiliations of an individual, and thereby weakens the cohesion and complementariness of the individual's character. Crises and pressures can drive the individual to disaffiliate and find refuge in either a broader or narrower circle of "identity." The Lebanese experience offers an example of these two types of phenomena: the disconnect between circles of affiliation and the escape from affiliations in crisis. When the nationalist circle of affiliation for the person was shaken to its core, we saw how individuals responded by escaping either to broader affiliations (supranational ideologies based on religion or ethnicity, such as Arab nationalism or pan-Islamism) or to narrower affiliations (sectarianism, regionalism, or familial).

Fifth, recognition of diversity requires the formulation of policy that guarantees coexistence among the diverse elements, recognizes both what is shared among and what is particular to each group, and links these groups together in citizenship and diversity.

In the Lebanese case, there is the formulation put into place with the Taif Agreement (1989), which ended the Lebanese Civil War. This formulation links the legitimacy of the authorities to their ability to protect the shared life of its citizens and their coexistence, which represents the basis of the social contract. This understanding of legitimacy was completely new to Lebanese understanding, as it no longer based legitimacy on the shared interests of interconnected sects at a specific historical moment. Instead, it became the foundation for a reality of coexistence, both realized and developing. In other words, legitimacy was no longer the foundation of an imagined history, but for a current reality. It therefore became subject to constant questioning about the extent of its actual capacity to undertake its duty of preserving coexistence. This duty is not one whose work can be done once and then is everlasting; it is a task that must constantly be completed.

The formula enacted in the Taif Agreement contained the elimination of sectarian quotas in parliament and the establishment of an alternate chamber, such as a senate, that would represent the sects as such. The idea was to make the issues of demographic balance, or alliances with foreign powers as compensation for numerical inferiority, nonfactors that could not be used to force the modification of sectarian quotas in the state. The theory here was that sects could not resort to inventing "special projects" to change the balance of power, thereby avoiding conflicts among them over demographics and external alliances.

By negating numerical standards, the Taif Agreement put an end to the understanding of Lebanese sects as they were, and opened the way for the enormous possibilities of their mutual interactions happening in a better way. Each minority became a member component of the "majority having a pluralistic nature," that is as a group of Lebanese with a composite identity, indivisible into separate components.

Therefore, the Lebanese were no longer a group of entities, but a single entity. This single entity was not founded on the denial of diversity and the imposition of forced assimilation. Instead, it was based on the acknowledgment, respect, and preservation of diversity.

In breaking the minoritarian logic, the Taif Agreement liberated the Lebanese from the "knot of fear of the other" that had been at the core of all sectarian policies. As a result, the other was no longer an adversary who should be confronted continuously, because the other formed a constant existential threat to oneself. Instead, the other became a complementary and essential element to oneself. The demographic obsession of the Christians and Druze, the historical persecution complex of the Shiites, the feeling of oppression among Sunnis, these were all exchanged for the feeling of belonging to a unified majority of minorities within the Arab world. From this new viewpoint, all of these well-known complexes would not return. These complexes had been the main driver of Lebanese history until that point, wherein each sect would attempt to control the state, or at least a part of it, under the pretext of providing "guarantees" of their existence.

Through their commitment to this social contract based upon mutual coexistence, the Lebanese were transferred from being "members in a sectarian group" into the position of "citizens" in a state of mutual coexistence. This did not call on them to abandon their personal affiliations or variegated identities, whether sectarian, regional, cultural or otherwise. It did not mean abandoning their openness to other worlds, whether Arab, Islamic, or Western. It did not necessitate foregoing their personal historical references and narratives. To the contrary, these varied affiliations were affirmed to enrich their mutual coexistence on an ongoing, continuous basis. Each offered their own contribution to the larger project.

Sixth, acknowledgment of diversity necessitates challenging the culture of division and negation reigning on a wide scale and replacing it with a different culture, one of connection with and openness to the other. How does this culture express itself in the Lebanese case?

– The culture of connection and openness to the other means that the rights of citizens are absolutely equal. Therefore, the sects in Lebanon are groups that must exceed their individuality to be groups with equivalent guarantees; that is, the protection of the group and its individuals depends upon the state to provide its security. The culture of division and negation, by contrast, sees citizens as numbers within their sects and minorities continuously threatened existentially. Within such a culture, each component seeks to guarantee one's own protection, in isolation from others, and typically in opposition to them.

– The culture of connection and openness to the other is based upon pluralism and cultural openness and interaction. This lifestyle has been developed in Lebanon, though it has not been easy to achieve here as elsewhere. I believe that we are a vanguard of an original contribution to the enrichment of world civilization, in its continuous search of a better, humanitarian environment. Such a lifestyle guarantees one the opportunity of communication and interaction with the other, and enriches one's character by meeting the novel character of another, thereby in turn enriching the character of the other. This can all occur without negating the specificities and differences that are in this case the source of enrichment for all. The culture of division and difference, by contrast, is based upon dividing the world into two camps: good and evil, fidelity and infidelity. Such a lifestyle drives one to fear living with the different other and to line up, without conditions, behind the most severe extremists — sometimes

in the name of larger principles, and sometimes in the name of eliminating nationalist, sectarian or narrower partisan affiliations. This culture in Lebanon exploited factors of silence and fear to propel sects toward "foreign protectorates," in an attempt to modify the internal balances of powers with external support and external conditions. This is what happened yesterday, and this is what will happen today in such a culture.

The Lebanese bearers of memory understand well the meaning of such a distinguished human experience. It is an experience that does not lack for transitory testimonies, whether they are Lebanese, Arab, or foreign:

– The culture of connectedness and openness with the other is based upon the purification of memory, and turning the page of the past in favor of acknowledging collective and individual responsibility for the mistakes of the war. All victims are considered martyrs of the nation, lest Lebanese—among which are the victims—remain divided onto two sides: traitors and heroes. There have been efforts by most Lebanese in the past 25 years to move on from the war and purify its memory. A culture of division and negation is based, on the other hand, on selective memory, recalling crimes and slapping the face of the other, with the intention of preventing a return to connectedness.

– The culture of connection and openness to the other views religion as a linkage among Lebanese, through their common belief that religion is divine, while the nation is for all. The culture of division and negation claims a monopoly of the holy and of the truth, giving itself the right, in the name of the holy, to decide good and evil, and to declare its adversaries infidels and traitors.

– The culture of connectedness and openness to the other views a human being as valuable in and of itself, in isolation from its various affiliations. It calls for respecting

the other, regardless of difference and variation, without seeking to negate or subordinate, without imposing forced assimilation that denies particularities or that homogenizes and reduces one's person to a single dimension. The culture of division and negation reduces the individual to their group, and thereby denies the freedom and right of one to choose a path outside of the one prescribed by the group to which one belongs.

The culture of division and negation cost the Lebanese an enormous price: 144,240 killed, 17,415 missing, and 197,506 wounded. These numbers do not include the cities and villages destroyed, the forced exile of hundreds of thousands of her sons and daughters, lost incomes, and reduced quality of life. They paid the price with their living flesh, with their capacity to hope, with their eligibility for salvation, and with their respect for themselves.

THE SOCIAL TOPOGRAPHY

A READING OF THE SOCIETAL DIVISIONS IN SYRIA AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE CURRENT CONFLICT

Fouad M. Fouad[*]

Introduction

With the Syrian conflict entering its sixth year, no one, regardless of the precision of their analysis or the spaciousness of their imagination, can be anything other than astounded by gazing at the figures and the data calculating the amount of destruction, blood, and turmoil of the events that have stormed through this country. Even in the darkest and most pessimistic scenarios, no one could have expected the fate that has befallen a revolution of the people

*   Fouad Fouad is a Syrian doctor of medicine, researcher, and an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Health Sciences of the American University of Beirut.

undertaken for rights recognized by most of the world, for the rights achieved by many countries before Syria, and for the same rights that other peoples will certainly persist in demanding after Syria.

The Syrian catastrophe is the worst humanitarian disaster since the Second World War—according to the United Nations Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura[11]— wherein many of the neighborhoods of some of the oldest cities in the world have been destroyed, and villages and small towns have been wiped off the map; half a million have been killed, five million have been made refugees, and seven million have become internally displaced. Unknown numbers have been arrested, are missing, or have been forcibly disappeared. Thousands of young activists who went out five years ago shouting for freedom and dignity are now underneath the soil, in jail, or frustrated and scattered across the vast land of the country. All of these together make Syria appear closer to ruins than a state and a society.

Is it because of geopolitics? Is it the historical and geographical position of Bilad al-Sham (a historical province of the Umayyad Caliphate that encompasses much of the modern Levant), of which Syria was the largest state? How quickly did the most legitimate demands become transformed into an opportunity for regional and world powers to attempt to rearrange the region according to their own interests, regardless of whether it set the area back more than a century?

Is the cause the nature of the regime that ruled Syria for 50 years, where the party came first and the country became secondary to the kingdom of the ruling family, regardless of whether usurpation or scorched earth tactics were necessary to ensure continuity?

Is it the composition of Syrian society to begin with—pluralistic and diverse in terms of sect, ethnicity, and culture—

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1)   UN News Center. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewID=49806#.VvcTuouzLdk (accessed March 2, 2016).

that what was established was a state imposed from above, against the will of its components and without taking into account what they wanted, would desire, and agree upon?

There is no clear answer. Certainly, there is no single answer. Perhaps, there will never be an answer.

This paper contends that it is the societal divisions in Syria, composed of several intersecting levels—some vertical, some horizontal, and others combining or covering multiple levels. When viewed in detail for scholarly purposes, it is indispensable to note that the interplay and interaction of different factors among each other makes them in some ways indivisible. Also, the examination of the divisions of Syrian society has been much commented upon in Leftist literature, with a focus on class divisions or the rural/urban divide. But, it must be noted that these two divisions are the central pillar of the ideological, media, and cultural rhetoric of the Ba'ath party (behind which is the security apparatus). At the same time, Ba'athist rhetoric has closed off the possibility of examining other divisions. Instead, the regime used these divisions as a resource to be exploited when needed, turning the social and cultural richness of the country into a weapon in its various battles.

1. Geographical/topographical divisions and history

In a speech given by Dutch diplomat and researcher Nikolaos van Dam in Aleppo in October 2007,[2] marking the 400th anniversary of the opening of the first Dutch Consulate in Bilad al-Sham, he recalled the following: "1964 was my first journey to Syria. I was a student seeking Aleppo and its rural countryside. I had reached Istanbul on the Orient Express, from there by bus to the city of Iskenderun

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2) http://www.nikolaosvandam.com/pdf/
   speech/20071028nvdamspeech01us.pdf

(historically known in English as Alexandretta) in the Hatay Province claimed by Syrians as the Iskenderun District. In Iskenderun, among those called 'Turks of Arab origin,' I saw and recognized for the first time, Bilad al-Sham. That wide swath of land that is known as "Greater Syria," extending to the cities of Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. I was in Iskenderun, and I began to see the first of its features. This impression did not change when I crossed the political border between the two countries at Bab al-Hawa. Bilad al-Sham continued as it had appeared before the border. In my several subsequent tours when I became a diplomat and my several later personal visits, I became more certain that Bilad al-Sham is Bilad al-Sham: various dialects and cultures, but one flavor with similar character. But things changed when in the beginning of the 1970s I crossed the Euphrates eastbound by car from Aleppo to Mosul, where Mesopotamia appear before my eyes. This impression rose suddenly as the car passed al-Raqqah eastbound, where the lands between the rivers and its culture appeared, likewise before the borders of the Iraqi state. It was exactly like the impression that came to me in Iskenderun, when Greater Syria appeared before the borders of the Syrian state."

"In my opinion, the Syrian Arab Republic covers an area smaller than Bilad al-Sham, that does not include Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and a portion of territory that has fallen under Turkish rule. But the state of Syria also encompasses area outside Bilad al-Sham, the northeastern regions of the country, beginning east of the Euphrates and extending to encompass what is called the Syrian al-Jazira. I apologize to the republic and its officials here and ask not to be misunderstood. This should never be taken as a justification for the division of the country. It is just personal observations and impressions."

Perhaps there is no need to discuss again here the role of geography and history in formulating the present of today's

nation-states, their issues and problems, and the features of their futures and fates as well. The modern Syrian state has not deviated much from the confused shape between the lines on maps that changed frequently as they changed hands between Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, between the years 1916 and 1920, to warp the straight lines of the Syrian map, which extended in earlier maps from Jordan to Iran and included Mosul in Syria. The English took this region, which at the time had been recently discovered to be rich in oil,—literally—with the stroke of a pen.

It must be noted that Ottoman Syria at the end of the 19th century was not exactly the three *vilayat* (provinces) of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, or its two *mutasarrafiyat* (a district with special administrative status ruled by a governor appointed directly by the Sultan) of Deir Ezzor and Jerusalem, which were established on a racial or religious basis. This made a region like northern Greater Syria (current northern Syria and southern Turkey) encompass a wide mixture of Turkmens, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, and Arabs. Likewise, the notable class in the cities was made up of families that mixed Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab blood, such as the al-Qotli, al-Shishkli, and Hnanu families. This intermixing did not prevent the emergence of Arab or Syrian nationalist tendencies later in the French Mandate period.

Thus, neither historic Syria nor the Syria of Sykes-Picot was ever a centralized state like Egypt (centered around the Nile River), around which civilizations and a centralized authority were based. The geography of Syria imposed great geographical diversity: mountains, deserts, and plains. This made Syria an open space for independent communities, creating ethnic and religious diversity. Likewise, the geographic location made it one of the essential trading corridors of ancient and medieval world commerce, which in turn brought even further ethnic and religious diversity.

These layers of geography, history, and natural resources combined to create a multilayered society in which different sects, ethnicities, and classes intermixed.

2. Ethnic, religious, and sectarian divisions

The map of the Syrian Kingdom did not appear stable until 1920, when it lasted a few short months before becoming the state of Syria under the League of Nations mandate system. It was quickly subject to further geographical changes that continued throughout the period of the mandate. The chief division at the beginning was the two large *vilayat* from the Ottoman period (Damascus and Aleppo), and this divide widened on a sectarian basis under French rule. An Alawite statelet was formed on the coast, a Druze statelet was formed in the south, and the clan-based statelet of al-Jazira was formed in the north. Notably, the French did not think about establishing a Kurdish statelet. At the same time, the subdistricts of Tripoli, Baalbek, Sidon, and Tyre were joined to the governorate of Mount Lebanon in order to form the state of Greater Lebanon under Maronite leadership. This may indicate a French preference for divisions on sectarian, rather than an ethnic, basis. However, Turkish forces subsequently entered into an agreement with the French to take over the Iskenderun district, renaming it the Hatay Province on September 2, 1938. The Armenians of Kesab, a small city with an Armenian majority that was included as part of the Turkish Hatay Province, demanded that they be returned to Syria. Thanks in part to the pressure of Cardinal Aghajanian, the papal representative to Syria and Lebanon, the French complied with their wishes.[3] The area of Iskenderun province divided from Syria was half the size of Lebanon, depriving Aleppo

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3) History of Kurdish coexistence in the border town of Kesab
    http://khabararmani.com/?p=796–

of its natural outlet to the sea after it had already been deprived of its traditional connections to the north and east.

However, while most Syrians in Mandate Syria were Sunni Muslims (around 69 percent in 1945), religious and sectarian minorities together formed a significant part of the population (16 percent was made up of non-Sunni Muslims including Alawites, Isma'ilis, and Druze, with a further 14 percent made up of various Christian sects). In urban areas, Aleppo (the most pluralistic city in the country at the time) reflected this great diversity, with nearly all sects represented. The proportion of Sunnis was less than the national level (61 percent of all residents of the city), with a higher relative rate of Christians, foremost Armenian Catholics and Armenian Orthodox (together constituting 20 percent of the city's population).[4] The vast majority of urban Kurds were Sunni Muslims, assimilated in Arab society linguistically and culturally, constituting 8.5 percent of the total population in 1945. Most Kurds could trace their roots to semi-nomadic tribes residing in the Euphrates and upper al-Jazira regions. Kurdish was the mother tongue of 3 percent of Syrians in 1945.[5]

Socioeconomic and cultural differences and disputes contributed to inflaming several conflicts and strengthening local loyalties, since minority blocs were distributed in limited geographical areas: the Druze in southeast Damascus; Alawites in the coastal mountains; and large numbers of Christians and Kurds settled in sparely populated regions that had originally been inhabited by Bedouin Arab tribes, such as al-Jazira located in the far northeast. Despite all of this, the topography of division made cooperation a

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4)   For further details, see Philip Khoury. *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Syrian Nationalism, 1920–1945.* Princeton University Press, 1987.

5)   Ibid.

necessity. The free exchange of commodities and thought was indispensable. There was conflict at times, and there was consensus at others. Mandate Syrian society was always open to the possibilities of change and exchange, and these possibilities could remain open beyond the foreseeable future.

3. Regional division

Regional division must be added to the two other divisions along ethnic and religious lines. The long historical competition between the capital of the north along the Silk Road from Asia to Europe, Aleppo, and the ancient Umayyad capital and main waypoint for the Hajj pilgrimage, Damascus, did not end throughout the known history of the two cities. Ottoman Aleppo was joined to the newborn Arab state under King Faisal bin Hussein. Then, Faisal and the Arab kingdom were betrayed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and first Mosul was taken, and then its seaport of Iskenderun.[6] But the region that had long suffered from marginalization was the northeastern area that previously had been known as the region of Aqor, and later in Arabic as the Euphrates's al-Jazira, or in English as Upper Mesopotamia, which encompasses Deir Ezzor, al-Raqqah, al-Hasakah, and the eastern countryside of Aleppo. This region—which was and still is the breadbasket of Syria and a strategic storehouse of basic goods—has long suffered enormous social, cultural, and developmental marginalization. Furthermore, at the beginning of the first decade of the third millennium, there was massive displacement because of severe drought. This displacement followed previous displacements that began 40 years earlier because of poverty, lack of work opportunities,

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6)   For further details, see Zayn Nur al-Din. *International Conflict in the Middle East and the Firth of the Two States of Syria and Lebanon* (in Arabic). Dar an-Nahar (Beirut) 1977.

and a dearth of cultural projects. A report on poverty in Syria between 1996–2004 that was published by the United Nations Development Program noted: "the northeastern regions, whether rural or urban, witnessed the highest rates of poverty of Syria both in terms of prevalence and severity;" and in addition, "extreme poverty has increased in the northeastern region four times more than the average in the coastal region."[7] Economic poverty is accompanied by cultural poverty: the first university in the region opened in 2006, half a century after Aleppo University (1958), and 35 years after Tishreen University in Latakia (1971).

Even the Central Bureau of Statistics in Syria can provide corroborating numbers. The number of workers employed in the administrative sector (that is, public employees of the state) in 2010 in the al-Hasakah governorate was 13,434, whereas the coastal governorate of Tartus had 30,000. It must be noted that the population of al-Hasakah is 1.5 million, which is twice the population of Tartus (758,000).[8] It is worth noting that parts of this marginalized region in the northeast came under the control of the so-called Islamic State (Da'ish) until they were largely expelled by Kurdish forces.

Deir Ezzor is another example of developmental and social neglect. Until the beginning of the 1980s, the television signal from the capital Damascus did not reach the residents of Deir Ezzor. Instead, they would follow Iraqi television. Iyas Khadr and Fuad Salem (Iraqi musicians) were closer to their artistic climate than Fahed Bilan and Sabah Fakhri (Syrian musicians). The women and girls of Deir Ezzor wore the Iraqi *abaya* (a loose over-garment), not the

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7) UNDP, *Poverty in Syria 1996–2004.* Heba al-Laithy (principal investigator) and Khalid Abu Ismail. June 2005.

8) Abd al-Nasser al-Ayed. *Northeast Syria: From Marginalization to Extremism… What Next?* (in Arabic). Arab Reform Initiative, March 2016.

Aleppo *manteau* or al-Shami *ishareb* (a stylish veil). Tea was drunk in *istkanah* (small glasses), not in coffee cups.

Nothing after the discovery that Syria's future wealth was under their feet in the depths of the earth. When companies prospected, drilled, and extracted the oil, their head officers were in Damascus. Contractors for food services, medical care, and infrastructure came from the coast and from among the most influential in the capital. Their young male employees filled the cafes and *jradiq*[9] *extending all along Deir Ezzor's great riverside.*

4. Military/civilian

To the complex network of geographic, economic, social, ethnic, and sectarian diversity, we can also add an additional layer that took shape after independence composed of warring powers over authority, especially among the two large blocks of civilian politicians and military officers. The first coup occurred shortly after independence in 1949. Since that time, control over the armed forces has become the chief means of obtaining control over the state.

The Ba'ath Military Committee was formed in secret in 1959 by Mazid Henidi (a Druze lieutenant colonel), Muhammad 'Umran (a Alawite lieutenant colonel), Bashir Sadeq and Abd al-Ghani Iyyash (Sunnis from Damascus and Hama). It was quickly reformed in 1960 without Henidi, Sadeq, and Iyyash, when 'Umran brought in Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad, Ahmed al-Mir, and Abd al-Karim al-Jundi (all either Alawites and Isma'ilis). Together, they formed the nucleus of the Military Committee that remained unknown to most of the Ba'ath political leadership until 1964, when "they, the civilian Ba'athists, learned that they [the Military Committee] waged politics and not

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9)   al-Jradiq in the upper Euphrates dialect means a café or restaurant
      on the river.

war," and that the officers thought of seizing control of the state, and not of war, battles, or military victory.[10]

In 1963, Captain Hafez al-Assad rose after the Ba'athist coup to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Then, in 1964, he became a general at the age of 34, climbing the military ladder without any military successes or fighting experience to justify this enormous leap. When the 1967 Arab-Israeli War erupted, he had spent a year in the position of minister of defense. His experiences and capabilities focused on political maneuvering and conspiracies within the ruling clique of the time. During the war, he needed to lead a military dedicated first and foremost to being an internal political tool against a state with greater military and technical abilities.

Despite the defeat of the Six-Day War and Syria's loss of a wide swath of strategic land that opened the road to Damascus for Israeli forces (if they had not been stopped by the pressure of the great powers), his political maneuvering became even more beneficial with the loss in the war. al-Assad was able to turn the blame on his adversaries, which led him to the seat of power in 1970. He remained the direct ruler of Syria until his death in 2000, and then subsequently via his heir until present day.

In extending the control of the military over civilian political life in Syria, the Military Committee had resorted to two tactics. The first was to make the Ba'ath Party the sole political force in the country by pushing out all other societal or political forces. This meant fighting them (an early example was the military's crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood-led riots in Hama in 1964) and protecting Syrian Ba'athism through an emergency law that remained in effect for almost half a century. The second was co-opting the civilian Ba'athists inside the party, whether by marginalizing

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10) For details, see Hanna Batatu. *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics.* Princeton University Press, 1999.

or assassinating its leaders or by transforming their base of support (enthusiastic youth) into a superficial element incapable of making decisions, let alone determining the party's fate.

The situation did not change much after 1970. In the words of Hanna Batatu, "the democratic rhetoric resembled the rhetoric of American politicians who sing the praises of the power of the people,"[11] but this was no more than romantic imagery for the people's consumption. Paraphrasing a rhetorical expression in one of Hafez al-Assad's speeches, al-Assad's power ranked alongside the power of God as the only two indomitable powers. But this indomitable power had no positive effect when it came to politics. People to him were just "economic creatures," looking forward to obtaining a house, a car, or a piece of land, and as such they were not the least bit concerned about politics. This philosophy was protected constitutionally by eliminating politics through the placement of the Ba'ath Party as leader of not only the state, but also of society.

It has become almost needless to say that the authority of Hafez al-Assad was based upon controlling different levels of authority. The military and intelligence agencies were completely restructured to become like bodyguards of the regime in order to deter coups and any possibility of a popular movement, or even popular discontent. Military units, particularly the elite ones (such as the Republican Guard), were established exclusively to protect al-Assad himself. Likewise, the internal security apparatus was designed to keep the agencies in a competition with one another, and most importantly, all reported only directly to al-Assad himself.

On a level far below most of the military and intelligence authorities came the Ba'ath Party, whose civilian leadership was also restructured according to loyalty. Despite this, the

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11) Batatu. "Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics."

president himself was also the head of the party. The wide difference between the power of the military and security officials and the power of the party and civilian officials created a buffer to offer additional protection to the apex of the pyramid. The next level was made up of the executive branch of ministers, governors, general directors, and municipal councils. Their rank was considerably lower than the civilian party leadership, and again they were also divided to create an additional protective buffer for the head of the regime. Centralized media propaganda put its spotlight solely on the person of al-Assad, making him the sole hero on stage, the beloved hero worthy of self-sacrifice (body and soul), and the eternal hero that could not be limited by time. He was the also the first teacher, the first worker, and the first guide, since his sayings constituted the inspiration for school curricula and the front pages of newspapers. Through these forms of propaganda, al-Assad's regime swapped reality for the regime's unreality with the deft hand of a magician.

This security/party/bureaucrat/propaganda layer made entirely in connection with the figure of al-Assad has formed a thick coating over society. Its unprecedented density has hidden the social, religious, and ethnic differences, until it appears to the foreign observer that there are no longer such differences—or that that there never were such differences. The Syrian people appear unified from afar, as if they will continue to be unified into the distant future, as one monolithic bloc "following its wise leadership."

Observations about the effect of the structure of the regime and the effect of regional conflicts on the conflict in syria

This paper has not addressed the Syrian revolution that began in March 2011, and therefore has not touched on the effect of the structure of the state and the regime on the

sequence of events of this revolution, nor has it discussed the effect of regional and international conflicts (modern or historical) on the vicissitudes of events and the conflict. At the beginning of the popular movement, it seemed as if all of these social divisions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs belonged to a far-off, distant past. What happened in Dara'a found its echoes in Latakia, Homs, Hama, Deir Ezzor, Amuda, al-Qamishli, Kafr Nabl, and Baniyas. The youth movement was organized around intellectuals, university professors, and the middle class. It led demonstrations and sit-ins, even in the heart of the capital of Damascus. This movement appeared cognizant early on of the official rhetoric that attributed the early protests to a "foreign element, targeting the role of Syria the actively resistant" (in reference to its role, along with Hezbollah, as the Arab bulwarks ostensibly still fighting Israel). Subsequently, the regime blamed "infiltrators masquerading in the guise of security men and targeting civilians." Then, after a few short weeks, the regime blamed Sunni "takfiri groups (jihadists declaring others apostates or unbelievers)." Quickly, advertising posters appeared in the major cities and in their squares depicting a hand with an index finger raised saying: no to sectarianism. The regime played a card aimed at winning over the Damascene bourgeoisie and clerics, which was to appease the audience of Kurds by considering the holiday of Newruz (the Kurdish variant of Nowruz or New Year) a national holiday. On March 21, 2011, only six days after the first protests, Bouthaina Sha'aban, an adviser to Bashar al-Assad, congratulated the Kurds on their holiday. Then, the regime issued a law granting nationality to the Kurds of al-Hasakah and canceling Decree 49, which concerned the purchasing and selling of property in border areas. A focus in Bashar al-Assad's first speech on March 30, 2011, was to smear the protests as "sectarian strife." In all of these cases, the regime's rhetoric and actions contributed to uncovering

the authoritarian nature of the regime and its reliance on polarization initially and hatred of the other subsequently.

As for the linkage between the conflict in Syria and regional or international conflicts, this is also nothing new. But, in any case, until the beginning of 2011, Syria was in a state of rapprochement regionally, if less so internationally, as a result of the international isolation imposed after 2004, first as a "rogue state," then imposed by US legislation through the Syria Accountability Act, and its worsening after the subsequent assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri. This state of isolation gradually lessened, then improved considerably after the Obama Administration came to power. That was preceded by a visit by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to Damascus and his holding of a joint meeting with al-Assad along with the leaders of Qatar and Turkey. The regime's honeymoon with Turkey and Qatar continued without ever impacting the Syrian strategic alliance with Iran. The Russians at the time had no major importance, particularly since their international effectiveness had minimal import.

Even in the first weeks of the revolution, the international stance did not change much. Visits and advice from the regional allies of Turkey and Qatar followed one after the other,[12] dominated by calls to stop the violence and repression and initiate a reform process inclusive of all parties. However, with the escalation of the protest movement and the choice of the regime to use the military and security services against it, international stances began to change, and divisions emerged between the great powers and the regional players. Confronted with these facts, Turkish diplomatic rhetoric escalated in its criticism of the regime's behavior. As expected, Iran escalated its political and logistical support for the regime. The pro-regime stance of then Iraqi

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12) The last visit by the Emir of Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa to Syria was in April 2011, when he met President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had significant influence in deepening the sectarian character of the Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian alliance. For the other side, it gave the Turkish-Saudi-Qatari rapprochement the image that dominates today: a Sunni alliance in the face of a Shiite cordon.

The fate of the current conflicts in syria and its trends for the foreseeable future

On March 9, 2016, *Foreign Policy* published an article by James Stavridis, a retired US Navy admiral and current dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, with the provocative title: "It's Time to Seriously Consider Partitioning Syria."[13] With the acknowledgment by the author of the difficulty of this issue and its complexity, he nevertheless recalled the partition that occurred to the "Sick Man of Europe"—the Ottoman Empire—in the wake of the First World War. The new states were quickly recognized. The modern partition he suggests is based on three zones: Damascus and the coastal areas containing the Alawites and led by Bashar al-Assad or whoever succeeds him in an agreed-upon leadership succession, the central area—now occupied by Da'ish—with the hope that with time it will be ruled by moderate Sunnis, and a third Kurdish region in the north that he considers the most problematic, not because of Syrian refusal, but because of Turkish apprehension.[14] Partition, he claims, could vary between actual partition along the lines of Yugoslavia after the Yugoslav Wars, or a highly decentralized federal system similar to Bosnia's that was put in place after the Dayton Accords.[15]

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13) James Stavridis. "It's Time to Seriously Consider Partitioning Syria." *Foreign Policy*. March 9, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/06/its-time-to-seriously-consider-partioning-syria/

14) Stavridis. "*It's Time to Seriously Consider Partitioning Syria.*"

15) Ibid.

The situation appears very cloudy these days. The specter of the partition of Syria—whether named variously as federalism, confederation, or de facto partition without determining boundaries—is plain to see and perhaps closer than ever to being realized.

Since the United States of America abandoned playing an influential role in the conflict, Iranian influence increased and Russian forces intervened in September 2015. It now appears that Syria is moving toward three regions resembling those mentioned by Stavridis in his article. The first region has been termed in some articles as the "Green Zone." It is demarcated by a vertical line extending from the north of Aleppo to the south of Dara'a, with the area lying to the west of the main international motorway that divides the country vertically. It seems that the primary focus of the Russian airstrikes is this area: Idlib, Aleppo, Rif Homs, North Latakia, and Rif Damashq. The purpose of these airstrikes seems to be drawing a border that can be negotiated upon subsequently. Such a region—in the event of its formation—would be comprised of different components of Syrian society. Such diversity would befit the Western imagination's image of a secular state that joins minorities together.

The second region, in the center of the country and extending eastward to Iraq, provides continuity with the Arab Sunni region there. Most of this area is occupied by Da'ish, which justifies the occupation through the rationale that the area has been a war zone for several years, and within which regional and international powers have settled accounts. Therefore, it seems to be a point of intersection and agreement more than a site of dispute. The Russians entered Syria with the pretext of combating Da'ish, and even though the facts belie this claim, who challenges it? Likewise, the Americans have established an airbase in the far northeast with Kurdish help, and the claim is that the

base will be used to supply friendly forces with the necessary supplies and weapons to combat the Da'ish. Some European states, like France, England, and Holland, have not hesitated to send their planes, and Canada and Australia have provided support as well. It is clear that after more than a year and a half of American and allied airstrikes—and six months of Russian strikes—the gains against Da'ish are minimal. The exception might be for the al-Assad regime, for which the Russian airstrikes intended to create a new border for Syria are beneficial.

The third region, Rojava, appears the most assured of its future as a result of the Russian-American-European consensus regarding it. Rojava's autonomy was declared in 2013. It lies in northern Syria and is composed of three cantons. It stretches from east of the Euphrates River near Jarabulus to the west of Dijleh at the intersection of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria; this includes Kobani (or Ayn al-Arab), as well as the Afrin District in the northwest. Estimates indicate that the Kurdish forces are in the process of announcing a federal regime in this region, joining representatives of Turkmens, Arabs, and Kurds. However, the very existence of this region flies in the face of a number of obstacles, the primary one being the absolute and categorical Turkish rejection of it.

Conclusion

Despite the repeated questioning of the winding fate of the Syrian revolution, the divisions caused, the widespread mass displacement, the disappointments, and the deaths to come, there is no doubt that it is a radical revolution, both politically and socially. Syria has been subject to deep changes that may also touch the region in its entirety. These changes are irreversible.

Beyond this, the Syrian issue raises questions to the world as to whether the international community is content with

its answer to the situation and whether it possesses the successful prescription to treat and deal with it. Although some of these questions are not exactly new, the size of the Syrian issue has put the spotlight upon them. The guarantees of justice and equality among mankind and the right to live in dignity remain pertinent only to white men. The tragedies in Syria are unprecedented for the 21st century: systematic killing, widespread devastation, the intentional destruction of medical facilities above the heads of sick patients and medical workers, the indiscriminate usage of weapons like explosive "barrel bombs" dropped from helicopters, and the targeting of civilians from the air. All of this has occurred in full view of the world, documented with all kinds of visual and social media. And yet, the international community does not see in this anything other than sectarian fighting between Sunnis and Shiites, or "conflicts in the Middle East with historical roots for thousands of years,"[16] as if the peoples of this region are invisible, and that priorities — once again — are dictated by the interests of the great powers. If the international community truly believes that it is best served by such means after two wars, the Syrian issue reveals this to be a delusion.

The second issue raised by the Syrian tragedy is the effectiveness of global humanitarian organizations and the importance of international law in alleviating the suffering of humankind and achieving universal rights for all. The failure of the United Nations to play a political role in resolving the conflict is not new, considering that the

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16) In the last State of the Union Address by President Barack Obama, he postulated that the conflicts in the Middle East are ancient hatreds extending back thousands of years and that changes could take generations. This mythical view of political conflicts in the region drew widespread criticism.
https://washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/13/obama-ridiculed-for-saying-conflicts-in-the-middle-east-date-back-millenia-some-dont-date-back-a-decade/

Security Council continues in its colonial tyranny under the control of five powers (even though some of them are no longer truly major). The UN has been ineffective since its founding after World War II in its founding mission of preventing wars and managing global conflict peacefully. Hundreds of wars, massacres, and humanitarian disasters have occurred over the past 50 years, perhaps only because the stage for these events is often on the margins, and not at the center of power. In light of history, the ineffectiveness of the international aid regime in response to the Syrian issue, as in other major crises, and the inability to offer the most basic protection to millions of human victims of these conflicts is not surprising.

On the social level, Islamophobia has returned to the forefront alongside the ascendance of the extremist European Right and neoconservatives. There has been a revival of racism in response to any basic desire to be liberated from a corrupt regime and determine to one's fate. All of this is bitterly dedicated to the continuation of the binary West versus Islam discourse, or the clash of civilizations. Despite all of the accomplishments of humankind, the world remains divided into two in this discourse: Muslims who are prone to radicalization, and non-Muslims who are the first victims of this radicalization. The examples have become innumerable, and the need to understand is more needed than ever before.

There is also demographic change and the legal issue of refugees. What does it even mean to be a refugee? What is this legal regime that divides the world into citizens and refugees?

The issue of refugees paradoxically highlights Europe's centralization and its internal divisions. Europe found in the refugees its own crisis and its own suffering, rather than seeing the crisis and the suffering of the refugees themselves. The issue in their view is how Europe can be united

once again in distributing the refugees, not solving the cause of their displacement. As if the problem is that a million refugees "bear a different culture and religion," that, in the words of the Czech foreign minister, "may greatly change the face of Europe." This comes at a time when the German prime minister sees the refugees as an importance economic resource, where the issue is solely their acclimatization to European societies. Unintentionally, this evokes what Hafez al-Assad said in 1971 regarding his opinion of Syrians: that they are economic creatures, pure and simple.

In any case, by way of conclusion – and not to diminish the importance or necessity of analyzing or defining any of the above-mentioned causes—Syrians must be allowed the opportunity and the ability to contribute to determining their own fate and the fate of their children—in particular when things seem heading inevitably toward a redrawing of the map and permanent social and demographic change. Perhaps it was only the recent past, despite its failures and floundering, that made a land shared between people who dreamed of dignity, a life, even flourishing—as everyone does everywhere. This particular place is called Syria—maybe there too remains a human that still dreams of being, as there is no other way.

REVOLUTION IN A NON-STATE SOCIETY

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL DIVISIONS ON THE YEMENI REVOLUTION

Adel Mugahid al-Shargabi[*]

Introduction

Five years after the outbreak of the February 11, 2011 Revolution in Yemen, and four years after the abdication by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the controversy still continues over what happened. Was it a revolution or a social movement?

The revolution was a process of political change initiated from outside the regime, through an unorganized popular uprising of the masses and civil society, using peaceful, non-violent means and tools to effect a radical transformation in the regime, its institutions, its legislation, and its people. This was mostly done not on the basis of class. There was

[*] Adel Mugahid al-Shargabi is a Professor of Sociology at Sana'a University.

a consensus in civil society to avoid targeting the political class, or specific individuals within the regime—as such an approach typically leads to power grabs or coups, especially in the military establishment, and would lead to a mere redistribution of power among the individuals in the regime. A radical change to the basis of the regime and its institutions would not have occurred via a coup. Traditional revolutions have occurred through arms, while contemporary revolutions are led by civil society actors and have a peaceful and nonviolent character.

President Saleh worked according to the tactic of "divide and rule" and built a fractured society that could not mutually assimilate by weakening traditional groups and primary identities. He worked to weaken civil society, political forces, and modern organizations, while working to support apolitical groups, tribal groups, and traditional religious groups. However, Saleh also worked to change the traditional structures, driving tribal groups to the level of intra-national conflict, and driving religious groups to the level of supra-national conflict. Despite this, Saleh's strategy led to the politicization of tribal and religious groups. While it was indeed a conservative type of politicization, in that these groups were meant to defend and keep the regime in place, it also led to the emergence of other movements demanding or opposing change. The first case was the growing Zaydi identity in Sa'da Province (Zaydis are a particular subset of Shiite Muslims), then in the northern provinces generally. The regime backed Sunni Salafists, led by Muqbil al-Wad'ai, and a new Zaydism emerged as an identity of armed resistance—which further boosted sub-national identities (on the basis of tribe, clan, and region) as well as supra-national identities (on basis of religion, more specifically Islamic sects).

