Mona Alami

The recent terrorist attack against Charlie Hebdo, the French satirical publication known for its scorching vilification of religious symbols and international figures alike, has created a new paradigm shift in France, home to a jihadi community of several hundred members. 

The assault and its aftermath, which resulted in the death of at least 17 people, commanded attention given the involvement of an older generation of jihadis and the intersection of several militant networks. These factors illustrated the evolution of the jihadi terrorist scene and the unpredictable results it may yield for the West. 

France had been expecting a possible terrorist operation for several months now, since the start of coalition airstrikes on ISIS, in which it is currently involved. According to French parliamentarian Alain Marsaud, about a thousand French radicals have joined jihadi groups around the world, a rough estimate in the absence of accurate statistics. In addition, at least five attacks have been foiled in France since August last year, according to media reports.

The Charlie Hebdo attack sheds light on several important factors. Contrary to various threat scenarios linking possible terrorist attacks to fresh returnees from the conflict in Iraq and Syria, the Charlie Hebdo attack was the work of a second generation of jihadis that had been involved in smuggling militants into Iraq over a decade ago. Cherif Kouachi, one of those involved in the Buttes Chaumont network, was sentenced in 2008 to three years in prison for facilitating the transfer of dozens of fighters. 

In the past 10 years, the path of Cherif Kouachi and his brother Said intersected with that of several militants who, like the Kouachi brothers, have fallen under the influence of different jihadi ideologues. This led them to embrace a wide range of militant causes. 

Another member of the Buttes Chaumont terrorist cell, Boubaker al-Hakim, who was indicted for “conspiracy to prepare acts of terrorism” with Kouachi, is believed to have been involved in the 2013 assassinations of two important political figures in Tunisia, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. The killings were claimed by Ansar al-Shariah, a radical Salafist Tunisian group established in 2011. The organization has recently pledged allegiance to ISIS.

A third member of the Buttes Chaumont network was Amedy Coulibaly. He reportedly worked in tandem with the Kouachi brothers and was attempting to lift the police siege on them by taking hostages at a kosher shop in Paris. In a video, Coulibaly pledged allegiance to the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In prison, Cherif Kouachi was further radicalized by Djamel Belghal, who had fought in Afghanistan and was sentenced for masterminding a terrorist attack against the U.S. Embassy in Paris in 2001. Belghal became Kouachi’s mentor. Through Belghal, Kouachi met Salim Benghalem, who is on the U.S. State Department’s “most wanted” list as one of the main ISIS executioners in Syria. 

Finally, according to recent media reports, Said Kouachi is believed to have trained in Yemen with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a group falling under the Al-Qaeda umbrella that is currently at odds with ISIS. AQAP’s glossy publication “Inspire” had placed the editor of Charlie Hebdo, Stephane Charbonnier, on its most wanted list “for crimes against Islam.” 

The Charlie Hebdo attack thus showcased the evolution of Al-Qaeda over the past decade, through the transformation of the Buttes Chaumont terror cell and its members, among them the Kouachi brothers. From the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to that of Iraq in 2003, the “war on terror” did not destroy Al-Qaeda. Rather, it temporarily weakened and fragmented it. Independent “franchises” emerged, which could easily mutate depending on local specificities. At times they could eschew a clear hierarchy, remaining shapeless, or they could adopt a more centralized structure, such as ISIS. 

The Internet has acted as a facilitator, blurring the lines between various jihadi groups espousing different causes. Networks built around personal relations weaved during conflicts are now coexisting alongside fluid and decentralized cells fueled by a powerful ideology and interfacing through social media. 

Researcher Karim Emile Bitar has dubbed this new trend, “a la carte jihad.” As he noted in an interview, “Militants now can pick and choose the causes and networks that appeal to them. There is porosity in their affiliations.” 

This flexibility and adaptability also applies to the types of terrorist operations now being waged in the West. Two operating frameworks are apparent, the first characterized by individual terrorist actions, and illustrated by a string of recent incidents. Last October, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau targeted the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa, killing an officer on duty before being killed in a gunfight inside the Canadian Parliament. 

In 2013, Fusilier Lee Rigby was murdered by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, in what was dubbed as an Al-Qaeda inspired attack. In both cases the attacks were the work of unbalanced individuals acting on impulse, who had little knowledge of jihadi ideology but were still sufficiently receptive to Islamist discourse. 

The Charlie Hebdo attack, which involved trained militants who had gathered a certain amount of intelligence – the attack was planned to coincide with the newspaper’s editorial meeting – falls within a second framework. It was possibly commissioned by an external party, in this case AQAP, and was a coordinated action that sought to cause maximum harm while leaving little room to chance.

With time the global jihad has become more localized and multifaceted, and thus more difficult to define. That is why the war against terrorism needs to be flexible itself and adapt to these changes. A one-size-fits-all anti-terrorism strategy is no longer effective.