Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck

With President Abdelaziz Bouteflika having entered a French hospital earlier this month, it is worth looking back at Algeria’s Cabinet reshuffle of last April 29, which gave some indication of the political maneuvering that is taking place to facilitate the looming presidential transition. 

One must keep in mind that whoever the successor is to Bouteflika, he will be chosen from a pool of men who are all pure products of a system that has locked the country into a mode of permanent transition, in which alternation and political renewal are almost nonexistent.

During the reshuffle, Bouteflika’s close advisers, including key ministers, kept their portfolios. Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal was reinstated after an interim period of over a month, during which he led Bouteflika’s election campaign. Tayeb Belaiz in the Interior Ministry, Ramtane Lamamra at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Tayeb Louh at the Justice Ministry, and Gen. Ahmed Gaid Salah at the National Defense Ministry likewise all kept their posts. 

Yet in the reshuffle, Finance Minister Karim Djoudi left the government and was replaced by a close confidant of the president, Mohamed Djellab. Other important figures, such as the adviser on defense and security affairs, Maj. Gen. Mohamed Touati, and the adviser for legal affairs, Said Bouchair, were dismissed, as was the special adviser to the president of the republic, Mohamed M’gueddem. Meanwhile Gen. Athman“Bachir” Tartag, who left his post as the head of the department of homeland security in September, reappeared as the special adviser for security affairs, indicating the already known presence of the intelligence services in the presidency. In addition, sources in the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securite (DRS) estimate that the majority (nearly 70 percent) of Sellal’s staff are affiliated to the president and former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, paving the way for a government that would be fully supportive of Ouyahia.

The great “loser” of the reshuffle was undoubtedly Abdelaziz Belkhadem, who was sacked from his position as adviser to the president on Aug. 26 after serving him for nearly 15 years. Although Bouteflika considered Belkhadem an asset in facing the Islamists in the past, the Islamists’ current decline in Algeria makes him no longer essential. Worse, Belkhadem, the former general secretary of the National Liberation Front (FLN), is prohibited from participating in the party’s activities and is now persona non grata within the National People’s Assembly. This prevents Belkhadem from being a potential successor to Bouteflika, although he maintains political aspirations that he does not try to hide. 

The “winner” is Ahmed Ouyahia, who made his umpteenth comeback, this time as a director of the president’s office with the rank of minister of state. He is responsible for the current revision of the constitution, which he had done once before as chief of government in 2008 to allow for Bouteflika’s third term. He is also been the enforcer of difficult and often unpopular policies. The Algerian press calls him “the man of dirty work,” a label he takes pride in, as he does in his credentials as a member of the uninhibited anti-Islamist “eradicator” fringe. His strength lies in the fact that he remained loyal to the president and the state despite being sacked in September 2012 as minister and losing the leadership of his party, the National Rally for Democracy. 

Ouyahia seems to be the one that behind the scenes decision-makers are likely to choose as a replacement for Bouteflika, despite rumors that Abdelkader Bensalah or Said Bouteflika are potential successors. The press put an end to Bensalah’s ambition when they claimed that he was a naturalized and not born Algerian – a requirement for the presidency per article 74 of the Algerian constitution. As for Said Bouteflika, he has a reputation of being a “thief” for his involvement in various corruption cases. 

Ouyahia is an alternative to both men, and he benefits from his special place in the Algerian military establishment. Decision-makers are trying to buy time for Algerians to come to terms with the idea that the man who was responsible for a number of unpopular policies, such as the wage austerity of 1995 and the implementation of the structural adjustment program of the IMF, could become president of the Algerian republic.