The Arab Network for the Study of Democracy

This report has been produced by the Research and Advocacy Team of the campaign group Naame Shaam, www.naameshaam.org, which is supported by the Netherlands-based Rule of Law Foundation, www.lawrules.org

The core argument of this report is that the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad would have collapsed a long time ago if it were not for the enormous military and economic support provided to it by the Iranian regime since March 2011, following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution.

This unprecedented level of support was driven, first and foremost, by the strategic interests of the Iranian regime in keeping arms shipments flowing to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, so as to keep Hezbollah a strong deterrent against any attack on Iran’s military nuclear programme.

One result of this heavy Iranian involvement in the war in Syria has been a qualitative change in the nature of the relationship between the Syrian and the Iranian regimes. From being historically mutually beneficial allies, the Iranian regime is now effectively an occupying force in the regime-held areas of Syria, and the Syrian regime is little more than a puppet in the hands of Sepah Pasdaran (the Iranian Revolution Guards) and its foreign operations, arm Sepah Qods. The latter’s commander-in-chief, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, is the de facto ruler of ‘Iranian-occupied Syria’.

Moreover, the authors argue that the Iranian regime’s influence in Syria is likely to continue even after the fall of the Assad regime because it is now exercised primarily through Iranian-backed and controlled militias fighting in Syria on behalf of the Syrian regime. Many of these militias, both local and foreign, are likely to outlive Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle.

With this in mind, chapter I, tracks the Iranian regime’s military involvement in the current war in Syria, showing how it gradually grew from providing strategic and technical support to Syrian regime forces against the mass popular protests to being in overall control of the Syrian regime’s military strategy and directing all its major military campaigns.

In early 2011, Sepah Qods as well as several Iranian intelligence agencies, formed a top-level ‘advisory mission’ to assist the Syrian regime in its ‘crisis’ following the start of the revolution. The mission was said to be headed by the former commander of Sepah Pasdaran’s Greater Tehran unit, Brigadier-General Hossein Hamedani, and the commander-in-chief of Sepah Qods, Gen. Qassem Soleimani. They reportedly dispatched Sepah Pasdaran commanders skilled in urban and guerrilla warfare to supervise and direct military operations in Syria.

One of the first steps in this Iranian effort was creating the Syrian National Defence Force (NDF), which was modelled on the Iranian Basij force and its experience in suppressing Iran’s own dissident movements, particularly the 2009 pro-democracy protests known as the Green Movement. The NDF, which is commonly known among Syrians as the shabbiha, was thus charged with doing the ‘dirty work’ of the regime in suppressing the anti-regime protests instead of the regular armed forces, just like in Iran.

The chapter details various pieces of evidence to support this claim about the ‘Iranian connection’, ranging from rare admissions and revelations by Iranian officials to testimonies by regime insiders and Syrian militiamen who served under Iranian commanders or were trained in Iran. Indeed, this chapter shows that the Iranian role in creating the shabbiha was not confined to advice but included training, arming and funding this notorious militia.

As the revolution was pushed towards militarisation and opposition armed forces started to achieve military advances on the ground around mid-2012, the Iranian regime made a strategic decision to send some of its loyal militias in Lebanon and Iraq to fight in Syria alongside, and even on behalf of, the Syrian regime forces.

Additionally, chapter I details various pieces of evidence to counter repeated denials by Iranian and Hezbollah officials of the role played by Sepah Pasdaran-controlled militias. It also tracks the gradual development of the role of these militias from supporting Syrian regime forces to assuming a leading role in all major, strategic battles (al-Qusayr, Homs, Yabroud, etc.). The chapter looks in detail at the role of Hezbollah Lebanon, Iraqi Shia militias, Afghan and other Shia fighters trained, armed and directed by Sepah Pasdaran.

The authors argue that the battle of al-Qusayr in spring 2013 was a major turning point in the Syria war. It reflected a noticeable shift in the Iranian regime’s military strategy in Syria: conceding, or perhaps losing interest in, the possibility of regaining control of the eastern and northern parts of the country that were now under the rebels’ control. Instead, the focus from now on would be on defending and consolidating the Syrian and Iranian regimes’ control in Damascus and its surroundings, Homs and its surroundings (which connect the capital with the coastal region) and the Qalamon region (which connects the first two and connects both with Lebanon).

The aim, they add, was to secure the capital, whose fall would have been seen as a fall of the regime, and to secure the Damascus-Homs corridor in order to provide both a geographical and demographic continuity of regime-held areas and to secure arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon, while at the same time cutting off rebels coming from or through eastern Lebanon.

The leading role in these keys battles would be assigned to Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias, who were seen as more reliable and better organised than the regular Syrian army. Meanwhile, the regime’s air force would continue its bombardment of rebel-held areas in the north and the east to perpetuate a state of war in those areas and make life there unbearable. The barrel bombs campaign on Aleppo is an obvious example of this.

