Walid Choucair

Amid the mounting developments in the region and succession of dramatic events, two recent events have coincided. Arrest warrants were issued by the head of the International Criminal Court, Louis Ocampo, for Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi, his son, Saif al-Islam, and Abdullah Senoussi, the head of Libyan intelligence, for crimes against humanity. Then, an indictment was issued Thursday in Lebanon, in the case of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and his comrades. The coinciding of these two events have led to striking developments in the relations of the region's countries with what is called "international justice," which is seeing a growing presence on the international scene.

Prior to these two events, a warrant was issued for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (two years ago), over his responsibility in crimes against humanity in Darfur, and the resulting massacres. Implementation of the warrant remains suspended and sometimes generates considerable controversy, and sarcasm, since Bashir is moving from country to country. His latest trip was to China, and before that was Iran, without any part of this warrant being carried out or Bashir's being turned over to the ICC.

Between the developments in Libya and Lebanon, there has been another example of international justice, with the opening of the trial of Khmer Rouge officials in the Special Mixed Tribunal for Cambodia, for genocide against the Cambodian people. Prior to that, on 31 May, a leading wanted figure for massacres in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 was handed over to the Special Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This took place 16 years after the man, General Ratko Mladic, managed to avoid any accusations against him.

This exceptional form of international justice might become normal, due to the many cases that are being taken up. The Libyan and Lebanese developments will certainly renew a debate. On one side, there are those who say that justice is selective and politicized, prosecuting the weak and not the strong, since the United Nations Security Council decides on establishing a court and referring cases to it; Israeli leaders have not been tried for their obvious crimes. On the other, there are those who say the political nature of these crimes does not necessarily mean that the verdict will not be judicial, or legal; they say that the inability to try a war criminal does not justify refraining from trying another and allowing this person to escape punishment.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon will continue to be subjected to a debate in Lebanon and the Arab world. However, the developments in Libya and Lebanon have added something new: the surrounding climate is increasingly working against the viewpoint of opponents of the STL. The Arab revolutions have begun to expand the scope of the political-popular current that calls for relying on international justice and the ICC, through documenting the ugly crimes committed by rulers of regimes against popular movements calling for freedom, equality and pluralistic democracy.

Needless to say, the call by these popular currents for international courts to try the leaders of a number of Arab countries is due to the inability to punish these people in local courts, where the judiciary is subject to the influence of the regimes. However, achieving this step is also linked to the Security Council, or a request by a country concerned by the crimes, since it is not possible for regimes whose members should be put on trial to call for international justice. Thus, the scope of civil society and human rights institutions is expanded in seeking redress from the Human Rights Council and other bodies to document these crimes.

Meanwhile, there are leaders in countries where the judiciary can try them, who deep down hope that they be tried in international courts, which will be more merciful than the local judiciary, as the latter might use the system of values that these leaders have set down during their authoritarian and despotic rule, which harmed the independence of the judiciary. In any case, the Arab revolutions are boosting the culture of resorting to the international judiciary, to prevent the use of violence in creating the domestic balance of power, or its alteration through democratic means. Isn't this the meaning behind the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri?

The developments in Libya and Lebanon can highlight the following observation: what if the Gaddafi case takes its true course in the ICC, and the Libyan Transitional Council, headed by Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, presents additional files to the court to help convict the Libyan leader? What if this information includes the file on Gaddafi's "disappearing" the hidden Imam, Musa Sadr, and his companions, Sheikh Mohammed Yaacoub and the journalist Abbad Badreddine? Would the forces that reject the STL also reject referring the Gaddafi case to the ICC even if damaging evidence is presented about Taddafi's responsibility for this disappearance, since Gaddafi cannot be brought to a Lebanese court, which has already indicted him?