Eduardo Wassim Abou Lteif

Last summer the world was shocked to hear of the disintegration of Iraqi army units when ISIS took over Mosul and large parts of Iraq.

Though it was ranked among the top 10 armies in the world in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Iraqi army in the post-Saddam Hussein era has become weak, disorganized and corrupt. According to Iraqi officials last year there were around 50,000 “ghost soldiers” – soldiers who either did not exist or who did not report to active duty, yet who received salaries.

The Iraqi army has been completely dominated by the Shiite community, especially at the command level. The institution answers directly to the office of the prime minister, thanks to Article 78 of the constitution. This states that “The prime minister ... is the commander in chief of the armed forces.”

Such circumstances have led to questions of how to rebuild the Iraqi army to face the challenges posed by terrorist organizations. Lebanon’s example of rebuilding a national army after the Lebanese Civil War may be useful in this regard.

Lebanon and Iraq are examples of countries whose societies are deeply divided, where sectarian identification supersedes a sense of national belonging. At different stages in their histories, the army was used to suppress one or more communities. In the Lebanese case, the Army was deployed on the eve of the Civil War to crush the leftist National Movement and its Palestinian allies. In Iraq, the army was deployed to repress Kurds and Shiites, among others, in the 1980s and 1990s. While the Lebanese Army was dominated by Maronites before the Taif agreement, the Iraqi army was led by Sunnis.

Lebanon succeeded in establishing a national army after its Civil War. Among rank and file members the armed forces reflected the country’s sectarian composition, while there was parity in the officer corps between Muslims and Christians. The institutional structure reflected a need to incorporate the religious communities into critical bodies. The Army command was expanded and consisted of the commander (Maronite), a chief of staff (Druze), and four deputies to the chief of staff who dealt with planning, operations, personnel and logistics (a Greek Catholic, a Shiite, a Sunni and a Greek Orthodox).

Second, a Military Council was established to look at appointments to senior military positions – regional commands, brigades, the military academy, battalion commands and so on – and to discuss the promotion of senior officers. All six major religious communities (Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics) are represented in the council.

How can a similar structure be applied in Iraq? Despite the fact that the country is deeply divided, its army has not been built to incorporate all sects into its ranks and into decision-making.

To start with, the most important step is to amend Article 78 that gives the prime minister exclusive command of the army. The decision to deploy the army should be similar to the Lebanese case, where a unanimous decision is required by the council of ministers rather than by the prime minister or president alone.

Moreover, proportionality should be applied in recruiting soldiers, reflecting the proportion of their sect in the wider population. Since Iraqi society is composed primarily of three distinct ethnic and sectarian communities – Kurds, Shiites and Sunni Arabs – 50-50 parity between Sunnis and Shiites is difficult. As a result it would be wise to have an equal percentage of officers distributed among the Arab Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities, with a smaller percentage reserved for minorities such as the various Christian communities and the Bahai.

So, for example, Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds may each receive a share of 30 percent of posts in the officer corps, while other minorities would share the remaining 10.

Regarding critical military decisions such as promotions and appointments, Iraq could establish a Military Council as in Lebanon. This should include an equal number of representatives from the major Iraqi communities.

In addition an important decision would be to avoid creating units that are homogenous in sectarian terms. All units should include members from all Iraqi communities. Also, it would be wise to have soldiers serve in areas other than the district or province where they live or from which they belong.

During the Fallujah uprising in Iraq in 2004, the Americans requested from the Iraqis that they send a battalion to fight the rebels. However, the soldiers all happened to be Sunnis, and in no time they had deserted and joined the rebels.

In other instances, in Sunni-majority Anbar, the army was deployed and the units were all Shiite. This made the Sunni population perceive the army as a Shiite army, rather than a national one, only generating greater hostility toward it.

It is important for the Iraqi government to learn from the Lebanese experience. The rebuilding of the Lebanese Army should be taken as a model for deeply divided societies, especially in Iraq, which faces challenges similar to Lebanon’s. Proportionality in recruiting soldiers, power sharing at the command level and creating mixed units whose personnel do not serve in the province from which they hail are the three critical steps needed to rebuild and reform the Iraqi army.