During his rule, which lasted more than 33 years (July 17, 1974 - February 21, 2012), the deposed president built

a strategy of social engineering by weakening the state and society to ensure that he would remain in power. In the period after he assumed power, Saleh repressed any and all revolutionary threats to his regime, whether violent or nonviolent. He did this via calculated, systematic processes to make the state fragile and fragment society. On the level of social engineering, in order to ensure his social hegemony, Saleh and his regime worked to block the formation of vertical divisions, chip away at their foundations, and reformulate them. The Saleh regime eliminated the independence of individuals and groups to in order to build a "voluntary slavish" society, in the words of the French thinker Étienne de la Boétie, by building a "clustery society" around the regime, in which the regime represents its spinal column or main "rachis" to which are attached all of the subsidiary "peduncles." Saleh worked to transform the tribal structure into a structure of "sheikhism." In this clustered system, the regime seeks to command the loyalty of the strong link in the cluster (the sheikh of the tribe) by tying the sheikh to the regime, thereby transforming the sheikh and reversing his role from a representative of the tribe to the ruler (as is the case in a tribalist regime), into a representative of the ruler and a foothold in the tribe. This shift turns national conflicts into localized ones between warring tribes, transforms the doctrinal structure into a sectarian one, and transforms the conflict on the national level into a supra-national one. In terms of state building, the regime built the state on the basis of authoritarian patrimonialism: oligarchic and administratively centralized to concentrate power in the hands of one official, so that the president monopolizes power and in particular the authority to appoint the regime oligarchs to high positions (whether civil, military, or security). The hegemony of the executive branch is complete over the legislative and judiciary branches.

This social engineering led to the formation of an authoritarian society, in which the citizen is subservient to the authority of the state, the tribe, and sect, and even the party and civil society organizations to a certain extent. This led as well to the consecration of a conservative structure, weakening social actors and agents of change. This begs the fundamental question: How could a revolution emerge in a traditional, divided, disjointed, and conservative society? What are the social forces that formed the critical mass of the revolution? What drove the traditional structures and tribal elites to participate in the revolution? To what extent do these latter groups desire the revolution to be completed? What are the obstacles impeding the completion of the second stage of the revolution, represented in building a modern nation-state? What is the expected fate of the revolution? These questions are what this research paper seeks to answer through sociological analysis.

The structure of the state

The administrative apparatus and the civil service were built on a patrimonial model; that is, closer to a family regime, where its major officials had direct or indirect personal connections to the president. Their interests intertwined with his interests. They owed him personal loyalty. He appointed them without competition based on the principle of equal opportunity. They obtained financial perquisites and gifts outside of the law,[1] to the point of becoming a clientelist system that covers all levels of the government bureaucracy.[2] Authority under such a regime becomes transformed into a personal matter. A patrimonial state is

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1) For the features of the patrimonial system, see Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, 1946, New York : Oxford University Press.
2) Iris Glosemmeyer. *Dancing on Snake Heads in Yemen* (Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute, May 2009), p. 2.

dedicated to the continuation of the familial regime and operates on the basis of personal relationships and personal loyalty to the president by its officials.[3]

The administrative apparatus for the state is bloated, owing to its usage as a political and tribal spoils system. Loyalty of some individuals of the tribe is bought and tribes are appeased by their employment in the bureaucracy. The loyalty of some of the sheikhs of the tribes is bought through granting them a title and ranks to fill, though of course the position is a sinecures and the employees are imaginary—allowing them recoup multiple state salaries, especially in the education sector, or to recoup salaries from other state institutions simultaneously.[4] Therefore, the numbers of employees in the state bureaucracy and in the public sector rose from 191,000 in 1990 to 348,000 in 1995, then to 404,522 in 1998, and 428,000 in December 2000.[5] In December 2009, the total number of male and female public employees was 559,092.[6] During a discussion between the former president and military officers in Aden Governorate in January 2011, Saleh said that the state would pay for the salaries of 1.5 million employees. USAID estimated the number of imaginary employees in 2008 at around 30,000, when the number of employees in the state bureaucracy was around 473,000. It also estimated that imaginary soldiers comprised about a third of the armed forces.[7] Most of the imaginary civil servants were concentrated in the education

3) Reinhard Bendix. *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait.* (Doubleday, 1962), p. 360.

4) The Arab Al-Jazira Foundation for Intellectual and Cultural Development (in Arabic), p.150.

5) See Ministry of Planning and Development, Strategy for Reducing Poverty (2003–2005), p. 27.

6) Statements obtained by the researcher during his heading of a Gender Integration team in the fourth five-year plan.

7) USAID Yemen, Yemen Corruption Assessment (September 2006), 4. Accessed February 4, 2010. http.yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf

sector. USAID estimated that proportion of imaginary employees in the education sector is about 40 percent of the total employees.[8] The remaining imaginary employees are distributed among various ministries and government institutions on both the local and central levels.

The state authorities devolved power in the countryside through traditional elite tribal sheikhs. The state apparatus did not penetrate much into rural areas. Most areas, especially rural ones, did not have courts or parliamentary representation. The existing courts and representatives suffered from a "severe shortage of justices and representatives, reaching 20–40 percent."[9] State-society relations were thus organized via the intermediary of tribal elites, since "the state was incapable of extending its influence to tribal region, which enabled the tribes to extend their influence to the government."[10]

Traditional social structures

Tribal groups were driven to intra-national conflict and religious groups driven to supra-national conflict, which led to the transformation of tribalism into "sheikhism" and a turn to sectarianism by religious groups (in particular those motivated by different doctrines of political Islam). The major tribal unions, such as the Hashid and Bakil, fragmented into smaller sheikhdoms. These tribal unions were no longer the basic social and political component of the Yemeni tribal structure, and there was no longer any basic unity in dealing with political and social issues. Instead,

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8) Ibid, p. 42–43.

9) Judiciary Modernization Project, p. 22.

10) Paul Darsh, "Popular Daily Polling: The State and the Nation in Yemen (in Arabic)," in Abduh Hamud al-Sharif ed., *Political Transformations in Yemen: Research and Western Studies 1990–1994*, Hamud al-Salehi et al. trans., The American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sanaa, 1995, p. 135.

subsidiary tribes become the basic components and the units for dealing in politics. The "sheikhs of the sheikhs," the well-established such as Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar and Sheikh al-Shayif, were no longer the primary actors. Instead, it was the sheikhs of smaller tribes, especially newly-made sheikhs (itself something of a contradiction considering sheikh literally mean "elder"), or those who some termed the "Sheikhs of Saleh."[11]

The regime worked to transform the tribe into a sheikh-dom. The tribe was no longer like it was in the 1970s and 80s, a relatively egalitarian flat structure where the sheikh was one among equals. Instead, it became hierarchical, where the sheikh was one above others in the tribe. The sheikh was no longer a representative of his tribe before the state or the regime. Instead, he became a representative of the regime in his tribe. The tribe became intertwined with the regime, and in general, the tribe was no longer independent from the state. Rather than being one of the forces of change, it became a conservative force.

The meddling with national identity that accompanied the politicization of religion and tribe by Saleh led simultaneously, in the beginning of the 1980s, to the support of Salafists and the "Believing Youth," who promoted a Zaydi revival and were a predecessor of the Houthis. It now appears clear that the relationship between Saleh and the Houthis had been hidden for all of these past years.

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, or al-Islah, was supported by the regime in opposition to the more civil democratic parties. It wanted to participate in a special political project not along the lines of the president, and it was active in the field of political ethics. After al-Islah achieved its goals of absorbing the Yemeni Socialist Party in particular and other civil parties generally, it became

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11) Along the lines of the "Sheikhs of Bremer" of Iraq under the American occupation.

clear after the parliamentary elections of 1997 and 2003 that al-Islah had become a political force. The party wanted to be in power. The regime began to destroy it by dismantling the party, which had always been a fractious alliance between tribes, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Wahhabi Salafists. The sheikhs of the tribes returned to the ruling General People's Congress. The Muslim Brotherhood was transformed into a political Islam group. Saleh had felt that al-Islah formed one of the most important powers threatening his regime, and therefore he sought to disperse the religious groups and reignite doctrinal conflict by supporting the "Believing Youth."

The sectarian and doctrinal map was no longer just the Sunni al-Shafi'i school and the Shiite al-Zaydiyyah. Instead, the regime intentionally broke up the groupings and aggravated sectarian and doctrinal conflicts. New factors entered into play because of regional divisions and conflicts, in particular the influences of Twelver Shiism and Wahhabi Salafism from Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively. This transformed doctrinal schools into sectarian groups, something which demands deeper analysis in order to take these transformations into account.

Modern social forces and organizations

The regime built a strategy based on weakening modern organizations, especially political parties. The regime sought to build a "veneer democracy,"[12] however, elections were essentially vehicles for traditionally loyal organizations and an outlet for individual competition among the elites. Veneer democracy depends on weak, superficial party pluralism. True political pluralism is blocked, and "the regime

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12) International Crisis Group, "Defusing the Saada Time Bomb," *Middle East Report* No. 86 (May 27 2009), p. 6.

would not allow the existence of a real opposition,"[13] to the point that the political regime became based upon a one-party system.[14] A hybrid regime is one that has "some elements of liberal democracy like a liberal constitution, multiple parties, and periodic free and fair elections that coexist with some illiberal elements; the resources and the administration of the state are employed to aggrandize the control of the ruling elite."[15] Sarah Phillips described the political regime in Yemen as one of "pluralized authoritarianism."[16] Over 26 years of party pluralism in Yemen, there was never real political pluralism, especially in the light of the linkage of the ruling party (the General People's Congress) with the state, and the sway of traditional elites over decision-making posts in many of the parties, to say nothing of the formation of political parties without real popular support. In the 2003 parliamentary elections, the General People's Congress party won 229 seats. Five other parties won 58 seats. Independent candidates won 14 seats. The other 15 parties that participated in the elections didn't win a single seat. In fact, they only received 40,000 votes out of 6 million cast—a paltry 0.6 percent.

Yemeni legislative elections were organized on the basis of a first-past-the-post voting system.[17] The system helped preserve traditional structures, strengthening the political power of the traditional elites and weakening political parties. This led to an increase in political dissatisfaction

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13) Ginny Hell, "Yemen: Fear of Failure," Chatham House Middle East Program Briefing Paper (November 2008), p. 5.

14) Stephen Day, "Barriers to Federal Democracy in Iraq: Lessons from Yemen," *Middle East Report* No. 8 (Fall 2006), p. 134.

15) Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 13 No. 2 (April 2002), p. 22–35.

16) Phillips, S. (2008). *Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 4

17) Day, p. 121–139.

and exacerbated social alienation.[18] The importance of individual involvement in modern civil organizations does not lie solely in achieving their political and cultural goals, but also in achieving psychological goals by reducing the alienation of individuals and strengthening their affiliations and attachments to the nation and the political system. Doing so increases consensus about political goals and aids in achieving political stability.

The party elites have been absorbed into a culture of spoils. In the past, political life was not based on real competition between parties, but on deals between the party elites, splitting the spoils of power derived from the state. This was not done in the interest of the public, and is perhaps one of the most important causes of the February 2011 revolution. Young people began to view these practices as one of the factors weakening democracy.

The regime weakened the national bourgeoisie that formed in the first half of the 20th century and replaced it with a newly minted "parvenu bourgeoisie," similar to the "protected bourgeoisie" described by Amartya Sen. Sen describes a protected bourgeoisie as one whose interests are linked to the regime "via dependence on networks of loyalty to win contracts with the state and thereby be successful businessmen."[19] This leads the bourgeoisie having a conservative nature, because the fall of the regime would also cause their downfall along with it.

The regime followed a similar policy with the middle class, which formed over the past three decades, as a group of intellectuals connected to the regime or "mandarin intellectuals," university professors, and bureaucrats.

Many university professors were granted high-level positions in the civil service as ministers or heads of departments, thereby becoming "mandarin professors." The

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18) Ibid, p. 123.

19) Phillips. "*Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective*" p. 14.

middle class was therefore also formed as a conservative group,[20] whether in their academic or bureaucratic roles.

Repercussions of social structures on the political regime

The destruction of traditional structures without being replaced with a modern civil relationship led to the transformation of society into an atomistic society or a "mass society," a weak society vulnerable to authoritarianism. The mass society suffers from social alienation and is composed of small, isolated social groups. They are not linked by shared values, and they do not have strong social linkages, making individuals alienated from one another. In the case where this mass society exists with a strong state and cohesive ruling elite, an authoritarian political regime forms, wherein no social grouping can limit the power of the state.[21] In the case where the state is weak, the masses become subject to social authoritarianism by influential elites. These masses may become prone to radicalization and mobilization by extremist movements.[22] The crowd is, in the words of Gustave Le Bon "a flock that the master cannot do without," and the crowd is "always ready to be subordinate to a strong authority and always ready to rebel against a weak authority." In the case of a clustered society, authoritarianism is transformed into "contented slavishness," according to the terminology of Étienne de La Boétie in one of his articles on chosen slavery. The citizen becomes subservient to both political and social

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20) Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley, *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe* (Verso, 1998), p. 73.

21) Bertrand Badi and Pierre Bernbaum, *Sociology of the State*, Joseph Abdullah and George Abi Saleh trans. p. 15.

22) Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics* 49:3, p. 404.

authoritarianism. The sheikhs of the tribes and the tradi-tional elites are transformed from representatives of their fol-lowers before the regime, into representatives of the regime in the circles of their followers, mere intermediaries for the power of the regime.[23] This leads to a narrowing of the space comprising the buffer between state and society. This buf-fer space is transformed into a corridor for the intervention of the state (or the regime) in the affairs of society. Citizens become individuals subservient to the political authoritarian-ism of the regime and the social authoritarianism practiced by traditional authorities.

All organizations, traditional and modern, are subject to what the German sociologist Robert Michels termed the iron law of oligarchy. The citizen is repressed by the parties, the tribe, sects and religious groups, and even civil society organizations—since they are elitist organizations and the elite make the decisions. The elites have been able to trans-form the revolution from a popular revolution seeking the fall of the regime, into a mere conflict among elites.

Yemeni society became a non-pluralistic, monistic soci-ety. There was party pluralism, but not political pluralism. There was superficial tribal pluralism, but the vast majority of the sheikhs were connected to Saleh personally. There was no pluralism among the elites. The sheikhs of the tribes were in control of political, social, and economic power. The sheikh is the officer, the bearer of business initiatives, and the official in the civil service—while also occupying decision-making positions in many of the political parties, even those outside of the parties formed by the sheikhs of the tribes, like National Solidarity Party or the Justice and Construction Party. In the ruling party under the Saleh

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23) For similar circumstances to these conditions in some African soci-eties, see Jean-François Bayart, *Politics off Filling Stomachs: Sociology of the State in Africa*, Halim Toussaint trans. Cairo: Third World Publishing House, 1992. p. 266.

regime, the tribal sheikhs formed most of its leadership structure. The same applies to the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islah).

On the local level, Yemeni society became collective, in that individuals do not enjoy real freedom and independence. Furthermore, the apparatus of the state was absent in rural areas, with the state dealing with citizens through traditional elites. This led to the connection of individuals in networks of loyalty. On the national level, competitiveness was curbed, as the electoral system did not lead to real competition between parties. Furthermore, there was no competition between political, economic, social, and military elites in power, since all of these elites were composed of tribal sheikhs. There was competition between sheikhs as individuals, but no competition between social groups.

The absence of individualism in a clustered society results in the ease of co-option. Although the young people promoted the slogan "the people want the fall of the regime," other young people, loyal to the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islah) or sheikhs of the tribes, defended half of the regime, contending that General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the al-Ahmar sheikhs of the Hashid tribe were heroes and revolutionaries. Furthermore, the agreement between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abdul-Malik al-Houthi transformed the Houthis from a revolutionary force into a counterrevolutionary force. The youth and the bases of some of the parties accepted the political settlement between the revolutionaries and the regime.

The spread of political violence grew worse, helped by the linkage between groups espousing political Islam with tribal organizations. The tribal structures had been able to imbue the political Islamic groups with their character. The political Islamic groups in all tribal regions in Yemen—as in all states of the world like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—are militant hardliners, whether Sunni or Shiite.

Path of the revolution

By building its state and an authoritarian political system through social engineering, the regime had been able to transform Yemeni society into a conservative society, one not held together by a unified national identity, which was superseded for individuals by tribal identities or any other form of identity. This resulted in the weakening of feelings by individuals and groups for a public interest and the strengthening of feelings for individual and group interests, arresting the progress toward social change, let alone toward revolution. To compensate for this, individuals and tribal groups looked for solutions to their individual problems, detached from a collective project.[24] Despite all of this, there is no doubt that no state, regardless of its power and authoritarianism, could have arrested or ended the revolution, since authoritarianism itself was one of the catalysts for the revolution. The authoritarian state, though possessing overwhelming power, is brittle. It bears in its guts the causes of its own downfall. The authoritarian state possesses sovereignty, but lacks the legitimacy needed to sustain it. Regardless of the power possessed by the state and the ruling elite, it does not coincide with the consent of the governed, whose power to rebel remains constant. "There is no doubt that dictatorships crush themselves by their inability to content the peoples that they rule."[25]

In light of these conservative social structures, it was not possible to bring about social change through social movements adopting tools of evolutionary change. The only means was revolutionary change. Students and

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24) Sana Abu Shaqra, *Rooting Democracy in the Arab Region: a Comparative Approach of International and Regional Principles (Political, Economic, and Social)* (in Arabic), Network of Non-Governmental Arab Organizations, 2008, p. 63.

25) Harold Laski, *The State Theoretically and Practically*, Publishing House of Knowledge Select Series No. 62, p. 118.

independent journalists were the vanguard of the revolution, chanting: "The people want the fall of the regime." Their social movements practiced political nonviolence, which disarmed the regime, whose background was in techniques of classic revolutions based upon the rebellion of part of the ruling elite or of a rebellious military cabal that led to either a military coup or a bloodless political coup.[26]

Young people, students, and independent intellectuals formed the critical mass of the peaceful popular revolution against the regime. The first sparks erupted on February 11, 2011, which enabled the peaceful character of the revolution in spite of the regime's confrontational response with repression and armed violence—especially on the Friday of Dignity (March 18, 2011). The critical mass mobilized the public for revolution and increased the popularity of the revolution,[27] which afflicted the elite both inside and outside of the regime with shock and horror. The regime began to fall apart for psychological reasons, and not for reasons relating to balances of power, driving much of the elite to announce their solidarity with the revolution. On February 15, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi called on his forces to take to the streets to demand the fall of the regime. On February 18, the party of the Association of the Sons of Yemen announced their solidarity with the revolution. On February 20, the Joint

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26) Regarding these two modes of revolutionary change, see Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Shawqi Jalal trans., Series of Books of the World of Knowledge,* National Council for Culture, Arts, and Literature, Kuwait, Book No. 286, 2002, p. 146.

27) This is true of all revolutions and social movements. The violence of the police increased the popularity of the student movement outside universities in Europe in 1968, in contrast to the black separatist movement in America, which alienated supporters beyond university circles, owing to its tendency toward violence. See Hannah Arendt, *On Violence,* Ibrahim al-'Aris, Dar al-Saqi, Beirut, First Arabic Edition, 1992, p. 18–19.

Meeting Parties called their constituents to join the young people in demanding the fall of the regime. By the end of February, the Southern Movement began to adopt the slogan of "the people want the fall of the regime." Some of the leaders of the movement announced their solidarity with the revolution of young people, demanding the fall of the regime and called their followers to join the Revolution of Freedom and Change. On March 21, an important segment of the army announced their defection from the regime and their support for and protection of the revolution and the revolutionaries. On the same day, several of the prominent tribal sheikhs announced their solidarity with the revolution.

However, the elites were able to transform the revolution into an armed conflict over power. This led to the division of society and the decline of the popularity of the revolution. This may be common to all revolutions in which the professional revolutionaries are surprised by the party leaders, political forces, and the ruling regime. Hannah Arendt coined the description "professional revolutionaries" for those unable to "effect revolution; all they could do was be present or to make others rush to the nation at the decisive moment, that is the moment of the regime's fall."[28] The role of the professional revolutionaries does not usually lie in effecting the revolution, but in leaping into power after the revolution breaks out,[29] because their names are the only names known to the public.[30] The leaders of the Joint Meeting Parties and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar had begun to speak on behalf of the revolution. They were the primary actors in the dialogue with the regime and with regional and international mediators.

After the signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, which superficially handed authority to then—Vice

28) Arendt, p. 381–382.

29) Arendt, "*On Violence*" p. 382.

30) Ibid.

President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in February 2012, Yemen began living in a stateless condition. Most officials remained loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh, especially since the regime was based upon the concentration of power in his hands. As a result, President Hadi was unable to execute his duties as president of the nation. He depended upon foreign support for his power, whether from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which possesses influence over much of the Yemeni elite, or the United Nations. Perhaps the most prominent examples of this are the fact that most of the military units have remained loyal to the deposed president Saleh and become subordinate to the Houthis. The revolutionaries discovered that there was no state authority to assume.[31] Power had been personal, divvied up between Saleh and al-Ahmar, forcing a large segment of the revolutionaries to join competing centers of power. Reformists joined al-Ahmar, and the Houthis joined Saleh. The only ones remaining on the revolutionary line were the civil forces.

The absence of the state aided the influx of the Houthi forces (who call themselves Ansar, or Supporters of Allah) in cooperation with the forces of the deposed Saleh into the capital, Sana'a, on September 21, 2014, and their takeover of the Republican Palace and the Presidential Residency on January 17, 2015, the siege of the residence of President Hadi and his resignation and the dissolution of the Khaled Bahah government on January 21, 2015, as well as the formation of the Popular Committee and Revolutionary Committees. The Revolutionary Committees began to impose their orders on the institutions of the state in the capital of Sana'a and direct the daily affairs of state institutions.

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31) Ibid. p. 377.

The coup and the counterrevolution

The traditional forces (whether tribal, Islamic, doctrinal, or sectarian groups) that had joined the revolution did not want a complete revolution. In fact, they feared the occurrence of radical changes. The reform of the political regime and the building of a true democratic regime is irritating to the Houthis in particular. Because of its doctrinal character, this group would remain isolated in the framework of the Zaydi minority and would not be able to reach power via democracy, with its constituency limited and closed — and worse, mainly apolitical. Although the Houthis had gained a political audience before its invasion of the capital, what had irked Saleh was the outcome of the national dialogue, which was conditional upon transforming the electoral regime into one of proportional representation. Furthermore, it imposed conditions on the candidates for president of the republic, requiring that any candidate must be ten years removed from military service. This eliminated Saleh's eldest son Ahmed from consideration as a nominee.

Saleh was able to convince the Houthis that the revolution would lead to al-Islah coming to power. He was aided in his argument by the behavior of al-Islah after the signing of the GCC initiative, which of course was the last to desire comprehensive change to the regime, instead wanting to change the distribution of political power and negate the revolutionary forces. Al-Islah also obtained the lion's share of governors' appointments. This all together contributed, indirectly and unintentionally, to the dismantling of the historic bloc supporting the revolution, which is what Saleh wanted. Modern political forces, especially the socialist left and the nationalist left, viewed the armed conflicts that occurred before the invasion of the capital of Sana'a as conflicts between traditional forces opposed to the revolution, not as national conflicts. The situation did not change much until after the Houthis storming of the capital Sana'a.

Thus, the path of the revolution was diverted, from a popular revolution seeking to build a modern civil state, to mere conflict among elites. This is what the traditional forces that had joined the revolution after March 21, 2011, had always wanted.

Saleh worked to partition the conflict and to defeat the major symbolic heads involved, represented by the al-Ahmar sheikhs of the Hashid tribe and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. This resulted in the non-involvement of many of the sheikhs in the battle. The brigade under the command of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar was scattered.

The steps taken by Saleh and his allies toward war, in order to evade the outcomes of the dialogue, quickly concluded the National Dialogue Conference. The Houthi coup d'état began with the siege of the residence of President Hadi, placing him effectively under house arrest on January 19, 2015. On February 6, they declared their own constitution. On February 21, 2015, Hadi fled to Aden. Forces opposed to the coup attempted to confront it with non-violent civil resistance, but the Houthis responded to the demonstrations with severe repression. There was nothing left but for people to organize themselves in armed groups. On March 21, 2015, the Houthi Revolutionary Committee announced a "general mobilization."

The resignation by President Hadi confused not only the Houthis and Saleh, but also all other political forces. Those undertaking the coup had not expected his resignation. They had believed that he would accept to stay as a figure-head, a conduit to implement their projects. They did not want to remove him (though it was in their power to do so) and were not keen to do so, as the time had not yet come. The ousting of President Hadi from power would accel-erate the disintegration of their alliance with Saleh. The Houthi-Saleh alliance would transform into a contest for power, perhaps even armed conflict between the two. The

Houthis did not desire to enter into a conflict with Saleh before gaining control over all of Yemen's governorates, the southern ones and Ma'rib in particular. On January 21, 2016, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, declared the need for an immediate entry into these territories to address the urgent security situation. The Houthis realized the difficulty of taking over Ma'rib without the help of the state. Despite one of the demands of the Houthis being fair treatment of southerners and just representation for the Southern Movement, this did not mean that they did not seek to invade the south. The militia's practices often contradicted its rhetoric. The Houthis spoke about partnership, yet worked to impose their views on all other parties. They spoke about building the state and enabling its sovereignty, yet built militias or "popular committees" that kidnapped employees of the state. They spoke about the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, but sought to impose an agreement contradicting that consensus.

Those undertaking the coup did not realize that while violence may destroy the state, it alone couldn't build it. They became confused and lacked a basis of legitimacy or legitimate social contract that could be the basis of recovering ordinary conditions.

The resignation of Hadi forced the Houthis to assume power when they did not desire to do so, in light of the conditions at the time, because of their fear of an explosion of conflict between them and their ally Saleh. In addition, they did not desire to assume power over a war-torn state that would ensure failure as it had for President Hadi himself. Furthermore, the state treasury was nearly bankrupt, and the international community and the states of the region would not recognize their authority, and perhaps begin imposing upon them sanctions. As a result, the Houthi state would be besieged from the beginning. Iran is unable to compensate for the loss of Arab Gulf states'

aid generally, and Saudi aid in particular, especially in light of declining in oil prices. The situation would only worsen, owing to the tribes of Ma'rib taking control of the oil facilities and depriving them of an important source of income, as well as the loss of Ta'iz, a main source of tax revenues since the northern regions controlled by the Houthis do not pay taxes. The coup thus meant that both the Houthi state and the Houthi movement would be in need of funding.

Forces of the revolution

The regime sowed the seeds of its own destruction with its methods of state building and social engineering. While guaranteeing stability and safeguarding itself against slow or evolutionary social change, at the same time it was one of the most important factors helping the success of revolutionary change, based upon group (and not individual) mobilization. This eased the fracturing of the regime, and was one of the most important dynamics of the revolution against the authoritarian state.

While the major sheikhs had been weakened and the authority of the lesser sheikhs had increased, and a clustered society connecting all bearers of tribal power to Saleh had been built, this new system of political patrimony did not eliminate the traditional social patriarchal relations that continued to exist and remain effective. Sheikh al-Ahmar and General al-Ahmar remained capable of mobilizing many tribal sheikhs for the revolution in 2011—and regardless of whether they occupied official positions of power in the state and in the regime, many of the sheikhs of the tribes announced their split from the regime.

It was the independent civil forces connected neither to the tribal structures nor the party organizations that launched the revolution from the city of Ta'iz on February 11, 2011.

The city of Ta'iz and the governorate of Ta'iz in general made up the bulk of the civil forces, and particularly its students and young people, who constituted the vanguard and the critical mass of the revolution.

The argument of the supporters of the revolution; that the imbalance of power between the deposed president and the revolutionaries and their supporters doomed the revolution, is false. It was possible for the revolution to be like the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, where the regimes collapsed from within. Even in the case when the regime resorted to violence, its fate would be the same fate as the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.

Summary

It is impossible for any of the three components of the *ancien régime* (familialism, sheikhism, and militarism) to return to power, or to reproduce a revised version of the *ancien régime.* Even if the three components of the *ancien régime* recovered their alliance, it would still be impossible in the short and medium-term to divide the south, which is claimed by some of the factions of the Southern Movement. It would also be impossible to divide the north, claimed by those calling themselves the Northern Movement. It is likewise impossible for the traditional southern elites to reestablish their sultanate sheikh-based emirates that had prevailed under the British protectorate of the Federation of South Arabia (that would later become South Yemen). It is impossible to restore the regime of the Caliphate demanded by some Salafist groups. Furthermore, it is impossible to rebuild the Imamate that had reigned before the revolution in the north, or like any that had reigned in any region of the Islamic world. Even if any of these groups were able to achieve their dreams, whether in Yemen as a whole or any part of it, it would not lead to stability. Instead, it would give

birth to new chaos. We have an example for this in what happened in 1994. The tripartite alliance behind the *ancien régime* had been able to assume power; however, conflicts between its three components immediately began, owing to the Saleh family seeking to possess the state, which led to the disintegration of this alliance in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Seeking to be in power is a legitimate right for all political and social forces (even religious ones under certain circumstances); however, these groups named above do not seek power over the government according to the principle of open competition and for a defined period. Rather, they seek to repossess the state, which would lead to a continuation of the conflict and the civil war in Yemen. The attempt by Saleh to possess the state was the cause of all that Yemen has witnessed over the past two decades in terms of conflicts and wars, foremost the war of the summer of 1994 and the six previous Saada wars. It is also the cause of the divisions that Yemen is currently witnessing between the Southern Movement, al-Qaeda affiliated groups, and the Houthis.

Returning to the past is impossible. The movement of history is always to the fore. Therefore, the spread of chaos and insecurity cannot enable any groups of these groups, which scheme or fund or execute plans, to possess the state as it was in the past. As a result, it is incumbent upon all social forces and political groups to surrender to the logic of history and abandon the pipe dream of returning to the past through chaos. Instead, they all must cooperate with other political and social groups in order to the build the future, and to achieve a consensus on building a civil, democratic, and modern state that guarantees equality among all of its citizens. Only then can competition over the government—for set term limits according to the principle of competition based upon pluralism and equal opportunity—begin

among the political groups and social forces of Yemen. The National Dialogue Conference therefore represents the last chance for Yemenis to find consensus on state building, on the principles of state building, and on universal participation in applying them.

LIBYA IN THE GALE OF THE
ARAB SPRING

*Ahmed al-Fituri**

In its first wave, the Arab Spring gave birth from the wombs of infirm military regimes put in place by coups in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. In all of these states, the rulers came to power by military coups over regimes with legitimacy derived either as being the anti-colonial post-independence party or the dynastic monarchy. This spring was unexpected and surprised even those who participated in its making, and in its fates future expectations were similarly disparate. The accustomed notion of Arab exceptionalism made many observers consider it a desert mirage. Expectations were so confused that previous imaginings were consigned to the dustbin. It was revealed that information never goes bad faster than in countries of revolutions. The past few years have launched us into the fire of constant and seemingly disconnected change, revealing our poverty

*   Ahmed al Fituri is a Libyan journalist and researcher. He is currently editor in chief of the weekly newspaper *Mayadin.*

of information and knowledge. The paucity of what we are able to obtain through research in terms of what is available is mainly journalistic sources that are interested in collecting what is on the surface, the impressionistic observation.

Libya before the Arab Spring

The geopolitical structure of Libya began to form between 1711 and 1830 during the Karamanli dynasty,[1] which established the political map as we now know it. The Ottoman Empire returned in 1830 after the collapse of the Karamanli dynasty and Italian colonialism came in October 1911. The United Kingdom of Libya, whose independence on December 24, 1951, was announced by the United Nations,[2] had effectively the same borders as the Karamanli state.

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1) The Karamanli dynasty ruled Libya for about 125 years. In 1711, Ahmed Karamanli led a popular revolt that toppled the ruler. He had been an Ottoman janissary and decided to rid the nation of corrupt rulers. When the Libyan people became fed up with their fiercely authoritarian ruler, they welcomed Karamanli who promised better rule. The Ottoman sultan agreed to his appointment as Pasha over Libya and granted him a large degree of autonomy. The Karamanlis were even somewhat independent in foreign affairs, thanks to their powerful fleet. For further details, see Amr bin Isma'il, *Collapse of the Karamanli Dynasty* (in Arabic), Dar al-Farjani, Tripoli (Libya), First Printing 1966.

2) The United Nations General Assembly issued decision number 289 on November 21, 1949, that stipulated the granting of Libya its independence on a date no later than January 1, 1952. A committee was formed to work on the implementation of the decision. In October 1950, a constituent assembly formed of 60 members representing each of the three regions of Libya (twenty members apiece). On November 25, the assembly convened to determine the shape of the state. A federal regime was approved over the objection of the Tripolitian representatives, and a committee was assigned to formulate the constitution. This committee studied different federal regimes around the world and presented its report to the constituent assembly in September 1951 and temporary regional governments were formed in Libya. On March 29, 1951,

During the Ottoman period, the first Senussi *zawiya* (a type of Sufi lodge in the Maghreb or North Africa that often functioned as a religious school) was established in the city of Bayda in the Jabal al-Akhdar (Green Mountains) in the east of the country. The Senussi order, or *tariqa,* is an Islamic reform movement found in Libya and Sudan. It began in Mecca in 1837, moving to Bayda in 1843. This order is distinct from other Islamic reform movements, particularly concerning its means, goals, its call to *ijtihad* (the role of rational interpretation in Islamic jurisprudence), combating of blind adherence to tradition (*taqlid*), and proselytizing with wisdom and good sense rather than violence and use of force. One of the influential sayings of its founder, al-Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ali al-Senussi (1787–1859),[3] is that "the precious things are found in planting a tree and in its leaves." As a result, agriculture and commerce flourished in oases where the Senussi established their order. The Senussis were also able to wage armed resistance against Italian colonialism between the years 1911 and 1943 in order to establish a state in the east of Libya and create a society based on the order. Initially, they depended on an army of slaves

the constituent assembly announced the formation of a temporary federal government for Libya in Tripoli under Mahmud al-Muntasser. On October 12, 1951, power was transferred to the federal government and the regional governments except for matters relating to defense, foreign affairs, and financial affairs. Financial powers were transferred to the federal Libyan government on December 15, 1951, after which on December 24, 1951, the federalist Libyan constitution was declared along with the selection of Idris al-Senussi as king of the United Kingdom of Libya, a federal regime joining three provinces (Tripolitania (named after Tripoli), Cyrenaica (known in Arabic as *Barqah*), and Fezzan). See Miftah al-Sayyed al-Sharif, *The Conflict for Independence* (in Arabic), Dar al-Furat, Beirut, First Printing 2011.

3) See Miftah al-Sayyed al-Sharif , *The Senussi* (in Arabic), Dar al-Istiqlal and Wahba Library, Cairo, First Printing, 2008; see also Muhammad Fuad Shukri, *The Senussi Religion and State*, Libyan Studies Center, Oxford, 2000.

liberated from their bondage by the tribes of the region, or what remained of them shortly after the abolition of the slave trade in the country. Other *zawaya* were established in several other Islamic countries in alliance with the small but effective tribes in the region. The first inklings of the formation of a modern civil society occurred in the cities under Italian rule, making Tripoli in the west and Benghazi in the east attractive to laborers and state employees.

The Kingdom of Libya was established in the cities, though it was a poor state. The state was unified and directed by a Libyan elite that had been educated during Italian rule or abroad. From 1951 to 1969, King Idris al-Senussi ruled a country that did not know either political unrest or grave social divisions. The country did not suffer from a sharp differentiation between cities and countryside, but that changed when the cities experienced significant economic change with the discovery and export of oil beginning in 1961.

Oil made Libya a rentier state par excellence. The wealth of the country immediately transformed it into a consumer country of the first type. Education was universalized with an Egyptian curriculum, along with many Nasserist teachers. The monarchy thereby produced in its schools a generation opposed to the narrow concept of Libyan nationalism espoused by the monarchy, and to the American and British military bases on Libyan soil that signified the monarchy's alliance with Western imperialism. This was the basis of the nationalist tide that swept the country. In addition, Libya was situated geographically between two countries of revolution: Algeria and Egypt. And of course, the very history of Libya was one of waging armed resistance against colonialism, symbolized by the Sheikh of the Martyrs, Omar al-Mukhtar.

From these roots came the military coup of September 1969 that brought about the dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi, though he and his comrades were no more than 28

years old at the time. Political parties had been banned in Libya under the Ottomans, under Mussolini's fascism, and under the monarchy. Gaddafi continued this ban in his first speech. He ruled the country as a demagogue, mixing and appropriating elements of Islamism, Senussi philosophy, and Nasserism—what he termed his "Third International Theory." According to Gaddafi in *The Green Book*, religion and nationalism are the twin movers of history. Colonel Gaddafi took power through an obsession with arms and wealth, and one of his well-known sayings reflected this: "power, wealth, and arms in the hands of the people." This obscene greedy obsession, in the opinion of the author, sowed the seeds of the divisions in and the fissuring of Libyan society. He lived as if he was a historical persona summoning from history the pillars of his rule, and saw himself as the prophet of the desert. He wore the shroud of Islamism while congregating with tribalism and Arabism. For reasons of his own personal security, Gaddafi worked to undermine any powers representing a threat to him, whether the military (ironic considering his own military background and reflecting of course his own military coup against King Idris) or a political party. As he declared in his first speech after the coup on September 16, 1969: "Whoever forms a party is committing an act of treason." On the social level, tribalism, regionalism, and the Sufi orders rose sharply—especially since Gaddafi's coup was against a king who was a scion of the Sennusi religious reform movement. Later, after the spread of Islamist movements following the regional realignments with revolutionary Iran and the policies of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Gaddafi attempted to sway the street toward taking an interest in the Sufi orders and tribalism in a very superficial way by dedicating, for example, medical clinics to one tribe in an urban neighborhood, or a club to another tribe. Gaddafi began a rhetorical war against the cities, especially Tripoli, his headquarters, elevating instead "Bedouinness"

and "Desertism." In short, Gaddafi would do or say anything necessary to retain his power.