Moreover, this leading role assigned to these Iranian- backed militias is likely to continue even after Bashar al-Assad falls. Indeed, many analysts have argued that the Iranian regime’s strategy in Syria goes beyond saving the Assad regime and includes preparations for a post-Assad era in which Iranian-controlled militias still have influence on the ground and serve the Iranian regime’s interests.

The chapter provides numerous examples of human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Syria by all these Iranian-controlled militias and forces, highlighting ways of bringing possible lawsuits against the Iranian regime. The authors argue that there is sufficient evidence – some of which is indeed detailed in the report – to try the Iranian regime’s military and political leadership for complicity in many of these crimes at various levels, ranging from ‘inciting’ and ‘endorsing and adopting’ specific acts to ‘aiding and abetting’ war crimes and crimes against humanity.

One of the examples included in the chapter, and perhaps the most significant, is the Ghouta chemical massacre near Damascus in August 2013. The case study details three types of evidence that strongly indicate a possible role for Sepah Pasdaran in this and other chemical massacres committed in Syria in 2013 and 2014, raising the following questions:

The authors therefore call for international investigations into the massacre to examine the possible complicity of the Iranian regime, particularly Gen. Qassem Solemani, in the massacre that led to a controversial international deal concerning Syria’s chemical weapons.

Many of these crimes could also be regarded as terrorist acts (they were pre-planned, politically motivated, targeted civilians rather than militants, and were carried out by militia groups rather than regular armed forces). All related Iranian officials and entities, the authors argue, should therefore be added to terrorism black lists and sanctioned accordingly.

Indeed, a whole section of chapter I is dedicated to examining the links between the Syrian and the Iranian regimes and extremist Islamist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS, now known as Islamic State (IS),) and Jabhat al-Nusra. After detailing various pieces of evidence, the authors conclude that both the Syrian and the Iranian regimes have infiltrated, collaborated and used these al-Qaeda-affiliated groups to derail the Syrian revolution towards militarisation and sectarianism and to justify their military actions against Syrian protesters and rebels.

This is quite significant as both regimes were in the summer of 2014 attempting to sell themselves as ‘partners’ in the international campaign against Islamist terrorist groups, following the UN Security Council resolution on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in August 2014 and the US President’s declaration of war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria on 10 September, 2014.

Finally, chapter I also examines the role of Iranian fighters and Iranian weapons sent to Syria and tracks their journey – like other aspects of the Iranian military involvement in Syria – from initial denial by Iranian officials, through intermittent admissions, to the gradual emergence of undeniable evidence.

Chapter II builds on these details and presents a case for treating the war in Syria as an international conflict that involves a foreign occupation (by the Iranian regime) and a liberation struggle by Syrian people against this foreign occupation.

This chapter starts with a legal discussion of what constitutes a military occupation, as defined by the 1904 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and whether the Iranian regime’s presence in Syria can be defined as a military occupation.

After outlining various pieces of evidence and case studies to back up their claim, including statements by Iranian officials, the authors conclude that the war in Syria today has all the characteristics of an international conflict.

Alternatively, they propose that the Syrian case is treated as what is sometimes called ‘occupation with an indigenous government in post’.

They also highlight the possibility of invoking Article 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which provides that conflicts shall be qualified as international when they occur between a state and an authority representing a people “fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.”

The authors then examine how this Iranian occupation is enforced, both directly, through its armed forces and militias, and indirectly, through the puppet Syrian regime. The first requires a clear and identifiable Iranian command structure in Syria, which the authors attempt to explain based on available information.

Another crucial question in this regard is who in the Syrian regime and in Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle has been liaising with the Iranian commanders and whether the latter’s involvement resulted in any changes in the Syrian command structure.

To answer this question, the authors examine the exclusion and inclusion of senior Syrian government and army officials in accordance with Iranian desires or orders. As a case study, they re-examine the assassination of a number of top military and security officials from what was known as the Syrian regime’s ‘crisis cell’ in July 2012.

Based on information relayed to them by a high-ranking and reliable source in the Syrian opposition, quoting Western intelligence officials, as well as various pieces of circumstantial evidence, the authors conclude that the high-profile operation had nothing to do with the Free Syrian Army or other opposition armed groups, as media reports claimed at the time. It was, rather, carried out by Sepah Pasdaran, possibly with direct orders from Gen. Qassem Soleimani himself.

The high-ranking and reliable source in the Syrian opposition told Naame Shaam that some members in the “crisis cell” had been opening communications channels with Arab Gulf states and the US to make a deal behind Iran’s back. The Pasdaran struck to prevent such a deal and, since then, to fully control President Assad who de facto became their hostage.

