Hazem Saghiyeh

The Syrian regime was once Hezbollah’s main source of support, but the opposite now holds true.
This is the first remark one derives from Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s speech.
Yet Hezbollah can derive many lessons from the Syrian regime’s experience with its dwindling strength so that the party’s strength does not dwindle as well.

Damascus revealed its weakness in public for the first time in 2005 when it withdrew its troops out of Lebanon. The use of “bartering chips” made up for its isolation and initiated Arab, regional and international openness towards it in 2008. This openness, however, was only short-lived. Its domestic issues soon blew up against a backdrop of the Arab uprisings, leading to the Daraa confrontations that widened and spread.

This trend can be comprehended only based on the major discrepancy between the lack of interest in domestic affairs and an exaggerated interest in foreign affairs. Following years of neglect going back to 1963, and especially to 1970, reform promises that came along with the transmission of power to Bashar al-Assad in 2000 were thwarted, and the lies embodied by promised reforms during the Baath Party’s national conference in 2005 became all too clear.

Accordingly, the crises of freedom and livelihood were growing deeper in parallel with foreign schemes to extend control over Lebanon, control Palestinian decision-making, scare Jordan, smuggle fighters into Iraq and consolidate the rejectionist alliance with Iran. The lack of domestic “bartering chips” eventually depleted all foreign “bartering chips.”

Hezbollah is now standing at a turn similar to the one the Syrian regime faced in 2005: It is preparing to gather foreign “bartering chips” that would serve the party in its confrontation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and consolidate its image as a resistance and liberation movement linked to Iran and allied with … Venezuela. This goes without mentioning its continuous support to its Syrian ally. Yet it is losing “one bartering chip after another” on the domestic level. Hence, Nasrallah’s latest address, which was characterized by a high-pitched voice and scolding spirit, indicates that the sole remedy lies in repression, whether from within or outside the cabinet.

In reality, the repercussions on the extremely deteriorated Lebanese meeting are such as cannot be mitigated by the Memorandum of Understanding with Michel Aoun. This holds even truer knowing that Aoun may, given the turn of events in Syria, give precedence to domestic issues over foreign ones based on his usual cheap, demagogic and populist approach. This goes without mentioning Jumblatt’s mysterious possibilities, which may undermine the majority and PM Mikati’s cabinet.

In short, if Hezbollah continues to go down the same path as the Baath party, it may be leading itself – and us along with it – toward impending doom. Is Hezbollah ready to reconsider? If such is the case, difficult though it may be to imagine it, will any of the Lebanese parties be ready to help it to change?

This article is a translation of the original, which appeared on the NOW Arabic site on Monday August 29