March 8, 2011  
 

There is no doubt that sectarianism is Lebanon’s principal malady, and no doubt that purification from it is the condition for Lebanon’s progress. It is more than just the main reason for the corruption caused by the divvying-up of power, and more than just the obstacle to change of the kind that we have seen in some Arab countries. Sectarianism, before all of this, is a cause of communal death to which the “dignity” of communities is driving us, even if the sects cover this with inflated ideological claims, such as nationalism, resistance and others.

There is also no doubt that the Lebanese regime, insofar as it is a mirror for the intersection of sects, is a sectarian regime. Its laws, elections and institutions reproduce this sectarian regime, root it deeper, and reinforce it.

It is an illusion (in which some of us indulge) to suppose that it is possible to overcome sectarianism by “changing the sectarian regime.” This is because the primary source of sectarianism is Lebanese society itself. It is not true that the sectarian leaders are oppressing their sects in the sense in which Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali oppressed their peoples, or in which Moammar Qaddafi is still oppressing the Libyans. Rather, sects adhere to their leaders, and sectarianism thereby becomes, in a sense, a popular phenomenon of a broadly representative nature. It is thus an oversimplification to describe sectarianism as a “bad habit,” as oppression practiced by sectarian leaders, or as a “bluff” these leaders are playing on their constituencies. 

Sectarianism is a network that distributes revenues in a way that benefits the sects’ members. It is a sub-culture through which the members of each sect become acquainted with the surrounding world, its affairs and its symbols. It is a system of protection against the sectarian “other.” It means a stance on foreign policy, international alliances, etc.

There is copious evidence for this, such as the fact that although the municipal elections are not based on sectarian shares, the crushing majority of voters vote for candidates from their own sects. Let us imagine: What would be the wretched fate of the anti-sectarianism youth if he ran in parliamentary elections against Amal and Hezbollah in the Shia regions, against the Future Movement in the Sunni regions, against the Progressive Socialist Party in the Druze regions, or against the Free Patriotic Movement or the Lebanese Forces together in the Christian areas?
Because sectarianism is all of this and more, combating it is far too serious to be left to the “enemies of sectarianism” among the secularists.

There is another fact that the opponents of sectarianism should keep in mind if they want to be serious. All of Lebanon’s modern history points to the fact that disputes over regional struggles were, and still are, the main factor inducing sectarian consciousness, renewing it, and arousing the fear of sects against each other. It is thus irrational to bring up the issue of sectarianism while some sects are armed and others are scared of these weapons.

The correct approach to confronting sectarianism is therefore to create a safe atmosphere in which there is no fear – that is, an atmosphere without weapons, whatever their ideological pretext. Merely achieving this, and the consequent neutralization of Lebanon in regional struggles, would make possible a broad and deep program – political and cultural, educational and economic – to combat sectarianism and its regime.