There is worry that Egypt will undergo serious and successive tests in the near future. What does this mean?
The Egyptian revolution has stabilized, until further notice, in an arrangement that is apparently uncomfortable for the various dominant actors, forces and ideologies in the region. The revolution and its political results appear, for these groups, to stand in a gray region: It is not “moderate” in the sense of the “moderation” of Hosni Mubarak – who abandoned every regional role – nor is it “resistance” in the sense that would mean the annulment of the Camp David treaty and alignment with Syria and Iran.

Thus the need for “clarification,” even if it means usurping the voice of the Egyptian people – which must truly appear through the holding of the first general elections in the post-Mubarak era. In fact, those eager for such hasty clarification are not worried at all that this behavior of theirs could obstruct the natural growth of the new situation in Egypt and confuse it. Indeed, it is likely that such obstruction is their goal.

Thus Israel will strive to extract reassurances that Cairo’s previous path in foreign and regional relations will continue as it was. Perhaps Israel will not be satisfied with the Military Council’s affirmation of Egypt’s commitment to signed treaties and charters, and will try to test Egyptian choices and push for “clarity.”

The same applies to the forces of “resistance,” especially since their regimes might not remain impregnable to the waves of popular challenge. Iran is no longer in the strongest position, given the intermittent continuation of the Green Movement and Western sanctions. The takeoff of the new Egyptian experiment, uniting democracy and peace, is bad news for the “resisters” in general. The old forces and ideologies may well be tempted to take initiatives to distract attention from the new agenda (liberty, bread, patriotism and youth) and impose a return to the old agenda (nationalistic and religious struggles). This has happened in the past. In 2006, war was launched from Lebanon in order to distract attention from the issues thrust forward by the March 14 movement (independence, a security regime and liberties).

These two regional currents thus meet, albeit from different directions, in their desire to put Egypt in a difficult position. Who knows – Lebanon, or Gaza, could be the arena for such a test.
Therefore it is not unlikely that the region will be exposed to waves of rhetorical escalation, and perhaps practical escalation as well. Responsibility therefore rests all the more heavily on the custodians of the new situation in Egypt. It is their responsibility to safeguard an experiment that must be governed, first and last, by the interest of their country. It is the responsibility of their youth, who played a special role in leading the revolution, to work to build the organizational and political bodies that will be needed after the transitional phase ends.

Egypt, when it grows stronger, can tell Israel “no more” and demand the swift establishment of a Palestinian state. Egypt can also tell the “resisters:” No to Iranian-employed war policies, and no to the demand for the annulment of the Camp David treaty.
Neither side wants to hear this. That is why neither side wants to see Egypt grow stronger.