Mona Alami

How will events in Syria unfold? How is Syria’s current political crisis different from the one it faced in the 1980s? NOW Lebanon sat down in Washington, DC with Syrian activist and Professor Radwan Ziadeh, a visiting scholar at the George Washington University, for his take on the upheavals in Syria.

In your opinion, what are the main differences between President Bashar al-Assad’s management of the current crisis and of his father’s tackling of the uprisings during his term in the late 1970s and early 1980s?

Ziadeh: The approaches adopted by father and son are in many ways quite similar. However, there were [powerful] political figures such as [General Mustapha] Tlass and [former Vice President] Abdel Hamid Khaddam, among others, who appeared on the Syrian scene in the wake of the first Gulf War. The main differences reside nonetheless, not in the actual power structure, but in the network [of clients]. Under Hafez al-Assad, security matters and power centers were held by the Alawite community, while business and economic matters were left to the Sunnis. This social contract came to an end under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, when [his cousins] the Makhloufs started dominating the economic sector. Members of the wealthy Sunni business class are [as a result] now funding the Syrian opposition movement.

In spite of a few protests, Aleppo, one of the largest Sunni cities, has remained relatively calm. Why is that?

Ziadeh: One has to keep in mind that when the Hama repression took place in [1982], about 10,000 of the people who disappeared at the time were actually from Aleppo. The city is also filled with baltagiah [armed pro-regime civilians], who attack protesters.

Many members of the Syrian minorities seem to fear the emergence of a religious conflict. Do you think it is a possibility?

Ziadeh: It’s an argument that has been defended by the regime, which has equated its survival to the protection of religious minorities. However, people need to be reminded that in 1954, Syria’s prime minister was a Christian, and that the community is today quite wealthy and fully integrated, unlike the Egyptian Copts. While Salafism does exist, like in many other societies, it is far from being mainstream. In addition, in spite of the fear factor, members of minorities are participating in protests. As an example, some 13 Assyrians and 41 Druze have been recently arrested by security forces for participating in the protests. 

Some in Syria argue that the 2011 pro-democracy movement does not include the Syrian intelligentsia, as the Damascus Spring did in 2000. Do you agree?

Ziadeh: On the contrary, the movement has garnered the support of many prominent figures such as [Syrian political dissident and former MP] Riad Seif, [lawyer and activist] Haytham al-Maleh and [Syrian poet] Adonis, among many others. 

How do you view recent reports published by various NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, accusing the intelligence services of torture?

Ziadeh: The most notorious case is certainly that of Hamzah al-Khatib, a child whose body was delivered to his parents, bearing multiple traces of torture and mutilation. In all authoritarian regimes, terror is ingrained, and enforced disappearances are commonplace. In Syria, which has ratified the international convention against torture, such practices are systematic. Today, the situation has worsened: In addition to members of the opposition, regular protesters are now targeted. This is done to terrorize the population, and, most importantly, people who remain undecided. Such practices have not stymied demonstrations, with more people taking to the streets. Some 11,000 people have been arrested in recent months with stadiums and movie theaters turned into jails, like the Cine Ugarit in the city of Latakia and the Damascus Municipal Stadium.

Who handles Syrian security? Do you think such practices are the result of an uncoordinated effort?

Ziadeh: There are various intelligence services, namely the General Intelligence, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Interior; the Political Security, which also [belongs] to the Ministry of Interior; and the Military and Air Force intelligence services, which are controlled by the Ministry of Defense. The Baath Bureau of National Security oversees all agencies, which, with the exception of the Air Force Intelligence that is responsible for special missions, are assigned to domestic intelligence-gathering tasks. In addition, these agencies have branches in the various Syrian provinces. 

What will be the fate of Syria if unrest persists?

Ziadeh: Syria faces three unknowns. The first possible scenario is that the regime may survive the protests, as was the case of Burma in 2007 and Iran in 2009. Contrary to these countries, however, the Syrian regime does not enjoy the same level of support. This can be seen in the case of Daraa, which is home to many political figures such as [Syrian Vice President Farouk] al-Sharaa and Minister Faysal Mokdad. Other differences exist: Only 79 people were killed in Iran in 2009; the figure has exceeded 1,000 in Syria in just over a three-month period. The international reaction has also varied greatly. The international community is conscious that it is faced today with a wave of protests equivalent to the democratic wave witnessed in Europe in 1989.

The second unknown resides in the role of the army. The Syrian army is some 240,000 men strong. It may be not as professional as its Egyptian counterpart, but definitely more structured than in Libya. We are already witnessing an increasing number of defections in the lower ranks, while army generals are assessing the power they have on the ground.

The third unknown is whether there will be an international intervention in the event that protests continue. I don’t foresee a clash between US foreign policy interests [namely toward Israel] and whether the regime survives or not. The latter has played the Israeli card [as seen in the recent demonstrations staged in the Golan]. Once the card is dealt, it can’t be used again.