Regional and tribal divisions and their effects on the conflict in Libya

Tribal divisions

It is widely held that Libya is a tribal society and that the tribe is a political actor, yet there is not only no proof for this, but also the notion of "the tribe" has not truly been defined. The political regimes in Libya since the emergence of the Senussi movement all have the same identity: the obsessive need for power. This power-obsessive identity of successive Libyan political regimes has worked to undermine any other entity that is perceived to be a threat or that could change the pillars that it depends upon to defend itself and extend its influence on the ground. For example, the Senussi formed their army from slaves that had been freed, and formed their leaders out of the graduates of its schools, like Omar al-Mukhtar, even including non-Libyans. The tribe at the time was subordinate, supplying the Senussi with fighters exclusively.

The widespread theory of "the Libyan tribe" is so vaguely and broadly defined as to encompass a wide range of contradictory types. Regions and even cities, like Misrata or Bani Walid, are often considered tribes. Peoples like the Tuareg[4] and the Tubu[5] are also crammed into this mold.

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4) The Tuareg are a nomadic pastoral people inhabiting the Sahara Desert, spread out and circulated among southern Algeria, northern Mali, northern Niger, southwestern Libya, and northern Burkina Faso. They are Sunni Muslims following the Maliki school of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). They speak a variety of Berber known as the Tuareg language, which is a cluster of three dialects: Tamasheq, Tamajaq, and Tamahaq.

5) The Tubu or Toubou are an ethnic group residing mainly in the north and west of Chad and around the Tibesti Mountains, and in

The entire east of Libya is shorthanded with reference to two or three tribes as the ancient component of this region, which obscures the main bloc of residents of the region, who are a mix of Arabs and foreigners who colonized the country long ago, like the Cretan[6] Greek Muslim minority. The city of Benghazi is known in Libya as a microcosm of the country as a whole, because its founders and the majority of its residents in the modern age are from all segments of Libyan society. The south is composed of oases, its residents known as either simply "the people" or as Fezzans (in Arabic *al-fezaznah*). They are agriculturalists that specialize in the palm tree, which is the basis for their traditional folk crafts. Yet even this simple image is belied by the fact that the south is composed of a mixture of different yet collaborative social groups, whose relations with the state have largely been marred by neglect and tenuousness.

The notion of the tribal political role is a well-circulated but untested hypothesis that has not been subject to thorough research, let alone basic scrutiny. This is what has been termed the "veil of the tribe" by the researcher al-Muwldi al-Ahmar: "all who work within the anthropological tradition inherited by Western research centers and educational

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the oases of the south and southeast of Libya and the far west of Sudan as well as the far north of Niger. Recent research has speculated that they have ancient Semitic origins lying outside the African continent. The Tubu are composed of 38 tribes. Herodotus, among other travelers, mentioned them, though little has been written about their history.

6)   The Kritili, or Cretans of Libya, have their origins in the island of Crete, currently part of Greece, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire until 1898. In the year 1897, the Muslims of Crete fled to Libya after the Greco-Turkish War of that year. They speak a special dialect of Greek alongside the official Arabic language. The majority of them are ethnically Greek Muslims, with ethnic Turks as well. All of them call themselves Kritili, or Cretans. Most live in major urban centers, mainly Susa, as well as Shahhat, Bayda, Benghazi, and Tripoli.

institutions must locate the tribe if looking at Africa, the
Arab region, or East Asia. If they do not find it as was
described by the pioneers of the field, they must—follow-
ing the *habitus* of the profession—look for its specter in the
folds of the enormous transformations that have swept the
societies under study."[7] Furthermore, al-Ahmar writes, "the
Libyan example is perhaps even more exciting, because
its academic horizons to those concerned remain steeped
deeply in the North African anthropological tradition and
its classical frameworks for thinking."[8]

During the Libyan Revolution (February 17, 2011),
which transformed from peaceful protests into armed
clashes over the period from March to August 2011, all
Libyan societal components coalesced against Gaddafi's
regime. Popular militias were organized by region, espe-
cially from the cities Misrata and Zintan in the west of the
country. In the east, militias were established largely on
the basis of Islamist groups, including those established by
the Muslim Brotherhood of Libya,[9] such as the February

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7) al-Muwldi al-Ahmar ,"Toward Restoring Observation Without the
Veil of the Tribe (in Arabic)," *'Imran* magazine, 15:4, p. 124.

8) Ibid.

9) In addition to Sudan and Palestine, Libya is considered one of the
first countries where the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood began
to spread. At the end of the 1940s, three individuals belonging
to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood accused of attempting to
assassinate the Interior Minister of Egypt at the time, Mahmoud
Fahmi an-Nukrashi, sought asylum in Libya with Emir Idris of
Cyrenaica, who harbored them and refused to deliver them to the
Egyptian government, which was pursuing the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt at the time. This led to tension in the relationship between
Idris and Egypt, and the Egyptian government closed the border
between them and Cyrenaica. The three Muslim Brothers sought
subsequently to spread the thinking of the Brotherhood in Libya.
The first head of the Libyan Brotherhood was 'Atiah Jabar, after
which was Idris Madhi, who was the first to link the group to the
global organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, followed by
Abdullah Ahmed 'Izz al-Din, Abd al-Majid Aburowen, Suliman

17 Brigade. There was no tribal basis for these armed militias. While some of the Zintan militias for example were considered to be tribal, in fact they included fighters from the western mountains town like al-Rajban, as well as even some from the cities of the coast. Later, the militias known as Zintan would align with the civil current and protect its symbols and its leadership and enter into conflict with what is known as the forces of Libya Dawn, a coalition between the traders of Misrata and the Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood of Libya and what remains of the Islamic "Libyan Fighting Group."[10] Even now, there is no tribal dimension to the armed conflict in Libya. Some sheikhs and warlords claim to represent certain tribes, but in reality they are small in number, with influence in certain limited areas that are based on smuggling. The war among them is over the land borders for smuggling purposes that has assumed a tribal guise. In essence, the politics have become confused because of the overlaps occurring on the ground of small wars for various, divergent ends.

Regional divisions

The forgotten foundation for the Libyan issue is geography. Libya is a land of rough terrain, and Libya's history as

Abd al-Qadr, and Bashir al-Kabti (who was elected by the group in November 2011 as the first publicly elected guide of the party in Libya).

10) The Libyan Fighting Group was an armed organization with a Salafist jihadist ideology. It was established by a group of young Libyan men after they returned from participating in the Soviet-Afghan War. It undertook armed operations in urban areas and military sites around Derna in the 1990s with the goal of toppling the Gaddafi regime. However, the Libyan army and the security apparatus largely eradicated the group and arrested a large number of its members. In 2009, the leaders of the group renounced their ideology and apologized to the state, prompting their release.

state reflects this geography. As the popular Libyan saying goes: "the state is on the ground and the people are in the air" (*al-dawlah ardh wa-al-'arab tuyur*; literally translated, "the state is land and the Arabs are birds").[11] The geography is fluid, the country a sprawling continent and isolated islands in the waste, as historian Arnold Toynbee wrote:

> "The divide, or buffer if you will, does not necessarily need to be water. The arid desert serves well as an alternative. The reality is that each oasis is an island, except the water is the island, compensating for the lack of water around it. Likewise, an island can be isolated by water on one side and the desert on the other. This is the nature of the two islands surrounded by the water of the Mediterranean and the stones and stands of the Libyan Desert and the Sahara. There is nothing farther east of these two islands—the Jabal al-Akhdar (Green Mountains) of Cyrenaica or Barqah—except a mirror image of its northern neighbor the island of Crete. Farther west of these two islands, known in Arabic as the *maghreb* or the West [gharb] of the Arab World is a mirror image of Sicily. Connection or isolation is relative. To reach either of the two islands to the north, one must board a ship. To reach either of them from the south, one must find camels to ride. But the desert, like the sea, can become a means for communications for any human well adapted to the circumstance. Throughout the course of history, each of the two islands was invaded with success, and it was likewise possible to occupy either of them via either of the two ways."[12]

This forgotten factor of the soil is representative of Libya, composed of three islands: Tripoli, Barqah (Cyrenaica),

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11) This popular Libyan expression means that the state is on fixed ground, while the people change through emigration and other migratory movements. The saying seems to be derived from the nomadic life of the Bedouin.

12) Arnold Toynbee, *Arab Unity coming from the Nile to the Niger* (Arabic translation of *Between Niger and Nile*), p. 16.

and Fezzan. Tripoli is the head owing to its population density, Cyrenaica its heart with a population representing the country as a whole (with Benghazi as a microcosm of Libya), and Fezzan the body as the ancient center of convoy trade and an oasis for transit between Africa and the rest of the world, and more recently, the oil fields of Libya. Geography has formed an obstacle as well, also known as the "revenge of geography." In this context, the American journalist Robert D. Kaplan pointed to the issue of the geography of Libya after the abbreviated Spring, that connectedness "has always increased the knowledge of history and geography of a particular country in the Middle East that had been lacking before the events. It could have been partially coincidence that the disturbance began in Tunisia. Or it could have been the classical legacy of colonies compared with Algeria and Libya (though here Kaplan ignores the Cretans entirely in favor of his biased Orientalist thesis, in which Tunisia is the heir to Western Civilization in North Africa, as if its Muslim neighbors to the east and west have always been a vacuum of barbarity, and no history has elapsed in millennia to change "Tunisia") … Libya's western region represented by Tripolitania has been oriented toward Tunisia throughout history, while the eastern region represented by Benghazi has always been oriented toward Egypt."[13] We see here that geography is not inevitable, but changes over time. But it illustrates that the issue of geography plays a serious role in social variables in the Arab Spring.

The events of the Libyan Revolution confirm the role of the regional factor in dividing the country. The east was first to be liberated from the grip of Gaddafi. Then Misrata suffered from a war extending for months with Gaddafi loyalists, then the Nafusa Mountains and the city of Zintan. Tripoli

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13) Robert Kaplan, *"The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate,"*, Iyhab Abd al-Rahim trans., p. 16.

and Tripolitania remained under the control of Gaddafi. The south of Libya appeared neutral superficially, but in fact was under the influence of Gaddafi's forces. The region of Fezzan had remained under French influence and did not join the United Kingdom of Libya until 1956. This division that arose from the inferno of the civil war had been made reality by the dictatorship that made Tripoli its impregnable bastion, while ignoring the rest of country. The natural result was the rapid rebellion of the areas outside the capital. On the ground, forces formed militarily and politically on the basis of regionalism. When the regime collapsed, and there was no longer a centralized army or security services, the political authorities that emerged from the revolution were figureheads, icons for national unity like the flag and national anthem agreed upon in the first exceptional moment of the announcement of the National Transitional Council headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil.[14]

These regional forces on the ground filled the vacuum. In the east, Benghazi was the capital of the revolution, recognized internationally as independent from the Gaddafi state in UN Security Council Resolution 1973, despite the security problems caused by the collapse of the army and the security services and a vacuum that was filled by militias on the ground, many of which were Islamist. In addition, without any reference to its identity and strategic importance, the city of Derna was cut off from the rest of the country. The city has no more than 100,000 residents and a rich history of openness stemming from its Andalusian heritage. It is located 300 kilometers from Benghazi in the Jabal al-Akhdar. It was declared an "Islamic Emirate," and

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14) The National Transitional Council formed on February 27, 2011, building on the consensuses of municipal councils at the time in the liberated regions in the east of the country, the elite of Benghazi notable among them, who chose the former minister of justice and defector from the Qaddafi regime Mustafa Abdul Jalil as its head.

Gaddafi referred to it at the time as the base for al-Qaeda that suddenly appeared in Libya. In the west, the alliance of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood with the traders of Misrata, a city known as the kingdom of Libyan capitalism, yielded something akin to a city-state: its own airport, port, and military and economic forces, with quiet international support represented in the establishment of consulates for Western states and Turkey. Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey visited thereafter, and gestured to the bonds linking the residents of Misrata with Turkey (a large portion of its residents being of Turkish descent, as he said). In the Nafusa Mountains, the Zintan militias became a thorn in the side of the capital and the Gaddafi forces. Afterward, they took over the capital, and these militias took control of many of the key aspects of the country.

Therefore, what happened in the country with the revolution was the regional division of the country, with the emergence of an alliance of Misrata traders and Islamists and other fighting groups in the west of the country, which came to be known as Libya Dawn. Whereas in the east of Libya, what was called the Libyan Army suddenly emerged under the command of the retired general Khalifa Haftar,[15] who gathered his forces in Benghazi on the model of the "Lightning Brigade" headed by Abdul Fatah Younis,[16] at the

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15) Khalifa Belqasem Haftar, born 1943 in Ajdabiya, is a Libyan military officer. He defected from the Gaddafi regime in the late 1980s. He returned to Libya with the outbreak of the February 17 Revolution and participated in the military and political work to topple Gaddafi. For a brief period, he led the Liberation Army that was established by the revolutionaries. In 2015, he was appointed by the Libyan House of Representatives (the Tobruk government) as the general commander of the armed forces in Libya, and promoted him to lieutenant general.

16) Abdul Fatah Younis (1944–2011) was chief of staff of the Libyan National Liberation Army during the February 17 Revolution. He was a former interior minister and one of the leaders of the Free Officers Movement that undertook the 1969 coup against Idris that

neglected military airbase Benina. The new Libyan army was formed in part with what remained of the old Libyan army in the east of Libya, but the main foundation of the army were the forces led by Haftar and the Zintan militias in the western mountains that allied together to wage war against Libya Dawn in June 2014. This army protected the elected and internationally recognized parliament that took Tobruk, in the far east of the country along the Egyptian border, as its headquarters. Despite this state of fragmentation, with the National Transitional Council refusing to cede power to the parliament, yielding two governments, one in Tripoli and the other in Tobruk — this country, a desert continent, the state of Libya has always remained a scattered island united by the veins of oil and the resulting rents that go out from Tripoli to all Libyans. The communication and transportation networks were appropriate throughout the country, and despite the absence of a unified state, it remained a shelter and provided sustenance.

Terrorism

A traditional, conservative social structure remains closed to outsiders, and will never accept any threat to its superior position with regard to preserving the mores and traditions that comprise its very being. The structure is old and deeply rooted, and it will fight fiercely with violence and force

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brought Gaddafi to power. He became the commander of the Libyan Special Forces. After becoming minister of the interior in 2009, he resigned from this and all other positions in the state on February 21, 2011, in response to Gaddafi's repression of the revolution. From then on, he had an important role in leading the battles of the revolutionaries and was appointed commander and chief of staff of the new Libyan army. He was assassinated on July 28, 2011, which the transitional government blamed on Islamic extremists; however, the assailants and the motivation remain in question. Speculation has emerged that Younis was killed because of suspicions by the anti-Gaddafi forces that he had secretly remained in contact with pro-Gaddafi forces.

against any meddling with its existence. Extremist Islamic ideological groups should not take hold in such a society.

The fertilizer for the spontaneous emergence and popularization of Islamist groups alongside the cities are crises and divisions. This is what happened in Libya with the worsening economic and social conditions in the 1990s resulting from the repressive policies of Gaddafi that aggravated the deterioration of the economy, especially with the collapse of Gaddafi's quixotic and chaotic project to impose a socialist state and the decline of oil prices. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the return of the "Arab Afghans," the Islamist Libyan Fighting Group emerged to wage gang warfare in the Jabal al-Akhdar, which had also been the bastion of the jihad movement against the Italians in the colonial period. The city of Benghazi, which had been the land of the opposition both under the Idris monarchy and the Gaddafi regime, as well as the small city of Derna in the mountains, became a base for al-Qaeda because of the deteriorating economic conditions. Extremist Islam further matured after the Gaddafi regime had simultaneously tried to expel it and use it to market itself as a defender in the war against terrorism, attempts that were crowned with of the dismantling of Libya's nuclear program.[17]

There was fertile ground for the infiltration of terrorism into Libya, into which it drove its wedge during the first stage of the revolution. A young French female journalist named Marie-Lys Lubrano observed the first glimpse of this trend: " 'al-Salaam (peace),' thus he spoke smiling when he

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17) Libya sought to acquire a nuclear weapon in the 1980s; however, Gaddafi was forced to give up on his country's nuclear program in 2003. Controversy surrounds the causes that drove Libya to give up its nuclear program. Some attribute the decision to Gaddafi's fear of suffering the same destruction as Iraq after the American invasion. Other experts attribute it to the economic sanctions on Libya, and therefore to the diplomatic efforts exerted to normalize relations with the West.

passed alongside us. My mouth gaped before this surreal neighbor, and I sent a questioning glance to Bashir, who gestured with his head: 'No. Clearly it seems the man is not a soldier, but he is good at using the rocket launcher and the mortar.' The man noticed I was looking at him in astonishment, and he began laughing, then came back to me and extended his water canteen. I said to myself as I sipped: 'Wonderful, this Taliban man really loves me.' I asked—as soon as he distanced himself from us—one of the fighters: 'Where does this person come from?' He grumbled in reply, 'Afghanistan.' I said 'is he Afghani?' He replied: 'no, he might me Libyan, but he, in all certainty, is not from the army; a Libyan coming from Afghanistan…' I began to realize that we did not choose with whom we fight in the war, and that whoever wants to come to the battlefield comes."[18]

The structure of the state, its weakness, and its contribution to the internal divisions

The Libyan state emerged handicapped

Libya is classified as a weak state with traditional structures that underwent rapid modernization, but this does not account for everything that has happened in Libya. The causes of this weakness have not been adequately defined or explored. This is not a rejection of these conclusions, but we simply need more analysis of the importance, for example, of geography and its contribution to the divisions happening in Libya. We see that Libyan geopolitics have remained consistent since the 18th century, when Libya was subordinate to the Ottoman Empire. The period of Fascist Italian colonialism in some ways shaped the independent state. The new Libyan state was thus not all that new, since

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18) Marie-Lys Lubrano, *Un taxi pour Benghazi*, Khaled Muhammad Jahimah trans., Dar al-Farjani, Tripoli (Libya), First Printing 2013.

it inherited the obstacles and problems of earlier eras that impeded state formation, making it a handicapped state.

In the second Ottoman period (1830–1911), political life was repressed. The members of the first political organization were put on trial and harassed,[19] and the nascent press was besieged.[20] In the Fascist Italian period (1911–1943), repression was even more extreme and consecrated with arrogance. The period of British military rule (1943–1951) could be considered an exception. But the monarchy continued political repression, particularly of Arab nationalism. Gaddafi considered partisanship treason. He nationalized civil society organizations and the press. He stifled and killed the seeds of a civil society until the moment of his downfall. Through this history, the modern state in Libya was born handicapped. Oil wealth only confirmed this. The defects of this state have not only been covered by oil, but also made these defects even more deeply rooted in the political and social topography of the country.

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19) The first opposition organization was established in Libya during Ottoman rule by Ibrahim Saraj al-Din (1860–1892). The idea of the organization (a civic organization began to crystallize when Saraj al-Din opened the subject with Ahmed al-Ta'eb (head of the Tripoli municipality), who not only welcomed the idea, but also supported and encouraged it with all his power. When Saraj al-Din found his idea welcome by a number of prominent people, foremost al-Ta'eb and Hamza Thafer, he began to take practical steps to organize and prepare, then gathered a group of young Libyan men who heard his speeches and held forums and discussed his opinions. For more details on the story of the first opposition organization in Libya, see Ahmed Sedqi al-Dajani, *Beginnings of the Arab Awakening and the Popular Struggle in Libya 1884–1911* (in Arabic).

20) The Libyan press emerged in the second Ottoman period with the first newspaper published in 1866, and was followed by several other private newspapers, among them *Buqasha*, a satirical newspaper, as described in *Press Struggle* by Ali al-Misrati al-Sader, Tripoli [Libya], First Printing, 1968. During the Italian colonial rule under Mussolini, private newspapers were closed, journalists were harassed, and Fascist party newspapers emerged under the control of the Italian Colonial Ministry like *Libya Illustrated Magazine* in the 1930s.

Oil state without an army

"Today nearly every state in the world has a military force to protect itself against aggression or foreign invasion. States are measured by their armed forces, and spend a high proportion of their national income to purchase military equipment." But the handicapped nascent state of Libya did not see things this way. Upon its independence, military coup d'états occurred in the newly independent states of what was known at the time as the "Third World," and especially in the Arab world. The military turned its arms against the rulers and brought themselves into power. In July 1952, the Free Officers Movement successfully seized power in Egypt, Libya's neighbor and larger sister state. The Kingdom of Libya did not pay its small army much attention until it was surprised in September 1969 by a coup that seized control of the country. Gaddafi, who had been the mastermind of the coup, was concerned in the beginning with purchasing a glut of weapons and modernizing the military. But from the moment of the coup, Gaddafi worked to erode the unity and power of the military of the country, so that it would not turn the tables on him in return. Gaddafi established parallel *kataeb* (battalions) whose leadership was directly subordinate and loyal to Gaddafi, alongside the official army. The security services of the country were thus dedicated from the beginning to protecting the head of the regime. Despite having no considerable security forces dedicated to crime-fighting, the country was in some ways protected by the nature of its society and economy as well as the rugged, intractable, sprawling desert.

The nation that is defended by God

During the revolution, in popular circles the saying spread "that the guard is my Lord! (*ann al-hares rabbi*!)," because

amidst the revolution, security conditions did not degenerate, crime did not spread, and chaos did not reign. However, this also provided a path for the emergence of the "Gestapo of the Revolution." Citing the necessity to safeguard the revolution from *al-azlam* (cronies) — a term referring to pro-Gaddafi loyalists — an Islamist group took a military base in Benghazi which had been a military detention center established by Gaddafi to imprison the opposition. Soon every armed faction in the country had their own prisons and detentions centers, following the Gestapo model of taking over existing facilities, and soon began targeting the Gaddafi police and judiciary.

By assassination, the Gestapo of the Revolution composed of Islamic extremists had sought to eliminate the security forces by killing its members. The first justification was revenge for what the Islamists had suffered at the hands of Gaddafi's men. The second was in order to lay the groundwork for the "Islamic State" they sought to establish in the country. They eliminated those who did not join them in the early days of the revolution. Militias like the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, which took over several former military bases, remain in control of them.[21]

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21) The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade is an armed militia in Libya established after the February 17 Revolution, and was initially known as the "Brigade of the Martyrs of February 17." The name was adopted in memory of one of the first Libyans to die fighting Qaddafi's forces that had entered the Benghazi outskirts in March 2011. Its force is estimated around 1,000 individuals, mainly in Kufra and Eastern Libya. On September 21, 2012, demonstrations including around 30,000 citizens broke out in Benghazi, in what was known as the Friday of Salvation of Benghazi. One of its foremost demands was that the military and police alone assume responsibility for security in the country and for the dissolution of the armed militias. Seventeen protesters were killed at a demonstration in front of the Rafallah al-Sahati headquarters located on a farm in the Hawari area of Benghazi (15 kilometers from the center of the city). Along with their ally Ansar al-Sharia, they took prisoners illegally, outside

Linkage between the internal conflict and the regional and international situation

The necessary and the possible

Gaddafi foresaw the end at the moment when things worsened for President Ben Ali in Tunisia at the beginning of the Arab Spring in January 2011. Gaddafi appeared on a Tunisian television station addressing the Tunisian people, stating that Ben Ali as the president deserved respect from his people, who should safeguard him, not topple him. Gaddafi, who came to power in a military coup inspired by the example of the Free Officers of Egypt, knew well the importance of foreign factors in Libyan politics. Inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab nationalism, Qaddafi took over the Libyan Kingdom, which had long lived between a rock and a hard place, when it came to two of the most popular Arab anti-colonial causes: Nasser's Egypt and the FLN of Algeria. The king's alliances and particularly his hosting of British and American military bases could not have come at a worse time in regional and world politics. Naturally, one of Gaddafi's priorities was to take over the two imperialist military bases— the American Wheelus Air Base in the west and the British Royal Air Force Station El Adem in the east, the latter of which was naturally renamed the Gamal Abdel Nasser Air Base.

This is to illustrate and make the essential point that conditions in Libya are deeply interconnected with regional and international developments. The Libyan political climate is deeply connected with external factors, particularly after the discovery of oil. Oil made Libya like a tourist country,

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of the justice system. The Rafallah al-Sahati militia possesses an enormous arsenal of weaponry and prisons in which they detain prisoners outside of the official judicial system. The leader of this militia is Isma'il al-Salabi, brother of Ali al-Salabi, member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars.

colored by workers of all nationalities. In many ways, the modern Libyan state was made abroad, since the Libyan issue became a focus of regional and international attention along with the beginning of the Cold War.

Regional and international conflicts were as intense at the time as they are today. In this way, today is the same as yesterday. We can say that from the beginning the Libyan issue was internationalized and perplexing to the region. The Arab League joined in support of UN Security Council decisions 1970 and 1973 that put Libya under Article XII and formulated the intervention that began on March 19, 2011, and has not yet ended as of this writing.

Consolidating influence and calculating interests

From its first moment, the regional and international intervention entered into the battle by supplying weapons, as happened during the Libyan conflict against the war declared by Gaddafi against the peaceful protests between March and August 2011. After the liberation of the country and killing of Gaddafi, regional and international actors gained influential roles in the corridors of power in Libya through politics and spying. Although the media depicts weapons flowing out of Libya to the region, under international cover, weapons flowed into Libya, especially from the Gulf States and later from neighboring states. The internecine warfare that is now in its fifth year is indication enough of the surfeit of arms as well as the influx of terrorists from every direction.

The Libyan Civil War has given neighboring countries the ability to export their crises to Libya, and in particular rid themselves of their local terrorists. Terrorists have flown into Libya from Mali, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Chad. However, the Libyan government has only officially accused Sudan of interfering in Libyan affairs. A Sudanese plane was stopped in Kufra airport (in the southeast of the country) carrying arms. Adversaries are exploiting the side

war to settle accounts among neighboring countries. The smuggling wars also involve Malta, through the smuggling of oil out of Libya. There is quiet support for this from some of the neighboring countries, many of which see Libya as a source of trouble and unrest since the Gaddafi period. These countries are taking revenge in order to consolidate influence and calculate their interests. As in all internal conflicts, the Libyan Civil War is an opening for regional and international interventions.

Current warring forces

Forces hiding their identities

The fog of war makes it very difficult to have a clear, detailed understanding of the warring parties, particularly those disguising or denying their identities. Observers are content with general descriptions and as a result there has been no comprehensive study, making even the basic definition of the combatants a thorny issue. The preceding analysis has shown that the warring forces and the political elites are heterogeneous. In the early days of the revolution, the most prominent category was young men of the middle class. Then, a political leadership of dissidents returned from abroad or long jail sentences. Most of them are middle-aged and also middle class. Thus emerged the category of lawyers, who had a vigorous union throughout a long period of Libyan history.[22] The class of lawyers emerged as the frontrunners to come into power. The civil democratic movement had participated in the first demonstrations of the revolution on February 17, whereas Islamist groups joined after a few days, particularly the Libyan

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22) The first council of the union of lawyers in Libya was elected in 1961. The first law concerning the legal profession came after independence in 1954. See ʻAmran Borois, *The Law Profession Historically, Presently, and Aspirationally*, Benghazi, self-published.

Muslim Brotherhood. Shortly before the revolution, the Brotherhood had entered into a historic reconciliation with the regime led by Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam.[23]

From the first moments, the Islamists appeared strongly organized and possessed considerable material advantages that they used to rally and address the public and raise religious slogans prominently. The Brotherhood attempted to take control by rushing to form associations and media centers, especially in order to issue newspapers and FM broadcasts and promote the formation of the February 17 militia. Some of its members had returned from abroad after the reconciliation deal with the regime, and they began to establish companies, schools, and colleges. They did not lack for operational expertise. The hierarchical nature of their organization likewise contributed to their discipline. They focused on attracting young men and spent lavishly on aid to those in need, while striving to remain anonymous in their activities.[24]

Political conflicts erupted between the civil democratic forces that favored peaceful protests and the Islamist groups that invested in combating Gaddafi through arms. The latter worked from the start on militarizing the conflict in response

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23) The reconciliation took place in 2009, after certain "revisions." A book titled *Revisions of the Libyan Fighting Force* was published. The leadership of the groups wrote about these revisions to their ideology and jurisprudence while in the Abu Salim military prison in Tripoli, under the supervision of the Gaddafi Foundation for Development. Most of those who participated in these revisions are currently the leaders of Libya Dawn.

24) During the first months of the revolution, the Brotherhood in Libya established associations and newspapers without announcing the group's relationship with them. In fact, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood denied their affiliation with them. This made me write an editorial demanding that the Brotherhood acknowledge this publicly, under the headline taken from the popular saying "go in peace" in the weekly newspaper *Mayadin* of which I am the publisher and editor in chief. (Published May 1, 2011)

to Gaddafi's violent repression of the peaceful protests. Within weeks, armed battalions emerged. They were formed by taking advantage of the mandatory "weapons training" for men and women (but particularly young men) imposed by the Gaddafi regime under the slogan "the armed people." The Libyan Fighting Group that waged guerrilla warfare against the regime in the 1990s has been discussed previously. These individuals were freed from prison after the 2009 reconciliation deal with the regime. Some left the country and there is no doubt that they formed armed groups and recruited new individuals. Thus, in its first hours, the revolution gave birth to political conflict that emerged along with the formation of the National Transitional Council.

Hinges of the warring powers

The warring parties took winding paths that can be summarized in the following:

1. Gaddafi, especially in the early period of his rule, contributed with funding and with force to supporting the Islamists. For this purpose, he established the Islamic Call Society (al-D'awah), which was the largest institution founded after the 1969 military coup. Gaddafi effectively handed it over to known Brotherhood members. These efforts culminated in the Libyan Opposition Conference held in London in 2005 that the Brotherhood boycotted in solidarity with its Libyan branch that was seeking reconciliation with the regime via Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to return to their country. During the revolution, the Brotherhood contributed to the political and military fight and financially, especially in Misrata, where a fierce battle raged with Gaddafi loyalists. This is the city where the alliance between the traders and businessmen with the Brotherhood emerged and later enlarged to incorporate other prominent Islamists groups like the Libyan

Fighting Group and the Libya Salvation Front. The funding for this alliance is suspected to have been embezzled from the government.

2. The civil democratic movement is the most diverse and generally unorganized. Its base of support lives abroad as a result of the Gaddafi regime's despotism and some of its leaders were executed early on. But in the early period of the revolution, the civil democratic movement was a key participant, with many of the most prominent leaders, like Mahmoud Jibril[25], that cultivated and established the National Forces Alliance relatively quickly. This movement has succeeded in the elections that were held in the country under international observation, both for the National Dialogue and the House of Representatives.

3. The Libyan Army, or at least the branch headed by General Khalifa Haftar that joined remnants from the Gaddafi era in the east and the Zintan militias in the west, announced its formation during what was known as "Operation Dignity" in May 2014. Officially, Haftar and the Zintan are under the command of the House of Representatives, but at the same time they are semi-independent. Political controversy surrounds them like all of the warring parties.

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25) Jibril is a technocrat with a master's and doctoral degree in political science from the University of Pittsburgh who served the Gaddafi regime as the head of planning and development initiatives. The National Transitional Council appointed him wartime head of the transitional government and served in 2011 during the fighting for liberation against the Gaddafi regime, after which he resigned. He was elected head of the National Forces Alliance that was formed out of a group of smaller political parties and some prominent leaders. The alliance was successful in winning the most seats in the elections for a General National Congress held on July 7, 2012, taking almost half of the 80 party-list seats. This alliance leans toward liberalism, calls for moderate Islam, democracy, and a civil state.

4. There are other various smaller factions, but they do not represent a main element in the warring parties. Instead, they appear independent but effectively exploit the parties named above opportunistically.

The fate of the conflicts in Libya and their future direction

Libya at the tipping point between al-Sisi and Essebsi

The Libyan Revolution erupted on February 17, 2011, not long after the Tunisian Revolution of January 14 and the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, and the Libyan Revolution has been torn between the outcomes of these two others revolutions of the Arab Spring. Overt conflict erupted after the army succeeded in Egypt in removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power. In many ways, the fighting between civil forces and Islamists in Libya resembles the Egyptian and Tunisian situations to different degrees, except that the Islamist Libya Dawn controls the capital in the west while Operation Dignity controls the east. Conditions in Libya have remained tense and in a state of war, with democratization occurring alongside the formation of the army and coups. As it stands, neither of the two processes can overcome the other.

If the Islamist current in Libya and its extremist wing fail, it will add to the list of failures by political Islam to establish a modern state: first with the religious reform movement of the Senussi, then the Gaddafi regime that claimed the Qur'an as the legislation and law for society. The failure of these two previous regimes at establishing a modern state in reality on the ground contributed to give popular legitimacy to the rhetoric of the Islamist current. Perhaps the civil current can succeed through the ballot box.

While it is possible that the international role in Libya in the early moments of the conflict was necessary, the resultant

military conflict indirectly led to the control of oil wells by terrorist groups on Libyan territory like Sirte, located in the heart of the Libyan oil triangle, and further linked Libya to international terrorism, Da'ish in particular.

In conclusion, while the Tunisian thinker Hisham J'ait has said: "prognostication of what will happen tomorrow is meaningless," that does not mean one must row in a sea of the shadows of the future. The Libyan issue, in my opinion, is the result the country being blown about by the gales of the Arab Spring. As a result, Libya's escape from its crises will necessitate the following:

1. The Arab Spring came belatedly to the region, but globally the world order only changed recently with the end of the Cold War, which took decades, and whose results are still present today.

2. The Arab Spring, as with all human revolutions, is taking divergent and winding paths. The Arab revolutions are not disparate events, but an interconnected wave. We Libyans in the first wave appear to be moving from spring into fall.

3. The Arab Spring came about through a single act of suicide through self-immolation in Tunisia. Today, suicide operations represent the horrible tragedies of the Middle East, with its ancient history, civilizations, and religions. They reveal that life cannot revert back to what it was before 2011, and though revolutions bring death, death is the most extreme means to seize new life.

4. The Arab Spring's revolutions brought the people to the streets, and now the scene has been stained by blood. The features of the second wave of the spring are taking shape and could reshape not only the region but also the world.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

THE ROLE OF MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE PATH OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION

THE CASE OF YEMEN

Mohamed Ahmad Ali al-Mekhlafi[*]

Introduction

The military and security forces in the countries of the Arab Spring have not had a unified response to the revolutions of change. Their stances have varied according to the structure of these two institutions. Where a unified institution exists for the military, it refrains from continuing to repress the revolution and from bloodshed, allowing the fall of the ruling families, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. But in

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[*]   Mohamed Ahmad Ali al-Mekhlafi is a doctor of law, lawyer, and researcher at the Yemeni Center for Studies and Research. He is also the Minister of Legal Affairs in the national consensus government of the Yemeni Republic.

countries where the military and security institutions were not united—where the institutions were disconnected and agencies and services mixed military tasks together with security tasks, where these units were directly subordinate to leadership composed of individuals of the family of the president, where their military and security doctrine was represented in personal loyalty to the president and his family, and where some units and individuals defected and stood on the side of the revolution—repression and bloodshed intensified and worsened. The most important factor is whether the elite of the military and security services stood on the side of the political regime, as happened in Yemen, Syria, and Libya. This paper will treat the case of Yemen.

This study seeks to define the role played by the military and security forces in Yemen to prevent change and support the victory of the counterrevolution. It is composed of two parts. The first part elucidates the causes and the factors that enabled the counterrevolution by the former, defunct regime by harnessing the military and security services to overthrow the political process and prevent change. The second part examines the stance of the military and security forces toward the revolution of change. This part deals with the nature of the structure of the military and security forces that made them loyal to the authoritarian regime, leading them to seek to preserve this structure during the transitional period. This stance enabled the forces of the counterrevolution to regroup and execute the counterrevolution.

Background

The popular youth-driven revolution broke out on February 11, 2011. It came after long political stagnation following the country's reunification in 1994, and after Yemen moved from a state of precariousness to the edge of

being a failed state economically, politically, and socially. Corruption became the governing system. The ruling elite had become unable to actually rule. As a result, they became indifferent to society and its suffering, content with a façade of politics while seeking hereditary succession within the ruling family.

In these favorable circumstances for revolution, there were two direct factors driving its outbreak at a specific moment: The first was the success of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in toppling the ruling families. February 11 was also the day that the president of the Egyptian regime resigned. The second was the peaceful protest agenda that the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and its partners put in place, containing a plan extending from January until April 27, 2011, in order to oppose the holding of undemocratic elections that the authorities intended to monopolize. The JMP implemented the plan from the beginning of January and mobilized crowds under the banner of "the popular rising."

In fact, the first factor had a much higher ceiling for the general aim of the revolution than the second factor. The JMP and its partners wanted to change the electoral conditions to hold free and fair elections, while the goal of the revolution in Yemen was to change the ruling family and eliminate the possibility of hereditary succession. For some, the additional goal of the revolution was to establish a modern, civil state.

Within days of the outbreak of the revolution, the JMP and its partners announced their support for the revolution and adopted its slogan of "change."

The youth-driven popular revolution was marked by two defining characteristics. First, its peacefulness on the part of the women and men of the revolution, as the youth in the squares and marches confronted the terrorism of the state and the regime's bullets in their bodies. The ruling family used army units and security services personally loyal to the

president and his family to kill demonstrators and attack the youth of the revolution. The military and security services did not hesitate in carrying out the orders of the president, except for a small part of the army represented by the First Armored Division and a small number of others units from the military and security services. The second characteristic was the strength in the ranks of the revolution found in civil society, and in particular the young people, foremost the students and women who played the essential role in revolutionary mobilization and sacrifice.

The character of the revolution was thus distinguished by the political role played by civil forces, and the purity of the young people's sacrifices. Included in those sacrifices were the sons of the tribes that participated, without bearing arms, in the sit-in the Square of Freedom and Change and the marches and demonstrations. Because of the blood of its young people the revolution was possible, and the blood of Yemenis prevented the slide of the country into a civil war at the time. This is the opposite of what the counterrevolution did three years after the revolution, as later became clear. The success of the counterrevolution without a doubt is owed to factors that led to the failure of the revolution. These are various, but here we will point in brief to the most important ones, fitting them within the scope of the subject of this paper.

Factors of failure

A number of failures, without a doubt, enabled the counter-revolution to overthrow the political process. Some of these factors can be attributed to the revolution and its forces, others to the counterrevolution and its forces. Here we will focus on three main factors: betrayal in the ranks of the forces of the revolution, the strategy of failure, and the lack of a transfer of power.

