The political caution Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati is practicing does not appear to be derived from political experience so much as it is produced by personal distress. The man is facing extraordinary missions, the least difficult of which is convincing his ally Michel Aoun that the Interior Ministry will not be given to his son-in-law Gebran Bassil – and it appears that this mission is itself no easy one.

Yesterday Mikati attended the Dar al-Fatwa meeting and agreed to a statement that contained an objection to the way in which he himself was nominated, and also contained something he does not have the strength to commit to – that is, commitment to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), not to mention containing a provision on the subject of the weapons that forced the change in domestic balance.

Perhaps PM Mikati did this while depending on the cover and support guaranteed to him by Syrian pressure on his allies. Syria is pressuring them to help Mikati as much as possible, since the Syrian mission at the moment is the removal of Hariri no matter the price. However, it is also true that Mikati, through his attendance at the Dar al-Fatwa meeting, provided a cabinet cover for commitment to the STL. He, by providing this cover, will be bound by a ministerial statement containing a reference to this commitment to the tribunal, or at the very least a statement that does not refer to Lebanese inability to abide by the tribunal’s decisions. It is likely, because of Syria’s unbridled desire, that this will be one of the predestined matters. However, the steps that follow this will be a test. An indictment will be issued soon, and Mikati’s government will have to deal with it according to the requirements of agreements between the Lebanese state and the STL. At that point, the prime minister will be faced with a real test in which caution will not help him: either he will stick to his allies, or abide by what he pledged at Dar al-Fatwa. 

This is not the only trial the prime minister-designate will face. He is at the head of a government supported by allies within Lebanon and in the region, allies who are part of a division that has returned in a new form. The Iranian nuclear issue and the Israeli-Arab struggle – to which is added today the domino game of crumbling regimes – are pressing issues. The premiership in Lebanon might be the most sensitive position to these regional currents, and it is reserved for the Sunni sect. This is a regional sect par excellence, and when the post is held by a person from this sect, he usually maintains his ability to balance between domestic considerations and regional and international balances.

Let us suppose, for example, that Mikati had formed his cabinet before the youth uprising in Egypt. Everyone would know the extent of Hezbollah’s authority in this cabinet. Suppose that after the uprising, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had come out with a speech announcing that he puts his party’s capabilities at the disposal of the revolutionaries. Mikati’s position would not be an easy one in this case, since he would have to bridge the distance from the fatwas of the Guide of the Revolution in Iran about what was going on in Egypt to the necessities of the position that he represents. He does not have the strength for this, and neither do any other Lebanese politicians. If the answer is that Hariri would not have done anything about this either, true. The difference here is that Mikati is at the head of a cabinet that Hezbollah overshadows, a cabinet that derives from Hezbollah’s authority in it a reputation, name and significance. Nasrallah’s stances will be viewed as an extension and depth of the government’s makeup and position.

The prime minister-designate is facing a mission impossible. A businessman’s caution will not help him here, nor will his gentleness, which all who know him agree is rare among politicians.