By Mohamed al-Dahshan

The January revolution that toppled Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak did not bring about regime change. Amid frenzied politicking and maneuvers by the military, young revolutionaries need organization to be a partner in regime transformation.

Young activists are demanding justice for the victims of the January revolution, including at least 1,000 fatalities; speedier trials for deposed Mubarak and his cronies; and the end of military trials for civilians and the release of all civilians imprisoned by military decision. All problems, they contend, can be traced back to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which has assumed power since Mubarak’s removal in February. The SCAF is widely viewed as resistant to change. Its leader, Field Marshal Mohammad Hussein Tantawi, was a close collaborator of Mubarak and Egypt’s defense minister for two decades.

A transitional government, led by protester-vetted Prime Minister Issam Sharaf, has scrambled to refashion a government acceptable to the population and implement the revolution’s goals, despite SCAF resistance. The SCAF has attempted to maintain a course it pushes onto the nation – parliamentary elections in the fall, followed by selection of a committee to draft a new constitution, and finally presidential elections, after which the SCAF has promised to withdraw from power. How far it will withdraw remains unknown.

While Sharaf should be leading a caretaker government until elections bring about an elected one, his Cabinet is under pressure by both the public and the army to make far-reaching decisions for which it lacks political and popular mandate. The national budget, for instance, already through a few drafts, is likely to be refashioned by a just-appointed minister of finance. While the plan for government spending includes increased budgetary lines for government salaries, increasing the shamefully low government minimum wage and hence responding to one of the protesters’ chief demands, a new higher tax bracket was also introduced. Health and education spending saw disproportionately small increases. The document hence betrays a bow to popular pressure, a problematic precedent.

Political parties seeking to compete in the upcoming elections are mushrooming at a blinding speed. No week goes by without a new party being declared “under establishment.” Rightist, leftists, religious and secular parties – all pop up on the political scene. Most are built around notorious public personalities with no clear political program, and perhaps all but one, Al-Adl party, founded by the inner team of presidential hopeful Mohamed ElBaradei, have no communication strategy of which to speak. Realistically, most newly formed parties will find it logistically impossible to reach the electorate before the elections in which they hope to compete.

The Muslim Brotherhood, meanwhile, has formed alliances with small parties to field candidates. An integral part of the Jan. 25 revolution, the Brotherhood found national acceptance to which it is unaccustomed, from opposition parties but also the army.

Far from relishing in its bliss, the Brotherhood lives its most confusing hour. It promised not to field presidential candidates in the first post-revolution elections, but dreams of controlling “35 to 40 percent of the parliament’s seats,” as spokesperson Issam al-Erian casually repeats. This goal may be difficult to achieve. Ten days after the deposition of Mubarak, the Brotherhood announced the establishment of the “Freedom and Justice” party to represent the organization, led by members of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council. Not everyone agrees with the party’s program and its leadership, and an increasing number of members are reticent in towing the line.

After brief hesitation, the Brotherhood made up its mind with regards to democracy and disagreement within the movement: There would be none. The Guidance Council has punished dissenting members and reportedly investigated those who have joined other political parties. Abdel-Moneim Aboul-Fotouh, a leading reformist figure within the organization, was expelled after declaring he planned to run for president. Members of the organization’s forward-looking youth wing have also seen their membership terminated after co-founding a new political party, the Egyptian Current. Another two non-Brotherhood parties are emerging, with a more or less radical interpretation of political Islam. This fragmentation of Islamist representation – and one would extrapolate of the Islamist vote – threatens the Muslim Brotherhood’s effectiveness. Other analysts, however, view that a widening political Islam on offer in the electoral market could increase the parliamentary presence of this branch of politics.

Meanwhile, many struggle to hold on to the original ideals of the revolution. It’s true that a number of revolutionary youth are active in political parties, but almost never in leadership positions. Ad-hoc groups – whose names invariably include some combination of the words “youth,” “coalition,” “January 25th” and “revolution” – are pullulating, with no real mandate, yet speaking on behalf of the revolution nevertheless. The public tolerates a few of these youth groups, in the absence of a coherent representation. Their divergent political ideas – from boycotting the existing government to coordinating with the army – dilutes the youths’ power.

The young revolutionaries, the salt of the democratic movement, are being cast aside from political developments in Egypt, held hostage by an undemocratic military council, a caretaker government with populist tendencies, and opportunist political parties with token youth representation. The revolutionary youth are aware of this, but they are disorganized and knee-deep in what can only be qualified as the day-to-day protection of their revolution.
Meanwhile, the political process goes on without them. The revolutionaries, hailed in the beginning of every political speech but thereafter disregarded, must find a way to participate in the electoral political process– and quickly.

Mohamed al-Dahshan is an economist, consultant on development policy, and writer. This commentary is reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online(www.yaleglobal.yale.edu), Copyright © 2011, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University.