Betrayal in the ranks of the forces of the revolution

Dissent grew in the ranks of the forces supporting the revolution while they were still in the Square of Freedom and Change. Disputes began over simple things, like competition to control the speaking platforms and over leadership of the youth movements. But, the common denominator remained change and the establishment of a modern civil state. With the transition to the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, the revolution supporters sought to accomplish two things. First, they wanted to preserve the consensus reached in the National Salvation document (the ideological platform of the revolution), especially concerning the establishment of a new regime based on democracy and human rights. The second goal was to reach a consensus on the issues that were still disputed among the JMP, namely the shape of the state.

Representatives of the JMP were able to reach a consensus on both points, that is, preserving the platform presented in the salvation document and agreeing that the state would be federalist, composed of multiple regions. However, some of the parties themselves disagreed with their representatives and with what had been reached in the agreement. They presented different visions at the National Dialogue Conference. Some of the pro-revolution parties turned instead to the former ruling party of the *ancien régime* (The General People's Congress). In particular, disagreements emerged over the division of the federalist state, with the Socialist Party supporting two regions, while the General People's Congress and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (commonly known as al-Islah) supported six regions. Disputes also broke out over the subjects of transitional justice and human rights.

These disputes were reflected in the parliamentary bloc and the government of the JMP, and as a result the performance of the president, the parliament, and the government

all suffered during the transitional period in terms of their abilities to accomplish the tasks of the transitional period and the process of transferring power.

The idea of change had succeeded in unifying the efforts of the JMP and its partners in the National Council for the Forces of Peaceful Revolution, achieving a clarity of vision focused on democratic transition, which was embodied in the Vision for National Salvation. The success of the peaceful youth-driven revolution had derived from the acceptance by all of the necessity of changing the authoritarian regime through a transitional period, run by a consensus between the revolutionary alliance and the former ruling party. The first step of the process was to form a government in partnership, but the partnership and the transition of power ended at this level. As soon as the transitional government formed, the Joint Meeting Parties began to drift apart over their differences and lack of joint coordination, and thus were unable to take the steps needed to continue the transitional process into its second stage after the election of the president.

The crux of the problem was that the habits from the *ancien régime*, and in fact the former ruling party itself, remained in place. Foremost of these inherited traditions was the state patronage system, particularly the parties competing to award positions in public employment. The High Authority of the JMP, in partnership with the leadership of the National Council for the Forces of Peaceful Revolution and the new government, had all agreed to respect the neutral, nonpartisanship of public employment and subordinate it to some sort of professional civil service. But the spoils or patronage system nevertheless remained a cause for conflict among the JMP, and there was a negative reaction when the rotational employment called for by law did not occur. Similar things happened with the implementation of regulations and the code of good governance issued

by the National Consensus Government. These unsuccessful reforms gave a window of opportunity to the remnants of the deposed regime and the deposed president, who remained close to the transitional president, to preserve the continued loyalty of the apparatus of the state to the former president and his family—foremost of which were the military and security forces.

The *ancien régime* continued its control over public employment, in which the conditions for appointments were personal loyalties, and not qualifications or competency. Furthermore, there was a lack of support for the transitional government, a lack of coordination among the JMP and its partners in government, and a lack of coordination between the House of Representatives and the government to take decisions (apart from a few exceptional moments) based on consensus. All of these failures favored the former ruling party of the General People's Congress and its allies, who adopted a strategy of failure.

The strategy of failure focused on foiling the implementation of many of the tasks of the government during the transitional period, thus thwarting the transition of power. Foremost was blocking the enactment of a number of essential legal measures: legislation concerning transitional justice and national reconciliation, recovery of embezzled public funds, transition of local power after the expiration of the terms of local councils, and blocking the transitional government's efforts to contribute to and work in concert with the National Dialogue Conference by impeding the government's ability to present its vision to the conference.

The decisions of the government were also blocked in the House of Representatives. The only possible solution to the lack of coordination between the ministers and the legislature—and the only way to avert the strategy of failure adopted by the deposed president and his allies—was for the transitional president to use his powers, which granted

him the ability to make decisions unilaterally in the event that there was a lack of consensus between the House of Representatives and the ministers of the government. However, the transitional president did not use these powers, which opened the door fully to the strategy adopted by the deposed president: the strategy of failure.

The strategy of failure

The *ancien régime* had accepted its diminished role in the government, which was the only piece of the transition of power that was accomplished. But in response, the deposed president and his allies adopted the strategy of failure that enabled them to prevent change and block or delay the tasks of the second transitional stage. This included tactics like extending the term of the National Dialogue Conference and crippling the performance of the government and of the head of state, in order to prevent any change or progress that the government might achieve. This strategy was possible because it retained control over state structures and agencies, including the legislative body, the military, and security services, as well as the supervisory and executive bodies. The "partnership" between the deposed government and the transitional government, composed of ministers representing the JMP and its allies, worked like this: a minister attempted to effect changes in his ministry and complete the tasks necessary for reform and modernization. The General People's Congress would use its enormous media arm and the specialized expertise of its apparatus, in particular military and political intelligence, to launch a smear campaign against the minister and incite terrorism against him, threatening his life. The General People's Congress would also use the House of Representatives crudely and directly in an attempt to subordinate the ministers to their blackmail. The components of the *ancien régime* remaining

in the government were completely driven by the strategy of failure, apart from a limited number of ministers that faced the same pressures and extortion. The government was driven completely away from directing the military and security portfolios. The military and security agencies did not even bother to present written reports. Originally, the ministers of defense and interior could not even request such reports without direction from the commander in chief of the armed forces — the president of the republic, to whom the security apparatus reported. Perhaps as a result of this, the president did not feel concerned about the continued loyalty of the military and security services to the deposed president and his family.

Herein lies the main reason why the transitional government floundered in its tasks. The apparatuses of the state remained in the clutches of the *ancien régime*, and its savage strategies weakened many of the individual members of the government. If true change lacked the necessary forces to support it, this was because the *ancien régime* retained control over the elements of concrete power: the army, the security apparatus, and money. These factors led to the successful adoption of the strategy of making the transition process fail, because these factors also enabled the regime to keep itself in place, without true change or transition in power. In the meantime, the party espousing change (the JMP and its partners) lacked a strategy to support the transition process. Their government could not take the steps needed to achieve the tasks of the transitional period, and they left the military and the security services in the grip of the *ancien régime.*

Lack of a transfer of power

Change in the administration of the state, a true regime change and transfer of power, could not be achieved by only a piece of the government, when the *ancien régime*

remained in control of the bodies and institutions of the state: both chambers of parliament (the elected House of Representatives and the appointed Advisory [Shura] Council), the military and security institutions, the supervisory apparatus, and local authorities. Therefore, it was objectively not possible to implement principles of good governance, defeat corruption, or to effect change in the military and security doctrine based upon regional, tribal, and personal loyalties to the president and his family. It was important to end the state of failure that the governmental administration had reached under the old regime, which demanded an end to the monopolization of government employment as a patronage system and an end to the regime's sense of personal ownership over public jobs. This could have been done by instituting impartial employment standards and by changing the structures, leaders, and operations of the military and security institutions. Despite the government's issuance of new regulations for public employment and a code of good governance, these were not applied in practice outside of a few exceptions in a limited number of ministries—which meant that even the ministries headed by pro-revolution ministers still worked on the same basis as the *ancien régime.*

The government had renewed its commitment to a more open, rotating form of employment in the context of treating the effects of the Yemeni Civil War of 1994, embodied in clauses 20 and 21 of the regulations. However, they were not applied, and were forcefully rejected by the president when it came to the military and security institutions. All of this enabled the *ancien régime* to use the apparatus of the state to prevent change and block the implementation of the tasks of the transitional period, and enabled it to transform the armed forces and the security agencies into militias under the command of the former president and his family. Local authorities were made into an instrument

to be mobilized in order to fund the coup against the political process and against the legitimacy of the transitional period. Both legislative chambers were also used to justify the counterrevolution.

To these three main factors, we can also add the reluctance of the international community and of supporters of democratic transitions to provide economic assistance to Yemen. This and other factors contributed to the failure of the process of change by a national consensus, which was a cause of the abandonment of the peaceful process of revolutionary change that had until then warded off civil war. The failure of the change process enabled the *ancien régime* to prepare for civil war in the north and south of Yemen, and to ally with the Houthis in order to proceed with the counterrevolution.

This raises the question of why Ali Abdullah Saleh abdicated from the presidency in the first place. Why did civil war did not erupt in 2011, when he possessed the capability of using the military and security forces against the revolution? What was the cause of the Saleh family resorting to the alliance with the previous defunct *ancien régime* that they had overthrown, represented by the Houthi family and their followers?

There is no need to prove that two defunct, deposed regimes launched the counterrevolution, because that it is crystal clear. What needs to be clarified is why Saleh and his family did not launch the counterrevolution in 2011, and why he needed to ally with a rival claim to rule.

The path of the war has shown that the recently deposed Saleh regime was in need of the ideology of the long deposed Houthi regime, owing to the latter's dynastic legitimacy and its sectarian base for mobilization. The Salehs created a false consciousness on the basis of declaring holy war, using the Houthi family to call for the war and the Houthi militias as a façade to hide behind for the military

and security services. This allowed the army and security
agencies to disavow the war crimes committed by these
militias. Moreover, it allowed them to repudiate the need
for this war and depict it as a sectarian struggle targeting
the Arab region in service of the interests of Iran. There is
no difference from a legal standpoint between the fighters
loyal to the Houthi family and fighters loyal to the Saleh
family, because the military and security forces have been
transformed into militias, simply by serving under the ille-
gitimate leadership of the Saleh and Houthi families.

The stance of the military and security forces toward the revolution and their role in the counterrevolution

The military and security services dealt with the 2011
revolution on the basis of the military and security doctrine
of loyalty the president personally and to his family, and loy-
alty to their tribes, which are also loyal to the presidential
family. This resulted in the military and security institutions
losing their national character. They were transformed by
the former president into familial institutions upholding
the security of the ruling family and of their tribes above
all else. Tribal and familial loyalties within the leadership of
the military and security institutions overlapped.

The army and security agencies viewed a wide swath of the
people as the enemy of the state. As a result, they dealt with
the peaceful revolution brutally, to the point of burning the
tents in the squares where the sit-ins were taking place with
people inside, intentionally killing protesters, along with
committing other crimes against humanity. Some of this
harkens back to the foundation of the Republic of Yemen in
May 1990 with the unification of North and South Yemen,
which forced the civil and military institutions from two
countries with contradictory and opposing politics and

ideologies to join together. The result was an unwieldy and divided state apparatus with divergent loyalties, owing to different degrees of professional competency, different military and security doctrines, and different working methods that could not be truly reconciled. The president at the time (Saleh) and those with him not only practiced corruption, but spread corruption intentionally among individuals and groups in the military and security services to ensure loyalty to the president and his family, and to give priority to geopolitical partisanship. This led to increased tensions and political crises that eventually resulted in the 1994 civil war. The aim of this war was to liquidate the military and security institutions that did not share the president's geopolitical partisanship, and hence were not personally loyal to the president and his family. This was achieved by expelling tens of thousands of men from the armed forces and security services. In particular, southerners were excluded from positions in these two institutions because northerners doubted their loyalty. Exclusion was accomplished via a number of retaliatory measures: discharges, firings, non-promotion or non-reappointment, and premature retirement. The result the solidification of the military and security doctrine, marked by personal loyalty to the president and his family first and foremost, followed by tribal and regional loyalties. This began to rot the cores of the military and security institutions, weakening their prestige and their role in keeping the peace and protecting citizens. Essentially, they abandoned their legal-constitutional duties that defined their role as an instrument for defense and security and the protection of society.

After the 1994 civil war, the regime resorted to filling the void left by the exclusion of popular politics and civil society organizations by expanding the role of military forces outside the structure of the armed forces and the security apparatus, such as the Republican Guard and Central

Security. These military and security forces, which had more personal loyalty to the president and his family, made the relationship between the military and security institutions with political parties and citizens a hostile one marked by intimidation. The mixing of the roles of the security services and the armed forces unified their role as protector of the president, his family, and his reign. In addition, there was no supervisory role for civilians over the performance of the security apparatus and military units, which had their own private budgets, after the ruling party (the General People's Congress) assumed a sweeping majority in the House of Representatives. This lack of public oversight continued throughout the transitional period.

With the outbreak of the popular, youth-driven revolution on February 11, 2011, the regime's corrupt policies made the military and security forces a bitter enemy of a wide swath of society, encompassing an array of different political and social forces. Thus, one of the conditions for the success of the revolution was the rapid restructuring of the armed forces and the security services and their true incorporation into the hierarchy of the state. As a result of their lack of integration, the former president retained his control over the units of the Republican Guard and Central Security. By retaining their loyalty to him and his family, he was able to transform these units into militias to be used alongside the Houthis and tribal militias in the counterrevolution.

The first months of the transitional process were decisive in terms of an opportunity to reform these two critical institutions, which would have not only protected the revolutionaries and the revolutionary state, but also weakened the chances of success for a counterrevolution at that moment. It was absolutely necessary to restructure the military and political institutions, re-qualify their cadres, and change the military and security doctrine. The first step should have

been to restructure the military and political leadership to reincorporate those who had been excluded after the 1994 civil war from both northern and southern provinces, and by doing so change the military and political leadership and structure on the ground. The opportunity remained open in 2012 and 2013, but the transitional president did not seize it. Instead, he monopolized the military and security portfolios. This monopolization meant the opportunity for change with the least cost was lost by the time the counter-revolution occurred. The cost of missing this opportunity was exorbitant, enabling the *ancien régime* and its allies to disrupt the transition process, the political process, and democratic transformation by seizing power and repeating the experience of the 1994 civil war. Ali Abdullah Saleh, the army, and the security forces at least enjoyed legality during the 1994 civil war; whereas their most recent war against Yemen, including the attacks on the southern provinces (Aden in particular), has no cover of legality. As a result, the fighters and their leaders are no more than an armed gang, and their acts are organized crime against the Yemeni people and their property. Furthermore, a fundamental difference in the most recent war is that Saleh's alliance with the Houthis lent his forces an air of ideological, religious, and sectarian legitimacy, whereas the first war was about political, rather than doctrinal, excommunication.

The changes in the army and security fell far short of restructuring the elite leadership of both branches, and the alternative was that they remain loyal to the *ancien régime*, specifically the former president and his family. The result was the army, security services, and the Houthi militias were easily able to enter the capital.

What was called restructuring was merely a change in title. The restructuring and reform of the military and security institutions was one of the main tasks of the transitional period—documented in paragraphs 16 and 17

of the Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transitional Process. This task was delegated to the Committee for Military Affairs and Achieving Security and Stability, which was headed by the president of the republic, who was content to rely upon a military and security leadership whose loyalties were known to lie with the deposed president.

According to the Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism, reform of the armed and security forces was defined with two main tasks. First, the armed forces needed to be unified, ending its division by treating the cause of the division. After this, the armed forces would be returned to their bases. Second, the armed forces and security forces would have to be rebuilt with defined, complementary roles (rather than previous mix of military and security responsibilities) under a unified, national, and professional command structure within the framework of the rule of law. This entailed removing the existing structure based upon geopolitical loyalty, a doctrine of corruption, and a narrow gang-like partisan mentality. These old loyalties had resulted in the violations of human rights and the division of these two institutions. This structure was to be replaced by new structures providing the necessary conditions of neutrality and independence for these two institutions. The ill effects of the previous structure would be removed by re-qualifying those belonging to either institution, making them capable of protecting the nation, as defined by popular and constitutional legitimacy and the protection of human rights and Yemen's citizens.

These tasks were never accomplished, and what was done was not even a real accomplishment. It was a mere cosmetic step, done on paper, but not reflected in reality. The armed forces were combined on the basis of traditional divisions. Units that were outside of the official structure were simply added to the general structure of the armed

forces. The move was official, but cosmetic, in joining the units of the Republican Guard, the First Armored Division, and the Mountain Infantry, which in reality remained under the command of the deposed president and his family. In 2012, regional commands were also unified by presidential decree. This decision defined the components of the command structure of the armed forces along the following lines: first, command authority (president of the republic, minister of defense, head of the joint chiefs of staff and his deputy); second, political and military management (ministry of defense, minister, deputy minister, joint chiefs of staff); and third, the primary components of the armed forces (ground forces, naval forces and coast guard, air forces and air guard, border guards, and the strategic reserve).

The forces of the strategic reserve are composed of two components: missile units (surface-to-surface) and special operations. All of these units are under command of the Republican Guard. Superficially, all of the remaining units of the Republican Guard and the First Armored Division were joined to the armed forces, and then divided into seven military regions. But in reality, the units of the army remained as they were.

A decree was issued in 2013 concerning the restructuring and reform of the security apparatus and the organizational structure of Interior Ministry. However, this did not change to the status quo in terms of building a new structure or changing the security doctrine, except for altering the name of Central Security to the Special Security Forces.

Although members of the Saleh family had been removed from positions of leadership in the military and security apparatus, other leaders loyal to Saleh replaced them. The middle and lower ranks of the institutions were left untouched. Members of the Saleh family were able to remain secretly in command of both institutions, thanks to

the weak stance of the JMP, their partners, and the president. Three factors resulted from this. First, the military and the security apparatus remained as they were. Second, commanders loyal to the deposed president remained in their posts. Third, the family of the deposed president retained their immense stolen wealth. A team of experts established by the United Nations Security Council estimated that while in power, the Saleh family had embezzled approximately $60 billion.

The counterrevolution depended on the forces under the command of Ali Abdullah Saleh, known as the Republican Guard, Central Security, and the Mountain Infantry. But from a legal perspective, these units no longer existed under those names and Saleh and his family were no longer their commanders. This made them mere militias committing organized crimes against the state and society.

In conclusion, the armed forces and the security services in Yemen represented the main instrument for the counterrevolution and the coup against the Revolution of February 2011, preventing change and a democratic transformation. After the state is restored and its legitimate authority is extended over all parts of the country, the first priority should be the restructuring of the army and security apparatus according to the fundamentals, principles, and standards of the document developed at the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference.

THE TUNISIAN TRANSITION,
A RELATIVE SUCCESS STORY

Ahmad Karoud*

The Tunisian case has emerged as a kind of relative "success story," the only one among the experiences of what has been known as the countries of the "Arab Spring." But there are enormous challenges for which necessary reforms are indispensable in order to avoid a return to the situation of the past.

Since the collapse of the rule of the former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and his flight from the country on January 14, 2011, Tunisians have adopted a new constitution containing important guarantees for human rights. They have elected a new parliament and president via means attested by most international and local observers as fair and democratic. Tunisians have strengthened the role of civil society organizations in political and social life. The authorities have also taken modest steps concerning the

*   Ahmad Karoud is an experienced trainer in Human Rights and Institution Building for Associations, and former director of the regional office of Amnesty International.

accountability of officials for grave violations of human rights, commissioning a Truth and Dignity Commission to address past violations.

Despite the fragility of the political, economic, social, and security situation, progress along the transitional path has continued peacefully, if slowly. However, there are serious challenges that could make further progress toward democracy open to question.

This paper will attempt to define the factors that explain the relative success of the Tunisian experience, centered on three issues:

1. The role played by the army and security institutions in what occurred in connection with the fall of the apex of the executive authority, and then in the transitional period that the country has been living in for five years.
2. The role of Tunisian civil society organizations in contributing to safeguarding the transitional process.
3. The effect of political polarization on the transition path from authoritarianism to democracy.

First: the roles of the army and the security institution in the fall of the head of state and thereafter

The role of the Tunisian National Army in the Revolution of Freedom and Dignity is largely defined by the stance of "positive neutrality" taken by the leadership and by helping to preserve the peaceful character of the revolution. On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi committed suicide by self-immolation in front of the Sidi Bouzid governorate in protest of his humiliation by government employees. On January 14, 2015, Ben Ali fled the country for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The 29 days between these events witnessed a popular uprising, launched from the cities of the western strip of

the country, then spreading to some cities and villages on the middle coast until reaching the capital of Tunis—specifically the large gathering that took place in Tunis' most famous streets. On Habib Bourguiba Street, and specifically in front of the Interior Ministry, which symbolized torture, repression, and humiliation for the Tunisian people, thousands of demonstrators called for the departure of Ben Ali.

Throughout this period, the Tunisian armed forces performed an important role in coordinating with the civilian authorities, while refusing at the same time to use force against the demonstrators. After the declaration of a state of emergency when Ben Ali fled, the army assumed the tasks connected with preserving the state, protecting public institutions and diplomatic missions, and imposing a curfew.

The National Fact-Finding Commission for Excesses was established in February 2011 and tasked with collecting information and gathering papers connected with the abuses recorded during the period of protests. In its report that was issued in April 2012 concerning the responsibility of the apparatus of the state, it affirmed that the national army "undertook its task of filling the security vacuum that was witnessed by the country under the state of lawlessness as a result of the events."[1] The report added, "that the investigations found that most of the deaths and cases of injury recorded after January 14 in which the national army was found responsible for committing occurred during the imposition of the curfew to address looting and sabotage of public and private property." The same committee found that security forces were the most responsible for the casualties. The committee found that during the period of lawlessness, the security forces were responsible for 98.89 percent of cases of death and 99.86 percent of cases of injury.

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1) Report of the Fact-Finding Commission for Excesses and Violations, Tunis, April 2012.

Concerning the responsibility of the Interior Ministry for the killings and the violent confrontations with the protesters, the committee saw that it "had not proven the existence of orders or instructions in the central operations rooms of higher security leadership or from the minister of the interior to open fire on the demonstrators." At the same time, it affirmed that "despite the continued firing of live ammunition at demonstrators for a period of more than 20 days, this leadership did not take any measure to stop the firing of live ammunition or to stop the security agents whose involvement in the shooting was proven, or to undertake the necessary administrative reviews to determine responsibility and affix the causes." The committee added in its report concerning the subject of snipers, around which questions were raised: "Sniping operations occurred in fact by agents of the security forces, who opened fire after taking positions on the roofs of high buildings, shooting to kill."[2]

On the basis of the results of this fact-finding operation, which was done in special political circumstances with reference to information provided by the trials of political and security officials in the Ben Ali Government, we can certify the existence of a clear difference in the roles and stances taken by the army versus the security establishment in terms of what happened during the days of the Tunisian Revolution. The military chose to not kill and harass demonstrators, while the other security institutions chose to employ "security solutions," meaning violence, against the peaceful popular uprising.

This "neutral" or at least politically unbiased stance taken by the army would be reaffirmed in the period following the flight of Ben Ali, when legislative, executive, and judicial authority was temporarily concentrated in the military's hands. This period saw the dissolution of the Democratic

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2)   Ibid.

Constitutional Rally (commonly referred to by its French initials, RCD), the party that had ruled Tunisia for over 23 years. The state security apparatus in the Interior Ministry was also dissolved.

The army was careful not to intervene in the process of the transition from the rule of Ben Ali to a new government springing from free and fair elections. These were held on October 23, 2011, when a national constituent assembly was elected and tasked with the responsibility of formulating a new constitution and administering the country its interim authority.

The stance taken by the commanders of the army toward the dramatic political transformations in fact embodied the doctrine of the Tunisian National Army that had been established in the first weeks following the independence of Tunisia from France on March 20, 1956. On May 3, 1956, the Ministry of National Defense was established to replace the "Ministry of the French War" after tough negotiations with France. It was agreed that the new army would be made up of less than 5,000 troops. The head of government, Habib Bourguiba, was appointed minister of defense, supreme commander of the army, and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. In his first speech as minister of defense, Bourguiba announced that "the army would be apolitical (*apolitique*)," along the model of the French army.

Both President Bourguiba and Ben Ali had worked to preserve the character of the army as a public institution whose role would be limited to the defense of the country from any foreign aggression; however, it would be used in extreme cases to repress demonstrations and popular protests when the interior security services were unable to do so. Examples of this occurred in the Kairouan demonstrations of 1960, protests following the Israeli aggression against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on June 5, 1967, the peasant farmer demonstrations in Ouerdanine in 1969, the union

general strike of January 26, 1978, and the bread uprising of January 3, 1984.

Both presidents were likewise keen to keep the army as a weak institution. The budget of the Defense Ministry was small compared to the Ministries of Education, Health, and the Interior. In January 2011, the budget of the Ministry of Defense was almost half of that of the Ministry of the Interior.

The military was also generally excluded from anything connected to political life and administrative duties. However, this stance of the army did not prevent the occurrence of large tremors that deepened the prevailing doctrine of a national role distant from the political, with loyalty to the political leadership represented by the president of the republic.

In December 1962, a "coup attempt against the Bourguiba" was uncovered. Several army officers were accused, among them graduates of the French École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr and the Syrian military academy in Damascus. Some civilians were accused as well, among them leaders of the resistance against French colonialism. Several of the accused were sentenced to execution, others to more than ten years of prison, after unfair trials.

In 1991, the ranks of the officers were subject to a campaign of arrests, investigations, and torture by the security apparatus of the Interior Ministry. They were accused of intending to organize a coup against the authority of Ben Ali. This was known as the Barraket Essahel affair, after the name of the town in the suburbs of the coastal resort city Hammamet where the officers supposedly met to organize the plot. After an unfair trial, most of them were released, but all of them were cut off from the military and deprived of their civil and social rights for over 20 years.

The two previously mentioned incidents targeting officers in the Tunisian military only strengthened the trend away from the militarization of Tunisian political life. Instead,

the Interior Ministry and particularly the security apparatus were given sweeping powers to support and protect the authoritarian political regime revolving around the institution of the presidency.

In the period after the rule of Ben Ali, the military leadership was not spared from the effects of the severe polarization that overwhelmed political life. These effects could be seen in the appointments of officers in sensitive roles such as the commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, military advisers to the president of the republic and the prime minister, as well as in the revival of the role of the national security council.

Over the past five years, Tunisians have followed media campaigns addressing the role of the leader of the military, Rachid 'Ammar, in the events of January 14, 2011, and what followed thereafter, as well as the disputes between him and the president of the republic about the stances of his predecessors.

In a February 2016 article, the *Washington Post* noted the transformation occurring in the role of former officers, highlighting their participation in the emerging civil society movement after the revolution: "And perhaps the most severe break with the Ben Ali era is the entry of retired officers into the powerful civil society in Tunisia. Retired officers have benefited from the new freedom in the society to form several civil society organizations to pressure the government, and to shape the public conversation about the military institution and its needs."[3]

Despite the enticements from and bickering among the executive branch authorities and the media campaigns mentioned above, the Tunisian military has remained faithful to its role as the main backer of the peacefulness and

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3) "How Tunisia's military has changed during its transition to democracy," Sharan Grewal, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage. March 2016.

civility of the transitional process. The efforts exerted by the military to protect the elections on three occasions (in October 2011 and October and November 2014) and to protest against terrorist attacks are only further evidence of this approach.

The role of the security institutions during the 2011 events and the past five years

As for the security apparatus, the situation differs somewhat. Unlike the military, the Interior Ministry and its security apparatus played and continue to play clear roles in the political life in Tunisia. Alongside the close monitoring of all structures of society and also of all political actors, including the structures and members of the ruling party, the ministry organized and oversaw the municipal, legislative, and presidential elections. The goal of this was to support the monopolization by the ruling party (the Neo Destour Party, later renamed the RCD) of all of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The role of the Interior Ministry and security apparatus in controlling political life and surveilling society as a whole had been supported through an administrative and intelligence regime employed at the service of the authoritarian regime. Likewise, it was aided by the spread of a culture of impunity enjoyed by the officers and agents of state security involved in practices of torture, the harsh treatment of political dissidents, and citizens generally. In addition, they benefited from the corruption in the Tunisian state administration. As a result, it is no wonder that the protesters chanted the slogan, rhyming in the original Arabic: "Ministry of Interior (wizarat al-dahkilia), Ministry of Terrorism (wizarat irhabiya)" in the cities and villages of Tunisia during the days of the Revolution of Dignity and Freedom.

In the five years following the fall of the head of the executive branch, the clear and pressing need to reform the security apparatus has emerged. It must be transformed from an apparatus in service of the party, the individual ruler, and the interests of a certain group into one in the service of national and public security. The 2014 constitution states: "national security is public security, its forces are tasked with keeping the peace; guarding the state; protecting individuals, institutions, and property; and upholding the law. All of this must be done with respect for freedoms and in a framework of complete neutrality."

In recent years, the Interior Ministry has undertaken several programs for training and capacity building for officers and agents of the security apparatus, with the goal of developing its performance in providing security while respecting human rights. In addition, several forums have been convened to discuss and study the issues connected with the security apparatus, such as the fate of the archive of the secret police (the State Security Department), the protection of private life, transparency in the security sector and intelligence work, supervision of state security services, and the issue of torture and its prevention. The most important change that emerged in the roles of the Interior Ministry and the security apparatus after 2011 was the transfer of responsibility for supervising and organizing elections to the Independent High Authority for Elections. The internal security forces and the national military have retained their protective roles.

Despite the lack of Tunisian experience in organizing elections without the supervision of the Interior Ministry and without the intervention of the security apparatus, reports from various observers affirmed the effectiveness of this choice in building democratic confidence in connection with the transfer of authority. In my view, the most important step was the acceptance by all competing parties

of the results of the elections held in 2011 and 2014. This supported the success of the approach followed by Tunisia until now in terms of building the legitimacy of the legislative and executive branches

The positive change occurring in the roles of the Interior Ministry and the security apparatus in the political process does not negate the existence of serious challenges connected with the security apparatus of the regime in Tunisia after Ben Ali. The most prominent of these challenges is the establishment of "security unions" for the first time, decades after taking over security from the French on April 18, 1956.

It is no exaggeration to say that those belonging to the internal security sector were among the greatest beneficiaries of the Revolution of Freedom and Dignity, in terms of the greater freedoms of expression, organization, and peaceful assembly, as well as the improvement in living standards and social benefits. On May 25, 2011, a temporary ruling was issued under then-Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi allowing the establishment of security unions. The decree states: "agents of the internal security forces have the right to practice unionized labor, and to this end there can be professional unions, independent from the rest of the professional unions and their federations… [while subject to the same standards of establishing a basic law and providing list of members to the administrative authorities]."

A number of diverse unions, with overlapping purviews, were formed on the basis of this decree. Some federations emerged, like the National Federation for Unions of the Tunisian Security Forces, composed of an array of organizations: the General Administration for Units of Intervention, the General Administration for Shared Interests, the General Administration for Protection of the State President and Official Persons, the General Administration for Special Interests, as well as unions for the National Guard, the General Administration for Technical Interests, unions

of the General Administration of Prisons and Reform, and the unions for the Civil Protection. Other unions were established as well.

What is interesting is not the formation of security unions by itself, since in a number of well-rooted democracies the agents and officers of state security have become a factor for the stability of the state. But the experience of the past five years in Tunisia in the field of labor unions for the security services raises several questions, the most important of which are the following: What are the limits and the relationship of the security labor union with political and party work? To what extent do these unions accept moving forward with accountability for the Interior Ministry and the security apparatus in the grave violations of human rights that occurred throughout the decades of the authoritarian regime that ruled the country before January 14, 2011? How ready and willing are the security unions to be involved in the process of deep reform for the security services, so that they may become a true public asset whose task is to uphold the law in a climate of respect and in a framework of complete neutrality?

These questions are being raised currently as a result of the accumulation of practices and stances of some security officials and of some unions during the organization of sit-ins or protests to demand social rights—and likewise, because of their contributions in the media dialogues dealing with the issues of torture and counterterrorism and the judiciary and their defense of legislation "to deter attacks on the armed forces."

Relations between some of the security unions and the executive authorities deteriorated until the slogan "Leave" was chanted in the face of the three heads (president of the republic, president of the national constituent assembly, and the prime minister) on October 18, 2013, at the barracks of the national guard during the memorial service for

two agents of the national guard who had been killed as a result of a terrorist operation. This behavior was repeated in the "Casbah Sit-in" on February 27, 2016, against the prime minister.

These protests and the sit-in before the prime minister (preceded by one before the president) provoked different reactions, including censure for disturbing the work of the authorities at a sensitive time for the country. Some went as far to consider it political interference by a segment of security officials, under the guise of union activity. But, there were voices from the unions that defended these actions, considering them an embodiment of the constitution of the country that grants the right to union activity to all citizens, including those working in security.

In addition to the worsening relations between a segment of security employees and the heads of the executive branch, in the past few years a controversy has emerged and escalated between security employees and associations of the judiciary, in connection with addressing the phenomenon of terrorism. Specifically, it revolves around how to deal with the rights of those suspected and involved in terrorist acts, and the use of torture in investigating suspects and detainees. Some politicians and members of the media defended the use of "extraordinary means" to combat terrorism. The writer 'Afif al-J'aidi saw "the rhetoric of the judiciary in connection with terrorism as political rhetoric, whose goal is to make public opinion support the security agent who could be accused of torture," and that the security apparatus had become one of the influential actors in Tunisian political life, not just a tool used by the executive branch to perpetuate its power over society and the institutions of the state via means of repression and surveillance.

In conclusion, the direction and stances that will be taken by the security unions and the Interior Ministry in the future regarding the issue of reform of the security

apparatus, so as to reinforce the rule of law, will be one of
the linchpins in the success of the democratic transition in
Tunisia.

Tunisian civil society organizations' contributions to safeguarding the transition

There is a consensus within research into Tunisian politics
regarding the central role of civil society organizations, fore-
most the Tunisian General Labor Union (known commonly
by the French acronym UGTT) and the Tunisian Order of
Lawyers, in driving the popular protests and demonstra-
tions in January 2011, the goal of which was the departure
of the now-deposed president Ben Ali. These organizations
continued, in various active roles, to strengthen the transi-
tion and safeguard it from setbacks in the stages following
the fall of the old regime. Beginning in the period of the
Higher Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of
the Revolution and Democratic Transition (March-October
2011), and passing through the stage of the formulation
of the constitution by the National Constituent Assembly
(January 2012–January 2014), civil society organized
political teams around the table of the National Dialogue
(October 2013) that succeeded in overcoming the paralysis
of the constitutional transition and avoided the specter of a
political vacuum. This led to political stability, with the elec-
tion of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People
and the president of the republic at the end of 2014.

Civil society organizations had an important role in
embracing the popular uprising. The cities and villages of
Tunisia had witnessed popular demonstrations and clashes
with the police at the end of 2010 and in the beginning
of 2011. The middle and base-level cadres of the UGTT
(founded in 1946 as a federation of unions for workers and
employees in Tunisia) and members of the Order of Lawyers

contributed to the bulk of these actions. The headquarters of the UGTT were in most cases the rallying points for protesters and demonstrators in the provinces and in smaller cities and towns. Popular gatherings also took place in Mohammed Ali Square in front of the central headquarters of the UGTT. A demonstration on January 12, 2011, that was called for and organized by the regional labor federation in the city of Sfax was decisive in the fall of the former president.

Toward a second republic

In the months following the flight of Ben Ali, civil society organizations participated vigorously and effectively in establishing the Higher Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution and Democratic Transition, a body that compensated for the dissolved parliament and worked on the basis of consensus. It issued a number of decrees, signed by the temporary president of the republic, that established the legal framework for the political process in the transitional period. In this, the majority of civil society in Tunisia chose to break with the deposed political regime and work to establish a new political regime. This package of legal decrees concerned the organization of elections, as well as both audio and visual media and the establishment of associations and political parties.

Concerning the election of members to the National Constituent Assembly, the decree stipulated that elections would be held on the basis of the principle of proportionality and on the basis of lists, with full equality between men and women. It also stipulated that the elections would be organized and supervised by the Independent High Authority for Elections, with the Interior Ministry content with providing security for the elections in partnership with the army. Among the successes resulting from this significant change

was that the elections were judged by most observers to have been fair and democratic.

In connection with the fair and democratic supervision of elections, it is worth pointing out that enormous efforts were exerted by alliances formed by several non-governmental organizations (such as 'Atid, Muraqebun, Shahid, and Awfia') in mobilizing and training thousands of special observers from among the youth, both male and female. These NGOs observed and wrote reports on these elections, and also presented recommendations. While these operations may seem simple and even superficial to a foreign observer, it is important to point out that hundreds of thousands of Tunisian men and women participated for the first time in half a century in the election of a constituent assembly to formulate the constitution without political or security pressures.

With regards to the establishment of associations, Decree 88 in 2011 set up a notification system to compensate for the regime of licensing, which permitted the establishment of thousands of associations, organization, and alliances. From the issuing of the decree in September 2011 until the end of 2015, 8,911 associations were established. The ease of establishing a non-governmental organization, free of complications and of legal or organizational obstacles, represented a new era in Tunisia after 2011. It is a break from the era wherein the state and the ruling party constantly tried to dominate and control professional and union associations and organizations, preventing either from emerging as truly independent non-governmental organizations, with the notable exception of a small number of associations that fiercely resisted any attempts to constrain their independence.

The interests of these groups diversified and encompassed several fields, most important of which were defense of the culture of citizenship, supervision of elections, and

championing of human rights generally or of the rights of certain groups such as women, the disabled, or minorities. However, it must be acknowledged that a small proportion of the total number of organizations had a direct role in influencing the formulation of the constitution and the development of political life in the transitional period.

Writing the constitution between the corridors of the constituent assembly and the pressures of the street

In 2012 and 2013, hundreds of associations, organizations, and unions of judges, lawyers, and security agents participated in special consultations on formulating articles of the constitution in public forums or hearings by the committees of the constituent assembly. Several organizations including the UGTT, Shabakat Dusturna (Our Constitution Network), and others presented draft constitutions. However, the assembly chose not to utilize a previously prepared draft constitution. The committees of the assembly worked instead to formulate select items before presenting them to the general session for discussion and voting. When the intensity of conflict and political polarization escalated in the summer of 2013, several of the organizations and groups resorted to pressure. They organized stoppages in protest before the assembly with the aim of impressing their demands for reform, gaining inclusion of certain rights, and to protest certain draft formulations of the constitution, particularly the draft on June 1, 2013.

It is no exaggeration to say that the constitution of the second republic in Tunisia was not written in the halls of the constituent assembly only. Some items were formulated on the street. The pressure from civil society organizations, unions, and opposition parties escalated on behalf of important reforms to the draft constitution, such as

including references to universal human rights, quotations regarding the principle of equality between men and women, guaranteeing rights for disabled persons, protecting the rights of children, media rights, access to information, and protection for the process of transitional justice. It is worth noting the important role played by women and organizations defending women's rights in mobilizing tens of thousands of Tunisian women from all backgrounds to be in solidarity on the necessity of constitutional guarantees for the gains made by women, the achievement of equality, and support for the principle of equal opportunity between men and women.

The national constituent assembly ratified the final draft of the constitution on January 27, 2014, by a sweeping majority. It was published in the official government gazette (al-Ra'id) on February 10, 2014. This formulation contained items embodying a break with the authoritarian regime that had remained for decades, enabling both male and female Tunisians to become involved substantially in the transition toward establishing a democratic regime.

