Hazem Saghiyeh

There are various analyses concerning Russia’s stance on Syria and Moscow’s obstruction of any international condemnation of President Assad and his regime. In addition to the military base in Banias, some emphasize Damascus’ indebtedness to Moscow, which Russia fears may be lost if the Syrian regime were to be toppled. Others speak of Russia’s cultural influence and military creed on the Baath regime and institutions, which date back to the old days of the Soviet Union. Others still mention Moscow’s fear that a post-Baath Syria would become part of the Western circle of influence, especially in light of NATO’s new role in Libya, not to mention other analyses whereby Russia’s intransigence in the Middle East is an appropriate means to improve its negotiating conditions with the United States regarding Eastern and Central Europe. Those in favor of this latter theory tend to predict that Russia will revert to a more flexible position as it did in Libya, especially if Turkey – Russia’s southern neighbor – succeeds in pushing things in that direction.

In any case, these assumptions are not wholly unfounded. However, they fit within the broader context of a despotic link bringing Moscow and Damascus closer to one another. While it is true that the communist regime fell along with the fall of the Soviet Union as such, the one that replaced it in the Kremlin stands midway between old despotism and impaired democracy. This explains Russia’s attachment to the “leader” represented by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, not to mention the dire situation of party and media freedoms.

In reality, Russia, which undertook to undermine “the spring of peoples” in its European neighborhood during the 19th century, is still playing this function within the available realms. We thus notice that it impedes democratic development in its neighborhood and, in so doing, takes advantage of some reckless and selfish US stances and of some deficiencies in the democracy-building process in its immediate Western neighbors.

Nevertheless, we know from experience that the world might stumble and walk askew, but it is still moving in another direction. Looking back to the individual experiences of each country, we can derive an almost infallible equation: Russia’s support for a cause or regime has seldom saved such a regime or cause. We have a long list of losers worldwide, more than 90% of whom were former friends of Russia.
The Syrian regime would better remember that.