Hazem al-Amin

According to some not-so-reassuring indicators, the March 8 forces are likely to make an offer to the March 14 coalition regarding the formation of the cabinet after they failed to form it themselves. This offer, if and when it is made, is not so reassuring because accepting it would be a major gift allowing the March 8 forces to catch their breath in the aftermath of domestic and regional failures. Yet this is but a trivial thing compared to the major loss the March 14 coalition would incur if it were to accept the offer that would be part of a regional deal, according to many rumors. And God only knows who would pay the price for it then.

The offer is not so reassuring because we are not certain that the March 14 forces are immune and wise enough not to be tempted by it. It’s been said that power is inexperience, and we all know that the March 14 coalition is not the master of its own choices, especially if such choices are part of some regional drive.

As a result, the Lebanese would miss several opportunities, some of which are summarized hereunder:

1 – There is an opportunity to score a precedent represented by the ruling of a slight majority. Indeed, the need for entrusting the formation of the cabinet to the party that wins the elections should be a constant principle in politics, especially following the resounding failure of the so-called national-unity governments.

2 – The idea of swapping the premiership for the parliament speaker’s position should be avoided, as it consolidates a majority-rule formula that would have to be implemented with regard to the premiership.

3 – The fact that the opposition in parliament is not represented in the cabinet helps to exert a genuine monitoring of the cabinet performance, especially given the slight advantage the majority has over the minority, which makes the latter’s objection even more valuable and provides multiple monitoring channels.

These reasons involve all the Lebanese, but more reasons still imply that the March 14 coalition necessarily has an interest in allowing the March 8 forces to form the cabinet, as summarized in the following:

A March 8 cabinet is almost certainly doomed to a performance as poor as that of the process leading to its formation. First and foremost, it would be a Hezbollah cabinet, and this entails regional and international pressure on the political, economic and diplomatic levels. Second, the cabinet would have to face the indictment to be issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. PM-designate Najib Mikati already said that he would abide by the Dar Al-Fatwa statement in this respect, whereas Hezbollah is expecting some other stance from him on this issue. In that case, either a clash between Hezbollah and the prime minister it designated is likely, or Mikati will not abide by the commitments he made in Dar Al-Fatwa, which would be detrimental to him.

An offer will very likely be made to the March 14 coalition regarding the formation of the cabinet, not only because of the March 8 forces’ resounding failure to form it on its own, but also because of the events in the only regional country sponsoring Mikati’s cabinet, as some early signs seem to be indicating.

If the March 14 coalition were to accept this offer, it would be taking part in an operation to rescue a foe faced with domestic failure and blocked regional prospects. It would be yet another failure to abide by the promise it made to its public regarding issues it now refers to as postulates, particularly illegitimate weapons, which will not be included in a potential cabinet deal.
Accepting the offer would not only be rescuing its foes: This would be political suicide.