By Daniel C. Kurtzer 
 

“Revolutions revolve 360 degrees,” wrote the late Middle East economic historian Charles Issawi. What we didn’t know yesterday about Middle East revolutions – and we didn’t know a great deal – becomes less relevant as the days fly by, for these revolutions, like all others that preceded them, are works in progress, changing constantly.
 
For the United States, the past 12 months have been characterized by consternation and some confusion. Comfortable verities and reliable partners of the past 30 years have given way to new power elites and growing instability. The U.S. is surely not alone in its uncertainty about the direction of regional politics and what to do; but for the U.S. the stakes are higher than for any other extra-regional power.
 
In some respects, the eruption of revolutions in 2011 was unsurprising in view of the long-term changes that were under way and in evidence in the region. During the past decade, the dominant role of the U.S. eroded as a consequence of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the failure of American leadership in the peace process. No single player replaced the Americans; rather, the region became a multiplayer arena, comprising the European Union, Russia and China as well.
 
As the extra-regional lineup was changing, so too was the distribution of power within the region. Regional Arab power has been on the wane for a long time, and in the past decade this decline reached rock bottom. What the Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis did meant far less than what the Israelis, Turks and Iranians did. While Turkey’s no-enemies policy, Israel’s alliance with the periphery, and Tehran’s regional power pretensions have not quite materialized as envisioned, these non-Arab states proved to be far more influential in the Arab Middle East than the Arabs themselves.
 
Another evolving change was the replacement of Arab state power with the power and influence of non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Since 1973, Israel-Arab wars have essentially been wars between Israel and a non-state actor. This decline of Arab state power was accompanied, perhaps stimulated to some extent, by a fundamental change in the defining ideology of the region, from secular Arab nationalism to political Islam, or “from Nasser to Nasrallah.”
 
To be sure, as consequential as these macro changes were, they did little to stimulate the cosmic upheavals of the past year. Longstanding crises of authoritarian rule, corruption, economic and social inequalities and aging, lifeless, sclerotic leaders created conditions ripe for revolution. The internal pressure cookers heated up, and ultimately some of them exploded.
 
External leverage on the direction and scope of change in the region is surprisingly limited. The immediate economic needs of Egypt and the immediate governance needs of Libya are great, but the United States and Europe are distrusted. Newly empowered elites such as the Islamists in Egypt are flexing muscles, as evidenced in the non-governmental organization crisis in Egypt. Middle Easterners seem to have decided that they will determine their own future.
 
The sooner Washington and other capitals realize this, the better able they will be to step aside, rethink what their real interests are in the region and adjust policies accordingly. For example, the U.S. diplomatic and military “footprint” is way too large and needs to be downsized considerably. The security of energy exports remains important to the U.S., but it should be important to others as well, and thus burden-sharing should replace U.S. unilateralism. An overhaul of U.S. policy is called for and is in the interests of both the Americans and regional actors.
 
Even as this resizing of America’s role and presence takes shape, the U.S. and others will not be able fully to escape at least four pressing policy challenges: First, Syria: indecision, no decision, or decision not to decide. The situation there could be heading toward chronic crisis, that is, persistent internal instability in which the regime stays in power but faces an ongoing opposition. Outside military intervention looks increasingly problematic and unlikely.
 
Second, Iran. The protestations of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak notwithstanding, it appears that coercive diplomacy is game on for the foreseeable future. If the U.S. can be assured of no paradigm shift in the Iranian program before the November elections – in other words a shift that could force a decision on the use of force – then real diplomacy has a chance in 2013.
 
Third, the Middle East peace process. Yes, the peace process, the problem that so many people try to wish away. But it won’t go away, and it also won’t be fixed by a status quo that allows both sides to take unilateral steps that worsen the situation – namely, settlements and internationalization of the legal issues. One hopes that a second-term Obama administration will develop a serious strategy backed by the determination that has made American diplomacy formidable.
 
And fourth, Western fatigue with the Middle East. The fact that these problems are so daunting but appear to have no answers feeds into a Western attitude of tiredness and anger. Given their other priorities, Western leaders would prefer just to watch the Middle East go away.
 
As much as it is in the interest of the United States and Europe for the Middle East revolutions to succeed and result in liberal democracies, outside powers will not determine this outcome. Smart policies that are adopted elsewhere, especially in the search for Middle East peace, can contribute to the outcome sought.
 
Daniel C. Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt (1997-2001) and to Israel (2001-2005), holds the S. Daniel Abraham Chair in Middle East Policy Studies at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.