Thursday, February 24, 2011
Alex Warren

The remaining lifespan of the Gadhafi regime holds the distinct prospect of intense violence as Libya’s leader lashes out from his remaining power base in Tripoli.

It is becoming increasingly clear, given the recent defection of some old figures from the Revolutionary Command Council – which planned and executed the September 1969 coup – that Gadhafi is alienating himself even from those closest to him.

The alarming element is the sheer uncertainty involved in any future scenario, with the strong likelihood of short-term chaos. 
Arguably the core issue is that, unlike Tunisia or Egypt, Libya has no clear transition to an alternative system of rule and has no strong national unity or identity to fall back on. 
There is no real civil society and professional groups such as doctors, journalists and lawyers are all relatively weak, while trade unions and other meaningful civil institutions are virtually non-existent.

The army has already shown that it is capable of fracturing along tribal or regional lines. One potential outcome is that the country fragments into a series of mini-states ruled by local authorities, a process which already appears to be happening in the east and in Benghazi.
This provincial system is what characterized the country in the days before its unification in the early 1950s, when the territory was essentially split into three different realms: Tripolitania in the west, the Fezzan in the south, and Cyrenaica in the east. 

So far, it appears that the eastern region has been calmed by the unifying call against Gadhafi: in some ways this is encouraging, and the unwillingness of the remaining Gadhafi military to declare out-and-out war on Benghazi would suggest that the east may already be beyond his reach – even if the current calm there does not persist.
The more uncertain battleground, however, will be Tripoli. It is certainly not beyond the realms of possibility that Gadhafi will cling on to power there for some time, raising the question of whether the country’s other tribal groups – and the outside world – will accept this.

One scenario is that the regional tribes in the east and south may prefer to protect and consolidate power in their own territories, while the international community may not have the stomach to intervene militarily against Gadhafi.
If, on the other hand, Libyan groups or international forces decide to attack Tripoli or intervene, then we could effectively see a final showdown with a core Gadhafi militia, under siege and intent on scorching as much earth as possible before the end.

No-one has any real leverage over Ghadafi: despite the recent international rapprochement, he is truly still a rogue operator, neither financially nor politically beholden to any external parties.

Yet, even that scenario could only be the first stage of a civil conflict between warring tribes and power groups seeking to control oil supplies and production, which are distributed across the country but concentrated in the central and western areas. In theory the most logical solution might be to re-divide the country into three devolved provinces, but in practice it is difficult to see how this can proceed smoothly.
The current period of chaos will have a massive impact on Libya’s internal security, with far-reaching implications for the international community.

Its land borders are huge and porous, flanked by a series of unstable and largely lawless swathes of sub-Saharan Africa. For the EU, a power void in Libya means opening a gigantic door opening up between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa, potentially giving greater rein to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
Just as importantly, Libya is already a key transit route for illegal immigrants from Sudan, Niger, Chad, Eritrea, Mali and even further afield, to reach the Mediterranean coast. That flow of people is likely to increase dramatically if security falls apart in Libya.

External issues will also become increasingly significant. Libya’s overseas assets are very substantial, both those controlled directly by the Gadhafi family and those held by the country’s sovereign wealth funds.

These may not have been anywhere near as high-profile as those based in Abu Dhabi or Doha, but have nonetheless been active in all over the world, from visible assets like stakes in the UK’s Pearson Group or Italy’s Fiat to more below-the-radar acquisitions of mines, hotels and telecoms operators in the furthest reaches of Africa.
The stakes are just as high for the major global powers, with the question of military and humanitarian intervention becoming increasingly acute.
And although Libya is not a major oil producer in regional terms, it possesses Africa’s largest proven reserves and holds huge long-term potential for energy production on Europe’s doorstep.

Alex Warren is a director of Frontier Middle East and Africa, a business research and advisory firm that has worked regularly in Libya since 2008.