Hanin Ghaddar

Whoever is still listening to Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches would think that he is either unaware of the uprising in Syria, or that he is in denial. Any person with a minimum level of common sense understands now that there is no turning back in Syria. The people on the streets will not go back home, and it is just a matter of time until the regime of Bashar al-Assad falls.

So what does Hezbollah have in the tube?

One would wonder if Nasrallah is watching the YouTube videos coming from the Syrian streets like the rest of us, or if he is following the news and the discussions on the Facebook groups. If he does, he would have changed his rhetoric a long time ago for one simple reason: to protect his party from increasing isolation and eventual collapse due to the loss of its only Arab ally—unless, of course, he has other plans to change the course of regional events.

Of course Nasrallah is very much aware of the events in Syria, and he is worried. Hezbollah is faced today with a double danger: the fall of the Assad regime and the upcoming indictment from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which many predict will point the finger at party members. The new government was formed to face these two dangers, and there is no doubt that Hezbollah’s next steps are going to be in that direction.

Last week, some reports mentioned that Hezbollah might start a war with Israel to protect the Syrian regime or at least to turn attention away from the daily demonstrations and Assad’s brutal crackdown on them.
According to Reuters, a Lebanese official close to Hezbollah said that the Party of God is “committed to do whatever it takes politically to help deflect what it sees as a foreign campaign against Damascus, but it is also readying for a possible war with Israel if Assad is weakened.”

As for the tribunal’s indictment, the official said the new government might halt the state's cooperation with and funding of the court, as well as withdrawing Lebanese judges.
A war between Hezbollah and Israel, on the other hand, has been on the horizon since the 2006 July war ended. But it seems less looming today, as Hezbollah is less likely to initiate any military conflict with the Jewish State for three reasons.

Firstly, Hezbollah’s support base cannot take another war with Israel. The Shia community in the South, the Bekaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut is still suffering from the 2006 war’s repercussions. The reconstruction of damaged buildings is not finished, and many Shia haven’t received their full compensations.

In addition, Hezbollah’s double-standards vis-à-vis the Syrian uprising would make another war with Israel a clear attempt to protect the Assad regime rather than the Lebanese people and land, even according to Hezbollah’s supporters. Hezbollah can’t risk alienating a major chunk of its backers who believe in the Resistance as the protector of the underprivileged, not of autocrats.

Second, were Hezbollah to enter into a war with Israel, which will react much more viciously than it did in 2006, it might risk losing the balance of terror created by its “Divine Victory.” Hezbollah is not guaranteed a win and will deplete its arsenal, which the beleaguered Syrian regime cannot afford to replenish and which provides the main weapons-smuggling channel.

Without its weapons, Hezbollah can’t keep its power internally and use the threat of violence to stay in control of Lebanese state institutions and political decisions. If the Party of God loses both its weapons and its neighboring ally, it will be left with nothing to fight for or with.

Three, immediately after the 2006 war, aid poured in from many donor states in the region. Qatar heavily participated in rebuilding the South. In addition, lots of money came in from Iran in bags in order to avoid bureaucratic procedures. The first rounds of compensations were paid immediately to the people in parallel with heavy doses of Divine Victory rhetoric.

This time, aid is not going to be that abundant or immediate. Iran is suffering from sanctions and deep economic problems, in addition to an internal political struggle with many layers, which would hamper the bags of money coming into Lebanon. In addition, Qatar is today having a serious problem with Hezbollah after its recent stance against the Syrian regime.

Moreover, in 2006, the Lebanese government was considered legitimate by many regional and Western states, unlike today’s Mikati cabinet, which many in the West have labeled “Hezbollah-led” and which has yet to hand in its ministerial statement, upon which other states will judge it.

It would be suicidal for Hezbollah to start another war with Israel, unless, of course, Iran asks the party to do so in order to protect the Syrian regime. But is the Assad regime more important to Iran than Hezbollah?
At any rate, a new war will probably not divert attention away from the Syrian uprising. The Syrians will not stop demonstrating against their regime, and the international community will understand the goal behind any war mongering by Hezbollah.

With Hezbollah’s double-standards and violent rhetoric, the peaceful Syrian uprising has only diverted attention away from Hezbollah, not vice versa. 
Maybe Nasrallah should seriously start considering a Facebook profile.

Hanin Ghaddar is managing editor of NOW Lebanon