Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Surprise, surprise: Egyptians, who it was thought would never revolt, finally did. It was a full-fledged revolution by millions in a country of 86 million, and in all 28 provinces, covering over one million square kilometers. For 18 days, Egyptians demanded the end of a regime that had controlled the country, with variations here and there, for six decades since July 23, 1952. This time, the revolution was not by the army, supported later by the people, but by the people themselves, aided later by the army to ensure a peaceful political transition.
Revolutions usually happen for both structural and circumstantial reasons. In this case, we must add mismanagement of the revolutionary event itself by the governing elite.

The structural reasons are rooted, ironically, in the successes of the fallen regime. First, Egyptians are healthier, with a youth bulge of those between the ages of 18 and 30, constituting fully 25 percent of the population. They are better educated and more connected to the world. Second, youths are the children of a growing new middle class produced by the economic growth and reforms of the last two decades. They are different from the old middle class derived from the bureaucracy, which has diminished in wealth and power. The shift to a market economy created more freedom and independence with respect to the state, which lost its monopoly over economic power.

 
Third, the Internet revolution in Egypt has been unprecedented in range and scope. Fully 22 million Egyptians, mostly youths, have access to the Internet, and everyone has access to about 600 publications and 700 Arabic-speaking television channels broadcasting often ferocious political talk shows. Fourth, all of the above fell under an ossified political system monopolized by the National Democratic Party that allowed little by way of a progressive political agenda. The result was a scene ripe for revolution.

Next come the circumstantial reasons. First, the results of the last parliamentary election gave the NDP a vast majority, unprecedented even by the standards of Egyptian elections, which are often suspected of being rigged.

Not only the Muslim Brotherhood, but secular parties as well were vanquished. A large coalition of the opposition aligned itself against the regime and its party, comprising all political forces in the country, formal and informal.
Second, President Hosni Mubarak signaled that he would likely run for a seventh term. There were indications at the NDP congress in December that if he failed to do so because of his health, his son Gamal would take his place.

Third, in recent years Egyptians have become more knowledgeable and sophisticated in the art of protest. In 2004 there were about 222 acts of protest; by 2009 there were 690. Youth began to test the street and integrate elements of media and the Internet. Egypt’s first national strike took place on April 6, 2010, organized by youths, who found ways of interacting with political movements like Kifaya (“Enough”).

The structural and the circumstantial prepared the stage for the call to demonstrate on Jan. 25, a holiday that commemorates the heroes of the police who fell in the resistance to the British occupying forces in 1952. For the next 18 days, the strategic political elite failed to manage the crisis. For one, the demonstrators were far more numerous than anticipated. The vanguard youth were soon joined by other political forces, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. While initially the demands of the youthful revolutionaries were modest, the regime’s response was always behind the curve. Police corruption was soon noticeable in the field, and facing hundreds of thousands and eventually millions of demonstrators, by the third day the police force had disintegrated. Police stations were burned in Cairo and other cities.

Mubarak was out of touch with the size and capabilities of the revolutionaries when he decided to deploy the army on Jan. 28. In reality, he had added a new political force to the equation, but with the mission of protecting the state, not the regime. The state was in danger and the army was ready to deal with revolutionaries in the street, but not to shoot them. A de facto coalition was formed to avoid the further deterioration of human security, the economy and public order.

Mubarak continued to lag behind the moment. His new Cabinet, the appointment of Omar Suleiman as vice president, his reform program – all were too late to keep up with developments in the street and convince the revolutionaries. The fate of Mubarak’s regime was sealed when he was forced to transfer his authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. On Feb. 11, Mubarak left Cairo for Sharm el-Sheikh and the revolution declared victory.
Egypt will never be the same again, nor, I believe, the Middle East.

Abdel Monem Said Aly is a political analyst in Cairo. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.orgm, an online newsletter.