Hazem al-Amin

Parties to the Syrian opposition are accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of being the first to strike a deal with the Syrian regime if given half a chance to do so. The Muslim Brotherhood, in return, says that it periodically receive such offers from the regime in Istanbul where the party is. The Iranian mediation they revealed is not the only one in this respect; rather, it was preceded and followed by mediations led by “independent” Arab figures from Algeria and Sudan, and by Syrian figures as well. They give the following answer: “How can we strike a deal with a regime that has no prospects? It would be tantamount to political suicide.”

Furthermore, the regime is taking great pains to allude to the fact that offers are being made to the Muslim Brotherhood. These offers come within the framework of the regime’s attempts to consolidate the Muslim Brotherhood at the forefront of the opposition in their capacity as its main component. In the same speech during which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad alluded that he was ready to initiate dialogue with them, he departed from the written text of his address and used once again the famous Baath expression, namely the “Devil’s Brotherhood.” This indicates that the “readiness for dialogue” is no more than an attempt to portray the opposition under a diabolical light.

Syria, as seen from Istanbul, is far more complicated and weak than what things are like in Lebanon or Jordan. In Beirut and Amman, those observing Damascus carry the burden of their country’s weakness and no sooner do they think about the events in Syria than they start having doubts regarding their own country and its future. In that case, they are easily frightened when they see Syrian President Bashar Assad on the Umayyad Square, and they just as easily say: “We are in a completely different period, one that is so dangerous as to compel strong presidents to do what Assad did.”

The scene from Istanbul is not bright, but it is different from what it looks like from Beirut and Amman. The National Syrian Council, which resides most of the time in Istanbul, is an image of another reality. The Muslim Brotherhood in it is a Turkish option whereas lay figures are a European one. It is easy to hear a “Turkish observer” say that Burhan Ghalioun “is a French puppet.” One must keep in mind here the implications of such an accusation against a backdrop of the crisis-fraught relation between Turkey and France due to the Armenian genocide and to the division caused by the success of the French option in Libya and the failure of Turkey’s tergiversation.

If you ask a Turkish official whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is the choice of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, you will not have any doubts regarding the answer despite this official’s best efforts to give a noncommittal answer. Yes, the Muslim Brotherhood is Turkey’s option but Turkey is not the most important partner in making Syria’s future. The Turkish official did not say that of course, but this can be inferred from the intensive Arab and international presence in Istanbul.

Nevertheless, Turkey is more capable than any other international player to reach into the “mind” of the Syrian opposition. Suffice it to take notice of the extraordinary speed at which the Justice and Development Party became a model for Muslim Brotherhood groups in many Arab countries. “Educated members” of the Brotherhood in Syria are talking in Istanbul about the option of a “civil state” where Islamists can form the government without undermining the “civil character of the state”, as was the case with the Justice and Development Party. It seems that this is the first attempt to divert from the model since state laicism – rather than the state’s civil character – is what the Justice and Development Party has yet to touch. Your feelings vis-à-vis the “cunning of the Brotherhood” will not be dispelled by their tales of the “Turkish civil option” as most of them came to Istanbul only a few months ago from the Sudan, Yemen and Jordan where they were welcomed by other Brotherhood-like movements. Some even had a brief stay in Doha become reaching Istanbul. Moreover, the speed at which the “Turkish option” was adopted is anything but reassuring.

In Istanbul however, one perceives more than anywhere else that the Muslim Brotherhood is not the greatest partner of the Syrian opposition. It is not the same as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood or Tunisia’s Nahda Movement. One is even more reassured by the fact that they feel the need for a rebirth. Some of their members realize that throughout Syria’s modern history, they were not only victims, but also partners.

This rebirth will not occur without a different reading of the Muslim Brotherhood’s story in Syria, and it seems that those calling for that story are not doing so loudly enough.