Civil society saves the transition

This was not accomplished without difficulties as the country endured serious crises. The political scene in Tunisia in 2012 and 2013 was dominated by the bitter conflict between two camps: the first being Ennahda (the Renaissance Party) and its allies, the second being Nidaa Tounes (Tunisia's Call) and its allies that composed what became known as the "Salvation Front." Civil society organizations tried to bring the political parties together around the negotiating table, particularly in the second half of 2013, when the disputes between the political parties reached a dangerous level after the assassination of two political leaders of the "Popular Front" (an alliance of leftist and nationalist parties) and the

killing of one of the local leaders of Nidaa Tounes, which had been established after the elections of 2011. These events paralyzed the work of the constituent assembly.

After discussions with different parties and members of the constituent assembly, the national dialogue was launched officially under the supervision of the "sponsoring quartet" of the dialogue: the UGTT (the largest union in Tunisia), the Tunisian Human Rights League (founded 1977), the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, and the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts (an organization for male and female employers).

The sponsoring quartet helped to launch the dialogue, which led in the end to consensus on a road map containing a timetable for the national constituent assembly to end its work (writing the constitution, formulating an electoral law, and establishing an independent body for elections) and for the replacement of the ruling troika government with a technocratic caretaker government, whose members promised not to stand for the presidential and legislative elections.

It was not possible to gather a large majority of the members of the constituent assembly to vote in favor of a consensus constitution draft without entering into a national dialogue called for by the civil society organizations, foremost the UGTT, to which political forces inside and outside of the assembly responded. Perhaps it was the coexistence of both the labor and employer unions, owner and worker alike, in the dialogue committee that was one of the sources of credibility for the sponsoring parties, alongside the enormous support that this dialogue was met with by foreign states, such as Algeria via President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the states of the European Union (particularly Germany), and the United States of America.

The national dialogue represented an effective instrument that was activated by civil society whenever a crisis loomed over the transition, beginning from the period

following the transition of power to the temporary president, then during the dissolution of parliament and formation of the Higher Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, through the period of consensus on the roadmap in the closing months of 2013. In fact, it helped overcome the obstacles to issuing a new constitution and establishing an independent election supervisory organization. Ennahda and its two allied parties abdicated power in favor of a caretaker government that oversaw the election of a new parliament and president at the end of 2014. With this, the Tunisian transition entered a new phase.

Will the current political consensus last, and for how long?

Based on the results of the elections for the Assembly of Representatives of the People on October 26, 2014, and the president of the republic in December 2014, four parties (Nidaa Tounes, Ennahda, Afek (Horizons) Tounes, and the Free Patriotic Union) formed a government headed by Habib Essid, who was a former minister of the temporary government that oversaw the elections of the constituent assembly in 2011.

This government was formed by parties that had waged fierce electoral campaigns against each other, but any observer of the developing relationship between the "two sheikhs" (the heads of Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes) since their meeting in the summer of 2013 would not be shocked by this choice, which came contrary to the severe polarization that has been the hallmark of political and ideological life since 2011.

The presidential elections, particularly in the second round, consecrated the deepening political polarization between the two camps. The first was comprised of forces that raised the slogans of "modernity" and preserving

the "type of society" that had developed in Tunisia since independence, and refusing the return of "the Islamists" to power. The second camp of forces raised the slogans of "identity" and defended the gains of the "revolution," rejecting the return of representatives of the *ancien régime* and refusing the return of "secularists" to power.

This ideological and political conflict accompanied all phases of the transitional period. But, events developed after the electoral results and the conclusion of the period of media campaigning, placing all political parties before the tangible benefits of the revolution, from combating marginalization and unemployment (from which a large section of the people suffered), to reforming the governmental institutions relating to security, economics, and education that had suffered from corruption and authoritarianism. When all parties looked over the structural problems, they presented practical and beneficial approaches to follow that would take years. This is the basis of the slogans and the ideological conflict between one current that sees *al- shari'a wa-al-hawiya* (Islamic law and identity) as the solution, and the other current that sees "preserving modernity" as the solution. This conflict has begun to recede with the new emergence of voices calling for "coexistence" between the political parties, turning the page on the past, and moving directly toward "national reconciliation."

Although the ideological conflict between the two major camps has lessened, the center of conflict has moved inside the parties themselves. The most important of these is the polarization and conflict that has begun to emerge more and more between the political class and the social groups and regions that have been marginalized socially, economically, and culturally. The return of violent protests in the cities and villages of the western strip of the country and in the popular quarters surrounding the capital is just one indication of the social and cultural conflict that is at root.

What are the possible choices for the political and social elite in the coming period?

With the declining intensity of the conflicts that have taken on an ideological guise, the center of popular interests has moved from elections to everyday problems (the amount of people who did not vote in the second round of the presidential elections rose to 62 percent of the population). Existential questions have begun to emerge before the political, social and ideological elites in the following areas that could shape the future or at least expectations for the near future:

1. Moving toward changing the pattern of development and the administration of socioeconomic affairs to develop society in the medium and long-term in order to guarantee social justice and reduce the problems of inequality and the marginalization of certain regions and groups. This choice faces serious obstacles, most prominently the economic interests of those groups that benefited under authoritarianism and who then consolidated their positions in the transitional period.

2. Deepening political change toward more freedom and participatory democracy, and transforming the gains enshrined in the constitution from theoretical texts into laws and regulations. The most important of these is the formulation of policies serving most of the people. This choice also faces challenges, namely resistance from those who benefited from the climate of authoritarianism to any change or accountability or reform of the branches of government.

3. Confronting the security challenges embodied by terrorist attacks, and likewise the political developments in the countries of the region at large. This demands following defensive and diplomatic policies that protect the independence of national decision-making and

limiting the influence of foreign powers and conflicts that have shaken the region for years.

4. Strengthening the role of the political parties and supporting their capacities so they can be capable of leading the political process in the direction of building a democratic regime. This choice reveals the enormous internal problems of the political parties. The coming weeks and months will inform us of what will emerge from the conferences of the major parties, as well as what will result from the local elections.

In conclusion, the central question connected with the political and ideological elite is whether they will head in the direction of establishing a stable democratic regime in which the transfer of power is accomplished peacefully via periodic free and fair elections on the basis of an agreed-upon constitution (as is the case in the many democratic countries) — or whether conflicts will develop, particularly over power, in the spirit of winner taking all and resorting to violent means and to hatred of the other, which in the end would perhaps lead to the return of authoritarianism, if only in a new shape and with new faces.

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THE POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY INSTITUTION IN THE REGIME OF JUNE 30/JULY 3, 2013

Fouad al-Said[*]

Introduction

complex interactions that the societies of the Arab world have seen over the past five years have revealed a distinction between the Egyptian case and the other cases of the "Arab Spring" in a number of features:

1. A lesser degree of disharmony and conflict—though there was certainly not harmony—among the components of society, compared to the cases of increasing sectarian, nationalist, tribal, or regional conflicts that have governed the paths of the social and political conflicts

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[*]   Fouad al-Said is a doctor, writer, and researcher at the National Center for Social and Criminal Studies in Cairo.

in several countries in the region. The conflict in Egypt has been limited to the political level, without falling into civil war.

2. The only case mixing political conflict with cultural and social conflict in Egyptian society is the Islamist case, which could rise to the existential level of disharmony connected to the meaning of life that could justify civil war. As a result, Egypt has known Islamist and sectarian violence, though not the other forms of violence spreading in the region.

3. In comparison to the Tunisian case, for example, the past five years have revealed the weakness of democratic values in Egyptian society and the inability of civil political forces to deliberate, maintain dialogue, and find consensus on compromises to political conflicts. This includes the backwardness and rigidity of the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists in general, and the lack of democratic and civil traditions taking root. The end result is the inability of society to control the political space and limit the intervention of the state and its institutions in the administration of the affairs of the country. This explains the state of acceptance of—if not applause for—rule by military council of Egypt after February 11, 2011, and the military and security takeover after July 3, 2013, which took advantage of the popular rising that rejected the authoritarian rule of the Brotherhood on June 30, 2013. This gradually ruled out the possibility of new rulers who were civil and democratic politically, forces of which had been a main part of the June 30 alliance.

4. The past five years have also revealed that regardless of the political and media clamor accompanying the January 25 Revolution of 2011, the assessments were largely wrong with respect to the strength and popularity of the civil political forces and civil society and their

relative weights. The political performance of both has been marked by upheaval, and a lack of consistency or continuity. Experience has shown that until the present day, Egyptian society has not had an organized societal bloc capable of effective political pressure. The exception is the bloc composed of political alliances with mutual interests that ruled Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, at the heart of which were the politicians of the National Democratic Party, the oligarchs, and the senior members of the security apparatus, in addition to the wide network of local beneficiaries (Ahmed Shafiq, representative of the Mubarak regime, won almost 50 percent of the vote in the second round of presidential elections after the January 2011 Revolution). The second-most organized bloc is the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamists (regard-less of the recalcitrance of the Salafists after June 30/July 3, 2013). Since February 11, 2011 and the fall of Mubarak and the events of June 30/July 3, 2013 and thereafter, the military institution has advanced into the political sphere as the third most-organized bloc in the country, behind which is a political and social patron represented in the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and a wide swath of those belonging to the lower class whose power was threatened by the tensions of the revolution, as well as another wide swath of psychologically fragile groups of women and elderly people belonging to the middle class that are searching constantly for the dream of security and stability.

5. The weakness of the political culture of Egyptians and their lack of a modern civic political culture that would recommend the idea of the capacity of the people to rule themselves through elected and democratic institutions, and the fragility of political public opinion that can be turned upside down in the space of a few short months. In short, there is a susceptibility to influence and change

by others. The end result is that Egyptians express long-ing for the idea of powerful, paternalistic rule—though a reversal cannot be ruled out.

6. Finally, June 30/July 3, 2013 revealed that except for the revolutionary youth that called for the fall of military rule and the Islamists dreaming of a Caliphate state, an indicative swath of Egyptians saturated by a traditional nationalist political culture belonging to the spirit of the 1960s has no principled stance to reject rule with a military background or that the army would play a cen-tral role in the administration of state, whether on the political or economic level, particularly at a time when the society is subject to existential external and internal dangers.

Explanatory approaches for the new regime

Following the events of June 30/July 3, 2013 in Egypt, most of the academic and political writings focused on attempting to answer the question: was it a revolution or coup? By comparison, more recent writings have focused on the more practical question connected with the nature of the current political regime, at the heart of which is the Egyptian military institution. Dina al-Khawaga has classi-fied the approaches toward this subject into those focusing on the idea of the return of Mubarak tyranny, if stronger (such as Nathan Brown, 2013); the resumption of the military dictatorship of the 1960s (Yazid Sayigh, 2013, and Emad Shahin, 2014); the establishment of a regime of alli-ances providing power, order, and quotas (Ashraf al-Sharif, 2012); the revelation of the use of tools of symbolic violence to demobilize after the January 2011 Revolution and lay the basis for a counter-mobilization of the masses (Ahmed Abd Rabbo, 2013); and the comparison to the experience of the American administration after the September 11 attacks

and the laws of the PATRIOT Act (Hanaa 'Abid, 2015). Dina al-Khawaga herself approaches the political regime as one that puts itself forward to the people as "the necessary state," preserving its institutions instead of answering the question of their legitimacy, employing the idea of the "state of war" as a material and symbolic resource, and practicing on the ground a role of the "state of [tax or levy] collection," which is a break with the heritage of the redistributionist Nasserist state.[1]

We can add other approaches, like the approach of following the Algerian example rather than the Tunisian model. Another interpretative approach is to focus on the regional roles of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose decisive roles in supporting the military, removing the Brotherhood from power, and establishing a new regime (which is then supported economically and politically) has recently been revealed by leaked documents.

Attributes of the new regime

Nathan Brown describes the new situation in Egypt as one embodying a security state operating (at least in the short term) in an atmosphere of popular support infected with panic and rabidity. The Islamist opposition is excluded from the political process in such a way as to make it more ready to use violent force. Civil conflict continues, while a cosmetic constitutional process offers a means to lend institutional character to the current political arrangements.[2]

In the wake of June 30, 2013, the new regime took advantage of the legislative vacuum to issue hundreds of laws

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1) Dina al-Khawagah, "Building a State after July 30th: War and Tax Collection as the New Bases for State-Society Relations, The Egyptian file," Center for Political Studies and Strategy, al-Ahram Institute, Cairo, No. 15, November 2015.

2) Nathan Brown, *Foreign Policy*, August 20, 2013.

that cemented its grip during the period of the temporary president and after the election of members of parliament. These decrees were engineered by the regime in order to circumvent the articles of the constitution continuously.

The current regime behaves as if it is possible to stop history and keep the situation as it was on the evening of January 24, 2011. It resumed the country's old political and economic path, as if Egyptians were unaware of the political experience that had accumulated between the January Revolution and the fall of Brotherhood rule, and as if the Egyptian political culture had not changed, even relatively. The flaw here lies in the lack of understanding of the temporary and conditional character of the popular stance toward political and social activities since June 30, 2013 and thereafter, as if it can be transformed into a permanent state. The security elite still believes that the essence of the political crisis in Egypt does not lie in the weakness of the democratic system and its loss of vitality, but in political and security feebleness of the Mubarak regime that ended when conditions worsened.

From another perspective, there is a fundamental contradiction between the regime and society, in terms of their respective political understandings of the nature of the essential, pressing goal that should govern the polities of the Egyptian state in the current moment. The regime is dominated by an ultra-realist, ultra-conservative imagination, focused on avoiding the fall of the state, confronting foreign threats, the recovery of security and stability, and the return of the economy to its ordinary operation. The understanding of the regime is thus marked by its defensiveness, content to fix conditions as they are, considering its mere stability a success. In contrast, the lower and middle segments of society have suffered long years of economic deprivation. They have repressed feelings of social injustice and an overwhelming longing for freedom. The crisis

lies in the sharp contradiction between these two levels of understanding. There are indications that the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions makes continuing in this way no longer possible. The regime appears confused in its performance in responding to successive crises. The patience of the socio-economically vulnerable sectors, as well as the people in general, has begun to run out.

In parallel with this economic decline, the conditions in terms of freedom and human rights have increasingly deteriorated. The media and society have witnessed a type of disaster in this respect, not only against the Brotherhood, but also against any dissenting opinion. On the political level, the state is following a policy of destroying the Brotherhood organization both militarily and economically. A new terrorism law was enacted that was prepared by the Interior Ministry with intentionally elastic clauses, granting the executive and judiciary sweeping powers to use against peaceful opposition of all stripes without exception. Twenty-two civil rights organizations have come to a consensus rejection of the law. The law extended the period of provisional detention such that it transformed a practical practice into a weapon against anyone accused, who would then be subject to long prison terms without any proof of guilt or of involvement in the crimes.

The deeper problem is that the series of unconstitutional laws issued were given a blessing by a significant number of Egyptians. Eric Trager pointed this out, that despite the negatives of the current regime, "the most important cause for al-Sisi remaining in power is the mood of the people, which is a mix of exhaustion and contentment. Egyptians feel exhausted after years of upheaval, but at the same time are content that their country has not suffered the destructive chaos of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. As a result, when several economic and demographic problems that led to the 2011 uprising have not been solved, a significant segment of

Egyptians prefer now their collapsed state over trying their luck repeatedly and risking further destruction."[3] In the end, this climate has granted the state the ability to close public space, with tangible public approval.

The matter is not limited to the regime's blindness. It is also connected to the political convictions of the regime, which in its severe, bitter ultra-realism does not only dislike public opinion, but frustrates it—such that it could perhaps drive those holding this viewpoint to overthrow it. This vision is an expression of the dreams of the poor and the middle class whose aspirations were raised on January 25, 2011, without any connection to the current and short-term economic conditions. To meet the demands of these two classes, while continuing to respond to the demands of the oligarchs of the Mubarak era, would only lead to the destruction of the economy. What matters is that the regime is convinced that the Egyptian people are not yet qualified to practice positive democracy. The regime believes that such an attempt would bring negative chaos, based on the experience of the past five years. In fact, it could bring something worse than the Brotherhood to power. The regime trusts no one except the cadres of the military institution and some state bureaucrats. This unspoken vision (which is nevertheless clear in the political behavior of the regime) justifies placing the Islamists and other revolutionaries and politicians in jail without fair trials, dominating and directing the media, and excluding everyone from the political sphere by disseminating electoral laws that guarantee domination by the executive branch over the "elected" parliament. By monopolizing rule, the regime formulates and adopts its political vision without the input of, or serious social dialogue with, any other components of society.

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3) Eric Trager, "Why do Egyptians not want another revolution?" *Politico*, January 26, 2015.

The regime needed a temporary rescue operation to pass through the parliamentary elections, represented in the hasty formation of an electoral list of those loyal to the state. It awaits the fruits of its attempts to cultivate hundreds of youth hand-picked by the presidency to rejuvenate youth organizations along the lines of those from the Gamal Abdel Nasser era, though of course with a different ideological bent.

Emad Shahin sees the only chance for the regime to continue as it is, in light of its sociopolitical alliances, is a transformation into a personal autocracy that marginalizes the role of institutions and communicates directly with the people, dependent largely on the security institutions for support. Such a model needs enormous resources to fund the machinery of authoritarianism, and to compensate for the lack of resources resulting from the monopolization and marginalization of others and the resultant weak economic performance. In light of the lack of such resources, the possibility of rooting individual authoritarianism is dwindling. Nothing remains for the regime except repression and propaganda, though even these tools are impermanent. With the deteriorating popularity of the regime and the emergence of larger cracks in its legitimacy, the chances of an uprising against it increase. But, as long as the regime's internal alliances remain stable, and as long as it has a low level of support, these attempts will remain scattered and ineffectual, especially as long as the opposition remains fragmented and splintered.[4]

Civil-military relations

The basic subject of civil-military relations in Egypt is connected to the unofficial and unannounced political role that is played by the military, intelligence, and security

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4)   Emad al-Din Shahin, "The Egyptian Regime between Impossible Authoritarianism and Unlikely Democracy." Issues, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, January 11, 2015.

agencies in order to dominate the political process (administering the recent parliamentary elections in Egypt, for example). This is in addition to the tendency to populate the most important administrative and economic positions with officers, manufacturing the elite of the state out of officers and the oligarchs in business and media.

The global experience with respect to civil-military relations can be summarized in the following goal: to place the military, like other institutions of the state, under the supervision of elected civilian bodies. The basic conditions for the success of such an approach are the unity of civilian forces in negotiating with the military, and focusing on convincing the military to accept a gradual path toward reaching this goal. Both civilian and military bodies must be keen to avoid popular conflict, in addition to applying the rules of transitional justice if need be. Most of these conditions have not been met in Egypt, though they could be in the future.

A number of scholars, such as Yezid Sayigh, have described Egypt as an "army economy," Companies with non-military products are not subject to oversight or accountability, but employ and are headed by the military leadership, giving military officers additional income and giving the army a significant and powerful role in the economy.[5]

Under Anwar Sadat and Mubarak, there was a continuing diminishment of the role of the military in determining political affairs, especially in comparison to the 1960s. There is no doubt that this has left negative impressions among the leadership and the rank and file of the military, who criticized Mubarak regarding the distribution of money and power. Despite this, "the military institution has embarked on aggrandizing its material wealth in order to avoid friction with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state when requesting additional funding for its budgets. This

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5)   See Yezid Sayigh, Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt. The Carnegie Papers, August 2012.

led to the emergence of individualistic interests of the military leaders seeking behind-the-scene positions in the companies serving the military and establishing close relationships with individuals and groups in the private sector and with businessmen."[6]

In any case, it is expected that the current domination of politics by the military and the security and intelligence agencies will lead to a spotlight on the size of the army economy. Most likely, the nationalist response to the military will uphold the public interest, represented in the acceptance of civil-military negotiations at a time when they become necessary. The principle of civilian review of the military's budget was raised forcefully and habitually in the wake of the January 25 Revolution and was acceptably raised in the media and in daily popular discussions, without detracting from the military. But in the climate of June 30/July 3, 2013, aside from the most strident liberals in the committee that formulated the constitution, the issue has not been raised as a political demand. The direction of the majority is to delay civilian oversight. Some economic experts close to the military, like Ahmed al-Sayid al-Naggar, complain that estimates indicating that the military economy composes 40 percent of the total Egyptian economy are "completely contrary to reality." He cites official Egyptian and World Bank statistics that the private sector contributes 61.8 percent of the gross domestic product, the public sector about 36.4 percent, and the remaining around 1.8 percent. The last figure is what al-Naggar claims is the share of the military economy in terms of GDP, at most. It is important to point out that civilian companies are subordinate to the military. This emerged after the liberalization of consumer prices and the beginning of the privatization of the public sector, during which the military

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6)   Gamal Matar, "The revolution in Egypt: major transformations and the roles of the players," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Arabic edition), No. 98, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Spring 2014, p. 9.

extended control over foodstuffs and other basic necessities in order to guarantee military provisioning. The military dictated that these should be under military command, with no changes taking place without consultation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF). In essence, the justification was that change should happen gradually, so as not to disrupt essential supplies. It must be pointed out that the current tax law exempts business projects in service of the national interest under the Defense Ministry from all taxation. This is illogical, since the companies of the military can continue in any non-military activity or work without taxation. They should be subject to taxation so that the market operates justly. Similarly, the "military" workforce should have the same pay scale as the civilian sector so there is just competition for employees. This should apply generally to all in the national service in order to protect their dignity, their humanity, and deepen their patriotic loyalty.[7]

The military and businessmen

Concerning the oligarchs, Amr Adly has observed that a large chunk of capital has been set aside for a stimulus plan whose aim would be to stimulate the Egyptian economy, instead going to support the new political regime forcefully and quickly. From another angle, the al-Sisi regime has introduced changes that have put pressure on the private sector generally, and on the oligarchs in particular. Despite this, there are some indications that these changes are temporary, taken out of necessity to attempt to reform the imperiled economy as part of the new political leadership's efforts to achieve political stability.[8]

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7) Ahmed al-Sayid al-Naggar, "What does the West Want with the Army Economy? Al-Ahram, October 8, 2013.

8) Amr Adly, "The Future of Big Business in the New Egypt," Carnegie Endowment, November 19, 2014.

Internal restructuring

With the end of Mubarak's rule, the picture appeared as if "the military institution depended on the president, who in turn depended on the police institution," which "enabled President Mubarak to dictate elections and tame the media." But of course there were signs of tension between the armed forces and the internal security apparatus, and accusations that the "military institution… did not perform its duty in protecting them in the appropriate way."[9]

In recent months, individual occurrences of friction between the police and the military have taken place, though the military has quickly moved to isolate the security forces. President al-Sisi issued a decision subjecting policemen to performance evaluation or a military tribunal when such frictions occur. There are no indications that these isolated incidents are escalating on an institutional basis, but it is certain that the president is attempting to support policemen in order to recover the solidarity between the two security institutions. Likewise, he understands the popular political demands to restructure them. He also understands the sensitivity and difficulty of being forced into radical and rapid restructuring as he is being pressured from abroad. As a result, he has chosen to task the defense minister personally with putting a plan in place along with the leadership of the Interior Ministry. However, reports indicate this project has stopped because of the tense security situation resulting from the actions of the Brotherhood and its supporters. Matar points to the possibility of Egypt gradually transforming into a regime of "light military" rule, meaning that "the military institution takes on the protection of the civilian transition process via reducing the influence of the interior security authorities and subordinating them first

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9)   Matar, *"The revolution in Egypt"* p. 10.

to the military leadership and then to civilian leadership."[10] During 2016, the number of instances of excessive violence has increased on the part of the security services, which include the intentional killing of a number of civilians. These events caused wide-scale popular dissatisfaction, and prompted calls by the members of the doctors' union for an emergency general association meeting after assaults on two doctors inside a public hospital. These incidents found wide resonance in the media, even with the official government media and those loyal to the state, making individuals in the security service feel as though the regime was sacrificing them as scapegoats.

Possible future directions

1. There is a tangible impact on the capacity of the current regime in Egypt as a result of the weakening economic support coming from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the wake of the collapse of oil prices, in addition to the presence of a major rift between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite Saudi Arabia's rejection of the possibility of the Brotherhood coming to power in any Arab or Muslim country, the kingdom does not have the luxury of using the Brotherhood within its Sunni alliance against the extension of Shiite influence in the region — which has led a slight softening of its stance against the Brotherhood, in favor of reconciliation and deescalation of their political isolation, something which the Egyptian regime rejects.

2. The exclusion by the regime of representatives of the revolution and the demands of the popular and middle classes (particularly the youth), and its contentment to employ them politically, in the media, and in the streets

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10) Ibid, p. 15.

to topple the Brotherhood, has gradually generated a wave of strident anger against the current rulers in Egypt. Signs of this include civil (non-Islamist) demonstrations opposed to the recent law regulating demonstrations, the participation of (again, non-Islamist) student groups in demonstrations of anger at universities, and demonstrations and sit-ins by workers, in addition to a change from the enthusiastic optimism of June 30, 2013, to worry and apprehension toward a cloudy future, owing to the murky sociopolitical directions of the current rulers. Indications are that popular support has begun to wane, without consideration of the danger of popular sectors increasingly entering into political frustration and apathy as a result of the delay in implementing the promises and socioeconomic aspirations that accompanied the climate of June 30, 2013. Furthermore, groups of urban youth have increasingly begun to express how fed up they are of the expanding role of the security institutions in order to further erode freedoms, particularly of opinion, with the nationalization of the media and of politics.

In conclusion, it seems that the popular and elite retreat from democratic demands may generate strong feelings within the civil society of the necessity of returning to square zero in order to root liberal values embedded in an effective constitution, and to apply pressure on all parties in order to defend the rules of the political game by both the state and political powers. They seek a third way in Egypt, a current that is forming and gradually gaining new support from different generations and backgrounds.

Furthermore, the continued closure of politics, even the freedom of expression, to Islamists may lead to the spread of terrorism and increase the motivations to join terrorist groups, whether inside or in the Sinai.

ROLE OF THE FORCES OF "POLITICAL ISLAM" AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR "CIVIL" DEMOCRATIC FORCES

POLITICAL ISLAM IN TUNISIA BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL ORGANIZING AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Mohammad al-Haj Salem[*]

The Tunisian Revolution led to the explosion of the political arena that had been enclosed since the founding of the independent state and monopolized for more than half a century by the ruling single party and its state, represented by the Neo-Destour Party in its various versions (socialist, then collectivist, then the seventh coup in November 1978).

This explosion gave birth to a large number of political parties (nearly 200), and it coincided with a break from religious centralization by the state. The new constitution consecrated freedom of conscience, which led to "political Islamic" movements formulating their new policies within legal parameters, allowing them to move out of secrecy

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[*]   Mohammad al-Haj Salem is a Tunisian scholar, specializing in political science, sociology, and Arabic.

and into open politics on the model of the Ennahda (Renaissance) Movement and Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). Two new phenomena thus emerged within the field of political Islam: the formation of political parties with Salafist backgrounds (The Reform Front Party, for example) and the choice on the part of the Salafist/jihadist current to emerge publically within an organized movement declaring itself Ansar al-Shari'a (Supporters of Islamic Law). Ansar al-Shari'a did not seek legal approval, instead preferring to be involved in terrorist activities that led it to be classified by the government as a terrorist organization by the end of 2013 and its supporters to be pursued by the security services.

While the revolution in Tunisia was undertaken on the basis of clear social and political demands, the political conflict after the elections of the National Constituent Assembly in October 2011 and the major victory for Ennahda moved away from the demands of the masses for development, employment, and reduction of the gap between regions. Instead of being a conflict about platforms, it became an identity-based conflict with a pronounced ideological nature between the "secularists" and the "Islamists," the state's character torn between "civilness" and "religiousity," the constitution between being based on "positive legislation" and "Islamic law." These issues of identity polarized the political sphere.

This conflict drove the movements of political Islam in Tunisia, particularly Ennahda as a partner in the ruling government, to develop mechanisms of dealing with their political rivals and with civil society, which made it develop its rhetoric and its political performance—feverishly seeking to solidify the credibility of its embrace of democracy and deepen the proof of its nationalist orientation, in confronting the accusations of its opponents of political dissimulation, duplicitous rhetoric or doublespeak, subservience

to transnational movements, and of using democracy as a means to power all the while Islamizing society and the state (if not declaring a Caliphate).

This paper seeks to formulate a conceptual framework revolving around the concept of ideology to analyze how the movements of political Islam in Tunisia (Ennahda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Supporters of Islamic Law) have become involved in society and how this has been expressed ideologically. Through this, it is possible to better understand their performance and the strategies they adopted to deal with issues of the constitution, the nature of the state, and the reformulation of civil society, as well as defining their stances toward the democratic transition process and other civil organizations.

Ideology and the social movement

Elites and institutions have interacted throughout Arab and Islamic history with some of the components of Islam in different ways in order to interpret and employ religious legitimacy to build social regimes—that is, employing the "holy" politically and gaining authority to either justify the status quo or initiate sociopolitical change. We would suggest that in order to differentiate among these patterns—between employing religion for political goals and between religion itself (as a pure form of belief and worship)—we should use the phrase "religious ideology" for the patterns of religiosity that seek to achieve a political goal. This type of ideology does not exclude patterns of religious practice that seem as if they want to withdraw from the world of man and be cut off from politics through a preoccupation with religious matters directly, as some Sufi orders suggest, for example. This in its own way is a political stance.

In order for an ideology to be effective, it must be expressive of a social movement, meaning the presence of

categories of people adopting the actions and behaviors advocated by the ideology wholesale, and rejecting partially or completely the prevailing social regime in order to change it. It is a collective act intended to achieve a clear project and mobilize on its behalf, within a logic of demands, and in defense of material or abstract interests. This means focusing on the "collective intentionality," and the adoption of "a logic of demands" toward the authorities in order to achieve change in public policies. By doing so, it expresses a political component, which is the core of its ideology around which supporters gather and the public rallies.

The literature on social movements has a near consensus that, in the beginning, a social movement emerges as a weak form of organization, lacking clear definition in its shape and goals. But it soon takes on an organized character through a leadership structure and the articulation of values and goals in order to differentiate itself from other social movements. Among the tasks of the social movement is to mediate between a group of people on one side and between social structures and facts on the other, thereby putting pressure on the people who hold the reins of power in their hands. It may not be necessary that a social movement take the shape of a political party, but instead it may transcend this organizational form to express itself through civil society organizations: rights organizations, cultural organizations, sport organizations, youth organizations, women's organizations, workers unions, journalist unions, etc. What matters is their cohesion around and adherence to a particular ideology capable of rallying and mobilization.

With this definition, it is possible to consider the movements of political Islam in Tunisia to be social movements with a religious ideology, whether they are organized as a political party on the model of Ennahda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, or

the Salafist Reform Front, or they are organized outside state supervision and not along the lines of civil society groups, or they seek to impose their project directly by replacing the civil order with a religious authority, along the lines of the Salafist jihadist Supporters of Islamic Law.

Of course, those holding the reins of political power also adopt a specific ideology, whether overtly or implicitly, in order to rally and mobilize people loyal to the authorities, who defend their interests by defending the authorities. This is what makes analysis of ideological conflicts in one society an important entry point to understanding social conflicts within the same society. With this in mind, we will attempt to analyze the stakes of the ideological conflict in Tunisia between what we term nationalist ideology—embodied in the Destouri (or Constitutional) current, expressed best in the past by the Destour Party and its heir the Democratic Constitutional Rally (the former ruling party in Tunisia commonly known as the Neo-Destour Party), and currently by Nidaa Tounes (Tunisia's Call)—and the Islamist ideology, embodied in the Islamist Awakening (Sahwa) current, best expressed in the past as the Islamic Action Group that became the Movement of Islamic Tendency, before developing into the Ennahda movement that became a political party after the revolution.

The emergence of nationalist ideology and civil society in Tunisia

Many researchers have argued that the idea of the independence of social and professional organizations from the state was present, if only implicitly, in Tunisian society. There is no better proof for this than the presence of hundreds of such organizations before the term civil society entered circulation in Tunisia. It had been generally called *al-mujtama' al-ahli* rather than the current *al-mujtama'*

al-madani.[1] This had been in order to distinguish the "popular civil society" from the "political society," in an attempt to fill the conceptual vacuum that took hold of our contemporary view of traditional society before the advent of the modern nation state. This forces us to deal with the issue of "forced modernization," which our country witnessed throughout French colonialism, which aborted much of the experiment of "local modernization" that was in process by cutting off its catalysts whether homegrown or in response to the European encounter at the time.

In brief, it is possible to say that the prevailing societal unit in the era before colonialism in Tunisia, dubbed by some researchers as "pre-modern" social organizations, by which they mean tribes, or what is called among Tunisians *al-'arushiah* centered essentially on extended familial relations. The tribe had been considered in its own right a form of intermediary social organization between the individual and state. However, the individual had no real existence outside of a framework of his collective familial relations that defined his social and political existence, guaranteed his means of living, and protected him from the arbitrary abuse of other groups or from the central rulers. Some in intellectual circles have talked about a quasi-eternal Tunisian "people" extending deep throughout history. However, it is not possible to talk about a people without the

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1) Translator's note: Both terms would be translated into English as "civil society"; however, the adjective "*ahli*" is derived from a term for people, it can also be used to refer to one's family or parents in particular. It gives the phrase here a connotation of an almost familial civil society. By contrast, the adjective "*madani*" derives from the word for city, and as an adjective can be used to mean urban, urbane, and thus civil or civilized. "*Madani*" is also used to refer to a civil law code, and thus has recently become a less freighted term for a type of separation between religion and state (whether in law or otherwise) in place of the Arabic word for "secular ('*ilmani*)," which has taken on a connotation of godlessness or atheism in the minds of many religious people.

presence of an individual person, which together compose the people—that is, within a framework of an ideology of individualism. We have noted the complete lack of this condition in Tunisian society before colonialism, which instead was a collective entity prevailing throughout the country, based on political loyalty of groups. Each tribe had a sheikh who was the official intermediary between groups of people and the state, which is nearly the same role that brokers or marketers would play within the artisanal organizations known as guilds.

With the French occupation of Tunisia, one of the most important goals for economic exploitation and European colonization was breaking the popular productive base dependent largely on agriculture, and to a lesser extent traditional artisan handicrafts. The colonial administration took over peasant holdings from Tunisians through property laws such as the one enacted in 1885 that necessitated land registration to provide security to French landowners, as well as eviction laws to enable the French to take over *waqf* land (endowed to religious institutions) via contracts of permission in exchange for rent, and then expanding public state-owned lands to benefit French colonists by combining tribal and crown lands. This provided capitalist companies and European colonialists with important areas of the most fertile lands, constituting about a million hectares. This also forced the majority of Tunisian peasants to become a wage labor force on their own land, or to be displaced to the cities or to the mining regions. From this emerged a massive working class that settled in poor neighborhoods on the outskirts of the major cities (*bidonvilles* or shanty towns, named for the poor quality of construction, with the roofs typically constructed of tin, or *bidon* in French).

The local craft industry was dealt a death blow when foreign capital established factories that supplanted local craft industries, which contributed to enlarging the phenomenon

of wage labor and led to the establishment of a working class for the first time in the history of Tunisia.

On the cultural level, the tense relations between local society and the imported colonial society led to a process of acculturation. One of the signs of this was the emergence of a new acculturated elite that received its education in France, wedged between the two cultures of an Islamic Arab nationalist culture and a Western culture in its French form, and opposed to the decaying traditional cultural elite (the *'ulama*, sheikhs, Sufi orders, etc.). Traditional education, such as that under the guise of the university of the Great Mosque of El-Zituna, was weakened.

Without going into detail, the blow to the productive base of local Tunisian society had led to the disintegration of the ties between the individual and his tribe. As a result, this weakened the strength of the tribe as the intermediary between the individual and the state. Most Tunisians found themselves isolated individuals in confronting the "colonial state." This atomization is the basic factor in the emergence of a social movement expressing itself through organizing in cultural, charitable, and youth associations and in political organizations and labor unions. The Destour party (later the Neo-Destour party) and the Tunisian General Labor Union (known by its French acronym UGTT) became the two essential organizational pillars for the nationalist movement. Demands for independence and a constitution were its two ideological pillars.

With the confluence of identification between the culture of the colonizer and the atomization of society, individuals found themselves forced to combine their individual desires in service of their political interests within and via the social movement. At the beginning of the 20th century, an elite emerged and established political parties (the most important of which was the Destour Party). The process of acculturation also led to the emergence of theatrical,

musical, scouting, and even sporting organizations. In the same period we witnessed the birth of dozens of sporting associations, perhaps the most important facet of which was their affirmation of "nationalism," as opposed to the "anti-nationalist" colonialist associations and parties. This was the beginning of the formation of the fabric of *madani* civil society in Tunisia, though it was on the rubble of the *ahli* civil society, which it replaced and began to perform the most important of its roles—as intermediary between the individual and the state.

The emergence of nationalist ideology and its embodiment in a social movement led to the emergence of a new concept, that being the concept of "the people." A people can only be discussed after the emergence of the tendency of individualism, and this had happened. The colonial administration had unintentionally created this, which the alliance between the workers' union and the Neo-Destour party exploited to form a demand-based nationalist ideology that was able to mobilize the masses. Through a political and a labor struggle, this led to the country achieving its political independence, from which the modern nation state emerged.

Nationalist ideology and civil society in the independent state

With the emergence of the nation state, the alliance between the Neo-Destour Party and the Tunisian General Labor Union continued purely as a means to obtain power. The government adopted the social program of the union, and several labor leaders assumed important ministerial portfolios and became members of the upper chamber of parliament (*Majlis al-Ummah*). It later led to the adoption of socialism, as a form of forced modernization from above. However, this also entailed the penetration of the

Neo-Destour party into all nationalist organizations, making them mere appendages. It also meant the ruling party's dominance of the UGTT by intervening in its affairs. This led to tension in the relationship between the party and the union, and thereafter a reversal of the socialist experiment in 1969 in favor of economic liberalization. This would be one of the causes of conflict between the ruling party and the labor union, which would peak in the second half of the 1970s with the union's announcement of a general strike in the country for the first time in its history. This resulted in clashes and street battles, during which hundreds died, which became known as Black Thursday (January 26, 1978).

