Raghida Dergham
It is no passing matter for Russia’s Defense Minister and
Foreign Minister to embark on a visit to Egypt that has been described as “historical”, in order to
discuss opening a new chapter in the bilateral relations between the two countries, accompanied by
news of an arms deal that is noteworthy in the trilateral relations among Russia, Egypt and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Reports indicate there is security collaboration
between Cairo and Moscow. President Barack Obama’s administration seems to pay no heed to such a
transformation, because it is certain that it will not turn into a strategic one, and perhaps also
because it does not care even if Russia were return to the kind of relations it had with Egypt
before President Anwar Sadat replaced the country’s alliance with Russia with an alliance with the
United States, 41 years ago. But a more important question is this: does Egypt today have a
comprehensive vision for its strategic relations with either or both the United States and Russia?
And is coordination part of Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s vision of the role they play and the weight
they carry together in the regional balance of power? They are both furious – for different reasons
– with the Obama administration and its contempt for these two countries, which are essential for
the weight of the Arabs in the regional balance of power, especially after both Iraq and Syria have
been eliminated from the strategic equation with Israel and been placed under the banner of Iran.
But will turning to Russia accomplish a serious qualitative shift in Egypt’s relationship with the
United States or does it merely represent a temporary expression of discontent? And because Iran,
Turkey, and Israel represent essential countries in the strategic balance of power, the relationship
of the United States and of Russia with each of the three must be taken into consideration by Egypt
and Saudi Arabia when forging a new partnership with Moscow or abandoning their old partnership with
Washington. Indeed, the issue of Syria intersects with the two poles represented by the United
States and Russia in Saudi Arabia’s considerations, as does the central role played by Iran in
relations with them. For Cairo, the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood takes top priority in Egypt’s
relations with each of the two poles. The Palestinian issue is of course important for both Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, but the stances taken by the Americans and by the Russians with regard to Israel
are nearly identical today, unlike what they had been during the Cold War. Turkey’s position is an
obscure one in the balance of power, as it wavers between a past that had brought it close to Israel
and a present that has inspired it to lead the Muslim Brotherhood. It is today in disagreement with
Egypt and wavering in its relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as with the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Faced with these factors, as well as with Russia’s
entrance into the Middle East as a whole by every means possible, as opposed to America’s retreat
everywhere, it is imperative for a long-term Saudi-Egyptian vision to emerge of their relations with
the two poles, the United States and Russia, so as for temporary measures not to represent the de
facto replacement for a necessary strategy. It is also imperative for the Arab popular base to
participate in such a vision, because it is no longer willing to automatically embrace either the
Russian bear or the United States’ Democratic donkey and Republican
elephant.
Egypt’s Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmi, in an interview he gave
Al-Hayat in New York on September 24, described his country’s relationship with the United States as
troubled, seeing as “there had been some ambiguity about the true role played by the United States
and the stance [it] took on former President Hosni Mubarak at the beginning, i.e. in the first
revolution, and then on the Muslim Brotherhood in the second revolution. There is no doubt that the
general trend in Egyptian public opinion about the United States is leaning towards the negative at
much higher degrees than it has at any other time in the past.” He also added that “ordinary
Egyptian citizens are calling for replacing the country’s reliance on the United States with
assistance from other countries, the simplest example of this being Russia. Yet such a call is
really about having a greater variety of options, not replacing one option with another. The notion
of replacing one country with another in this day and age is illogical, ineffective and unwelcome.”
He said that his visit to Moscow at the beginning of his term as Foreign Minister represented “an
important message, but not a message of historical transformation. The significance of this
important message is that we want to restore relations or raise the level of relations between Egypt
and Russia, without the least bit of doubt or shame. Yet the issue is not one of turning East at the
expense of the West, or turning South at the expense of the North.”
Fahmi
asserted in his interview that “there will be relations in the military field, for example, with the
United States, as well as with a number of Western European countries, and also with Russia.” The
main event now is the first visit by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister
Sergey Shoygu to Cairo this week to hold the first meeting of its kind in the history of relations
between the two countries, within the framework of what has become known as the “2+2” of Foreign and
Defense Ministers, being also the first Russian visit at this level since President Mohamed Morsi
and the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood were toppled.
The issue where
Russia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia meet is the Muslim Brotherhood, as all three are determined to
prevent it from rising to power again. The point where they part is that of Iran and Syria,
especially for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, bearing in mind that the Brotherhood’s Egypt had taken a
stance in opposition to the regime in Damascus and to Russia’s interference in Syria. Egypt today,
on the other hand, is not as clear and sharp in its stances on developments in Syria. In fact, the
measures that have been taken by the Egyptian government against Syrian civilian refugees or
migrants have very often been harsh. Indeed, on the issue of Syria, stances differ between Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, making the security collaboration between the three both striking and
perplexing.
Even more curious is the issue of where Iran lies in this
trilateral venture, knowing that Russia is perfectly clear about its strategic alliance with the
Islamic Republic of Iran, in their bias in favor of the regime in Damascus as well as in their wider
relations and the positioning of each of them at the regional and international levels. Indeed, the
axis that brings together Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus, and also includes Hezbollah, represents a
serious and firm coalition, particularly at this juncture. And no multibillion-dollar deals will
tempt Moscow if it must in return abandon this axis, especially in the aspect of it that regards
Tehran.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah spoke this
week, mocking Arab-Western alliances and how quickly the United States abandons its allies, in what
has become known as a reputation for betrayal. He boasted of his own alliances, in particular with
Iran, as well as with Syria, where his forces have been tipping the military balance of power on the
ground in favor of the regime in Damascus, in collaboration and coordination with the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) present on the Syrian battlefield.
