Hazem Saghiyeh,
January 4, 2011   

Ten years ago in the year 2000, a political event marked a new era. That day saw the beginning of the context whose consequences we are still experiencing: the Israelis withdrew from the occupied territories in the South and the Western Bekaa, and two voices appeared.

One voice argued that the Israeli withdrawal removed the justification for continued Syrian military presence in Lebanon, and that if the Israeli exit was followed by that of the Syrian army, we would have a historic opportunity for a new national beginning.

The other voice spoke about the “withdrawal conspiracy” and inflated the matter of the newly discovered Shebaa Farms, aiming to keep Lebanon in the heart of the regional struggle (which is only ever waged in Lebanon) and on this basis to keep the weapons of the Resistance on Lebanese territory, together with the Syrian army.

The first voice has gained forces and supporters, the most important of whom was Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was assassinated in the ugliest way in 2005. The March 14 movement began immediately afterward and, in spite of its enormous and costly shortcomings, succeeded in establishing a cross-sectarian alliance. The alliance was certainly fragile, but it was the first of its kind in modern Lebanese history.

Through the effort and momentum of March 14 that day, and thanks also to political support from abroad, the Syrian army left Lebanon. However, this direction had to be reversed, and the spotlights had to be turned away from it – priority and consideration had to be given back to the old agenda, symbolized by the word “arena.” Thus was waged the 2006 July War, which succeeded in directing attention away from the political struggle over authority in the country, especially given that the general parliamentary elections in 2005 had given the majority and a popular mandate to the advocates of the Lebanese national choice.

The infamous cabinet freeze completed the suspension of politics that began with the “war of destiny.” This was crowned violently by the military takeover of Beirut in May 2008. The Doha Agreement patched over the problem to end the open struggle, but it was unable to halt the decay of sectarian relations, especially between the Sunni and Shia.
 
Meanwhile, new elections were held in 2009 and proved the same result as the previous elections: the opinion of the popular majority has no value in the shadow of weapons. The difficulties encountered in reaching the election of a new president and in the formation of a new cabinet indicate that the country has become completely empty of politics.

Today, with the subject of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon occupying the minds of the Lebanese, there is nothing left for us to depend on to avoid the Frankenstein of violence except Syrian-Saudi mediation. The decade has ended in this way, and we have ended up with a nation suspended from a rope in thin air.