In these circumstances of push and pull between the will of the ruling party to enlist civil society and strike at any inkling of independence from the state, the features of a new social movement began to emerge with the growing anger inside wide segments of Tunisian society. It found adherents from those hurt by the socialist experiment and those fearing for the gains made under economic openness and the adoption of a market economy. Here, we are talking about the Islamic Action Group, which was established in 1972 in secret, becoming the first formation representing political Islam in Tunisia. It would grow throughout the 1970s and 1980s by feeding in particular off the failure of the state's developmental policies. It also waged conflict with the authorities over its attempt to introduce political openness in the early 1980s, allowing the tiniest openings to select opposition parties that the ruling party sought to keep within its orbit. This made the Neo-Destour party truly dominant over political life in the country. But, this symbolic political openness of course did not entail legal recognition of the Islamic Group, which changed its name to the Movement of Islamic Tendency with the aim of obtaining official acknowledgement. Instead, its leadership was quickly thrown in prison.

The attraction and repulsion between the movement and the authorities remained this way until the coup of the Seventh of November, which welcomed the movement to sign the National Charter document that President Ben Ali called for as a base to organize political activity in the country. The group changed its name to the Ennahda Movement, which is significant in that it was restricted to being a movement rather than party, since parties were legally prohibited from being established on a religious basis. The Ennahda Movement nevertheless requested licensing from the state as a party, which was answered with rejection by the authorities—despite its participation in the legislative elections of April 1989 on independent lists and obtaining (according to the public results) about 13 percent of the votes. Frightened by these results, the authorities (who had intended to rig the elections) reacted with a series of arrests. The movement was stunned by the violence of the official reaction. Thousands of those belonging to the movement were arrested and tried before military tribunals that handed out very severe sentences. Some of the leadership fled into exile. The authorities continued their persecution and severe harassment of those belonging to the movement in subsequent years amidst widespread criticism from human rights associations. Ennahda's activities remained completely prohibited in Tunisia, thus limiting its public activity to Europe and North America in the circles of Tunisians abroad, until the fall of Ben Ali from power.

In the atmosphere of this campaign of persecution and its declining popularity, the regime worked to beautify its image abroad, like it had done internally by enlisting some associations and attempting to penetrate intractable civil organizations like the Tunisian Human Rights League. The regime worked in essence to form a parallel civil society, establishing thousands of loyal associations on the local level of every city and village in the country (known as

neighborhood committees) to increase its ideological control over society. This occurred alongside stringent security monitoring on the level of every residential neighborhood (known as Guidance Teams). On the level of political control, the regime worked to monopolize power within the dominant party through the establishment of Neo-Destour branches in all residential neighborhoods throughout the territory of the republic. This overall left a miniscule margin for the opposition parties to avoid irking the regime.

The three means of control mentioned above amplified the besiegement of every social and political movement in the country: ideological, security, and political control down to the level of the neighborhood in all cities, towns, and villages. This was the terrifying tool by which Ben Ali reigned for two decades, under which Islamists of all types lived through a suffocating ordeal. This fed the emergence of a violent Islamist current beginning in the mid-1990s that would be known subsequently as Salafist jihadist, influenced by what happened in Afghanistan in particular (where jihadist armed operations targeting the overthrow of the Soviet-backed regime were given material support by some Western countries). This led to a further tightening of the noose around various sectors of the people, especially the Islamists. This continued until the revolution of December 17, 2010 and the fall of the Ben Ali regime, which marked the decline of nationalist ideology and the rise of Islamist ideology, which tasted victory for the first time in its history after the election for the constituent assembly when the Ennahda party won a parliamentary majority that brought it to power.

Political Islam and the social movements in Tunisia

Here we present a hypothesis arguing that the seeming fragmentation of Islamist ideology into different movements

and parties is merely variations of the same religious ideology. They can be considered variegated social movements in terms of their membership along class or generational lines. We find the majority of those belonging to Hizb ut-Tahrir among educated young people in general from the middle class. Their belonging is mostly on an individual rather than a familial basis (wherein the entire family — men, women, and children — are members). Ennahda is distinguished by its attractiveness to the middle class from mainly non-urban areas. It's backbone is these men and their families. The Salafist jihadists have attracted young men from the urban margins, and mainly on an individual basis (rather than the familial units of Ennahda), similar to Hizb ut-Tahrir.

1. Ennahda Movement

The ability of Ennahda to form a cohesive and strong party organization was less due to the strength of its religious ideology or religious politics as much as it was due to its ability to renew its stances through reviews undertaken while its members were imprisoned and the emergence of a new generation of activists in exile, which took on an essential role in directing the movement. European exile offered many among the leadership and the general membership an opportunity to meet with secular and liberal groups and Western civil society organizations. This eased the development of their views and contributed to the development of the movement. Perhaps the most important development was their recognition beginning in the 1990s that slogans like "Islam is the solution" or "The Quran is our constitution" were insufficient to constitute a political platform or to form a political alliance capable of removing authoritarian rulers. Instead, they realized that democracy is the best way to confront dictatorial regimes — much more feasible than calling for jihad or the application of *shari'a* (Islamic law). This is what explains, for example, the participation

of the movement in building a wide political front opposed to the regime of Ben Ali in the 2005, known as the 18 October Body for Rights and Freedoms, which included secular opposition parties like the Progressive Democratic Party, the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (commonly referred to by its transliterated name, Ettakatol), the Congress for the Republic (known as El Mottamar), the Tunisian Communist Workers' Party, and the Nasserist Unionists in Tunisia. The founding statement of the body called in particular for the "formation of a democratic era guaranteeing all male and female citizens equality, freedom, and inalienable human rights; and the formation of a base for political participation and transition in power on the basis of fair competition over platforms and views; an era that would raise the level of the unity of action by firmly establishing the foundations for democratic change." The discussions between secularists and Islamists inside the body led to the issuance of a series of publications "on the relationship between the state and religion," and "about the freedom of conscience and belief," and "about the rights of women and equality between the genders." Although the body was not able to become a front in opposition to the regime, it was a significant experiment in joint political work between secularists and Islamists and a laboratory for dialogue between different political forces, particularly in reintegrating the Islamist representatives of the Ennahda movement into the political life of the country on common ground for all by setting the principles of democracy as a means of change.

Through this, Ennahda was able to continue representing wide swaths of society and to change from within. It changed its stances because society changed as well. It can be said that the ascendance of Islamists perhaps reflected the social and cultural revolution in Tunisia more so than it reflects the political revolution. This may be the cause

behind absence of initiative and hesitation to make decisions and the continued retreated from politics that marked the performance of Ennahda when it was in power. This also may be what is behind what the party is witnessing currently in terms of internal discussions. The movement seems to be preparing for its 10th party conference, which is expected to produce a quantum leap in strategy away from its history as an Islamist movement, with attention to the most decisive issues—namely the division between religious activity and politics—and instead moving toward building "a democratic political party with an Islamic reference," as was put in the introduction written by the preparatory committee for the tenth party conference.

2. Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir has a presence in more than 19 countries, which it calls provinces, among which are five Arab countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan; and five Muslim countries: Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, and Malaysia. The remaining chapters are spread among Europe, the Americas, and Australia. The relatively weak presence of the party in Tunisia can be explained by its transnational nature, which accounts for the weak resonance of its ideology as a social movement inside Tunisia. Its publications focus on "fighting Western imperialism" and preaching for a "global caliphate on the model of the prophets," which again explain its relative lack of appeal ideologically and organizational weakness in Tunisia. But the party, despite its rejection of democracy as a model for rule and transfer of power (it considers democracy a forbidden "infidel regime" that should not be called for, let alone be a permissible form of government), remains attractive among young men, if only in limited groups. It appeals to those who have a longing for a global messianic movement and severe hostility to foreign domination of Islamic

countries, which they argue was the main cause for the dismantlement of the caliphate and the division of the Islamic world. Its cadres are also hostile to capitalism, to which they attribute the misery of the people. This message has resonance among young men who are angry at this history yet do not seek to adopt violence as a means for change.

3. Salafist jihadist current

As was previously mentioned, among the tasks of a social movement is to be the intermediary between a group of people on one side and social structures on the other, in order to clarify the collective conscience (that is the state of the group) that it discovers itself or its interests and where these interest lie. From this basis, it pressures the individuals who hold the reins of power. One of these conditions is obvious in the phenomenon of the Salafist jihadist currents. The supporters of the Salafist jihadist current are instead informally organized, involved in the movement on the social level, which is in a way a flawed or corrupted social movement. This is because of the lack of clarity of its form and the fogginess of its aims, and its organizational fragmentation as a result of its severe rejection by the general public and by the public authorities, which have severely repressed it.

The flaw on the level of organization was deepened by the movement's failure in its first experiment at formal organization, which was known as the Supporters of Islamic Law. Its failure can be attributed to inertia withinin the organization itself, and to its classification by the government as a terrorist organization, which was the decisive factor in its dismantlement that resulted in the failure of the experiment. After this decision, the activity of those belonging to the current became generally limited to small isolated secret hidden cells. This explains the disappearance of some of its adherents from the public space, particularly

the most important spaces that had absorbed their activities: the mosques.

The current can be defined as "marginalist" in the sense that it has emerged from those who are deprived socioeconomically, which is the main factor for mobilization and recruitment. But, this does not mean that the leadership of the jihadist current, whether in Tunisia or outside it in neighboring countries, came entirely from a marginalized socioeconomic background. There is a near consensus in most studies dealing with the jihadist current in Tunisia that the ideal ground for its spread is in the outskirts of major cities, where enormous "popular" neighborhoods spread daily as large numbers of rural dwellers flee the failed policies of forced modernization that the state has adopted since independence. The slums of the major cities represent for jihadists ideal environs for proselytizing and mobilizing the masses, a vital field for their activities. Forced modernization was concentrated on the coasts, far from the interior of the country, which led to industrialization being limited to the major cities and to specific sectors (with little beyond light manufacturing and weaving). This increased the displacement from rural areas, and the newcomers were not integrated into the fabric of the city. They instead settled into unplanned areas around the cities that quickly became "marginalized areas," suffering from minimal public services and lack of public facilities that exacerbated the fragility of the residents and excluded them socially. This occurred simultaneously amidst enormous demands on the job market for educated labor, thanks to universal education. Crime and the informal market, as well as other issues, spread in the popular neighborhoods, which aided in their transformation into "protest spaces" that bred rejectionist identities. This led to the emergence of different types of groups: musical groups (rap and *al-mzud*, the term for popular songs that flourished inside prisons in particular),

football team supporters, and popular opposition and revolutionary groups, who participated in the repressed Bread Revolution of January 1980 as well as the Revolution of Dignity and Freedom in December 2010 that was led to the flight of Ben Ali.

Social vulnerability indicates a fragile social status, wavering between pure integration into society (defined as sharing of the same values, views, and dominant standards in society) and between a complete separation from it (the adoption of different values, standards, and views).

From this definition, the rise of the Salafist jihadist current can be considered one of the uncontrolled revolutionary expressions that accompanied the rise of protests in the marginalized and economically deprived regions. But it did not receive a sufficient embrace, owing to the severity of its ideology adopting armed violence as a means for change. Perhaps the loss of the popular incubator is what explains that some of the young jihadists went to hotspots in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Iraq where the politically chaotic situations and lack of security control left fertile ground for their activities.

While some young men from the middle class were found in the ranks of the jihadists, this does not negate the fact that the Supporters of Islamic Law organization were rooted essentially in the popular neighborhoods surrounding the cities. This has fed the common opinion that impeded horizons among young people by the scourge of unemployment is one of the important factors in their involvement within the jihadist current, which replaces frustration with the promise of a utopian project of a state on the model of the prophet. Jihadism uses an ideology that can be described as "scotomization," a kind of hyper tunnel vision bordering on blindness, focused on one or two central ideas (like jihad) and the adoption of a strident interpretation of a text (like the sayings of the Salaf or forbearers, shorthand to refer to the first generation of Muslims at the time of the prophet).

But the most important aspect is the lending of divine legiti-
macy to the ideology. This becomes the exclusion of any
other types of society, institutions, or politics, especially any
elements of *jahiliya* (ignorance, shorthand for pre-Islamic)
culture in two parts: "the West" and "false Islam." This exclu-
sionary tendency is a central element in Salafist jihadist ideol-
ogy that seeks to build a differentiated model by adopting
three principles in order to preserve its general structure:
distinctiveness, self-sufficiency, and sequestration.

1. Differentiation

Anything outside of the group is a blow to the principle
of loyalty that the group believes in, taking one outside of
the *ahil al-haqq* (the righteous ones) or the "victorious sect."
There is no space for personal thought outside of the group's
ideology, which marks the boundaries for individual think-
ing. On this basis, personal differentiation within the group
is forbidden—while differentiations from society and from
other groups is encouraged (regardless of whether they have
similar orientations, from parties to associations or schools
of thoughts or ideological currents and so on).

2. Self-sufficiency

This is what allows the development of the psychologi-
cal motivation of the group and what drives the individual
to withdraw gradually from society and become immersed
in the group. The group operates on a basis of tension
between a tendency toward building a group representative
of collectivism, and the tendency to adhere to the social
conditions imposed upon the group. This is what causes
social vulnerability. This principle forces the group to rely
on its own cultural and psychological resources, usually
preventing the reading of books that differ in belief and
religion, and limiting reading and website access to only
those espoused by the group, alongside prohibiting theater,

cinemas, and cafes where genders mix (and the role of culture in general) — any places that can break the principle of differentiation and separation of the group from society.

3. Internal and external sequestration

The Supporters of Islamic Law organization is distinguished from other unannounced groups in its lack of clear dividing lines between inside and outside. Its sequestration from the surroundings is incomplete. Perhaps its slogan "your sons at your service" that the group raised as proof of its desire to be acknowledged as the sons of the society discharging its service as a group by offering "its gift of the adoption of *shari'a*." This principle indicates the collective embodiment of the principle of patricide symbolically, and the reversal of the parable of the wayward son, by depicting the father as lost. This also indicates the presence of intergenerational conflict, which finds practical implementation in the violence of the group. The vast majority of those belonging to the current in fact are under 40, according to comparative studies of the age of those belonging to the spontaneous revolutionary currents in the modern history of Europe and the West generally, particularly during the period of social activism similar to what our countries are witnessing currently.

Throughout our fieldwork that we undertook during our research into Salafist jihadists in the period between 2012 and 2014, the Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies found that jihadist groups in Tunisia practice their activities on a base of direct interaction between supporters and adherents, which grants the organization a project and a symbolism that could be structured on its base, but without transferring it practically into the level of a more comprehensive institutional organization. They have adopted a strategy of proselytization, rejecting organization as a party, and practicing within extended networks lacking structure

and hierarchy—and without legal, official status with the state—centered on people or territory. They have been fed by the daily direct interactions between its followers and its leaders, united in a shared ideological direction. What eased the collapse and failure of the attempt to form a structured jihadist current in Tunisia was simply outlawing the organization of the Supporters of Islamic Law by the ruling government in August 2013, based on its involvement in several terrorist attacks and plots to change the regime through arms.

Immediately after the announcement of the ban, security operations including raids, arrests, and prosecution intensified, particularly within popular neighborhoods whose young men were known to embrace jihadist ideas. Security incursions increased at the time, reaching the point of open gun battles. This reflected badly on the Supporters of Islamic Law, which further alienated the group from the people in these neighborhoods, especially the elders, after the confirmation of their involvement in several terrorist attacks in the country. Sheikhs stopped providing lessons and cut the organization out of mosque study circles. These events also drove some of the young jihadists toward Libya and Syria to join jihadist groups there. Others chose to withdraw quietly, in order to avoid arrest for belonging to a banned terrorist organization. According to official statements, they number in the hundreds.

As a result, the Salafist jihadist current lost many supporters and its core cadres because of security interventions. Disputes, divisions, and defections within the jihadist fighting groups in Syria further divided the jihadist youth in Tunisia between supporters of Al-Nusra Front and supporters of Da'ish after the two groups fought each other in 2013. Finally, we should point to other factors not related to ideology behind the attraction of some young men to the jihadist current. Among these in particular is the economic

dimension, which drove some young men to join jihadist groups, whether in Libya or in Syria/Iraq, with the aim of improving their material and social conditions. This comes from the testimony of some who returned from these places, though they are few. This factor, despite its weak evidence, points to the dilemma of unemployment in the ranks of the youth, which could be behind the phenomenon of joining jihadist groups. If a quick and comprehensive solution to the problem of unemployment could be found, it would help to reduce this phenomenon. However, angry young men do not necessarily resort to extremism. Some of the young men joining the ranks of jihadists have received a good education and were hoping to move up socially to qualify them to join the middle class, but they could not find a place for themselves in a society suffering from corruption and nepotism and found themselves marginalized owing to unemployment or lack of security—as a result of the structural reforms in the mid-1980s, the privatization and liberalization of the 1990s, and the failed promises of the Revolution of Freedom and Dignity of 2011. They are "estranged," as a famous Salafist song puts it, which is what makes Salafist jihadism a protest identity.

Conclusion: an Islamic nationalist ideology?

Ennahda seeks to put itself within a nationalist framework having an Islamic background, in order to extend into nationalist reform movements. This is what has been proposed through discussion of working papers at local and regional conferences of the movement in recent months. It seems that through these papers that the movement is in the process of researching the conditions of completing the transitional path and achieving the goals of the revolution regarding growth, employment, and development in deprived regions. These local and regional conferences

wait for the national conference to reconcile the nature of Ennahda, as it is located in the Tunisia political scene as a national party cut off from religious grounds as a basis for its political activity and from any foreign links. Resolution of the issue of the division between political and religious activity is also necessary. How will the movement go about the transformation from a party uniting religious and political activity to a contemporary political national party in which its political action is liberated conclusively from its religious duties, but without abandoning the religious aspects that appear to be conducted by associations connected to the movement, without the party intervening directly in its activities? Through this, Ennahda will seek to preserve its basis as a social movement immersed strongly in the national situation, with change to some of the features of its ideology by going more toward expressing the aspirations of its members instead of the utopian platitudes that marked the stages of its founding. Rapprochement, if not alliance, between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes is remarkable in terms of both calling for the same type of reform and the frequent return in the rhetoric of both to the inspiration by certain individuals like Tahar Haddad and Abdelaziz Thâalbi (the founder of the Destour party). This could augur a move beyond a mere political alliance to the birth of a hybrid "Islamic nationalist" ideology that could allow a consensus to form between the Destouri side with a nationalist ideology and the Nahdawi side with an Islamic ideology on a unified political project—one that excludes the leftists in their Marxist and transnational components as well as the Islamic side represented by Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Salafist jihadists that are officially classified as terrorist groups. Both these latter sides refuse democracy from the start. The new rhetoric, however, holds a promise: unity between the nationalism of Nidaa Tounes and the Islamism of Ennahda.

THE ROLE OF THE FORCES OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR "CIVIL" FORCES IN MOROCCO

Abdelaziz Karraky[*]

Is it possible to continue discussing the Arab Spring as it was in 2011, after it became clear and indeed certain that the dynamics of societies differ from one state to another, and it is not possible to generalize the experiences of all the nations? If the Arab people — who have passed through this experience of "spring" or the tragedies of Iraq, Syria, and Libya — were asked about the best kind of rule, what would they choose? The history of revolutions built on violent change confirms in general that stability does not follow. Instead, waves of more violence follow, differing in their duration from one place to another. Can we predict the amount of time this will take in the Arab context?

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[*] Abdelaziz Karraky is a Professor of Political Science and Human Rights at the Muhammad V University in Rabat.

Since formal colonialism ended in the Arab world, people have become accustomed to the tussling of political forces between the Right and the Left. The crises of Arab societies redound to other causes as well, but the failure of both currents (Left and Right) has led to the emergence of new powers, searching for a place between the classical political actors. In particular, this is what has been termed the forces of political Islam, adopting a new path termed "Islamic awakening"[1] and the search for a state applying "the rule of God."[2] Despite this commonality, there is pluralism even within the same state, as is the case in Morocco.

What is uncertain today is whether the transformations initiated by the "Arab Spring" have been to the same degree in all Arab countries, and of the same type. Some regions have not succeeded in producing the desired political change, instead producing violence, destruction, and human misery in various forms. Millions have been driven to emigration, seeking refuge in Europe in search of better horizons where human rights and dignity are respected. However, most Arab countries (regardless of their basic differences) have seen the emergence of the forces of political Islam as factors in the post-Arab Spring equations. Morocco is no exception.

The experiences witnessed by the Arab world have confirmed that the emergence of Islamist movements in a certain country are a result of the interaction of internal conditions with general connections connected to "the

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1) "Awakening" is a type of rupture or sequestration from what is the predominant culture, and the provision of solutions to all of the problems facing society. See: al-Mukhtar Ben'abdlawi, *Contemporary Islam: A Reading in Founding Rhetoric* (in Arabic), Dar M'ad for printing, publishing and distribution, first printing 1998, p. 17.

2) This refers to the state of ones religious activity. See Mohammed Qatab, *Islamic Awakening* (in Arabic), distribution of the Salafist Library, 1992, Casablanca, p. 70.

regional Arab and Islamic regime."[3] Through this, all of the
Moroccan Islamic political forces have been linked to the
transformations witnessed by the Arab world. The Islamic
Youth[4] emerged as a result of what the Islamist movement in
Egypt lived through with Nasserism. The emergence of the
Justice and Charity Group[5] was linked to Khomeini's rise to
power, which is reflected in the group's leader's thoughts
that frame the group's stances.[6] The Islamic Youth on the
whole prefer collective struggle. From the beginning they
have been weighted with the blood of Omar Benjelloun.[7]

3) Mohammed Dharif, *The Islamist Movement: Founding and Development*,
al-Zaman publications, second printing, 2008, p. 11

4) This movement is headed by Abd al-Karim al-Mati', who lives in
exile in Libya. The movement was involved in the killing of leftist
leader Omar Benjelloun. The group is banned in Morocco.

5) This movement has been led since its establishment by Abdulsalam
Yassin, who previously sent a letter to the deceased king Hassan II in
1974 bearing the title: "Islam or deluge." This letter is considered by
many to be the moment of the group's appearance, whereas specialists
in the affairs of the group date it back to 1972 when Yassin published
his book "Islam between religion and state." See Mohammed Dharif,
Justice and Charity Group: Reading of its Paths (in Arabic), publications of
the Moroccan Journal of Political Sociology, first printing 1995, p. 9.

6) Abdulsalam Yassin is considered a Moroccan political leader who
produced many of the books aiming to reinforce the presence of
the group on an ideological level. Among the most well-known of
his publications is a book of dialogue with democracy proponents,
in which he announces his stance on democracy: "we have no fight
with democracy; if we knew the truth of it inside and out, if we
clarified to ourselves and to others its material, and how it accords
with or conflicts with Islamic demands…." See Abdulsalam Yassin,
Dialogue with Democracy Proponents (in Arabic), Horizons Printing,
First Printing, Casablanca 1994, p. 58.

7) Omar Benjelloun was a major leftist militant and member of
the leadership of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces who was
assassinated in front of his home in December 1975 by elements
of the Islamic Youth. From that moment, the movement went into
hiding after its leader fled abroad and many of its supporters left,
among which were some who would lead the Islamic Movement in
Morocco, such as Abdelilah Benkirane, Mohammed Mutassim, and
Mohammed Marwani.

Its leader was not as successful as Abdulsalam Yassin in building a political group with a powerful presence. Instead, they announced they were awaiting the realization of "Islamic rule."[8] Some defectors from the Islamic Youth movement,[9] aspiring to political action, joined the Popular Constitutional Movement party, which would be renamed the Justice and Development Party.[10]

The forces of political Islam in Morocco are not the offspring of the Arab Spring. Moroccan history is full of the near-continuous employment of religion in the field of politics.[11] This is perhaps what confirms the thought that Islam is a type of "generator for the monarchy."[12] Of course, we will not research the initial tremors of the appearance of political Islam because that it is not our subject here, as

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8) Dharif, *The Islamist Movement: Founding and Development,* op. cit., p. 106.

9) This current joins the Popular Movement party that would transform later into the Party of Justice and Development that would leader the first government in the framework of the 2011 constitution.

10) The Popular Movement party was founded in the context of the conflict between the monarch and forces of the nationalist movement that split up later (as their consensus had been on the basis of demanding independence). The party split from the Popular Movement that had been established by al-Mahjubi Ahredhan and Mohammed al-Khatib, both of whom had rejected the dominance of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party; however, the relationship between the leadership with the monarchy would change with the announcement by the authorities of a state of exception and the dissolution of the parliament. This drove al-Khatib and others to leave; however, this party was unsuccessful in its history of contesting for an important position on the political map.

11) It is possible to confirm this via how religion has been employed as an instrument of mobilization to resist the colonization through the organization of reading campaigns in different Moroccan mosques before these groups would emerge to demonstrate in the streets. See in this regard: Abu Bakr al-Qadri, *My Memoirs in the Moroccan Nationalist Movement From 1930 to 1940,* Part One, 1992, p. 107.

12) 'Ali Omlil, *Cultural Authority and Political Authority,* Center for Arab Unity Studies, Second Printing, Beirut 1998, p. 10.

much as we will seek to research the different roles played by
political Islam since the start of the Arab Spring. However,
it should be noted that the majority of the forces of political
Islam reject violence.

The condition of the forces of "political Islam" and their role in the movement that occurred in Morocco

The forces of political Islam[13] have been continually pres-
ent in different ways in all of the transformations witnessed
by Morocco. However, their relationship with the political
authorities has differed depending on the politics of the
period, and their presence and influence in affecting the
events of the Arab Spring are distinctive on numerous lev-
els. We will discern these by analyzing the roles that these
different forces have played.

1. Justice and Charity Group

The Justice and Charity group is linked to its former
leader Abdelsalam Yassin, who died in 2012.[14] Some scholars
have returned to the moment when he sent a letter to Hassan
II bearing the title "Islam or deluge" in 1974, whereas oth-
ers have pointed to earlier publications, particularly *Islam
between Religion and State in* 1972 and his book *Islam Tomorrow*
in 1973.[15] These publications are considered the ideological
groundwork for the group through expressing its refusal to
differentiate between "religion and state," considering it a
type of *fitna* (religious sedition or strife).[16] The leader of the
group rejected the description of *jaheliya* (literally ignorance,

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13) Meaning political Islamists.

14) Dharif, op. cit., p. 9.

15) Ibid.

16) Yassin, op. cit., p. 27.

a term signifying pre-Islamic practice) that is considered one of the central concepts in the ideologies of Islamist groups since the era of Abi al-A'ala al-Mawdudi (an influential Pakistani philosopher and political activist). According to Yassin, "if we rule as ignorant ones then we may efface the features of renewed life irreparably."[17] The group went on to describe itself to the state as providing two pillars, religious activity (proselytism) and leadership of jihad.[18] The division of religion from politics is absent. The group realized that the political authorities were adopting the same bent. As a result, they clarified the nature of the difference between themselves and the state by defining themselves as "politicizing Islam without Islamizing politics."[19] The leader of the group clarified its political plan by seeking to distinguish and differentiate from other political forces, stating: "our political plan is that we do not object to opposition parties on the level of directing day-to-day life and economics; rather we see them as exiting the circle of Islam."[20]

However, what is notable about the movement is its participation alongside other political forces. It is possible to say that the movement's participation in the February 20 Movement is what made it stronger. They took to the street in large numbers, throughout all the Moroccan cities that saw protests of the Arab Spring. However, what is remarkable is that the combatants of the group during their participation in the protests kept their self-restraint, which distinguished them in comparison to other political forces. They were not only distinguished by their dress, but also by adherence to the orders of field leadership.

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17) Abdelsalam Yassin, *Islam Tomorrow* (in Arabic), al-Najah Printing, Casablanca, 1973, p. 470.

18) Dharif, op. cit.

19) Ibid., p. 16.

20) Abdelsalam Yassin, *The Prophetic Methodology: Structure Organizationally and Marching*, Second Printing 1989, p. 25.

It should be pointed out that the group previously had a push-pull relationship with the authorities. A good example of this relationship occurred in the summer of 2000. After the group was prohibited from organizing private summer tents, its members took to the beaches that have large numbers of summer holiday visitors to express themselves—insisting on challenging in peaceful ways.

2. Justice and Development Party

The Justice and Development Party embodies the moderate current within the Moroccan Islamist movement. Perhaps this is because its path of formation differed from the other Islamist movements in Morocco. First of all, in the beginning it split from the Islamist Youth movement, which is a reflection of the divisions within the political Islamist movements in Morocco.[21] The Islamist Youth had been accused of the assassination of Omar Benjelloun, one of the leaders of the Socialist Union Party. Second, it decided to become a political party after splitting off. This embodies an adherence to necessities of the constitution that prevents the establishment of "political parties on the basis of religion, language, ethnicity, or region, and in general any basis of discrimination and violation of human rights."[22] This gave it a political framework to develop within, empowering the wing of Islamists, which is reflected in its renaming.

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21) This movement was established in February 1970 by Abdulkarim Mati'a alongside Abdullatif 'Adnan and Mohammed al-'Abdlawi al-Madghri and Ibrahim Kemal. It put in place a framework enabling it to find a foothold in the political arena through targeting three different groups: professors, workers, and students. In the second stage it established a group of associations: Association of Young People for Islamic Call, Association of Vanguard of Islam, Association of Islamist Graduates of Teachers' Schools, Association of Muslim Youth, etc.

22) The seventh section of the current constitution, which is consistent with previous constitutions.

This party endured an ordeal following the terrorist events witnessed in 2003 in Morocco. Some sought to pin responsibility on it, even seeking its permanent dissolution. This drove the party to retreat somewhat from its ideas and acclimatize with the necessities of the political action climate in Morocco. It worked gradually and avoided the fate of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria (whose landslide electoral victory triggered a civil war) by not nominating candidates in all electoral districts at once. It could be said that it chose this to enable its leadership to practice politics, especially on the level of parliament. In order to be accepted they chose gradualism, and introduced a division between the party and its religious arm, the Movement of "Unification and Reform."[23]

All of this has contributed to making the party take a wary stand toward the 2011 movement, at a time when some of its members demanded involvement in the marches seeking change. The party decided to leave the field open to individual stances. Some of the party's youth and leaders took to the streets to demonstrate for reform, whereas the party adopted a formal stance of non-participation.[24] This was a chance for the party to demonstrate that the ceiling

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23) The Movement of Unification and Reform calls for reform by "following the message of the prophets and affirming the elements of the good; reform on the levels of both individual and society empowers both; resistance of the elements of corruption and anything corrupting the individual and society." This differs from the party which competes via elections and seeks to practice political affairs. For more details see the website of the movement in Arabic: http://alislah.ma

24) Ben Kirane as secretary general of the Party of Justice and Development addressed the youth of the February 20 Movement, stating: "we do not stand against you; we have not clashed with you; we have not called for a boycott of your movement; likewise, we have not condemned it. We said only that we as a political party will not participate. Whoever wanted to participate personally has done so. Source: a forum organized by the periodical *al-Ayam* (*Days*) published number 465, March 5, 2011.

for its demands did not exceed demands for reform (that is, to demonstrate that it does not harbor hidden demands for more radical regime change).

3. Sufi Islam

Typically analysts are not concerned with this current, taking its public statements of eschewing the political in favor of the spiritual at face value. However, the Boutchichiya *zawiya*[25] *took to the streets in a special march during the 2011 reform movement. This phenomenon therefore demands research, making Sufi Islam in our opinion no different from other groups of political Islam, even if this "protest" march was undertaken solely to support the constitution.*

The zawiyas in Morocco emerged in the 14th century CE as religious foundations undertaking various social tasks. With the passage of time, their activities expanded and began to play different roles beyond proselytizing. However, their appearance in general is linked to some of what occurred in the region in terms of a reaction in the 18th century CE toward the increasing hard-line interpretation of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence).[26] Their role in Morocco throughout history is linked to what the political authorities permit them to do. When the state is strong, the *zawiya* retreat and limit their activity to proselytizing purely.[27] In times of

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25) Translator note: *zawiya* literally means corner, metaphorically meaning group; in North Africa it signifies a religious school, known elsewhere as a *madrasa*. Ahmed Boukari, The role of the Moroccan zawiya in supporting the Sunni madhhab (doctrinal school), Journal D'awa al-Haqq (Call of the Right), number 257, July 1986.

26) Georges Spillman, *Equisse d'histoire religeuse du Maroc confreries et zawayas*, université Mohamed V Rabat 2011 p. 279.

27) Typically zawiyas undertake other roles such as feeding, aiding, and protecting its followers and seeking to mediate between them and the authorities in case of problems between them. Sometimes the political authorities support them in their tasks. See Abduljalil Halim, "The Zawiya and Sufism: Return of Spirituality or Propensity

political crisis, the *zawiyas* are empowered and change their rhetoric to become more clearly political. While we cannot delve into detail as it is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that it is essential to focus on the Boutchichiya *zawiya* that today has in its ranks many of the men of the economic and political elite. Under its sheikh Hamza al-Qadari al-Boutchichiya, the group spread throughout Morocco and focused on teaching its form of mysticism to its followers. Its role, however, was not limited to the religious, instead organizing activities for the benefits of children and even women. The *zawiya* provided a website for communication with its followers in modern ways.[28] However, it should be noted that this *zawiya* did not come out in favor of the protest movement so much as it organized its own march supporting the constitution. This made some in Morocco see this *zawiya* as a tool of the authorities. It may have received a green light from the government in order to counterbalance the Justice and Charity Group.

It is important to note that the forces of political Islam in Morocco cannot be shorthanded to just these three groups. There are other movements like Ennahda (Renaissance) Party, al-Fadila (Virtue), and al-Badil al-Hadhari (The Civilizational Alternative). However, their extent within Moroccan society remains limited. In contrast, some limited groups have fallen under the spell of the rhetoric of the movements of political Islam active in the Middle East that accuse society of *takfir* (apostasy) and resort to violence against it. In fact, security reports clarify that many of these people are more than fascinated with this rhetoric and have moved beyond to begin planning terrorist attacks targeting

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for Political Influence (in Arabic)." Collection of articles under the title zawiyas in Morocco, Part One, p. 12, Publications of the Ministry of Culture, 2009.

28) Website of the zawiya is http://www.boutchichiya.com/

citizens and institutions.[29] In particular, some of them have previously fought in Syria or Iraq.[30] Confirmation of this is in the rising numbers of terrorist cells dismantled preemptively between 2013–2015.[31]

The relationship between the forces of political Islam and democratic transformation

In terms of the relationship between the forces of political Islam and democratic transformation in Morocco, it must be affirmed from the beginning that the majority of the forces present today in the political arena reject violence and refuse to adopt it as a choice that can be resorted to. However, this does not mean that all of them accept all of what democracy means.

The interests of Sufi political Islam in Morocco focus on proselytizing and spiritual renewal that ignores the body in favor of the heart, though "neither in shape nor inside nor outside in the meaning of not in sense... As spiritual renewal celebrates spiritual life and believe in the man, connecting the spirit and heart of the man; whereas it extricates one from the level of understanding of a creature and brings it to the position of humanity, in order to obtain the ethics

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29) 170 individuals were detained throughout the past four years on charges of plotting terrorist activities. 90 remain detained in 2015, which is a record number.

30) The painful terrorist attacks in France in the vicinity of the Stade de France in Paris have hung over Morocco, particularly since among the participants were young men of Moroccan origin that had previously frequented conflict zones in the Middle East. This made many states recognize that fighting terrorism cannot be accomplished by one state alone. It demands cooperation and the intensification of efforts, particularly in the fields of information and data sharing.

31) The number of these cells exceeded 20; some of them had obtained weapons and materiel for making explosives, and there were some that had reached advanced planning stages for terrorist operations.

of perfection."[32] As a result, it accords entirely with the Sufi school in the Arab world that distances itself from politics, raising fundamental problems. Spiritual renewal such as this does not have a political character, but it remains connected to its purposes. It operates in a framework that is determined to reject all that comes from outside.

However, in the case of Morocco, the Boutchichiya *zawiya*, which is considered the largest of the Sufi groups in the country, demonstrated on behalf of voting for the constitution. It could be a mistake, however, to arrive at the conclusion that the Sufis are in favor of democratic change.

As for the Justice and Charity Group, which is considered one of the most powerful groups in Morocco, it issued a paper certified by the group's council for political affairs about the subject. It is entitled "Loyalty to and modernization of the spirit of tyranny," and argues "that the methodology of the constitution, its shape, and its content are as far removed as possible from the principles of the Islamic religion: the principles of *shura* [consultation], freedom, justice, and dignity; it could not be farther removed from the values of real democracy. Will the decision makers be content to dispense with values that are a complete deviation [from Islam and democracy] and merely consecrate and continue tyranny?."[33]

This is further confirmed by the relationship with the political authorities, which is marked with tension. Until now, although the group has not obtained legal recognition, which would make it possible to coexist naturally in the political arena, this has not diminished its presence. In terms of the priorities adopted by the group, the first is to

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32) See Jemal Bouchma, "The Concept of Spiritual Renewal on the Website of the Group" http://www.boutchichiya.com.

33) Translator's note: punctuation added for clarity.
   The stance of the group was issued in a short pamphlet in response to the 2011 constitution.

harmonize the constitution with "principles of the Islamic religion." This can be understood as the group not paying any attention to separating religion from politics. Its second priority is "democratic values," which perhaps confirms once again that the type of rule that political Islamist movements would adopt does not differ from what is present now, as it would trend toward a type of regime that enables the political authorities to coexist between religion and politics.

The Justice and Charity group recognizes that democratic transformation has a special logic that allows it to coexist naturally, which is why it has not transformed into a political party. Of course, this imposes the softening or mellowing of its stances toward the existing elites in society that do not adopt the choice of the group or differ with them on sources of its ideology. It seems that the difference between the two elites is deep to a certain extent, wherein the logic of mutual exclusion prevails over both sides. More time is needed for their stances to change.

In contrast, the Justice and Development Party has emerged as a growing power in the world of political Islam, able to align itself with the path of democracy to the extent that it has become a key and powerful actor within organized party politics. The party has contested elections and aligned itself with the opposition, giving the movement a special place. It obtained an important majority of seats in parliament, making it the primary political power in the country qualified to form the first government after the enactment of the 2011 constitution. The power of the party lies in its organizational structure and its ability to communicate with different segments of society. The party's adoption of a policy of ground-level activity and establishment of associations is a crucial tool enabling it to exist across all areas of Morocco. It has guaranteed the possibility of developing relationships between the party wide swaths of voters.

The relationship of the forces of political Islam to other political actors

The forces of political Islam are linked to other political parties and civil society actors. These relations have not succeeded in establishing an atmosphere of continuous mutual understanding, and things remain subject to matters that are sometimes hard to or interpret.