He said,
“When major settlements are reached in the world, the friends and allies of this or that side become
worried, but we do not worry about our allies. We have had and continue to have two main allies,
Iran and Syria. Tell me, has there ever been a time when our allies have sold us out and turned us
in, or stabbed us in the back?” He continued to boast, addressing those who had wagered on their
alliance with either the United States or the Arab Gulf states in the battle in Syria, “We are
confident of our relationship with our allies, but do you want us to count the number of times your
allies have abandoned you and left you stranded in the middle of the
road?”
Even more striking was Nasrallah’s defense of the understanding
between Iran and Western countries headed by the United States, warning that “the alternative to an
understanding between Iran and the countries of the world (…) is war in the region.” His warning of
the alternative of war echoes a similar warning from the Obama administration to Congress that not
reaching an agreement with Tehran on the nuclear issue and not enticing it with a gradual lifting of
the crippling sanctions would mean war. In Tehran too has risen the echo of warnings against war as
the de facto alternative to not yielding to Iran’s demands to reach an understanding on the nuclear
issue with the West. Indeed, scaremongering has become the easiest means to convince Western leaders
that they should appease Iran in negotiations over the nuclear issue and in terms of granting it
regional leadership. That is because American and European public opinion is obsessed with what it
holds as a top priority, namely that: we do not want to go to war. The leadership in the United
States, as in Britain, is rushing to yield to Iran’s leaders because it fears being forced to go to
war. This is why Tehran is mobilized to take advantage of this Western “weakness” without having to
offer anything in return. Indeed, what the West gets in return has in effect become ceasing to
threaten with the specter of “war.” And Washington, London, and Berlin seem willing to suffice
themselves with this.
What is surprising is that Washington and London are
perfectly well aware of the extent to which the sanctions imposed on Iran are undermining its
economic power to the point of exhaustion. They are also perfectly well aware that the motive behind
the campaign of “moderation” coming out of Tehran is its dire need for those sanctions to be lifted.
Yet they are using this reality as ammunition against themselves. Instead of utilizing this dire
need of Tehran’s to obtain true moderation on the nuclear issue and on the issue of Syria, the Obama
administration and Cameron’s government are trembling in fear before the regime in Tehran and in
effect joining the stances taken by the government of Angela Merkel, the strong-willed German
Chancellor who considers Iran to have the right to enrich uranium. Indeed, Germany has traditionally
stood with Tehran, and views Iran as never having been a “hostile” state, just as the West always
views Israel as the victim rather than a state with a record of “hostility.” France thus seems to
stand alone within the framework of the nuclear talks with Iran, which bring together the three
European countries with Russia, China, and the United States. Paris alone recommends not slipping
into the embrace of Iran’s uncommitted smile and not merely falling in love with the moderate Iran
whose moderation has yet to be proven.
Britain is not merely rushing to
resume diplomatic relations with Tehran. In fact, according to a reliable source, the British
government is trying to find itself a mediator to reach Damascus as well, specifically in order to
repair its relationship with President Bashar al-Assad. Indeed, Britain, which had been in the lead
to thwart the military strike against the regime in Damascus as punishment for its use of chemical
weapons, is today clearing the path for rehabilitating the regime in Damascus in order to meet
Iran’s demands.
There is then a striking intersection between, on the
one hand, the stances taken by the United States, Britain, and Germany, and on the other those taken
by Russia and China towards Iran, both in terms of the nuclear and of the Syrian aspects.
Negotiations over the nuclear issue may grow more complicated if Tehran were to go too far in terms
of self-confidence and of its wager on the West’s weakness and on its need for “no war.” Indeed, its
insistence on enriching uranium at 20 percent could place the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation
Treaty in danger of collapsing. And that is something none of the five major nuclear powers wants.
Nevertheless, there is today a quasi-understanding at the international level about the necessity of
reaching an understanding with Tehran rather than confronting it. There is also implicit
near-approval to grant international legitimacy to a regional role for Iran, most prominently in
Iraq but perhaps in Syria as well.
Such developments are the result of
several factors, among them the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted a strategy that
is patient, carefully designed, and comprehensive, based on perseverance, long-term vision, and
self-control that steers clear of emotional behavior. If the Arab countries are then to have a
chance to restore an Arab stance to the regional balance of power, “patching things up” will not be
of any use to them, nor will imagining that drawing closer to Russia, for example, out of anger at
the United States, represents the ideal course of action for Arab interests, while Russia in effect
represents Iran’s primary ally – the Islamic Republic being one of the most important poles in the
regional balance of power. Indeed, correcting the distortion caused by the alliance between the
United States and Israel in the balance of power at the expense of the Arabs will not come through
the alliance between Russia and Iran. In fact, there is a new intersection today between the United
States, Israel, Russia, and Iran, one that Arab parties should really take into consideration if
they are really thinking of restoring an Arab position in the regional balance of
power.
Egypt is qualified to regain its regional weight, yet it will
not be able to achieve this without visionary and effective collaboration on the part of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab countries. Egypt is eligible to do this on
the condition that it does not fall into emotional policies and policies of arbitrary
diversification, meant to express resentment or anger. Egypt is eligible to do this if it lays out,
together with its main partners, a visionary long-term strategy, and immediately starts to make
Egyptian public opinion and the Arab popular base partners in the new decision-making process in the
Arab region. |