The authors therefore propose a new narrative about the Syrian revolution and the current situation in Syria, as well as a new set of demands in light of this new reality. The war in Syria, they say, should be regarded as an international conflict that warrants the application of the four Geneva Conventions and the regime-held areas of Syria should be considered occupied territory – not metaphorically but in the strict legal sense of the word.

Recognising the war in Syria as an international conflict that involves a foreign occupation and a people struggling for liberation may also provide a powerful ‘legal weapon’ against the Iranian regime, namely that it is committing “grave breaches” of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which are considered even more serious war crimes than the ones outlined in chapter I. This is because, as an occupying force, Iran has certain “duties” towards the Syrian population under its occupation.

There is abundant evidence, some of which is outlined in this report, that the Iranian regime and its forces and militias fighting in Syria have repeatedly violated many of these duties since March 2011.

For instance, the mass destruction of private and public properties in vast areas of Syria has not always been necessitated by the war (against the rebels) and is a clear and repeated breach of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Similarly, the mass evacuations of entire villages and districts in Homs and elsewhere, and reports of evacuated properties being registered to Syrian and Iranian regime supporters from elsewhere (including foreigners such as Afghan fighters) are a clear and repeated breach of Article 49 and may even amount to ethnic cleansing.

Based on this new narrative, the authors also propose a new set of demands addressed to the European Union, the US and their allies in the Friends of Syria group, as well as the UN and other international bodies.

It is the view of the authors that, unless the Syrian opposition is united in pushing for the war in Syria to be recognised as an international conflict, the US and other Western powers are likely to continue with their ‘slow bleeding’ policy towards Iran and not publicly admit that the war in Syria is one against the Iranian regime, so as to avoid being pressured into taking concrete steps to end the bloodshed in Syria and the wider region.

The third and last chapter deals exactly with this issue. It sheds light on two main aspects of what is described as ‘Iran’s Vietnam’ in Syria, namely the economic and human costs to Iran of the war in Syria and what sort of impact it has on the Iranian economy and ordinary Iranians.

support provided by the Iranian regime, which has prevented the Syrian regime from economic collapse, as many analysts were expecting it to do. In addition to the costs of the Iranian weapons, fighters and militias sent to Syria, particular attention is paid to Iranian financial loans and credit lines, worth billions of dollars, and how they have been used.

The authors then look at the impact of this expenditure on the Iranian economy and ordinary Iranians, coupled with the cost of international sanctions on Iran and Iran’s nuclear programme. As the author argue at length, this is because the three issues cannot be separated.

One indicator of this enormous burden on the Iranian economy is the inflation rate, which has more than tripled between 2009 and 2014 and has increased by about 10 per cent since the start of the war in Syria in 2011. As a result, almost a third of all families in Iran (31 per cent) live below the poverty line in 2014.

At the same time, while phasing out energy subsidies, Iran has been sending millions of barrels of oil to Syria at discount prices, paid for by Iranian credit. While winding down social assistance payments to nearly 60 million Iranians, Iran has been sending millions of tonnes of food and cash to Syria.

Despite the Iranian media’s celebration of President Hassan Rouhani’s economic ‘achievements’, the authors argue that Iran’s economic problems are unlikely to go away any time soon unless there are fundamental shifts in its foreign policies. And that is certainly not in the president’s power. The same applies to Hezbollah Lebanon.

Another aspect of ‘Iran’s Vietnam’ in the mounting death tolls of Sepah Pasdaran, Hezbollah Lebanon and Iraqi militia commanders and fighters. This chapter examines available information on their casualties, which is admittedly limited.

This is because, right from the start, both Sepah Pasdaran and Hezbollah Lebanon have been very cagey about their casualties in Syria. Both have been doing all they can to keep this information hidden from the public because it would show how heavily involved they are in the war there. It would also reveal how much they are losing, which could be damaging to the morale of their supporters. Suppressing such evidence is a classic war tactic aimed at avoiding public pressure to ‘bring the boys back home’ before they too die out there.

While the Iranian regime has made a choice to ‘go for it’ in Syria at any cost, this ‘Syrian Vietnam’ is not just a consequence of this choice. It is also a policy by the US administration and its allies, which the authors describe as the strategy of ‘slowly bleeding Iran in Syria.’

This chapter examines and assesses this strategy, quoting President Barack Obama and other US officials at length. The authors argue that this ‘bleeding’ policy is being implemented at the disproportionate expense of the people of Syria and the wider region, and will inevitably lead to more instability and extremism in the region and beyond.

In other words, hopes that a proxy war with the Iranian regime in Syria, coupled with crippling economic sanctions, would eventually lead to the weakening and even collapse of the Iranian regime (‘winning the Syria war in the streets of Tehran’) are, at best, wishful thinking.

As the authors put it, it may be true that Syria has become ‘Iran’s Vietnam’ and that Iran is ‘bleeding’ in Syria. But the Iranian regime may be capable of bleeding for a long time to come, much longer than the Syrian people can endure.