First: the relationship with the political parties

The forces of political Islam are connected in various ways with other political parties, and the situation is different for each. Sufi political Islam, in the form of the Boutchichiya *zawiya,* has attracted several members of political parties, particularly for organizing the annual celebration that has become a pilgrimage for many from outside Morocco, which has become transformed into an international forum for Sufism.[34] But this relationship remains purely spiritual and limited to men. The apolitical stances of the *zawiyas* in Morocco in general has helped, as politicians do not see them as a threat, as it is not necessary to belong to the *zawiya* or attend its activities, beyond the spiritual rituals.[35]

The relationship of the Justice and Charity Group with the political parties is unclear. Except for some occasional tacit support from the Justice and Development Party, many parties that have adopted modernism ignore and avoid

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34) The annual season for the Boutchichiya zawiya is organized in the village of Madagh in the east of Morocco. The celebration coincides with the holiday of the birth of the prophet, and on its margins several Sufi activities occur, the most prominent of which is the night of remembrance in which the Quran is read and several religious chants are chanted until some of the followers lose consciousness.

35) The Boutchichiya zawiya is not alone in its acceptance by some politicians. Another model is embodied by the al-Tijaniya zawiya, whose influence extends into the heart of Africa. Ministers and politicians have made the pilgrimage to it and announced their affiliation without any resultant political commitment.

dealing with the group. The group suffers from difficulties on the regional level in several areas, making some parties view it with apprehension. Nevertheless, it has a major presence in some spaces, such as universities. This necessitates occasional coordination with its components, even if it does not have the guise of a union or association. Its relationship with parties of the Left remains tense. These parties have adopted a particular vision of modernity, which excludes religion from the field of politics. Perhaps the most prominent moment when the political parties met with the Justice and Charity Group since its founding[36] was when the group came out alongside the other vital forces in Morocco in what is termed the February 20, 2011 Movement that raised the slogan of reform.[37] This was the first time that the movement took to the streets alongside other political forces in a way that was not a one-time coincidence.

By contrast, the Justice and Development Party has been able to move from the idea of political Islam to a type of organization in total harmony with what is imposed on it in terms of political activity as enshrined under the law. In the blink of an eye, it transformed into the most powerful political party in Morocco. However, the September 4, 2015 local elections showed that its presence in government since 2011 has not won it more power or more ability to attract voters.

The Justice and Development Party has been able to lead the first government under the 2011 constitution. The Moroccan field of political parties is an experience in illogical pluralism that does not allow any one party to monopolize the government. The party must search for partners

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36) The association came out for demonstrations alongside the other political powers in Morocco, particularly in connection with the Palestinian issue, which Moroccans consider a collective issue in which there is no dispute over.

37) This movement adopted the slogan "the people want reform of the regime," reflecting but modifying the slogan "the people want the fall of the regime" adopted elsewhere in the Arab world.

in governmental work.[38] The logic of things necessitated, according to Mohammed 'Aabed al-Jabri, that the major parties accept working with the Justice and Development Party—because the context was different, and many elements could help the political parties recover their roles as the vanguard that they had performed in the past. Then the Socialist Union Party refrained from joining, arguing that the voters had not voted on this (meaning that the people wanted them in the opposition, not in government). This opened the door to several interpretations. However, the closest to the correct one in my opinion is that the Socialist Union cannot overcome the psychological barrier erected after the assassination of their leader Benjelloun by elements of the Islamist Youth, even if this stance weakens the party.

Meanwhile, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party rushed to join the government,[39] particularly because it has much in common with the Justice and Development Party. The Independence Party realized that it would be easy to serve the party inside the government. In response, the Justice and

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38) Previously, the Moroccan thinker Mohammed 'Aabed al-Jabri had suggested that all political forces unite in a historic bloc, joining even the Islamists, in order to move toward democracy. However, some progressive forces rejected this, and argued that an alliance with Islamists is a red line, even if they are together on the side of the opposition.

39) Followers of the Istiqlal party link the appearance of the political party in an organized form to the presentation of a document [declaring] independence in 1944, which is considered the first document presented by nationalist forces to the colonial authorities. Several representatives demanded independence and not reform at the time. It is important to note that some leaders of the party when it was first organized had been in secret organizations that were called "zawiyas," a name which offered religious legitimacy. Perhaps this was a result of the fact that some had been graduates of the University of Al Quaraouiyine, which endowed them with a religious culture. For more details on this point it is possible to visit the website of the party: http://istiqlal.info/

Development Party welcomed their participation, conceding several important ministerial portfolios such as finance, as well as the presidency of the parliament. The Independence Party held a national conference at which Hamid Shabat assumed the position of secretary general, marking the arrival of a new generation to the center of decision-making. Astounding all, the party then held a conference for its parliament in which it announced its exit from the government in order to join the opposition. It then launched barbs of criticism at the government, describing its leader as descended from the movements of political Islam. Things then deteriorated, with accusations exchanged between the opposition and the government, such as describing the leader of the now opposing party as a traitor agent in service of the Mossad (Israel's external intelligence agency), or of being connected with Da'ish. The elections on September 4, 2015, made this situation improve somewhat, particularly after one of its leaders stood for the presidency of the second chamber.[40] If one of the components of the opposition denounces this to the surprise of many, this would open the door to guesses attempting to understand what is happening behind the scenes in Moroccan party politics.[41]

The arrival of Ben Kirane, descended from the womb of political Islam, confirmed for the forces of the Left in the Morocco the difficulty of unification. The Progress

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[40] The matter is connected to Abdulsamad Qiuh, who was unsuccessful in becoming president, despite the Justice and Development Party voting for him. Hakim Benshemas of the Party of Authenticity and Modernity won the position.

[41] The Istiqlal Party was compensated for in government by the centrist National Rally of Independents Party. However, since the ascendance of Salah al-Din Mizwar to its leadership, the party has abandoned its centrism and become entrenched, whether in government or in opposition, the latter of which has made it hard to adapt to the current political climate.

and Socialism Party,[42] which represents communism in Morocco, endeavored to accept participation in the government headed by an Islamist party, from the basis of pragmatism, as it envisioned being empowered as a party within the government.[43] This attracted heavy criticism on the part of some of its members and from other leftist parties. However, the leadership did not heed this after it became clear that the objectors to working with Islamist were just a small minority.

The recent local elections confirmed that this party is the most committed in its stances toward the Islamist Justice and Development Party. Its behavior has given meaning and ethical value to political work. The recent elections made it clear that the leftist party was able to find common ground to work with the Islamist party, such that both of them benefited. This is the opposite of the other political parties, which argued that they would be less effective at solving problems inside the governing alliance. The Party of Socialism and Progress has announced plans to continue its alliance with the Justice and Development Party after the next elections in the fall of 2017.

The relationship with civil society

Civil society in its various components has experienced consistent growth, and its relations with the forces of political Islam vary in Morocco. The associations that work in developmental fields usually do not have any problems with

42) The Party of Progress and Socialism is the heir to the Communist Party which emerged in 1943 and was officially recognized in 1974. It has abandoned communist modes since 1995, preempting a ban of the party by judicial decree.

43) The regional and local elections on September 4, 2015, confirmed that the party had achieved tangible progress on the level of elections. It was able to find a foothold inside rural areas that had previously been monopolized by the Istiqlal Party and the Popular Movement Party.

them. Their first priority is searching for funding for their
projects, which of course are not abundant in many govern-
mental sectors in Morocco (some of which are headed by
Justice and Development Party ministers). The same goes
for local groups and even some international organizations.

By contrast, there are groups dedicated to raising atten-
tion to issues of rights. They are linked to some of the politi-
cal parties, generally on the Left. They do not look content-
edly on Islamists and do not trust what they are doing, such
that they may seize the first chance to harass them. This is at
a time when the ministry tasked with the relationship with
parliament and civil society has launched an initiative envi-
sioning a closer relationship with civil society and new rules
structured through a participatory approach encompassing
the entire country. Some of the activities that belong in the
majority to the Left have named this the Rabat Dynamic
(Dynamique in French), which published an announcement
known as the Rabat Call (Appel in French) to Democratic
Associations, calling in its conclusion to:

"Establish a national dialogue aiming to formulate
collective suggestions for comprehensive reform, strength-
ening freedoms and consecrating the independence of
the collective movement. The holding of comprehensive
consultations to enrich these suggested topics is also called
for, and to put a strategy and a working plan in place in
the future for convening a national debate for the collective
democratic movement, to demand the adoption of laws and
regulations that are tangible and sufficient to root the rule
of law and consecrate the role of associations as natural and
essential actors in democratic development."[44]

The same thing also applies to the Moroccan Association
for Fighting Clandestine Abortion that advocates about
this issue—when at the same time the Ministry of Health

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44) It is possible to view the complete announcement at the following
     link: http://www.dynamiqueappelrabat.org

is organizing forums about it as well. All concerned parties participated in these events, which led to monarchical intervention in order to converge the views of the different parties.

The relationship with the political authorities

The monarchy holds a special place in the Moroccan constitution.[45] It can be considered to be on a higher level of authority that is not subject to the logic of ballot boxes and is not affected by election results. While the constitution of 2011 expanded the powers of both the prime minister and parliament, the balance remained tilted in favor of the monarchy, which had held power since independence as the sole effective political institution. The Justice and Charity Group's relationship with the monarchy[46] since the reign of Hassan II has been marked by resorting to giving advice as a means of addressing the political authorities. As is the case throughout the Arab world, the monarch is not subject to public criticism and does not need to accept the opinion of others. It is not like an ordinary political party that has to accept competition and share legitimacy with other parties.

For the Justice and Development Party that leads the government and has a comfortable parliamentary plurality, its relationship with the monarchy until now continues without notable problems. Perhaps this is what has made the party continue leading the government since emerging from the ballot boxes, even with the possibility of its coalition dissolving after the Indepedence Party's withdrawal from the coalition.

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45) The Moroccan constitution dedicates an entire section, composed of 19 parts, to the monarchy.

46) Yassin sent his letter entitled "Islam or deluge" to Hassan II; and he sent a letter to King Mohammed VI titled "To whom it may concern."

Horizons of transformation in Morocco in the future and the role the forces of political Islam may play

Legislative elections under the 2011 electoral law will be held on October 7, 2016. It seems that the forces of political Islam represented in the Justice and Development Party were able to acclimate within the democratic atmosphere and they could obtain a comfortable majority, which was again confirmed by the local elections held in September 2015. They are an organized political party in its modern form capable of surmounting challenges. They provide the elite with tools to communicate politically and can adopt transparent political rhetoric. They can convince, which is better than using fear as a political tool. The continuation of the series of reforms may damage the interests of some segments of society accustomed to the support of the party, as they will change the relationship between the monarchy and the party. This is at a time when the forces of the Left have fallen to an extent previously unimaginable, considering how far behind the Socialist Union Party (that led the experiment in the rotation of power in 1994) has fallen as it struggles to find leadership that is internally accepted by its members. Even the alliances that had been accepted in the past have weakened today. Perhaps its interest is no longer in winning the coming elections, as much as it is to seek a respectable presence in the incoming parliament in line with the historically significant roles the party has played.

The Independence Party is currently trying to find its way haphazardly after its poorly calculated exit from the government. The party could be forced by the Justice and Development Party to return to the government, something that could raise deep questions about the elites of the party connected with the leadership and the nature of the decisions they take. Will the party succeed in presenting itself as a dependable partner in the leadership of governing alliances?

In this framework, it seems that solving the problem of the Justice and Charity Group and providing it legitimacy to work could give the political space more dynamism, but this of course assumes it would undergo a number of reforms that would be difficult to undertake today. It may be possible when a different elite reach leadership positions capable of reading the situation from multiple angles and realizing that most of the theories formulated by their deceased leader Abdelsalam Yassin would be difficult to enact in reality, thanks to the difference between thought and practice.

Perhaps the real problem does not lie today in political life, which has become constrained and framed by the constitution that governs political actors. Even the Salafist leadership that were in prison undertook revisions of their ideologies on multiple levels, with some preparing to contest politics through elections and party organization. However, the increasing numbers of young people who desire to travel Iraq or Syria to fight, or those who went there and returned believing in a violent ideology and accusing society of apostasy —highlights that the real danger that threatens all is that which bears the name of terrorism.

The Moroccan experience in the field of democratic transition confirmed that it is possible to produce transformation in the Arab world within a framework of continuity—far from the hasty rapid change that believes in a break in politics completely separate from the dynamics of society. Democracy is the logical result of a slow accumulation. But it must grant all ideologies, currents, and powers the legitimacy to exist.

AL-QAEDA WAS INJECTED WITH THE BA'ATH STRAIN… AND THUS BECAME DA'ISH

Hazem al-Amin[*]

In a meeting in the Jordanian capital of Amman that brought me together with two sheikhs of "jihadist Salafism" Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi ('Assam Taher al-Barqawi) and Abu Qatada ('Omar Mahmud 'Othman), both of the two men seemed aghast at the level of violence practiced by the organization of the so-called Islamic State, which they both refer to as Da'ish. It is worth noting that the two sheikhs, both of whom have Palestinian origins, are not known for their moderation or economy in calling for fighting since the beginning of the "jihad" in Afghanistan, which al-Barqawi visited at the time. In the 1990s in Algeria, Abu Qatada was a mufti of the jihad there. Al-Maqdisi's son was killed fighting in Iraq. Regarding Syria, Abu Qatada's son

was arrested in Amman on charges of recruiting young men to fight there.

On this day, al-Maqdisi had taken on the role of mediating between Da'ish and the Jordanian government over the issue of the Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh. He had been sent as an envoy to Da'ish in the Syrian city of al-Raqqah in order to organize the exchange of al-Kasabeh for several the leaders of the organization and their relatives, among them the Iraqi women Sajida al-Rishawi, sister to one of the "emirs" of Da'ish, who had intended to carry out a suicide bombing at a hotel in Amman but failed in the attempt, while her husband succeeded in blowing himself up.

Da'ish burned al-Kasabeh alive after less than a week after capturing him. They did not announce this, despite videotaping the burning. al-Maqdisi muttered complaints about this, as well as the undocumented information that reached Jordanian Intelligence about his execution. But Abu Muhammad was sent to al-Raqqah to bring other news. The organization seemed interested in the Jordanian offer of an exchange, and the envoy returned from al-Raqqah optimistic. After a few short days, the organization broadcasted that it had burned the pilot, at a time when al-Maqdisi believed that the exchange was on the verge of being accomplished.

"Those who proceeded with burning al-Kasabeh are the Ba'athists of Da'ish, and not its experts in *shari'a* (Islamic law)," al-Maqdisi told me at this meeting. He pointed out that he met with sheikhs in the organization residing in al-Raqqah, and not military and security officials. The sheikhs, like himself, were not aware of the execution of al-Kasabeh by immolation.

Those who al-Maqdisi called "the Ba'athists of the organization" are Iraqi army officers who assumed field command of the organization in Iraq and Syria. The man was right when he said that the violence of Da'ish involves Ba'athism.

And what he meant by "the Ba'ath" is less the long-ago established party and its echo in the contemporary party; rather, to al-Maqdisi's knowledge, "Ba'ath" means the experience obtained from service in the Iraqi army and intelligence services under Saddam Hussein. It also signifies the types of violent relations between clans and between Iraqi regions. This violence also encompasses relations among the tribe and specifically among its most vulnerable components, their women.

Al-Maqdisi also said to me on that day that Da'ish had never wanted to exchange for Sajida al-Rishawi, the woman that the Salafist sheikh had previous believed they wanted to recover even more than the men. After mentioning the claim that Da'ish was uninterested in the fate of al-Rishawi, al-Maqdisi followed up with a tale of the woman that had been sent to Amman by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2005 in order to execute a suicide operation, indicating that the woman was tasked with this operation after she had been clearly disowned by her family, and by her brother, who was close to al-Zarqawi.

Al-Rishawi was sent to a task with her husband whom she had been "contracted to" just days before the operation. He blew himself up, and she did not succeed. Researchers who specialize in suicide attacks suggest that most failed attempts are because the individuals do not want to commit suicide.

But what is certain is that the family of Sajida sent her to kill herself and to kill others. She was from a family of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, Zarqawi's organization) supporters, and her brother was the "emir of al-Anbar." Her other brothers were active in the organization as well. Al-Rishawi had a troubled personal history, which is what forced the decision of her family to dispose of her—a blessed things in clan consciousness, especially since her death would be invested in a "jihadi" act.

There is no doubt that the failure of al-Rishawi to blow herself up was behind the bitterness and sense of shame in the thoughts of her brothers, the sons of the al-Qaeda branch of the al-Anbar clan of Abu Risha. Their sister failed in the task they had sent her to do. Furthermore, al-Zarqawi himself—who had hastened to eulogize her as a "martyr" before learning that she had fled from the hotel after her partner and "her husband" blew himself up—was also afflicted with deep disappointment. How could the emir of the organization that transfixed the world eulogize "a martyr" who had not achieved martyrdom?

The shame multiplied here. The sister had been sent in order to die and bury stories of her mental disorder, so that she could become a "martyr." But rather than die, she became a prisoner in the hands of the men of the Jordanian *mukhabarat* (intelligence and security services). What shame, what ignominy, what disgrace is this? Whoever saw the face of Sajida in court during her trial in Amman could gather much of this from the images. There is no doubt that her brothers dwarfed her in her mind, from her glances during the trial, the silence, and the few short indecisive phrases she uttered in the courtroom—all suggesting that the tragedy behind her private tragedy was her failure to press the detonator. Fear of what goes on outside the courtroom—that was the desert stretching from ar-Rutbah to ar-Ramadi.[1]

The story of Sajida is well suited as an entry point for examining the Zarqawi dimension of Da'ish. His organization, known in Arabic as "al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Tributaries," (which is the Arabic phrase referring to Mesopotamia, which itself means the land between the

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1) Translator's note: The Iraqi town of ar-Rutbah is located in al-Anbar province, and its name is derived from the word for moisture or humidity. ar-Ramadi is the largest city of the same province, located at a strategic crossroads into Jordan on the Euphrates River. Ramadi is the adjectival form of ash, meaning gray or ashen.

two rivers) appeared to form an independent personality from the parent al-Qaeda organization at the time of al-Zarqawi's leadership in Iraq—that is, beginning in 2004, and continuing until the organization officially distanced itself from the parent organization after 2011 (years after al-Zarqawi's death). Abu Musab had cut his group off organizationally from the global leadership of al-Qaeda. Correspondence uncovered between "the emir of Iraq" and Osama Bin Laden revealed the disputes with and reservations of the leadership in Waziristan on the level of violence that the organization reached in terms of targeting Shiite civilians, and the mosques of "the offenders against the Sunnis." These disagreements were demonstrated by a letter of "advisement" by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi from his jail in Amman to al-Zarqawi. The letter raised an enormous uproar in jihadist Salafist circles in Jordan and in many of the areas where the current has proliferated, causing a split that resembles to a great extent the division that reigns over the current today—between supporters of Da'ish and supporters of al-Nusra Front.

The features of "Zarqawi-ism" of the newborn organization bear all the hallmarks that distinguish Da'ish from al-Qaeda today. Al-Zarqawi was an East Bank Jordanian from the Beni Hassan clan. He was weakly connected to its sheikhs and muftis. In his "emirate," the organization prized the values of force, violence, and bloodshed. Abu Musab scorned the elite of al-Qaeda and connected his organization through blood to the sectarian divisions that would be fed by the Iraqi civil war, as well linking it to clan networks that Saddam Hussein before him had invested in during the last years of his reign in Iraq. All of these new elements in the work of al-Qaeda laid the groundwork for a violent transition from a stage of "objection" to one of establishing a political institution in the form of a "caliphate."

The issue of the state is at the crux of Da'ish's operations, which is the opposite of al-Qaeda. After the first years of "jihad" in Iraq, it named itself the "Islamic State in Iraq." Experience in managing the regions under its control accumulated, and the organization benefited from the wide-ranging experience possessed by its new recruits, particularly former officers of the Iraqi military. "Management by savagery," control of recalcitrant areas, and controlled chaos; these expressions are contained in the literature of the group and practiced as means of rule and a way to "establish the caliphate." This meant that Da'ish provided a stringent regime of punishment and security as well as services. It did not identify itself with jihadist Salafism, that is, with its sole organizational goal being "jihad."

It seems that many of the emirs of al-Nusra were defectors from the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda when it transformed into Da'ish. They tried to invest their Da'ishite experiences into the regions that they transformed into their own emirates. For example, the emir of al-Nusra in Dara'a, the Jordanian Iyad al-Tubasi (Abu Jelibib) tried to establish what he called *Dar al-'Adl* (a house of justice), which were courts and schools to manage the regions under his control. He enlisted in his experiment battalions from the Free Syrian Army and Ahrar al-Sham. According to a Salafist activist, this led to the failure of the experiment, since sovereignty requires that there be only one ruler, and the implementation of orders requires a package of conditions not available to the authorities.

The comparison reveals the major dilemma wracking al-Nusra, recognized by the international leadership of the al-Qaeda organization, especially as the scales of competition tipped in favor of Da'ish: its increasingly limited ability to address its audience in the narrow sectarian terms that have divided the region in its entirety in two. The sectarian enmity propogated by Da'ish is its spearhead and the only factor capable of unifying both its fighters and its followers.

Its state and "caliphate" are effective in drawing support, in effect decisively demonstrating its superiority over al-Qaeda in its Syrian formulation (that is, al-Nusra Front).

Qatiba, a Jordanian jihadist from the city of al-Salt, says that the "State" organization is a state and a caliphate, whereas al-Nusra is a "jihadist" project without a future. The young man sees the announcement of "the caliphate" as compelling Muslims to pledge obedience to the competent caliph, even if his personality has not convinced them. Leaders of the Jordanian Salafist jihadist current point to the haste of Da'ish's proclaimed leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in announcing his caliphate in order to form a significant challenge to his rivals, since it places them in front of the challenge of "completing the jihad." This move has revealed a significant gap in the ideological toolkit of al-Nusra, thereby comparing "the spiteful jihad" of al-Nusra unfavorably to the "the jihad of empowerment" of Da'ish. Many new jihadists find themselves allured by the caliphate that Da'ish offers.

The situation is that al-Nusra remains the mere idea of "jihad," which Da'ish makes look trite through its project of the state and the caliphate. This reveals another dilemma, represented in that Da'ish is the true call while al-Qaeda is unrealistic. It should be noted that the model of the al-Qaeda fighter on the whole is fraught with the values professed today by Da'ish even more so than what is offered by al-Nusra: absolute violence, force, and effectiveness are the elements of the ideological preparation that jihadist Salafism has adopted as its cry and its appeal to the consciences of its recipients in the mosques.

Da'ish also was an Iraqi organization before it became Syrian or anything else. Despite the fact that al-Zarqawi was not Iraqi, the Iraqization of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia occurred in his time. Iraqization here means that its Iraqi concerns dictated upon it an Iraqi agenda. Aspirations to

impose control over the regions of Iraq in turn imposed the necessity of dealing with Iraqi local factors, especially in the provinces of al-Anbar, the north, and some of the central regions. These regions form a kind of vacuum where it was easy for the group to invest itself and no longer seem strange, foreign, or removed from the sectarian and clan structure of the area.

Here we must return to what was recently mentioned about these regions and the cities in which Da'ish roams. The Syrian desert covers enormous areas whose people are not linked to their states, except through scattered military and security bases. The towns of the al-Anbar desert alongside the highway appear to those traveling by land from Baghdad to the borders as distant, dusty towns—disconnected except by the abundant sands. If you discover that a friend has his origins from there, you will endeavor to stare at him, attempting to find something in his gaze toward the towns, but you will not succeed, as you know nothing about these towns. The Jordanian city of al-Zarqa also fits well into this same vacuum. Al-Zarqa is not far from Amman, but it is like the Iraqi towns alone in the desert—cut off from the capital, its values, and its architecture. Al-Zarqa is even more congested and overcrowded than Amman, making it easier for the dusty vacuum to draw one away from the overpopulated city and toward the nearby borders, which hundreds of the young men from the city have crossed in order to join Da'ish.

When the bloodthirsty regimes in Damascus and Baghdad lost their influence, this vacuum was discovered. Nothing connects these cities except the dust of the tottering state and the rotting regime. Even the clans that the state bequeathed were exhausted, staggering, and fighting among themselves.

Here precisely lies the danger of Da'ish and its power; the reality of the vacuum has planted firm roots in the long

decades of the state's absence. The vacuum was born of the corrupt relations between a domineering state and the groups it left in the dust of its cities.

Thus, discussion of the preludes paving the way for the birth of the Da'ish organization must also return briefly to the stage preceding the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, specifically the 1990s. Saddam Hussein at the time felt that the Ba'ath no longer befit the identity of the regime, so he started what he called the "Faith Campaign," beginning in the army specifically, the institution Saddam knew as the nerve center of the regime. In this era, "Islam" became a source of authority, trickling down to the officers of the Iraqi army. Izzat al-Douri came to prominence as the one assuming the task of moving the regime from Ba'athism to Islamism.

Today, the former officers of the Iraqi army form the nucleus of the operational leadership of Da'ish. Even the "Caliph" al-Baghdadi, who was not a military officer, is considered marginal in the leadership due to his lack of military roots, to say nothing of the other weaknesses from which the man suffers that reinforce the conviction that his leadership of the organization is symbolic — that he is weak in his religious credentials, and that he is a teacher of Quranic recitation, and unfit for anything other than reciting the Qur'an.

Perhaps returning to the journey of the former Iraqi officers is the best way to discuss the development of Da'ish. These men have been pursued by the Coalition Forces, which gives some idea of the position of these officers in the organization and their roles, which are much more important than the role of the religious sheikhs.

The investigation conducted by the German magazine *Der Spiegel* found that a former officer of the Iraqi military under Saddam was "the most important strategist" in the Da'ish organization. When the group took over the north of Syria, it

revealed the role of the officers who had surged into the Sunni cities of Iraq and then went beyond the borders into Syria. The magazine said that the officer, Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi (known by the name al-Haji Bakr) and a former member of the military council of the "Islamic State" organization, were killed by fighters of the Syrian opposition in Tell Rifaat in the north of Syria in January 2014.

The man was a former Iraqi Air Force Intelligence colonel in the Saddam Hussein era, according to the magazine, which stated that it based its information on documents handwritten by Bakr himself, and that it had obtained them after long negotiations with Syrian opposition fighters in Aleppo.

The magazine noted that the documents show a specific program for establishing a caliphate in the north of Syria, planting espionage cells in the cities and villages, and using assassination and kidnapping "as a prelude to assuming power" in order to decapitate the local leadership before moving in formally.

The magazine also reported that Bakr had become unemployed after the decision to dissolve the Iraqi army by L. Paul Bremer, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq in 2003, after the fall of the Ba'ath regime. Bakr met with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and then Bakr was jailed for two years between 2006–2008 in American prisons, Abu Ghraib in particular. After that, Bakr was cut off from the Islamists. In 2010, he planned "this important strategy" as Der Spiegel described it, with a group of former Iraqi officers to appoint Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the head of the "Islamic State" in order to give a religious dimension to the organization.

The magazine quoted a witness saying that Bakr "was never an Islamist," but a nationalist, "using religion as a means to justify the end." It added, "he was sharp witted, firm, and adept at math."

Another former officer in the Iraqi army died in an airstrike by the international coalition on a Da'ish position in Mosul, Colonel Fadl al-Hiari, nicknamed Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who was described as the second highest ranking person in the terrorist organization. If we wanted to use the technique of hashtagging, borrowing from today's digital journalism to help Google searching for the man, then we would write the keyword this way: #'aqid_da'ish_'iraq_bokah.[2] Phrases like this one have become the fundamental keys to searching for the "State" organization. If terms like Da'ish and Iraq are self-evident, then *'aqid* (colonel) needs to be looked at closely, while Bokah needs only a short explanation: it is the name of the prison in which former Iraqi army officers met. There the connection was made among them that would subsequently become Da'ish.

As for the story of *'aqid*: observation takes us to the truth that most of the leadership of the organization are former colonels, which is a rank that no one in the leadership hierarchy ever exceeded: a colonel in the Iraqi *mukhabarat,* a colonel in the Republican Guard, and a colonel in the Iraqi special forces. They were colonels at the moment of the collapse of the Iraqi army and the announcement of its dissolution in 2003. This was no coincidence at all. The age of a colonel in the army at that time ranged between 40 and 50 years old, and they were the middle managers of the leadership that gave out the orders originating from Saddam Hussein, under the transformations of the last decade of his rule that changed the military from the basis of the regime apparatus to the social, sectarian, and clan surroundings. In that decade, many changes raged in the mind of Saddam, who was besieged and exhausted, crowned by the "Faith Campaign" that injected a dose of Islamism into the "soul of Ba'athism" and desert clanism into the regime's professed "pan-Arabism."

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2) Translator's note: 'Aqid is the transliteration of colonel, to reflect the fact that this keyword search is done in Arabic.

Therefore, the leadership of Da'ish composed of colonels of the dissolved Iraqi army was not entirely Ba'athists. Ba'athism had touched some of their minds, but it had not devoured them entirely. They would have been in their 30s when Saddam Hussein started to reorient his Ba'athism toward Islamism in the 1990s. This is something that has not been explored until now in the explanation of the "State" organization, which is its pan-Arabism. This is not something built mentally or ideologically, but a mix of feelings and moods, fantasies and delusions, added together by the direct experience of history. All of this is accompanied by conspiratorial thinking capable of transforming into the most extreme forms of violence in an instant.

The Arabism of these colonels is not unique in the history of Arabism, which has brought violence to wherever it touched. The Syrian coups in the 1950s, and the arrival of the Ba'ath to power in Iraq through a series of lynching operations are two models of it. Nasserist Arabism is not exempt, in its Egyptian experience, from doses of violence, if less spectacular.

But the theater of Arabism in which Da'ish acts is more typical in the endorsement of the relationship of the terrorist organization to the values of Arabism. This appeared in the Ba'ath consciousness based on a structure of a sectarian and clan-based kind of tribalism, which was sharpened after the defeat of Saddam in Kuwait and the dose of Islamism. This was then followed by consecutive defeats that drove the original tendency toward conspiratorial thinking in its extreme. This is what it meant to be a former colonel in the Iraqi military; this is the nucleus of Da'ish. Attempts to divert the view away from this fact are no longer beneficial. Exposure of the Arabism of Da'ish is likely provocative to many for whom time has not yet shaken their Arabism. Da'ish is Salafist jihadist, Da'ish is a conspiracy, Da'ish is the moment of a major collapse. All of these descriptions may

be true, but Da'ish is also us: our values, our experience, our violence, and the patterns of our relationships. It brings us closer to ourselves and to the truth that what has corrupted us is a militaristic "Arabism" whose shadow we have lived under in recent decades.

When we think of Da'ish, it is necessary always to return to the moments of its founding, to the geography of its founding, and the sociology of its founding, found in the desert shared between Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. And former officers of the Ba'ath Party who were led in the beginning by a youth from the eastern desert of Jordan, and are now followed by thousands of volunteers pumped between the Syrian-Iraqi borders. And the Ba'ath were not alone in this desert. The values of the desert dwellers continue to feed the souls of their imaginations, at a time when the defenses of cities scattered across an enormous desert collapsed.

Here precisely lies the moment of divergence between jihadi Salafism and between the "State" organization. It is the divergence between Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, coming from "mosque-based jihadism," and his student Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, coming from "prison-based jihadism." The prison here is a type of "cultural" element of social experiences where the borders between jailer and prisoner do not exist. Al-Zarqawi, like al-Baghdadi, was an inmate. In jail they formed their "jihadism," an ideology bludgeoned into shape by the jailer and his violence. Yes, Da'ish is a conspiracy. Here we must return to the facts of its founding and clarify. The secrecy and opacity of the caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi make one feel that "his pledge of allegiance" is a Ba'athist event. This is because it looks like a coup similar to the coups of Syria and Iraq in the decades of the establishment of Ba'athist states in both. Officers of middling ranks seek to eliminate the obstacles before the progress of the caliphate, directing conspiracies and slandering their predecessors, until their

caliphate is stabilized. The story about the former Iraqi officer Haji Bakr who was killed close to Aleppo speaks to this: the man was a "nationalist," and not an Islamist. He built Da'ish in the rural hinterland of Aleppo by adopting the expertise gained in the Iraqi security apparatus. He did not stay at home praying. Nearly the same applies to Abu Muslim al-Turkmani. A military doctrine was formed, grafting equal parts of the spirit of Ba'athism, the violence of the desert clan, and the Islamism of Saddam Hussein's "Faith Campaign."

This triangle needs a vacuum caused by a series of collapses in order to establish its authority. Salafist jihadism has aided this doctrine by offering it a "*fiqh* (religious jurisprudence) of brutalization," that is, pouncing on society at the moment of its collapse and brutalizing it. Its authority is formed from the twin elements of collapse and brutality. This also takes us back, if less clearly, to the moments when the Ba'ath pounced on local societies themselves.

In discussing this from the perspective of the recipient, that is the city that collapses and whose people become brutalized, this harkens back to what Iraq witnessed in 2003 when the regime collapsed. But an authority formed at the moment of the collapse from the material of this collapse itself, and herein lies the diabolical genius of the officers of the Ba'ath.

The situation is that al-Qaeda was injected with the Ba'ath strain during the emirate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the real founding father of Da'ish. It is very beneficial to return to the book by researchers Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Haniya entitled: *The State Organization? The Sunni Crisis and the Conflict over Global Jihadism.* The book reviews at length al-Zarqawi's paternity of Da'ish and his unannounced separation from the parent organization. It is likewise beneficial to return to the Second Battle of Fallujah

in 2004, when al-Zarqawi tested the fighting experience of the Iraqi army and ascertained that there could be no "victory" without its officers, who had become unemployed after the disbandment of the Iraqi military.

The *Der Spiegel* investigation added further facts to this analysis, contending as well that Da'ish is the child of a second father as well: the Syrian Ba'ath that hosted Haji Bakr in Damascus throughout the years of the Iraqi "resistance." The organization, according to the German magazine, was no impious or ungrateful wayward son to its second father. It established relationships that were uncovered through the journalist's investigations. In analyzing the criminal structure of the organization, the journalist turns to Western comparables, especially the Nazi-era German intelligence services (the Gestapo). This however illustrates a shortcoming in the author's knowledge of the Ba'ath and in the type of authority established in both Iraq and Syria, and the difference between the two country's experiences.

The Ba'ath cracked down on al-Qaeda locally while employing it to serve its project in Iraq after Saddam's fall as well as in Syria after the revolution, in turn using al-Qaeda for its purposes. What resulted from this was the "cross-pollination" between the Ba'th and al-Qaeda that resulted in Da'ish. When we discuss the Ba'ath here, we mean the authoritarian expertise obtained through involvement in the machinery of the regime's violence in both of the two countries, since the Ba'ath in both were content in being a party apparatus that constructed hierarchies of loyalty toward the leader, his clan, and his sect.

But Da'ish also remains part of the collapse of the global regime and the collapse of modernity and the disintegration of its values. What emerges from this is the astounding Western acceptance of volunteering in this barbarous

organization. Here as well is the linkage of the organization with the values of technological progress and social media networks. Da'ish makes its image before it become reality. The organization realizes the power of this equation and has gained what it could from modern hardship.

Da'ish therefore has roots in the West, part of a network of roots forming the network, while differing from its brothers, the violent organization and jihadist Salafists. The Western branch is the dimension of spectacle and tragedy. Murder is filmed and the photos and video proliferate throughout the world. This becomes clearer when we learn that the documentation of killing intensifies it by giving it an epic depth, a role in the procession of the group. The terror and panic that the image leaves behind is its job. It preceded the conquest of Sinjar by collapsing its defense with ease, and it also preceded the invasion of the Syrian province of Deir Ezzor. The image has been made part of the bloody and criminal activity and it serves as entry point into the culture of jihadist Salafism. The al-Qaeda ideology of Bin Ladenism did not employ the massacre in its activity. Instead it censured al-Zarqawi for his excessive filmed massacres. If the latter was the one who initiated the time of massacre as a "jihadist technique," he was killed himself before it was transformed from the slaughter of individuals into the massacre of groups.

Da'ish is part Hollywood as well, or rather it has been able to transfer Hollywood's violent imagination to the level of reality. The British man with a London accent who slaughtered the American journalist James Foley was keen to leave a scene of filmed carnage that would leave behind terror like those of Hollywood movies. In fact, the propaganda videotaped by Da'ish a few months prior in Fallujah returned to film scenes of the city that were reshoots of other scenes that were shown by Hollywood in the film "The Search for Bin Laden."

The difference is that Hollywood is fiction and Da'ish is real. This is a monumental difference made by the non-Western roots of the bloodthirsty organization. Hollywood addresses the impossible and unrealistic in the Western consciousness, while Da'ish makes the impossible possible. Herein lies its attractiveness for some of the Western malcontents coming from Europe to Syria and Iraq. For them, Da'ish gives the opportunity for them to transform theoretical fiction into real violence. This is the same equation motivating violent crime in American cities, from the serial killer to the school shooter.

But Da'ish brought in other roots of violence. It combined a tendency for violence and for killing from all sources. It is violence stripped of any value or meaning, violence for nothing other than violence. It seized from the Ba'ath its violence and propensity for killing, from the clans their impulses for vendettas and bad blood, and from the desert mercilessness and toughness. Its roots were struck solely through actions. This is the end of "bloody modernity," as a result of borrowing everything without discrimination. It borrows from the West the modernity of the killing machine, from the clan its reins, and from the Ba'ath their grudges. Then it became accustomed to killing the West with its own machine, striking the clan with its sons, and executing Ba'ath officers that fought alongside them without becoming part of them.

This is the identity composed of high explosive components that generates all this death: the violence of jihadism combined with ultraconservative Salafism. The marriage between these two components brought about al-Qaeda. It is clear that Da'ish is another issue. The violence of modern Iraq is part of this identity, the marginalized clans as well as sectarian grudges, all competing and contributing to the violence of this identity. The Da'ish identity has no

past, though this is not meant in the sense of denying the cultural and historical origins of this violence. Instead, the past in Da'ish's identity is irreconcilable and incapable of coexisting with itself.

Then there is something resembling the suicide of the wicked, where one going to his death wants others to die more painfully, to pollute the conscience of the survivors with scenes of their impending death. Da'ish claims no more than that. It does not want anyone to be convinced by or accept it. It wants fear, pure and simple. The Yazidis must be killed because they have been Yazidis since before they were born. There is no time for them to be spared from death, so on the way from Mosul to Erbil all must die. This did not occur according to a plan, it happened because reality can be transformed into imagination, and not the opposite. The testimonies and stories of the survivors among the Yazidis about the massacre make one feel that the cliché "fiction come to life" has been inverted, to become "life has become fiction."

It is to this extent that Da'ish appears unreal. The gradual transformation from the filmed individual murders begun by al-Zarqawi to the filmed mass murders has been accompanied by an intensification of the Hollywood imagination, employing hatred of and from the environment. All of this produces real-life death that is beyond belief.

If Da'ish in this meaning is unreal, it is also present in all of us. This is because we live in a time when we are exposed to it and that awakens the unreal in ourselves. This wretched unconscious that our miserable societies are incapable of treating its fissures. Da'ish, as events have revealed, is not a mentality formed in a mosque or from experience or conviction, but the surprising awakening to old, unrecognized misery. Suddenly a man finds in himself an element of Da'ish. Suddenly it is discovered that the

Yazidis "worship fire" and that his Christian neighbors in Mosul are "people of the book" that must pay a special tribute or convert to Islam. In this "surprise" lies the bloody savagery of Da'ish, and in this "suddenly" lies its unreality, in that it does not extend to anything we know about ourselves — it lies in what we do not know about ourselves.

As for those Western brats that came to volunteer for Da'ish that are filming us with their cameras, killers and killed alike, they have come to participate in the scene thinking it was a Hollywood fantasy come to life.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND SUMMARIES

*Hassan Krayem*_

In conclusion, thanks must be given to the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs and to its director, the Honorable Dr. Tarek Mitri, its head of research Dr. Nasser Yassin, and to their entire working team for their great efforts that have provided the conditions for the success of this workshop on all logistical, organizational, media, and academic fronts. We hope that this workshop will be the start of further cooperation between the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy and the institute, in order to produce knowledge based on cooperation and interaction between academics on one side, and activists on the other—joining together theoretical knowledge with the practical knowledge emerging from fieldwork and experience on the ground, complementing and completing the work of both sides.

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* Hassan Krayem is a lecturer in political science at the American University of Beirut.

The Arab Network for the Study of Democracy has worked since 2007 studying the subject of democracy in the Arab world. Since 2011, the network decided to dedicate its efforts to observing, documenting, and analyzing the political, economic, and social developments in the region, in the wake of the uprisings and revolutions calling for freedom and dignity in several countries. The network published several case studies to assess the developments and to analyze their dimensions, beginning with a book: *The Arab Spring: Revolutions for Deliverance From Authoritarianism: Case Studies*, published in Beirut in 2013 in Arabic, then translated and published in 2014 in English.[1] This was followed with three policy papers, one on the region as a whole, and two reviewing the conditions of Syria and Tunisia in depth.[2]

This workshop has been organized in the same general context to attempt to answer the main research question: what has happened and what are the results five years after the launch of an Arab movement toward freedom?

The difficulties, complexities, and failures that have faced this movement toward freedom in several of the countries of the region raise further research questions regarding the causes of the failures, setbacks, and complications that have resulted in conflicts and divergent outcomes, from civil wars to destructive regional and international conflicts.

In order to limit the subject, the workshop used three tracks in order to analyze recent developments in the region since late 2010.

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1) Edited by Hassan Krayem and translated by Jeffrey Reger.

2) Ahmad Karoud, policy paper: Tunisia. January 2015. "Does Political Polarization Pave the Way for Establishing Pluralistic Political Systems; or, is it merely the prelude to ever-worsening power struggles?"; Iyad Abdullah, Policy Paper: Syria. May 2015. "Syria: Four Years From the Start of the Revolution."; Hassan Krayem, Policy Paper: "Five Years after the Arab Spring: What Happened?" October 2015.

First: the effects of internal social and societal divisions, such as ethnicity, sectarianism, and regionalisms.

Second: the effects of the roles played by the armed forces, whether military or security services, in the scheme of things.

Third: the effects of the roles played by the forces of political Islam in all its varieties and differences.

The workshop focused on reviewing the case of the countries where events had a significant impact both domestically and regionally, which thereby changed the situation in the region as a whole.

The effects of internal social or societal divisions such as ethnic, sectarian, and regional

Samir Franjieh's paper put in place a conceptual framework to understand the situation of social divisions in the region, focusing on elaborating the cultural dimension. Cosmopolitan societies are distinguished by their diversity and pluralism, which must not only be affirmed, but also preserved in order to manage these divisions wisely. To quote his paper:

> What is simplified in popular discourse as the "identity" of the individual is in fact a complex array of internal personal identifications and external categorizations by others. Identity in fact contains multiple, overlapping, and nested affiliations (familial, professional, national, sectarian, cultural, individual, etc.). Some of these affiliations are defined by the history of the existing groupings in society. Others can be traced to the natural features of the country (such as internal geographical divisions between coast, mountain, and plains) in addition to other factors. But "identity" is not a random, arbitrary collection or accumulation of divergent affiliations. Rather, it is a sort of précis or short summary of

the individual personality or character. The individual will not move from a smaller scale affiliation to a larger scale one without reassurance that there is a place for her or him in the broader context. At the same time, the individual needs reassurance that adding additional layers of identification within a larger grouping will not make her or him lose the preexisting framework, that is, the understanding of who she or he is.

The reduction of "identity" to just one of its component parts leads to the creation of an unnatural division between the different circles of affiliations of an individual, and thereby weakens the cohesion and complementariness of the individual's character. Crises and pressures can drive the individual to disaffiliate and find refuge in either a broader or narrower circle of "identity."[3]

This demands the acknowledgement of equality in rights and duties of equal citizens on the basis of citizenship, regardless of other affiliations. The Lebanese experience offers proof of this:

Recognition of diversity requires the formulation of policy that guarantees coexistence among the diverse elements, recognizes both what is shared among and what is particular to each group, and links these groups together in citizenship and the diversity.[4]

The cultural dimension of the project of democratic transformation emerges from the history of the region's authoritarian regimes, which bear the responsibility for the culture of division and negation and the condemnation of diversity. What is needed is a culture of connection and openness to the other that acknowledges, respects, and

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3)   Samir Franjieh, "The Effects of Internal Social Divisions on the Path of Transformation in the Arab World: A Conceptual Framework." *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P.28.

4)   Ibid, P.28.

preserves diversity in societies that are blessed with freedom and democracy.

Beyond the specifics of the Lebanese example and the distortions forced upon its society and culture, recent events in the region have revealed the quiet divisions that were often violently denied and repressed by authoritarian regimes. These divisions are extremely dangerous and important, perhaps even more dangerous than the way that divisions have been formalized along the lines of the Lebanese model. These repressed divisions must be dealt with along the political transition to greater freedom and democracy.

Case of Syria

In the case of Syria, Dr. Fouad Fouad presented a description of the catastrophic humanitarian situation that Syria has become:

> The Syrian catastrophe is the worst humanitarian disaster since the Second World War—according to the United Nations Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura—wherein many of the neighborhoods of some of the oldest cities in the world have been destroyed, and villages and small towns have been wiped off the map; half a million have been killed, five million have been made refugees, and seven million have become internally displaced. Unknown numbers have been arrested, are missing, or have been forcibly disappeared. All of these together make Syria appear closer to ruins than a state and a society.[5]

In attempting to analyze the causes that led to these catastrophic results, the author presents three factors in the form of questions:

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5) Fouad M. Fouad, "The Social Topography: A Reading of the Societal Divisions in Syria and other Effects on the Current Conflict." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P.36

Is it because of geopolitics? Is it the historical and geographical position of Bilad al-Sham (a historical province of the Umayyad Caliphate that encompasses much of the modern Levant), of which Syria was the largest state? How quickly did the most legitimate demands become transformed into an opportunity for regional and world powers to attempt to rearrange the region according to their own interests, regardless of whether it set the area back more than a century?

Is the cause the nature of the regime that ruled Syria for 50 years, where the party came first and the country became secondary to the kingdom of the ruling family, regardless of whether usurpation or scorched earth were necessary to ensure continuity?

Is it the composition of Syrian society to begin with—pluralistic and diverse in terms of sect, ethnicity, and culture—that what was established was a state imposed from above, against the will of its components and without taking into account what they wanted, would desire, and agree upon?[6]

In researching the geopolitics of Syria, it seems that geography had a significant impact in creating ethnic and sectarian diversity and a resultant complex state. The author elaborates by explaining the historical development of all regions of Syria, and likewise the regional conflicts between Aleppo and Damascus, concluding:

Thus neither historic Syria nor the Syria of Sykes-Picot was ever a centralized state like Egypt (centered around the Nile River), around which civilizations and a centralized authority were based. The geography of Syria imposed great geographical diversity: mountains, deserts, and plains. This made Syria an open space for independent

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6)   Ibid, P.37.

communities, creating ethnic and religious diversity. Likewise, the geographic location made it one of the essential trading corridors of ancient and medieval world commerce, which in turn brought even further ethnic and religious diversity. These layers of geography, history, and natural resources combined to create a multilayered society in which different sects, ethnicities, and classes intermixed.[7]

On the nature of the authoritarian regime that has ruled Syria for 50 years, the author clarifies that the authoritarian regime was founded by a military council and how everything was subjected to the control of the military. The existence of diversity was disavowed and repressed by force:

> This security/party/bureaucrat/propaganda layer made entirely in connection with the figure of al-Assad has formed a thick coating over society. Its unprecedented density has hidden the social, religious, and ethnic differences, until it appears to the foreign observer that there are no longer such differences — or that that there never were such differences. The Syrian people appear unified from afar, as if they will continue to be unified into the distant future, as one monolithic bloc "following its wise leadership."[8]

But the analysis would not be complete without delving into the societal divisions along ethnic, sectarian, and regional lines, as well as the civil-military divide. These divisions converge to marginalize peripheral areas like al-Hasakah or Deir Ezzor almost completely. This marginalization has played a role in the emergence of three distinct regions now evident in Syria: the region of Damascus and the coast controlled by the regime, the region of the Kurds in the north, and the central region

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7)   Ibid, P.39.

8)   Ibid, P.47.

controlled by Da'ish. This division has not been solely dictated by historical composition, but also by current events on the ground. Together, this de facto division leads to the current conflicts over partition, federalism, or confederation as the political models of organization to solve the current conflict. The author reaffirms the possibility of any of these three types of divisions for the future of Syria, in light of the regional and international conflicts that are being waged in Syria: "Since the United States of America abandoned playing an influential role, Iranian influence increased, and Russian forces intervened in September 2015, it appears that Syria is moving toward three regions."[9]

Despite the gloomy picture and the enormity of the disaster that has befallen Syrians, the author ends his paper with optimism and indispensable hope:

> Syrians must be allowed the opportunity and the ability to contribute to determining their fates and the fates of their children after them—particularly so when things seem heading inevitably toward a redrawing of the map and permanent social and demographic change. Perhaps it was only the recent past, despite its failures and floundering, that made a land shared between people who dreamed of dignity, a life, even flourishing—as everyone does everywhere.[10]

The deep analysis reveals the historical and sociological composition of Syria and the Syrian people, and that the responsibility for what the situation in Syria has become lies on the shoulders of the authoritarian regime that has not hesitated to resort to wide-scale destruction, civil war, and open conflict to stay in power. This in turn has led to the entry of several regional and international powers, as

9)   Ibid, P.51.
10) Ibid, P. 55.

happens in all civil wars. The result has been a level of death and destruction without precedent in the recent past of the region.

Case of Yemen

In the case of Yemen, Dr. Adel al-Shargabi explains how society was engineered in the interest of perpetuating the authoritarian state established by the deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh. The author analyzes the social structure in Yemen, wherein "sheikhism" replaced tribalism, creating a tribal hierarchy wherein the sheikh at the head was co-opted to serve in the alliances and network of relationships that would guarantee the reproduction and continuity of the authoritarian regime. The head tribal sheikh became part of the regime itself, and thus invested in protecting it in order to guarantee his own interests. As for the state:

> The administrative apparatus and the civil service were built on a patrimonial model: that is, closer to a family regime, where its major officials had direct or indirect personal connections to the president. Their interests intertwined with his interests. They owed him personal loyalty. He appointed them without competition based on the principle of equal opportunity. They obtained financial perquisites and gifts in kind outside of the law, to the point of becoming to a degree a clientelistic system that covers all levels of the government bureaucracy. Authority under such a regime becomes transformed into a personal matter. A patrimonial state is dedicated to the continuation of the familial regime and operates on the basis of personal relationships and personal loyalty to the president by its officials.[11]

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11) Adel Mugahid al-Shargabi, "Revolution in a Non-State Society: The Influence of Social Divisions on the Yemeni Revolution." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P. 60-61.

The revolution began when the internal divisions in the network of alliances of the authoritarian regime increased, which led to the division of the military, which in turn led the ascendance of demands for partition by the Houthis, the Islamists, and the Southern Movement. The natural result was an incredibly complex conflict. The turn to the use of force and weapons transformed the conflict into a civil war and a regional war. The author points out the crisis of the regime and its dilemma over the continued influence of tribes:

> While the major sheikhs had been weakened and the authority of the lesser sheikhs had increased, and a clustered society connecting all bearers of tribal power to Saleh had been built, this new system of political patrimony did not eliminate the traditional social patriarchal relations that continued to exist and remain effective. Sheikh al-Ahmar and General al-Ahmar remained capable of mobilizing many tribal sheikhs for the revolution in 2011 — and regardless of whether they occupied official positions of power in the state and in the regime, many of the sheikhs of the tribes announced their split from the regime.[12]

On the subject of the transformation of the conflict into a bloody one, here the author points to the weakness of the civil forces that undertook the revolution and their subsequent marginalization by the warring parties after resorting violence and arms. It remains important to point out the terrible deterioration of humanitarian conditions in an already impoverished country like Yemen, which has reached an unprecedented level. The UN has elevated its classification of the situation in Yemen to the most extreme degree of a state of humanitarian emergency. More than 21 million individuals, or 80 percent of the Yemeni people, need aid, owing to the lack of food and water and the spread of epidemics.

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12) Ibid, P.77.

Case of Libya

In the Libyan case, Ahmed al-Fituri focuses on the responsibility of foreign interventions in worsening the conflicts and the deterioration of internal conditions. In this regard, the lack of a national army has played a decisive role in the lawlessness. Gaddafi had instead built security units linked to him personally that worked to protect him and his authoritarian regime.

The Libyan case highlights the effect of regional divisions:

The events of the Libyan Revolution confirm the role of the regional factor in dividing the country. The east was first to be liberated from the grip of Gaddafi. Then Misrata suffered from a war extending for months with Gaddafi loyalists, then the Nafusa Mountains and the city of Zintan. Tripoli and Tripolitania remained under the control of Gaddafi. The south of Libya appeared neutral superficially, but in fact was under the influence of Gaddafi's forces.[13]

As for the most prominent social forces involved in the revolution from the beginning, the author points to the role of the middle class and the youth in particular, confirming that:

In the early days of the revolution, the most prominent category was young men of the middle class. Then, a political leadership of dissidents returned from abroad or long jail sentences. Most of them are middle aged and also middle class. Thus emerged the category of lawyers, who had a vigorous union throughout a long period of Libyan history. The class of lawyers emerged as the frontrunners to come into power. The civil democratic movement had participated in the first demonstrations of the revolution on February 17, whereas Islamist groups joined after a

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13) Ahmed al-Fituri, "Libya in the Gale of the Arab Spring." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P.91.

few days, particularly the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. Shortly before the revolution, the Brotherhood had entered into a historic reconciliation with the regime led by Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam.[14]

The author returns to clarify that the civil movement was not weak in the case of Libya, stating:

> The civil democratic movement is the most diverse and generally unorganized. Its base of support lives abroad as a result of the Gaddafi regime's despotism and some of its leaders were executed early on. But in the early period of the revolution, the civil democratic movement was a key participant, with many of the most prominent leaders, like Mahmoud Jibril, that cultivated and established the National Forces Alliance relatively quickly. This movement has succeeded in the elections that were held in the country under international observation, both for the National Dialogue and the House of Representatives.[15]

The Libyan case is a perfect example of the nature of the fragile authoritarian state and its weak institutions, with the exception of the repressive security apparatus. The collapse of the security apparatus and the division of the army are a cause for the entry into destructive conflict, despite the desire to build the sought-after civil state. This building process will take a long time and demand consensus and agreement on an acceptable form of government and the avoidance of extremist, destructive choices. This is what is hoped for from the ongoing negotiations between the different Libyan parties under UN auspices.

All of the papers and the resulting discussions on this first subject of societal divisions revealed that the authoritarian state has attempted to meld society and

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14) Ibid, P.103.

15) Ibid, P. 105.

all of its components together by force and repression under its totalitarian or authoritarian regime. But society has rebelled. There has been a "fall of the wall of fear" among the masses. The authoritarian state has responded by resorting to excessive violence, but through this it has only lost its legitimacy entirely. With the continuation of the conflict, the very idea of the state and its institutions has collapsed. Society has become divided and resorted to alternative affiliations other than the national in the fight for survival.

The effects of the roles played by the armed forces of the army and the security services in the scheme of things

Dr. Mohamed al-Mekhlafi emphasized the institutional importance of the army and its distance from the personalization of authority, using the Yemen example to clarify his thinking:

> The military and security forces in the countries of the Arab Spring have not had a unified response to the revolutions of change. Their stances have varied according to the structure of these two institutions. Where a unified institution exists for the military, it refrains from continuing to repress the revolution and from bloodshed, allowing the fall of the ruling families, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. But in countries where the military and security institutions were not united—where the institutions were disconnected and agencies and services mixed military tasks together with security tasks, where these units were directly subordinate to the leadership composed of individuals of the family of the president, where their military and security doctrine was represented in personal loyalty to the president and his family, and where some units

and individuals defected and stood on the side of the revolution—repression and bloodshed intensified and worsened. The most important factor is whether the elite of the military and security services stood on the side of the political regime, as happened in Yemen, Syria, and Libya.[16]

Case of Yemen

It can be said that the case of Yemen resembles the cases of Libya and Syria, where the military was divided and plunged into infighting. Research into the case of Yemen shows how the *ancien régime* and the deposed president made a mockery of the apparatus of the state by continuing to maintain control over it, prioritizing the army and using the elite military units loyal to him personally to undertake the counterrevolution and successfully short-circuit the political process. The counterrevolution prevented change from occurring by force, then hazarded a coup and summoned foreign intervention.

All of this enabled the *ancien régime* to use the apparatus of the state to prevent change and block the implementation of the tasks of the transitional period, and enabled it to transform the armed forces and the security agencies into militias under the command of the former president and his family. Local authorities were made into an instrument to mobilized in order to fund the coup against the political process and against the legitimacy of the transitional period. Both legislative chambers were also used to justify the counterrevolution.[17]

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16) Ibid, P.112.

17) Mohamed Ahmad Ali al-Mekhlafi, "The Role of Military and Security Forces and their Effects on the Path of Democratic Transition: The Case of Yemen." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P. 121.

Building off of this, the author emphasized the importance of rebuilding the army and the armed forces, concluding by stating:

> In conclusion, the armed forces and the security services in Yemen represented the main instrument for the counterrevolution and the coup against the Revolution of February 2011, preventing change and a democratic transformation. After the state is restored and its legitimate authority is extended over all parts of the country, the very first priority should be the restructuring of the army and security apparatus according to the fundamentals, principles, and standards of the document developed at the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference.[18]

Case of Tunisia

The Tunisian case differs in facts and results from others. The author Ahmad Karoud presents an interpretation of the relative success of the Tunisian experience in the process of democratic transition. The interpretation is based on three primary factors:

1. The role played by the army and security institutions in what occurred in connection with the fall of the apex of the executive authority, and then in the transitional period that the country has been living in for five years.
2. The role of Tunisian civil society organizations in contributing to safeguarding the transitional process.
3. The effect of political polarization on the transition path from authoritarianism to democracy.[19]

The Tunisian army played a decisive role on this relative success story in the toppling of the head of the regime and

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18) Ibid, P. 128.

19) Ahmad Karoud, The Tunisian Transition: A Relative Success Story. In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P. 130.

in subsequent developments. In particular, the institutional nature of the Tunisian army since its founding in refraining from direct intervention in the internal politics of the country, and in its neutrality when necessary, such as when the revolution broke out, played a key role. This of course does not encompass the role of the security apparatus subordinate to the Interior Ministry:

> As for the security apparatus, the situation differs somewhat. Unlike the military, the Interior Ministry and its security apparatus played and continue to play clear roles in the political life in Tunisia. Alongside the close monitoring of all structures of society and also of all political actors, including the structures and members of the ruling party, the ministry organized and oversaw the municipal, legislative, and presidential elections. The goal of this was to support the monopolization by the ruling party (the Neo Destour Party, later renamed the RCD) of all of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.[20]

Civil society organizations, famed for their power and vitality in Tunisia (especially in comparison to the rest of the region), succeeded in contributing effectively to the revolution by keeping political conflicts between various parties peaceful on the whole and convening dialogues. On a practical level, the national dialogue was initiated under the supervision of what is known as the sponsoring quartet for the dialogue, joining the Tunisian General Labor Union (known by its French acronym, the UGTT being the largest union in Tunisia), the Tunisian Human Rights League, the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, and the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts.

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20) Ibid, P. 136.

Case of Egypt

Moving to the Egyptian case, we have observed that the military in Egypt has continuously played a central role in the country's politics, remaining in power and bearing influence over governance in Egypt since 1952. This is what explains the Military Council that has ruled the country since February 2011, and later the military's return to the presidency since July 3, 2013, by exploiting the popular uprising against the rule of the increasingly authoritarian Muslim Brotherhood on June 30, 2013. But the new rulers have gradually expanded their repression beyond the Brotherhood to encompass civil and democratic political forces that were a key component of the June 30 alliance. In describing the present situation of the regime, the author Fouad al-Said borrows a description by Nathan Brown for the new situation since 2013 as the following:

> Nathan Brown describes the new situation in Egypt as one embodying a security state operating (at least in the short term) in an atmosphere of popular support infected with panic and rabidity. The Islamist opposition is excluded from the political process in such a way as to make it more ready to use violent force. Civil conflict continues, while a cosmetic constitutional process offers a means to lend institutional character to the current political arrangements.[21]

The author continues to describe recent developments succinctly:

> In the wake of June 30, 2013, the new regime took advantage of the legislative vacuum to issue hundreds of laws that cemented its grip during the period of the temporary president and after the election of members

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21) Fouad al-Said, "The Political and Developmental Role of the Egyptian Military Institution in the Regime of June 30/July 3, 2013." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P. 157.

of parliament. These decrees were engineered by the regime in order to circumvent the articles of the constitution continuously.[22]

The author describes the current state of freedoms and human rights as the following:

The conditions in terms of freedom and human rights have increasingly deteriorated. The media and society have witnessed a type of disaster in this respect, not only against the Brotherhood, but also against any dissenting opinion. On the political level, the state is following a policy of destroying the Brotherhood organization both militarily and economically. A new terrorism law was enacted that was prepared by the Interior Ministry with intentionally elastic clauses, granting the executive and judiciary sweeping powers to use against peaceful opposition of all stripes without exception. 22 civil rights organizations have come to a consensus rejection of the law. The law extended the period of provisional detention such that it transformed a practical practice into a weapon against anyone accused, who would then be subject to long prison terms without any proof of guilt or of involvement in the crimes.[23]

In assessing the current predicament for Egypt under military rule, it is difficult to provide answers to the Egypt's problems. The civil-military conflict is likely to worsen. The author characterizes the state of civil-military relations in Egypt as the following:

The basic subject of civil-military relations in Egypt is connected to the unofficial and unannounced political role that is played by the military, intelligence, and security agencies in order to dominate the political process (administering the recent parliamentary elections in

22) Ibid, P. 158.
23) Ibid, P. 159.

Egypt, for example). This is in addition to the tendency to populate the most important administrative and economic positions with officers, manufacturing the elite of the state out of officers and the oligarchs in business and media.[24]

The main issue in the democratic transformation in Egypt is moving the control of the military to supervision by an elected civilian body. This goal must be accepted by both parties and implemented gradually in order to avoid a clash between the civilian and military parties. Most of the conditions for this are not yet prevalent, as the author recognizes, but they could be in the future.

The effects of the roles played by the forces of political Islam in all its varieties and differences

Case of Tunisia

The author Mohammad al-Haj Salem presents an analysis of the involvement of the movements of political Islam in Tunisia—particularly the Ennahda Movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Supporters of Islamic Law organization—in order to better understand their performances and their adopted strategies for dealing with issues of the constitution, the nature of the state, the reformulation of civil society, and their stances toward the process of democratic transition. The author investigates what he calls "religious ideology," or the expression of types of religiosity that aim to achieve a political goal. In contrast to this religious ideology, the author follows the emergence of "nationalist ideology" and civil society in Tunisia.

The author then clarifies that the moderation that marks the stances of Ennahda, as a cohesive and strong party

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24) Ibid, P. 162.

organization, are less a result of the power of its political-religious ideology as much as it was:

> Its ability to renew its stances through reviews undertaken while its members were imprisoned and the emergence of a new generation of activists in exile, which took on an essential role in directing the movement. European exile offered many among the leadership and the general membership an opportunity to meet with secular and liberal groups and Western civil society organizations. This eased the development of their views and contributed to the development of the movement.[25]

As for Hizb ut-Tahrir:

> The relative weak presence of the party in Tunisia can be explained by its transnational nature, which accounts for the weak resonance of its ideology as a social movement inside Tunisia. Its publications focus on "fighting Western imperialism" and preaching for a "global caliphate on the model of the prophets," which again explain its relative lack of appeal ideologically and organizational weakness in Tunisia.[26]

Lastly, he comes to the jihadist Salafist current that suffers from organizational fragmentation:

> The flaw on the level of organization was deepened by the movement's failure in its first experiment at formal organization, which was known as the Supporters of Islamic Law. Its failure can be attributed to inertia within the organization itself, and to its classification by the government as a terrorist organization, which was the decisive factor in its dismantlement that resulted in the failure of the experiment.[27]

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25) Mohammad al-Haj Salem, "Political Islam in Tunisia between Ideological Organizing and the Requirements of Social Movements." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P. 183.

26) Ibid, P. 185.

27) Ibid, P. 186.

The relative success of the Tunisian experience occurred through consensus on a constitution that obtained 93 percent approval in a referendum, the organization of democratic parliamentary elections adopting proportional representation in which all parties were represented, and democratic presidential elections that brought in a new president in place of the president supported by the Islamist Ennahda Movement. In addition, a coalition government was formed that worked to manage conflicts and solve them democratically and peacefully. This may not have happened without the presence of a robust civil society with effective and well-organized unions on the one hand, and the political moderation of the Islamist Ennahda Movement on the other. The moderation of the party will be crowned at its latest party conference, with the formal division between religious and political activity, as the author expects:

> Resolution of the issue of the division between political and religious activity is also necessary. How will the movement go about the transformation from a party uniting religious and political activity to a contemporary political national party in which its political action is liberated conclusively from its religious duties, but without abandoning the religious aspects that appear to be conducted by associations connected to the movement, without the party intervening directly in its activities?[28]

Case of Morocco

The case of Morocco is special in terms of the consensus on gradual and limited reform between the king and the majority of opposition parties, including the largest Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party, which led the first government under the new 2011 constitution. The demands of the party do not exceed the acceptable

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28) Ibid, P. 193.

ceiling of calling for reform, and as a party it decided not to participate in the protest movements in Morocco. This party works to divide religious activity from the political, according to the author:

> The Justice and Development Party has emerged as a growing power in the world of political Islam, able to align itself with the path of democracy to the extent that it has become a key and powerful actor within organized party politics. The party has contested elections and aligned itself with the opposition, giving the movement a special place. It obtained an important majority of seats in parliament, making it the primary political power in the country qualified to form the first government after the enactment of the 2011 constitution.[29]

The Moroccan experience shows that the logic of slow, gradual reform can permit the participation of all parties that accept the inviolability of the monarchy and the king's absolute powers, which include the Justice and Development Party, which in turn has emerged as the greatest beneficiary.

Case of Da'ish in Iraq and Syria

In his review of the case of Da'ish in both Syria and Iraq, Hazem al-Amin focused on what differentiates the organization from other Islamist and Salafist movements, in particular al-Qaeda. The fundamental distinguishing principle is its move to establish a state on the basis of brutalism and savagery. For the author:

> The issue of the state is at the crux of Da'ish's operations, which is the opposite of al-Qaeda. After the first years of "jihad" in Iraq, it named itself the "Islamic State in Iraq." Experience in managing the regions under its control

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29) Abdelaziz Karraky, "The Role of the Forces of Political Islam and the Implication for Civil Forces in Morocco." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P. 207.

accumulated, and the organization benefited from the wide-ranging experience possessed by its recruits, particularly former officers of the Iraqi military. "Management by savagery," control of recalcitrant areas, and controlled chaos: these expressions are contained in the literature of the group and practiced as means of rule and a way to "establish the caliphate."[30]

It follows that the establishment and appearance of Da'ish was no surprise, in that it grew in the view of all, and there are causes related to the situation in Iraq and its sectarian divisions and the repression by the Iraqi government under Nouri al-Maliki of the Sunnis and their demands. Ba'ath officers from the former cadres of Saddam Hussein resorted to Da'ish to fight the new Iraqi regime. Officers of the disbanded Iraqi army form the nucleus of the operational leadership of Da'ish. The author clarifies how Da'ish is a fundamentally Iraqi organization by stating several times the following:

> Da'ish also was an Iraqi organization before it became Syrian or anything else… Iraqi concerns dictated upon it an Iraqi agenda. Aspirations to impose control over the regions of Iraq in turn imposed the necessity of dealing with Iraqi local factors, especially in the provinces of al-Anbar, the north, and some of the central regions. These regions form a kind of vacuum where it was easy for the group to invest itself and no longer seem strange or foreign or removed from the sectarian and clan structure of the area.[31]

> […] The Ba'ath cracked down on al-Qaeda locally while employing it to serve its project in Iraq after Saddam's fall as well as in Syria after the revolution, in turn using

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30) Hazem al-Amin, "Al-Qaeda was Injected with the Ba'ath Syrian and Became Da'ish." In *Political Developments in Arab Countries since 2011.* P. 222.

31) Ibid, P. 224.

al-Qaeda for its purposes. What resulted from this was the "cross-pollination" between the Ba'ath and al-Qaeda that resulted in Da'ish.[32]

From exploiting the internal conditions in Iraq, the group extended its work to war-torn Syria, where the authoritarian regime was tottering. As the author states:

> When the bloodthirsty regimes in Damascus and Baghdad lost their influence, this vacuum was discovered. Nothing connects these cities except the dust of the tottering state and the rotting regime. Even the clans that the state bequeathed were exhausted, staggering, and fighting among themselves.[33]

In conclusion, it must be reaffirmed that the observation of the transformative and changing phenomena must be put into a general framework and be studied within a concept or paradigm of change and transformation from authoritarianism in its various forms and degrees to freedom and openness to democratic transition. This does not mean that the path will be smooth and easy; rather, the opposite. It will be difficult and arduous and challenged by failures, setbacks, and counterrevolutions. It is a conflictual process that will continue for many decades, with progression and regression, success here and failure there. All of this will depend on the balances of powers between the social blocs for freedom and change on one side, and the forces benefiting from authoritarianism and working to protect and prolong it on the other.

The type of familial-factional-hereditary authoritarian regime, or what has been called the "sultanistic state," has fallen in some Arab states, but this did not go to the extent of toppling the security-military authoritarian system that

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32) Ibid, P. 231.

33) Ibid, P. 224.

must be restrained constitutionally and legally because the social forces for change have not yet been capable of imposing such democratic constraints peacefully on the security and military apparatuses of the region. The result has been internal wars and setbacks and the advance of counterrevolutionary forces here and there.

Because this battle will be long, it will inevitably involve other crucial areas of study: culture, social structures, human rights, women's rights, constitutionalism, the rule of law, state and institution building, and legal reform – just to name a few. Future research efforts must focus on these issues.

AUTHORS

Tarek Mitri

Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut and chair of the general council of the Sursock Museum. Worked as the special representative of the general secretary of the United Nations in Libya in 2012. Served between 2005–2011 in four Lebanese governments, and was minister of media, environment, administrative development, and culture, as well as interim foreign minister. Before joining the Lebanese government, Mitri worked as the coordinator of inter-religious relations and dialogue in the World Council of Churches in Geneva (1991–2005), and was the director for a program seeking dialogue between Christians and Muslims in the Council of Churches of the Middle East (1984–1991). He holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Paris X, and taught at the American University of Beirut, Saint Joseph University, University of Balamand, Harvard University, and Geneva University. He has several publications on politics, philosophy, and literature, the most recent being his book *Rugged paths: two years in and for Libya* (in Arabic) from Dar Riyadh al-Rayes.

Ziad Majed

Lebanese writer and professor of Middle East studies and international relations at the American University of Paris; coordinator of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy. His most recent publication is his book *Syria: the orphaned revolution*, published in both Arabic and French. He has previously published a group of research papers on issues of democratic transformation, as well as contributed to reports and publications about sustainable human development, election and party laws, civil society, and political participation of women in the Arab region.

Samir Franjieh

Author, researcher, and former Lebanese member of parliament; founding member of the "Permanent Conference for Lebanese Dialogue" and the forces of March 14. He has numerous intellectual and political contributions and articles in the major French and Arabic Lebanese newspapers. Author of the book *Journey to the extremes of violence*, published in both French and Arabic (winner of the Phoenix Prize for Literature 2011), and author of *The day after the spring* (interview in Italian 2012). Contributor to several other publications among them *Memoir for the future* (an-Nahar 2002), *Choices for Lebanon* published in English and Arabic (2005), and *The black book for the fate of Christians in the world* (in French 2014).

Fouad Fouad

Doctor and Syrian researcher, assistant professor in the college of health science at the American University of Beirut. His research interests are connected with demographic changes in Syria resulting from the internal displacement and refuge to neighboring countries, and the influence of the prolonged Syrian crisis on the issue of health broadly. He also researches the role played by international organizations in forming the international aid regime and the extent of its effectiveness. He is the primary author for a chapter on "health" in the report adopted

by ESCWA about "future health policy choices and the rebuilding of the healthcare system."

Adel Mughahid al-Shargabi

Doctor in sociology and Yemeni researcher, professor of sociology at the University of Sanaa since 2011. He has several books and research publications on social development, democratic transformation, state building, civil society, social structure of Yemeni society, and human rights in general and women's and children's rights in particular. He has participated in many local and international conferences. Founding member of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy and members and activist in several civil society organizations in Yemen.

Ahmed al-Fituri

Journalist and Libyan research. Founder of "Mayadin for journalism, publication, and training" in the city of Benghazi and editor in chief of the weekly newspaper *Mayadin* since 2011. He was an editorial secretary of the newspaper *The Cultural Week* in 1978 under Abdulrahman Shalgam. He has weekly contributions in literary criticism and politics in several Arab and Libyan journals, such as the Libyan *Four Seasons* and *The Middle*, and the Tunisian *Cultural Life* and the Egyptian *New Culture*. He has several publications including "Beginner in thought and culture: forgotten in the mud" and "Tale of a Ben Ghazi — Srib" (novel). He has several manuscripts, including a novel in publication about the experience of prison, "A thousand felons and a night of a dust bowl."

Mohamed al-Mekhlafi

Doctor of law, lawyer, and researcher at the Yemeni Center for Studies and Research. One of the founders and former president of the Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights and trainer in the field of human rights. Member of the administrative board of the Center of Information and Training. Minister of legal affairs in the national consensus government of the Yemeni Republic as

of December 2011. Author of several published books, studies, and scientific research about globalization, the dangers of investment freedom, intellectual property rights, arbitration rules for international commerce, rule of law in the Yemeni crisis, modern judiciary in the Arab nation, and the electoral system in Yemen. Founding member of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy.

Ahmad Karoud

Professor of human rights training and institution building for associations, and former director of the regional office of Amnesty International. Training expert for Amnesty and for the Arab Institute for Human Rights (Tunisia) previously. Worked as a trainer and expert in capacity building in most Arab countries with the Arab Institute for Human Rights, the Geneva Institute for Human Rights, the International Network for Human Rights Education, the Denmark Institute for Human Right, Oxfam, and the British INTRAC (International NGO Training and Research Centre). Member of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy. He has several contributions in his publications about the Jasmine Revolution and the current conditions in Tunisia.

Fouad al-Said

Doctor, author, and researcher at the National Center for Social and Criminal Studies in Cairo. Interested in studies of political culture, political media, and trends in public opinion. He has periodic contributions to several Arab and Egyptian newspapers and other publications. Member of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy.

Mohammad al-Haj Salem

Doctor in political science, the sociology of culture, civilizational sociology, and in the Arabic language and Arabic civilization. Researcher on humanity and civilization. Translator and journalist, researcher in the unit on young people and the

internet of the college of human and social science in Tunis, researcher in the unit of discourse analysis in the college of literature, arts, and humanities in Manouba, head of the research unit on jihadist salafism at the Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies (2012–2014). Adviser in the London School of Economic and political science. He has several scientific publications and more than 100 articles published in several specialized journals.

Abdelaziz Karraky

Doctor in rights and professor of political science and human rights at the University of Mohammed V in Rabat, director of coordination and promotion of human rights in the ministerial delegation tasked with human rights, member of the scientific council tasked with emplacing the legal vision for the Committee of Equality and Combating All Forms of Discrimination in Morocco, member of the Center for Studies in Social Sciences in Rabat. Adviser to civil society organizations in the field of preparing corresponding reports to the committees of the United Nations dedicated to supervising the implementation of agreements in the field of human rights. Member in the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy.

Hazem al-Amin

Author and journalist and official of the department of investigations of the *al-Hayat* newspaper. Holder of a postgraduate diploma in sociology. Roving correspondent for the newspaper that covered the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Kurdish zones, and Gaza. He has a book published by Dar al-Saqi with the title *The orphan salafist* about the emergence and development of jihadist and salafist movements in the region, particularly in Jordan.

Hassan Krayem

Lecturer in political science at the American University of Beirut. Director of the governance program at the Lebanon

Office of the United Nations Development Programme. He has several publications on matters related to democracy and elections in Lebanon and the Arab world (three books and more than 25 articles). Founding member and former secretary general of the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections. Member of the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy.

Jeffrey D. Reger

Doctoral candidate in the history of the modern Middle East and North Africa at Georgetown University. Former research assistant for the Kettering Foundation and the Sustained Dialogue Institute.

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